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第 31 期 · 核心追问 Ⅳ·06「伟大的事业从哪来？」
Sam Altman - How to Succeed with a Startup
节目发布 2018-08-29章节 · 点击跳转视频
0:00
第一课：好到用户自发推荐的产品
0:56
看市场增长率，而非今日 TAM
1:52
真趋势与假趋势：iPhone 对 VR
2:48
布道者创始人与有野心的愿景
4:50
第 20 号员工为什么加入你
5:50
团队：乐观、点子与行动偏好
8:54
无经验的祝福
9:52
永远不要失去势能
10:52
三个坏信号：护城河、盈利、增长
12:53
创业公司在哪三种情况下赢过大公司
本期小问 · 档案清单
0:00
伟大的事业从哪来？
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一群人如何做成一个人做不成的事？
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好的判断从哪里来？
12:53
创业公司凭什么能打败大公司？
本期讲者
萨姆·奥特曼时任 Y Combinator 总裁（2014–2019），此前为 Loopt 联合创始人；2019 年起任 OpenAI CEO，主导了 GPT 系列与 ChatGPT 的发布。
01第一课：好到用户自发推荐的产品
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okay today I'm going to talk about how to succeed with a startup obviously more than can be said here in 20 minutes but I will do the best I can the most important thing the number one lesson we try to teach startups is that the degree to which you're successful approximates the degree to which you build a product that is so good people spontaneously tell their friends about it startups always ask us for the secret to success they always want to believe it's something other than this because this is really hard to do but this is it if you can build a product that is so good people spontaneously tell their friends about it you have done 80% of the work that you need to be a really successful startup if you think about the most successful companies you know Google Facebook whatever you probably found out about them because a friend of yours said you got to try this it's great so this is the bar something that people love so much they tell their friends about it one important indicator for a product
好，今天我要讲的是如何让创业公司走向成功。显然，20 分钟里能讲的东西很有限，但我会尽力。最重要的一点，也是我们试图教给创业公司的第一课，就是：你成功的程度，大致等于你做出的产品好到什么程度——好到人们会自发地向朋友推荐它。创业公司总是问我们成功的秘诀是什么，他们总希望答案是别的什么，因为这件事真的很难做到。但答案就是它。如果你能做出一个好到让人们自发地向朋友推荐的产品，那么成为一家真正成功的创业公司所需要的工作，你已经完成了 80%。想想你知道的那些最成功的公司，谷歌、Facebook 等等，你多半是因为某个朋友对你说「你一定要试试这个，特别棒」才知道它们的。所以这就是标准：人们喜欢到愿意主动告诉朋友的东西。这类产品的一个重要标志是，它容易解释、容易理解。如果你
02看市场增长率，而非今日 TAM
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like that is a product it's simple to explain and easy to understand if you can't explain in a few words what you do and if people don't if at least some people don't say oh that's pretty interesting that's usually a mistake it's usually a sign of unclear thinking or a need that is not big enough another thing that startups need to look for is a market that is either started to undergo or is soon going to under grow exponential growth I think this is actually related to one of the biggest mistakes investors make when evaluating startups investors always say well what's your growth rate we care about the growth rate investors will forgive smallish revenue today if it's growing quickly for some reason people don't think about markets this way but if you think about the most important startups they are the ones that I start in small markets that are growing very very quickly 11 years ago the market for iPhone apps is zero dollars it's not huge and I think if you only think about the TAM today you'll make a big mistake
没法用几句话说清楚你在做什么，如果人们——至少一部分人——听完不会说「哦，这挺有意思的」，那通常是个问题。这往往说明你的思路不清晰，或者你解决的需求还不够大。创业公司还需要寻找的另一件事，是一个已经开始、或者即将开始指数级增长的市场。我觉得这其实跟投资人评估创业公司时最常犯的一个错误有关。投资人总会问：「你的增长率是多少？」我们关心增长率。如果收入增长很快，投资人可以原谅今天收入还很小。不知为什么，人们不用这种方式去看市场。但如果你想想那些最重要的创业公司，它们往往起步于很小、但增长极快的市场。11 年前，iPhone 应用的市场规模是零美元，一点都不大。我认为，如果你只盯着今天的 TAM（总体可寻址市场），你会犯大错。你真正该做的，是找到一个
03真趋势与假趋势：iPhone 对 VR
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what you really want to do is identify a market that's going to grow every year and be able to ride that up elevator a really important thing to figure figuring this out is learning how to differentiate between real trends and fake trends a real trend is something that's actually going to happen in the fake trend is not or at least not yet and before you make a big bet on a new platform you want to make sure it's real now there's an easy trick for this which I'll share now real trends are ones where a new technology platform comes along and the early adopters use it obsessively and tell the friends how much they love it a fake trend is one where people may buy the product but don't use it or at least not enough so an example of a real trend I already mentioned the iPhone I'll mention that again when the iPhone first came out many people were dismissive because they only sold a million or two million that year and they said well this just doesn't matter but for the people that had an iPhone they used it
未来每年都会增长的市场，然后搭上那部上行电梯。要想做到这一点，很重要的一件事是学会区分真趋势和假趋势。真趋势是真的会发生的事，假趋势不会发生，或者至少现在还没发生。在你押注一个新平台之前，你得先确认它是真的。有一个简单的判断方法，我现在就分享给大家。真趋势是：一个新的技术平台出现，早期使用者会疯狂地用它，还会告诉朋友自己有多喜欢它。假趋势是：人们可能会买这个产品，但不用它，或者至少用得不够多。真趋势的例子我刚才已经提过了，就是 iPhone。我再说一次。iPhone 刚出来的时候，很多人不以为然，因为那一年只卖了一两百万台，他们说：「这没什么了不起。」但对于拥有 iPhone 的人来说，他们每天要用
04布道者创始人与有野心的愿景
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for hours every day it became central to their lives they loved it they told their friends you've got to get one and I think it was obvious then do people pay an attention that something had fundamentally shifted and we had a new a new computing platform that was gonna spawn huge businesses and it was a good time to bet on mobile apps a fake trend or at least a fake trend as of august 2018 I would say as VR I do believe VR will be big someday but today most people that I know that own a VR headset use it never or very rarely and so although a lot of people talk about it and maybe even a lot of people buy them there's not the intense usage per user among the early adopters that I think you want to see before you make a big bet another thing that startups need at least one evangelical founder usually the CEO someone at the startup has got to be the person that is going to recruit sell the product talk to the press raise money and this requires someone who can infect with enthusiasm the whole
好几个小时，它成了他们生活的中心，他们爱它，还告诉朋友「你一定得买一台」。我觉得当时只要留心，就能明显看出有些东西已经发生了根本性的转变，我们有了一个全新的计算平台，它会催生出巨大的生意，那正是押注移动应用的好时机。而一个假趋势——或者至少截至 2018 年 8 月还是假趋势的——我会说是 VR。我确实相信 VR 总有一天会做大，但今天我认识的大多数拥有 VR 头显的人，要么从来不用，要么很少用。所以尽管很多人在谈论它，或者说，就算有很多人购买，早期用户里也没有那种每个用户都高强度使用的情况，而我认为在你下重注之前，你是想看到这种情况的。创业公司还需要另一样东西：至少要有一位布道者型的创始人，通常是CEO。创业公司里必须有人站出来去招人、去卖产品、去跟媒体打交道、去融资，这需要一个能用热情感染全世界的人，让所有人都了解这家公司想做
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world about what the company is trying to do and someone who becomes the chief evangelist for the company it's very hard to succeed wildly without that it's very hard to build a team at all without being able to do that one thing that helps for this is having an ambitious vision you never want to be grandiose that turns people off but you want to let yourself grow more ambitious over time and as long as you do that organically people will respond ambitious visions are exciting they're fun to work on in fact I think in 2018 at least in Silicon Valley it's easier to start a hard startup than it is to start an easy startup now this sounds paradoxical but ambitious projects are interesting you know in the current environment it may be relatively easy to raise capital but it's really hard to do everything else there are so many startups it's so easy to start one they all sound so promising that that bringing together enough talent in one organization is really hard to do and if you're working on a
什么，并成为公司的首席布道者。没有这样的人，很难取得巨大的成功，甚至连组建团队都很难做到。有一件事对此很有帮助，那就是拥有一个有野心的愿景。你永远不该夸夸其谈，那会让人反感，但你应该让自己的野心随时间不断变大。只要这个过程是自然生长出来的，人们就会有回应。有野心的愿景令人兴奋，做起来也有意思。事实上我觉得在 2018 年，至少在硅谷，做一家难的创业公司比做一家容易的创业公司更简单。这听起来很矛盾，但有野心的项目才有意思。你知道，在当下的环境里，融资也许相对容易，但其他每一件事都非常难。创业公司太多了，创办一家太容易了，个个听上去都很有前景，所以要把足够多的人才聚到一个组织里真的很难。如果你做的是一个可能只能取得中等
05第 20 号员工为什么加入你
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problem that you know maybe modestly successful it's it's kind of easy to get the first two people to join you can give them a lot of equity but then it gets really hard why is employee xx gonna join why is this why does this matter to the world why should someone work on your startup versus any of the other things they could do and picking something that matters if you're successful is a great way to do that and so I think it's really important to think about when you're starting a company how is this going to evolve into a vision that a lot of people want to help with but a lot of people want to be associated with because I think getting talent and getting mindshare it is really hard in the current environment and people are interested in startups that matter another thing that we've noticed among our best Saunders again and again and again is that they are have a confident and definite view of the future they may be wrong and so we say it's good to be confident and flexible but this idea that you are
成功的问题，招到前两个人其实挺容易的，你可以给他们很多股权，但之后就变得非常难了。第 20 号员工凭什么加入？这为什么重要？这对世界为什么有意义？为什么有人要来你的创业公司干活，而不去做他们能做的其他任何事情？选一件如果做成了就真正重要的事，是解决这个问题的好办法。所以我觉得，在创办公司的时候，非常重要的是去思考：这件事将来会演变成一个什么样的愿景，让很多人愿意来帮忙，也让很多人愿意与之为伍。因为我认为在当下的环境里，获取人才和获取心智份额都非常难，而人们感兴趣的是那些真正重要的创业公司。我们在最优秀的创始人身上一次又一次注意到的另一点是，他们对未来有一种笃定而具体的看法。他们可能是错的，所以我们说，既自信又灵活是好事，但这种“你很
06团队：乐观、点子与行动偏好
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confident in definite this is what I think is going to happen or this is what is going to happen and being relatively sure of that having courage of your convictions being a clear leader saying we're gonna do this and that's why even in the face of a lot of doubt that seems to really correlate with success and this comes back to having an ambitious vision but the entire startup ecosystem is best set up to support companies that have a low chance of success but are huge if they work and I think going for something that is huge if it works will attract the best people not going to talk too much about the team there are a lot of obvious things I could say that have been said many times by many people about you know you need smart people who want to work really hard and who communicate well these are all really true but I'd like to mention a few non-obvious things that we've noticed that we don't hear people say as much about the team you need to assemble the note Khosla says that the team you
笃定、很具体”的状态——我认为将会发生的是这样，或者说事情就会这样发展——并且相对确信这一点，有勇气坚持自己的判断，做一个清晰的领导者，说“我们就这么干，原因是这样”，哪怕面对大量质疑也是如此——这一点似乎和成功高度相关。这又回到了要有一个有野心的愿景。整个创业生态的设计，最适合支持那些成功概率低、但一旦做成就极其巨大的公司。我认为去做一件“一旦做成就极其巨大”的事，会吸引到最优秀的人才。关于团队我不打算讲太多，有很多显而易见的东西我可以说，很多人也已经说过很多遍了，比如你需要聪明、愿意特别拼、沟通能力好的人，这些都非常对。但我想讲几件不那么显而易见、我们注意到但很少听人提起的事，关于你要组建的这个团队。维诺德·科斯拉（Vinod Khosla）说过，你搭建的团队就是你搭建的公司，我真心认为这是对的。我至今
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build is the company you build and I really think that's true I've still met only a handful of founders I think that spend enough time on recruiting like Mark Zuckerberg is famously one of them but building a great team I think other than picking the right market and building a great product is the most important thing you do all founders go through a transition all successful founders where you switch from building a product to building a company and building a company really is about the team so you need to mist the whole world will be telling you why you're gonna fail as a start-up if you don't have that internal fire of belief if you don't have people who say you know what we are gonna do this and it doesn't matter what the haters say we're gonna figure this out and there is you know this problem it must be solvable if you don't have the spirit of optimism on the team it's very hard to succeed when the world continues to punch you in the face you need at least some idea generators there are a handful of people in any
只见过屈指可数的几位创始人在招聘上投入了足够的时间，马克·扎克伯格就是其中很有名的一位。但组建一支出色的团队，我认为除了选对市场和做出好产品之外，是你要做的最重要的事。所有创始人都会经历一个转变——所有成功的创始人都会——就是从做产品转向做公司，而做公司归根结底就是做团队。所以你需要……整个世界都会告诉你，作为一家创业公司你为什么会失败。如果你没有那股内心的信念之火，如果你的团队里没有人说“你知道吗，我们就是要把这件事做成，不管唱衰的人怎么说，我们会想出办法来”，还有那种“这个问题一定有解”的劲头——如果团队里没有这种乐观精神，当世界不断扇你耳光的时候，是很难成功的。你至少需要一些点子生成器。在任何一家
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company that has gone on to be really successful that I that I've been able to work with who are just really good at coming up with lots of ideas you don't too many these people because that's more ideas than a company can follow through on but having some people within a company that are just constantly throwing out new ideas most of which will be bad it turns out to be super important to have on the team this spirit of we'll figure it out is my favorite thing to hear among early startup team members a lot of things go wrong the situations that startups win in tend to be incredibly dynamic and so this idea that even if I'm not qualified on paper even if I haven't solved this problem before even if this problem feels like it's gonna kill the company which many problems will feel that way this spirit among the team of you know what we've got the people we need we're gonna figure this out we're gonna get this done that's super important another thing that I love to hear from early team members is
后来变得非常成功的公司里，我合作过的人当中总有那么几个，特别擅长冒出大量的点子。这种人不需要太多，因为那会产生超出公司执行能力的点子量。但公司里有几个不停抛出新想法的人——其中大多数想法都会很糟——事实证明对团队来说极其重要。“我们会想出办法的”这种精神，是我最爱在早期创业团队成员身上听到的。很多事情都会出岔子，创业公司能赢的局面往往是极其动态的，所以那种心态——哪怕我在纸面上不够格，哪怕我以前没解决过这个问题，哪怕这个问题看起来会要了公司的命（很多问题都会给人这种感觉）——团队里这种“你知道吗，我们有需要的人，我们会想出办法，我们会把这事搞定”的精神，非常重要。另一件我特别爱从早期成员那里听到的话是“交给我”。你知道，在大公司里很多人会说“这不是
07无经验的祝福
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I've got it so you know you hear in big companies a lot of people say that's not my department someone else is gonna do that yeah or you know who this is really bad this is gonna hurt us and you want people who just step up and say I'll do it I've got it don't worry about it you want people to have a bias towards action startups especially in their early days often win by moving very quickly you never get as much data as you'd like you never have as much time to deliberate as you'd like and you want people who will are willing to act with much less data than they'd like to have with much less certainty and then if they act then it doesn't work they adapt really quickly and try something else we talk also about the blessing of inexperience we have seen many of our startups do incredible things because no one told them it was hard no one told them they can't do it um there's a great quote from Steve Wozniak about how all the best things he ever did came from having no experience whatsoever and
我的部门，会有别人来做的”，或者“哎呀这真糟糕，这会害了我们”。而你想要的是那种直接站出来说“我来做，交给我，别担心”的人。你需要有行动偏好的人。创业公司，尤其在早期，往往靠动作极快取胜。你永远拿不到你想要的那么多数据，也永远没有你想要的那么多时间去权衡。你需要那种愿意在数据远少于理想、确定性远低于理想的情况下就动手的人，而且如果动手之后发现行不通，他们能极快地调整，去试别的路子。我们也常说“无经验的祝福”。我们见过很多创业公司做成了不可思议的事，因为没人告诉过他们这很难，没人告诉过他们做不到。史蒂夫·沃兹尼亚克有句很棒的话，说他做过的所有最好的事情，都来自于完全没有经验、也完全没有钱。当然，这显然并不总是成立，但创业公司身上确实会发生一种
08永远不要失去势能
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having no money and you know that obviously is not always true but there is a magic thing that happens with startups especially in their early days before they've learned they're not supposed to be able to do certain things and so I think as a start-up again doesn't work to have everybody being experienced but you can take more bets than you normally would on inexperienced but super high potential people that's the end of a topic on on team one of the most important jobs you have as a founder is to never lose momentum and this is a little bit depressing because it means for the first few years you never get to take your foot off of the gas you never get to really rest we try to be honest about this that startups are not the best choice for work-life balance at all but especially in the early days startups survive on their own momentum if you have momentum people keep delivering results beyond what they think they're capable of if you lose momentum it's very difficult to get it back and so continuing to make sure that
神奇的事，尤其是在早期，在他们还没学会“自己不该能做到某些事”之前。所以我认为，作为创业公司——当然，让所有人都毫无经验也行不通——但你可以比平常更多地押注在经验不足但潜力极高的人身上。团队这个话题就讲到这里。作为创始人，你最重要的工作之一就是永远不要失去势能。这有点让人沮丧，因为这意味着最初的几年里你永远不能松开油门，永远不能真正休息。我们尽量对此坦诚：创业公司完全不是追求工作生活平衡的好选择。但尤其在早期，创业公司是靠自身的势能存活的。有势能的时候，人们会不断交付出超越自己想象的成果；一旦失去势能，就很难再找回来。所以要持续确保创业公司有一个节奏，确保
09三个坏信号：护城河、盈利、增长
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the startup has a cadence that the startup keeps winning on a relatively predictively short and predictable and this is really important and it's up to the founders to make sure that that you don't lose ahold of this another thing that we think startups need is a competitive advantage over time now this is something that sounds so obvious I hesitated to even put it in this is well discussed but we're seeing more and more startups apply to YC and when we ask them so what is the long term monopoly effect here what is the long term competitive advantage what is you know where is the network effect in this business they look at us like it's the first time we've ever they've ever heard this question all of the really great businesses I know have an answer to this question and in fact the better they are the more they pretend not to but this is something that you you want to have a plan for another thing you want to have a plan for is at least a sensible business model you don't have to have it all figured out at the
公司在相对较短、可预期的周期里不断赢下一个个胜利，这非常重要，而且要靠创始人来保证不让这件事失控。我们认为创业公司还需要的另一样东西，是长期的竞争优势。这听起来太显而易见了，我甚至犹豫要不要放进来，这也被讨论得很充分了，但我们看到越来越多申请 YC 的创业公司，当我们问他们“你们长期的垄断效应在哪里？长期的竞争优势是什么？这门生意的网络效应在哪儿？”时，他们看我们的眼神就像第一次听到这个问题一样。我认识的所有真正伟大的生意，对这个问题都有答案。事实上，它们越是有答案，就越会装作没有。但这是你需要有个规划的事情。另一件你需要有规划的事，是至少要有一个说得通的商业模式。你不需要在一开始就把一切都想明白，但当我们问创始人“你们打算怎么赚钱”，
11:52
beginning but when we ask founders so how are you ever going to make money and they look at us like it's the first time they've ever been asked that question which happens more often than you would think recently that's a bad sign too again this one is so common that I hesitate to put it in here but when we ask a start-up how they're gonna grow how they're gonna get users and they look at us like it's the first time they've ever heard that question bad sign so some sensible idea to try here first Paul Buchheit once spent a bunch of time looking one of the YC partners spent a bunch of time looking at the traits of our best founders and tried to distill down what they were and he came up with a frugality focus obsession and love I actually I think that is really good I don't know how much to add but I think these are things that you should be able to say about what you're doing and you as a founder and finally I want to talk about why startups get to be big companies we've there are lots of
他们看我们的眼神就像第一次被问到这个问题一样——这种情况比你想象的要常见，最近尤其如此——这也是个坏信号。同样，这一条太常见了，我都犹豫要不要放进来，但当我们问一家创业公司打算怎么增长、怎么获取用户，而他们看我们的眼神就像第一次听到这个问题一样，那就是坏信号。所以先得有个说得通的想法可以试。保罗·布赫海特（Paul Buchheit）曾经花了很多时间研究——他是 YC 的合伙人之一——花了很多时间研究我们最优秀的创始人身上的特质，试着把它们提炼出来，他得出的结论是节俭、专注、痴迷和热爱。我其实觉得这总结得非常好，我也不知道还能补充什么，但我认为这些是你应该能用来形容你所做的事、以及形容作为创始人的你自己的特质。最后我想讲一讲创业公司为什么能长成大公司。原因有很多，我这里只讲几个常见的。我认为这些趋势
10创业公司在哪三种情况下赢过大公司
12:53
reasons I'm going to talk about a few common ones here I think these trends are valuable enough that as you evaluate startup ideas you might do it's worth thinking about if you fit into these because it's really hard for startups to beat big companies most of the time and here are some areas where we see it happening repeatedly so I think one difference is if you are a product manager at a big company and you want to do something that sounds sounds like a bad idea but is a good idea you have to get everybody from your boss sometimes all the way up to the CEO to say yes so one no can kill you if you're a start-up you can go to I see demo day any number of the thousands of investors can say yes and you get to have a crack at it so it's a very different mindset and for those ideas that sound bad but are good because of this phenomenon this one no versus one yes startups can win in fact startups usually do beat big companies in that category of ideas so look look for ideas that sound bad but are good and where
足够有价值，以至于在你评估创业点子的时候，值得想一想你是不是符合其中某一条，因为大多数情况下创业公司要打败大公司真的很难。以下是我们反复看到创业公司能赢的一些领域。我认为一个区别在于：如果你是大公司的产品经理，而你想做一件听起来像是坏主意、实际上是好主意的事，你必须让所有人——从你的老板，有时一直到 CEO——都说“行”。所以一个“不行”就能把你毙掉。而如果你是创业公司，你可以去 YC 的 Demo Day，成千上万个投资人里任何一个说“行”，你就有机会试一试。所以这是完全不同的心态。对于那些听上去糟、实际上好的点子，正是因为这个现象——一个“不行”对一个“行”——创业公司能赢。事实上在这类点子上，创业公司通常确实能打败大公司。所以要去找那些听起来糟、其实是好的点子，在那些领域你拿到一个“行”的可能性，
13:59
you are much more likely to get one yes then someone in a big company is to get all yeses another area where startups usually be big companies aren't very fast changing markets startups great speed great advantage is an agility and speed the more a market is changing the higher the number of decisions you get to make and the higher number of tweaks to your product and your strategy you get to make and you want to optimize the number of those decisions that someone has to make to compete with you because a big company will make them on average worse than certainly much slower than you do so the speed of market evolution gives you a lot more chances to compound your advantage over a big company and then finally startups usually win on big platform shifts many people have observed that startups companies clusters those clusters usually come after a big platform shift we'll stick with the iPhone example here after mobile apps became a thing many new companies got started that are now quite valuable and one of the reasons here is
要远大于大公司里的人拿到所有人都点头的可能性。创业公司通常能打败大公司的另一个领域，是变化非常快的市场。创业公司最大的优势就是敏捷和速度。一个市场变化越快，你能做的决策数量就越多，你能对产品和战略做的调整也越多。你希望把“别人要跟你竞争就必须做出的决策数量”最大化，因为大公司做这些决策，平均而言会比你做得差，而且肯定比你慢得多。所以市场演进的速度给了你更多机会去累积相对大公司的优势。最后，创业公司通常会在大的平台迁移中获胜。很多人都注意到，创业公司会成簇出现，而这些簇通常出现在一次大的平台迁移之后。还是拿iPhone 举例吧：在移动应用成为一件事之后，涌现出了很多如今非常值钱的新公司。其中一个原因是，大多数大公司至少是按年度节奏在运作的，
15:07
you know most large companies work on sort of an annual cadence at least and when there's a huge platform shift they are not good at making a big enough strategic pivot the Battleship just turns too slowly whereas a start-up can say wow woke up this morning the world is fundamentally different than it was six months ago we're gonna go all in on this new direction and so that's a way that startups usually win or that that's an area where startups usually win there there are many others but thinking about these three I think is is directionally a good thing to do alright that's all I've got for today Jeff thank you very much for having me and for the class
而当出现巨大的平台迁移时，它们不擅长做出足够大的战略转向——这艘战列舰转向太慢了。而创业公司可以说：哇，今早醒来，这个世界和六个月前已经根本不一样了，我们要全力押注这个新方向。所以这是创业公司通常获胜的一种方式，或者说这是创业公司通常能赢的一个领域。还有很多其他的，但我认为想清楚这三点，方向上是件好事。好，今天我要讲的就这些。Jeff，非常感谢你邀请我，也感谢这门课。
15:53
you
谢谢。
视频总结 · 一句话概括与核心要点
一句话概括
Sam Altman 认为创业成功的核心在于做出好到用户会自发推荐给朋友的产品，再叠加高速增长的市场、有传教士气质的创始人、正确的团队特质、持续的势头和长期竞争优势。
核心要点
- 产品好到用户自发口碑传播，就完成了 80% 的工作：Google、Facebook 等最成功的公司，多数人都是通过朋友"你一定要试试"了解到的。创业者总想找别的捷径，但这才是真正的标准；一个附带指标是产品必须能用几句话说清楚，否则通常意味着思路不清或需求不够大。
- 要选正在或即将指数增长的小市场，而非只看当下 TAM：投资人会容忍现在收入小但增速快的公司，却很少用同样眼光看市场。11 年前 iPhone 应用市场规模是零，只看当时的总体市场规模会犯大错，关键是"搭乘上行电梯"。
- 区分真趋势与假趋势的诀窍是早期用户的使用强度：真趋势是早期用户痴迷地使用并向朋友推荐（iPhone 首年只卖出一两百万台，但用户每天使用数小时）；假趋势是人们买了但不用（以 2018 年 8 月为例，VR 拥有者大多几乎不用，尽管讨论和购买量都不少）。
- 至少需要一位传教士型创始人（通常是 CEO）：负责招人、卖产品、对媒体、融资，用热情感染整个世界。没有这一点很难建成团队，更难取得巨大成功。
- 2018 年的硅谷，做"难的创业"反而比"容易的创业"更容易：融资相对容易，但招揽人才极难——创业公司太多、都看起来有前景。平庸项目靠股权能招到前两个人，但第 20 号员工凭什么加入？有抱负的愿景（自然生长、不浮夸）才能持续吸引人才和注意力，而整个创业生态本就为"成功概率低但成功了就巨大"的公司而设。
- 最好的创始人对未来有自信且明确的判断：可以错，但要"自信而灵活"，在充满质疑时仍有坚持信念的勇气，这与成功高度相关。
- 团队的非显性特质：乐观精神、创意发生器、"我们能搞定"和"我来负责"：Vinod Khosla 说"你建的团队就是你建的公司"；Altman 只见过少数创始人（如扎克伯格）在招聘上花足够时间。团队需要少数不断抛出想法的人（大多数想法会很糟但仍极重要）、偏向行动、在数据和确定性不足时敢于决策并快速调整；同时可以对缺乏经验但潜力极高的人下更多注（Wozniak 称自己最好的成果都来自毫无经验和没钱的时候）。
- 创始人最重要的工作之一是永不失去势头：头几年不能松油门，创业与工作生活平衡不兼容；有势头时人们会交付超出自己预期的成果，失去势头则很难找回，需保持短周期、可预测的持续胜利节奏。
- 三个"常识"问题却常让申请 YC 的创业者哑口无言：长期竞争优势/网络效应是什么、如何赚钱、如何获取用户。所有伟大企业都能回答第一个问题（越好的公司越假装没有）。Paul Buchheit 总结的顶尖创始人特质是：节俭、专注、痴迷、热爱。
- 创业公司战胜大公司的三种情形：①"听起来糟糕但其实很好"的想法——大公司里一个 No 就能否决，创业者只需成千上万投资人中的一个 Yes；②快速变化的市场——决策次数越多，创业公司的速度和敏捷优势越能复利累积；③大型平台转移——大公司按年度节奏运作、"战舰转向太慢"，创业公司可以一夜之间全力押注新方向，公司集群通常在平台转移后出现。
结论与值得注意的细节
- 优先级排序：选对市场、做出极好的产品、组建伟大团队，是创始人最重要的三件事；所有成功创始人都会经历从"做产品"到"建公司"的转变，而建公司本质是建团队。
- Altman 反复强调这些是"显而易见却常被忽视"的问题，说明多数失败并非缺乏秘诀，而是没有认真回答基础问题。
- 演讲有明确时间标记（2018 年 8 月），对 VR 的"假趋势"判断带有"至少目前"的限定，他也表示相信 VR 终将成大事——判断标准是使用强度而非销量或讨论热度。
- "无经验的祝福"：早期创业公司往往因为"没人告诉他们这很难"而做出惊人之事，这是一种在学会"不应该能做到"之前的魔力。
核心句型 · 9
1. the degree to which A approximates the degree to which B
“The degree to which you're successful approximates the degree to which you build a product that is so good people spontaneously tell their friends about it”
用「程度对应程度」表达两个变量的正相关，比 the more…the more 更正式、更像论断。适合陈述核心命题。
2. so [adj.] (that) people [verb]
“A product that is so good people spontaneously tell their friends about it”
口语中常省略 that。用「好到……以至于」把抽象标准落成可观察的行为，是定义「标准」的好句式。
3. if you can't …, that's usually a sign of …
“If you can't explain in a few words what you do … that's usually a sign of unclear thinking”
把表面症状归因到深层问题，「a sign of」后接抽象名词。适合做诊断式表达，语气克制（usually）。
4. X is one where …; Y is one where …
“Real trends are ones where a new technology platform comes along … a fake trend is one where people may buy the product but don't use it”
用平行的 where 从句定义一组对立概念，结构对称、便于对比。仿写时保持两句句式一致。
5. this sounds paradoxical, but …
“Now this sounds paradoxical but ambitious projects are interesting”
先承认观点反直觉，再给出解释。这是引入反常识论点的标准开场，能降低听众抵触。
6. they look at us like it's the first time they've ever heard this question
“They look at us like it's the first time we've ever they've ever heard this question”
like 引导比喻状语（口语，正式写作用 as if）。同一句式在全片重复三次形成排比，制造幽默与强调。
7. the more …, the higher the number of … you get to make
“The more a market is changing the higher the number of decisions you get to make”
the more…the + 比较级 的变体，后半句用「the higher the number of」承接可数名词。get to 表「有机会」，暗含积极意味。
8. even if …, even if …, even if …
“Even if I'm not qualified on paper even if I haven't solved this problem before even if this problem feels like it's gonna kill the company”
三重 even if 排比层层加码，最后落到主句。用于表达「无论如何都要……」的决心，注意由轻到重排列。
9. one no can kill you / any … can say yes
“So one no can kill you if you're a start-up … any number of the thousands of investors can say yes”
用极简的名词化（one no / one yes）概括结构性差异，高度凝练，适合做金句。
生词精讲 · 81 · 按出现顺序
approximates
/əˈprɑːksɪmeɪts/
v.
0:00
近似于，大致等于
spontaneously
/spɑːnˈteɪniəsli/
adv.
0:00
自发地，主动地（无外力促使）
the bar
/bɑːr/
n.
0:00
标准，门槛（set/raise the bar 提高标准）
indicator
/ˈɪndɪkeɪtər/
n.
0:00
指标，标志
undergo
/ˌʌndərˈɡoʊ/
v.
0:56
经历，经受（变化、过程）
exponential growth
phr.
0:56
指数级增长
smallish
/ˈsmɔːlɪʃ/
adj.
0:56
偏小的，不算大的（-ish 表「有点」）
TAM
/tæm/
n.
0:56
Total Addressable Market，总体可寻址市场（投资术语）
ride that up elevator
phr.
1:52
搭乘上行电梯（比喻借市场增长之势上升）
differentiate between
/ˌdɪfəˈrenʃieɪt/
phr.
1:52
区分，辨别
make a big bet on
phr.
1:52
下重注押在……上
early adopters
/əˈdɑːptərz/
n.
1:52
早期使用者（创新扩散理论中率先采用新技术的人群）
obsessively
/əbˈsesɪvli/
adv.
1:52
着迷地，无法自拔地
dismissive
/dɪsˈmɪsɪv/
adj.
1:52
不屑一顾的，轻视的
fundamentally shifted
phr.
2:48
发生了根本性转变
spawn
/spɔːn/
v.
2:48
催生，大量产生
evangelical
/ˌiːvænˈdʒelɪkl/
adj.
2:48
布道者式的，狂热宣扬的（原为宗教用语，此处指热情推广者）
infect with enthusiasm
phr.
2:48
用热情感染（他人）
chief evangelist
/iˈvændʒəlɪst/
n.
3:50
首席布道者（科技公司中负责对外宣扬产品/愿景的角色）
succeed wildly
phr.
3:50
取得巨大成功
grandiose
/ˈɡrændioʊs/
adj.
3:50
浮夸的，好大喜功的（贬义，区别于 ambitious）
turns people off
phr.
3:50
让人反感，令人失去兴趣
organically
/ɔːrˈɡænɪkli/
adv.
3:50
自然地，有机地（非刻意推动）
paradoxical
/ˌpærəˈdɑːksɪkl/
adj.
3:50
自相矛盾的，悖论式的
raise capital
phr.
3:50
融资
modestly successful
/ˈmɑːdɪstli/
phr.
4:50
取得中等程度的成功
equity
/ˈekwəti/
n.
4:50
股权
mindshare
/ˈmaɪndʃer/
n.
4:50
心智份额（在目标人群注意力中占据的比重）
be associated with
phr.
4:50
与……有关联，与之为伍
definite
/ˈdefɪnət/
adj.
4:50
明确的，确定的
courage of your convictions
/kənˈvɪkʃənz/
phr.
5:50
坚持自己信念的勇气（固定搭配 have the courage of one's convictions）
in the face of
phr.
5:50
面对（困难、质疑）
correlate with
/ˈkɔːrəleɪt/
phr.
5:50
与……相关
ecosystem
/ˈiːkoʊsɪstəm/
n.
5:50
生态系统（此处指创业生态）
non-obvious
/nɑːn ˈɑːbviəs/
adj.
5:50
不明显的，非显而易见的
a handful of
phr.
6:53
少数几个，屈指可数的
famously
/ˈfeɪməsli/
adv.
6:53
众所周知地
go through a transition
/trænˈzɪʃn/
phr.
6:53
经历一个转变
haters
/ˈheɪtərz/
n.
6:53
唱衰者，喷子（口语）
punch you in the face
phr.
6:53
扇你耳光（比喻不断遭受打击）
idea generators
n.
6:53
点子生成器（指不断产出想法的人）
follow through on
phr.
7:52
把……执行到底，贯彻落实
throwing out
phr.
7:52
（随口）抛出（想法）
qualified on paper
phr.
7:52
纸面上够资格（指学历履历符合要求）
dynamic
/daɪˈnæmɪk/
adj.
7:52
动态的，不断变化的
I've got it
phr.
8:54
交给我，我来处理
step up
phr.
8:54
站出来（承担责任）
bias towards action
/ˈbaɪəs/
phr.
8:54
行动偏好（倾向于先行动而非过度分析）
deliberate
/dɪˈlɪbəreɪt/
v.
8:54
仔细权衡，深思熟虑（作动词时重音与形容词不同）
adapt
/əˈdæpt/
v.
8:54
调整，适应
the blessing of inexperience
/ˌɪnɪkˈspɪriəns/
phr.
8:54
无经验的祝福（指缺乏经验反而带来的好处）
whatsoever
/ˌwʌtsoʊˈevər/
adv.
8:54
丝毫（用于否定后加强语气，no … whatsoever）
take more bets
phr.
9:52
多下注，多冒险押注
momentum
/moʊˈmentəm/
n.
9:52
势能，动量，势头
take your foot off of the gas
phr.
9:52
松开油门（比喻放松、减速）
work-life balance
n.
9:52
工作与生活的平衡
cadence
/ˈkeɪdns/
n.
10:52
节奏，周期性节拍
lose ahold of
/əˈhoʊld/
phr.
10:52
失去对……的把控（ahold 为美式口语）
competitive advantage
n.
10:52
竞争优势
hesitated
/ˈhezɪteɪtɪd/
v.
10:52
犹豫
monopoly effect
/məˈnɑːpəli/
n.
10:52
垄断效应
network effect
n.
10:52
网络效应（用户越多产品价值越高）
sensible
/ˈsensəbl/
adj.
10:52
合理的，说得通的
business model
n.
10:52
商业模式
distill down
/dɪˈstɪl/
phr.
11:52
提炼，浓缩（要点）
traits
/treɪts/
n.
11:52
特质，特征
frugality
/fruːˈɡæləti/
n.
11:52
节俭
obsession
/əbˈseʃn/
n.
11:52
痴迷，执念
have a crack at it
phr.
12:53
试一试，尝试一下（口语）
demo day
n.
12:53
路演日（孵化器结业时向投资人展示的活动）
mindset
/ˈmaɪndset/
n.
12:53
心态，思维模式
phenomenon
/fəˈnɑːmɪnɑːn/
n.
12:53
现象
agility
/əˈdʒɪləti/
n.
13:59
敏捷性
tweaks
/twiːks/
n.
13:59
微调，小修改
compound
/kəmˈpaʊnd/
v.
13:59
复利式累积，叠加放大
platform shifts
n.
13:59
平台迁移（如从 PC 到移动）
clusters
/ˈklʌstərz/
n.
13:59
簇，集群
strategic pivot
/ˈpɪvət/
n.
15:07
战略转向（pivot 为创业圈常用词）
Battleship
/ˈbætlʃɪp/
n.
15:07
战列舰（比喻转向缓慢的庞大组织）
go all in on
phr.
15:07
全力押注（源自扑克术语 all in）
directionally
/dəˈrekʃənəli/
adv.
15:07
在方向上，大致上
理解自测 · 11 题 · 是真懂了，还是以为自己懂
1. Altman 认为创业成功的「第一课」是什么？他用什么例子说明？
第一课是：你成功的程度约等于你做出的产品好到什么程度——好到用户会自发向朋友推荐。他说做到这一点就完成了 80% 的工作。依据在开头第 0 段：他指出创业者总想听别的秘诀，因为这件事太难，但答案就是它；并举 Google、Facebook 为例——你多半是因为朋友说「你一定要试试」才知道它们的。他还补充了一个可操作的标志：好产品通常容易用几句话讲清，且至少有一部分人听完会说「有意思」。
2. Altman 给出的判断「真趋势」与「假趋势」的方法是什么？分别举了什么例子？
标准不是销量，而是早期使用者的使用强度和口碑：真趋势是早期用户「疯狂地用」并告诉朋友；假趋势是人们可能买了但不用或用得不够。依据在第 2–3 段的对照：iPhone 首年只卖了一两百万台、被很多人不以为然，但拥有者每天用好几个小时、成为生活中心，这是真趋势；VR（截至 2018 年 8 月）很多人谈论甚至购买，但他认识的头显拥有者几乎不用，是假趋势。他明确说自己相信 VR 终有一天会大，但当下缺乏「每用户高强度使用」的信号。
3. Paul Buchheit 总结的最优秀创始人的四个特质是什么？
节俭（frugality）、专注（focus）、痴迷（obsession）和热爱（love）。依据在第 12 段：Altman 说 YC 合伙人 Paul Buchheit 花了大量时间研究 YC 最优秀创始人的特质并加以提炼，得到这四个词。Altman 表示他认为这个总结非常好、自己无可补充，并建议创业者用这四个词检视自己和自己在做的事。这一段位于「坏信号」讨论之后、「创业公司为何能变大」之前，是对创始人个人特质的收束。
4. 为什么 Altman 说「做一家难的创业公司比做一家容易的更简单」？他的推理链是什么？
推理链是：2018 年硅谷融资相对容易，但创业公司太多、个个看起来有前景，所以稀缺资源是人才而非资金；一个中等规模的问题能靠大额股权招到前两个人，但到「第 20 号员工」时股权已不够，必须回答「这为什么对世界重要」；只有「一旦做成就真正重要」的事才能持续吸引人才和心智份额。因此难题在最关键的瓶颈（招人）上反而更容易。依据在第 4–5 段，他先承认「听起来矛盾」，再逐层展开。
5. 「一个否决 vs 一个同意」的论点如何解释创业公司在哪类点子上能打败大公司？
大公司里推动一个想法需要从直属上司到 CEO 的每一层都点头，任何一个「不行」就能毙掉它——决策是串联的；而创业公司在 Demo Day 上面对成千上万投资人，任何一个说「行」就能开干——决策是并联的。这种结构差异决定了「听起来糟、实际上好」的点子在大公司几乎不可能通过，却是创业公司的天然领地。依据在第 13 段，Altman 由此建议专门去找这类点子，并说创业公司在这一类点子上通常确实赢过大公司。
6. Altman 为什么把「势能」视为创始人最重要的工作之一？失去势能会怎样？
因为创业公司靠自身势能存活：有势能时人们会不断交付出超越自己预期的成果，是一种自我强化机制；一旦失去，很难再找回。因此创始人要确保公司以相对短、可预期的节奏不断赢下小胜利。依据在第 10–11 段。他坦承这「有点让人沮丧」——意味着最初几年不能松油门、不能真正休息，并直言创业完全不是追求工作生活平衡的好选择。这一论点承接团队部分（乐观精神、行动偏好），说明团队状态需要靠节奏来维持。
7. 「快速变化的市场」为何对创业公司有利？「compound」在这里指什么？
市场变化越快，需要做出的决策和产品/战略调整就越多；大公司做这些决策平均而言更差、且肯定更慢，所以每一个决策都是创业公司积累相对优势的机会。「compound」指这种优势像复利一样随决策数量叠加放大。依据在第 14 段：Altman 说你应当「最大化竞争者必须做出的决策数量」。推论是：在静态市场里创业公司的速度优势无处发挥，而在动态市场里速度会被反复兑现。
8. Altman 谈「真趋势」的标准与开头「好产品」的标准之间有什么内在联系？
两者是同一逻辑在不同层面的应用：产品层面的标准是「好到用户自发推荐」，平台/市场层面的标准是「早期使用者疯狂使用并告诉朋友」。两者都拒绝以购买量或市场规模作为判断依据，而以「使用强度 + 自发口碑」作为真实需求的信号。这也解释了为什么他反对只看今天的 TAM（第 1 段）：TAM 衡量的是规模，而他关注的是增长与真实使用。可以推断，Altman 的整套框架核心是「真实的、强烈的使用行为」优于任何账面数字。
9. 「无经验的祝福」与「需要经验丰富的团队」看似冲突，Altman 如何调和？
他的立场是平衡而非二选一：一方面引用 Wozniak「最好的事都来自毫无经验」，指出创业公司常因「没人告诉他们这很难」而做成不可思议的事；另一方面立刻补充「这显然并不总是成立」，并明确说「让所有人都没经验也行不通」。他的实际建议是：比通常更愿意押注「经验不足但潜力极高」的人。依据在第 9–10 段。推理上，这与前文「乐观精神」「行动偏好」一致——早期创业环境高度动态，纸面资历的预测力有限，潜力与心态的权重相应上升。
10. 如果有人反驳说「许多成功公司（如 Google 早期）并没有清晰的商业模式」，Altman 会如何回应？
他的原话已预留了回应空间：「你不需要在一开始就把一切都想明白」。他反对的不是没有确定答案，而是「从没想过这个问题」——被问到如何赚钱时「像第一次听到」。Google 早期虽未确定广告模式，但创始人清楚搜索流量有价值、探索过多种变现路径。同理，他对「竞争优势」的要求也是「有个规划」而非已建成护城河。因此 Altman 会说：反例恰恰证明了他的观点——那些公司认真思考过并保持灵活，而不是对此毫无概念。依据在第 11–12 段。
11. 把「战列舰转向太慢」的论点放到 2023 年后的 AI 浪潮，还成立吗？Altman 自己的经历提供了什么证据？
部分成立、部分需修正。成立之处：OpenAI 作为相对小型的组织在 2022 年底推出 ChatGPT，迫使 Google 等巨头「红色警报」式仓促应对，符合「平台迁移后创业公司成簇出现」的判断，而 Altman 本人正是 2019 年后全力押注这一方向的人。需修正之处：AI 平台迁移的算力和资本门槛极高，OpenAI 依赖微软百亿美元级投入，大公司凭资源优势快速追赶（Gemini、Claude 背后均有巨头支持），这与「移动应用时代小团队即可参与」不同。所以「速度优势」仍在，但「一个 yes 就能试」的低门槛前提在 AI 基础模型层面已不完全适用。
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