视频库 / NO.067
--:--
点击播放，这里会跟随视频显示当前句的中英字幕。
第 67 期 · 核心追问 Ⅱ·07「语言还承载意义吗？」
The Spell of Linguistic Philosophy - Bernard Williams & Bryan Magee (1977)
节目发布 2022-03-31章节 · 点击跳转视频
0:14
什么是语言哲学：意义即用法
3:24
与逻辑实证主义的决裂
6:43
语言哲学 ≠ 语言的哲学
8:29
「消解而非解决」的许诺
10:41
哲学可用于一切领域？
14:07
魔咒何来：日常例子的深意
18:48
清晰的责任与文学传统
21:20
维特根斯坦与黑格尔：清晰是什么
26:53
根本局限：低估理论
30:20
脱离题材、缺乏历史感
35:41
「琐碎」指控与句子即意思
38:08
遗产：工具袋的形状
本期小问 · 档案清单
6:43
语言塑造思想吗？
14:07
会说话，就等于理解吗？
26:53
我们真的在理解世界吗？
35:41
语言还承载意义吗？
本期讲者
布莱恩·马基英国哲学家、作家、广播主持人、前工党议员（1930–2019），主持 BBC《Men of Ideas》（1978）与《The Great Philosophers》（1987），以向大众介绍哲学著称。
伯纳德·威廉姆斯英国道德哲学家（1929–2003），时任剑桥奈特布里奇哲学教授，后任牛津怀特道德哲学教授，著有《道德运气》《伦理学与哲学的限度》，被视为二十世纪后半叶最重要的伦理学家之一。
01什么是语言哲学：意义即用法
0:14
The two terms linguistic philosophy and linguistic analysis are both used to mean the same thing. And that is a technique of doing philosophy which developed mainly in the Anglo-Saxon world, and which came to fruition in the 1940s and '50s. Though I think it's fair to say that the way almost everybody since then has done philosophy has been influenced by it. The two great centers of activity in it were Oxford and Cambridge. At Oxford, the most influential figure was JL Austin. And to a lesser degree, Gilbert Ryle.
语言哲学和语言分析这两个术语，用来指的是同一件事。它是一种做哲学的方法，主要发展于盎格鲁-撒克逊世界，并在二十世纪四五十年代趋于成熟。不过我想可以公平地说，从那以后几乎每个人做哲学的方式都受到了它的影响。它的两大活动中心是牛津和剑桥。在牛津，最有影响力的人物是 J.L. 奥斯汀，其次是吉尔伯特·赖尔。
0:47
At Cambridge, it was incomparably Wittgenstein. These and the other individuals involved all differed among themselves naturally, but they had certain basic tenets in common. Perhaps the chief of them can be put this way. Ever since Socrates, philosophers have tended to ask questions like, what is truth, or what is beauty, or what is justice, on the assumption that each of these words stands for something, perhaps an invisible or abstract something. But anyway, something that has its own existence independently of how the words are used. It was as if the philosophers were trying to pierce through the question through the language to some non-linguistic reality that stood behind the words.
在剑桥，则无可比拟地是维特根斯坦。这些人以及其他相关人物彼此之间自然各有分歧，但他们有一些共同的基本主张。其中最主要的一条也许可以这样表述。自苏格拉底以来，哲学家们总倾向于提出这样的问题：什么是真理？什么是美？什么是正义？他们假定这些词各自代表着某种东西，也许是某种看不见的或抽象的东西。但无论如何，是某种独立于这些词如何被使用而自身存在的东西。这就好像哲学家们试图穿透问题、穿透语言，去抵达某个立于词语背后的非语言的实在。
1:34
Now the linguistic philosophers came along and said that this was a profound error. And an error, what's more, that leads into other serious mistakes in our thinking. There are, they said, no entities for which these words stand. Language is a human creation. We invented the words and we determine their use. Understanding what a word means is nothing more nor less than knowing how to use it. So taking a notion like truth, when you fully understand how to use the word truth correctly and its associated words like true, truthfulness, and so on, then you fully understand its meaning.
如今语言哲学家出现了，他们说这是一个深刻的错误。而且这个错误还会引出我们思维中其他严重的谬误。他们说，根本不存在这些词所代表的那种实体。语言是人的创造物。是我们发明了这些词，也是我们决定它们的用法。理解一个词的意思，不多不少就是知道如何使用它。所以拿真理这样一个概念来说，当你完全懂得如何正确使用真理这个词，以及与之相关的词，比如真的、真诚等等，那你就完全理解了它的意义。
2:12
This meaning simply is the sum total of the word's possible uses, not some incorporeal entity that exists in some abstract realm. From this, linguistic philosophers went on to say that the only satisfactory way to analyze the categories of human thought, or the concepts in which we try and come to terms with the world or communicate with each other, is by investigating how they're used. And doing linguistic philosophy consists in carrying out such investigations. In fact, the most famous book in linguistic philosophy is called Philosophical Investigations by Wittgenstein.
这个意义无非就是这个词的一切可能用法的总和，而不是某种存在于抽象领域中的无形实体。由此，语言哲学家们进而提出，要分析人类思维的各种范畴，或者说我们用来理解世界、彼此交流的那些概念，唯一令人满意的方式就是考察它们是如何被使用的。而所谓做语言哲学，就在于开展这样的考察。事实上，语言哲学中最著名的一本书，就是维特根斯坦的《哲学研究》。
2:50
Normally such an investigation would be into one concept of the time, as it might be say, The Concept of Mind, which is the title of what is probably the second most famous work in linguistic philosophy, a book by Gilbert Ryle. For some years after the publication of these two books-- Ryle's in 1949, Wittgenstein's in 1953-- linguistic analysis exercised an enormous spell on philosophy. And in those years, it came at the very least to color the way the subject was practiced by almost everyone in the English speaking world.
通常这样的考察一次只针对一个概念，比如说，《心的概念》——这是语言哲学中大概排名第二有名的著作的书名，作者是吉尔伯特·赖尔。在这两本书出版之后的若干年里——赖尔那本是1949年，维特根斯坦那本是1953年——语言分析对哲学施加了巨大的魔力。在那些年里，它至少给英语世界几乎所有人研究这门学科的方式都染上了一层色彩。
02与逻辑实证主义的决裂
3:24
To discuss it now on this program, we have someone who has spent many years each at both Oxford and Cambridge. Bernard Williams, now one of the two professors of philosophy at Cambridge, was an undergraduate at Oxford in the heyday of linguistic philosophy there. Well, Bernard Williams, the philosophy that linguistic philosophy represented a breakaway from was primarily logical positivism, wasn't it? Logical positivism was the prevailing orthodoxy of one generation, linguistic philosophy of the next. And I think a way in which we can continue the characterization of linguistic philosophy that I started in this introduction is by talking about the contrast between it and logical positivism that it broke away from.
今天来到本节目讨论这个话题的，是一位在牛津和剑桥都各待过多年的学者。伯纳德·威廉斯，现任剑桥大学两位哲学教授之一，他本科就读于牛津，正值语言哲学在那里的鼎盛时期。那么，伯纳德·威廉斯，语言哲学所代表的那次决裂，主要是针对逻辑实证主义的，对吧？逻辑实证主义是上一代人的主流正统，而语言哲学则是下一代人的。我想，要接着我在开场白里对语言哲学的刻画讲下去，一个办法就是谈谈它与它所脱离的逻辑实证主义之间的对比。
4:08
I think we were very conscious of the difference from logical positivism. And perhaps more conscious than people will be looking at all later on. But the real difference, I think, was this, that positivism tremendously thought of the canon of human meaningful discourse and knowledge as being science really. It admitted that there were other forms of discourse as well. But it measured the meaningfulness of other discourse by really, the standards of science. And for positivism, philosophy almost was the philosophy of science.
我想，我们当时非常清楚它和逻辑实证主义之间的差别。也许比后来的人看这段历史时更为清楚。但我认为，真正的差别在于这一点：实证主义对人类有意义的话语和知识的准则，抱有极其强烈的看法其实就相当于科学本身。它承认还存在其他形式的话语。但它衡量其他话语有没有意义时，用的其实就是科学的标准。对实证主义来说，哲学几乎就等同于科学哲学。
4:44
Whereas linguistic analysis or linguistic philosophy was tremendously and self consciously aware of the variety of different forms of human discourse, the many different ways of talking, many different sorts of meaning, besides scientific meaning. And the business was to try and discover how these various other sorts, as well as the scientific sorts, worked. Not to measure everything by the canons of science and pronounce the other sorts meaningless. The logical positivists did in fact quite explicitly say, didn't they, that any statement which was not empirically verifiable was meaningless?
而语言分析或者说语言哲学，则极其自觉地意识到人类话语形式的多样性，意识到说话方式有很多种，除了科学意义之外，还有许多不同种类的意义。它要做的，是去弄清楚这各种各样的意义——包括科学意义在内——是怎么运作的。而不是拿科学的准则去衡量一切，然后宣布其他种类都是无意义的。逻辑实证主义者确实非常明确地说过，对吧，任何不能被经验证实的陈述都是无意义的？
5:20
Yes. Except for the, as it were, segments of mathematics which was just true in virtue of the meanings of words, as it were. But certainly, all the statements of ethics or aesthetics or religion. And indeed, many everyday psychological statements, I suspect, by the positivist canon were meaningless. So whereas, for example, the logical positivists would have said that religious talk was meaningless, talk about god and so on was meaningless, because there was simply no way in which any of it was verifiable, the linguistic analysts might have been inclined to say before we pronounce this meaningless, let's have a very close look at what precisely the concepts are that are being used here, how they're being used, how they function within this universe of discourse and so on.
是的。除了那些——可以说是——数学的部分，那些仅凭词语的意义就为真的东西。但可以肯定，所有伦理学、美学或宗教的陈述，乃至我想还有许多日常的心理学陈述，按照实证主义的准则都是无意义的。所以，比如说，逻辑实证主义者会认为宗教话语是无意义的，谈论上帝之类的都是无意义的，因为这些根本没有任何办法加以证实，而语言分析哲学家则可能倾向于说，在我们宣布它无意义之前，先让我们仔细看看，这里用到的究竟是些什么概念，它们是怎么被使用的，在这个话语世界里是怎么发挥作用的，等等。
5:58
Oh yes. I mean, they not only might have been disposed, they were very disposed to say that and were always publishing books called Faith and Logic. That was the title they tended to have. Because it has got a rather curious, ironical, two sided aspect, that business. Because although linguistic philosophy, for instance, was as you say, kinder towards religious language than positivism had been, which at least did it the honor in a sense of showing it off the premises as empirically meaningless, the linguistic analysts were a little disposed to say well, here we have this form of discourse, which is one form of human life like any other. And of course, it implicitly already gave an extremely, as it were, humanistic interpretation of religion.
哦，是的。我的意思是，他们不仅可能倾向于这么说，他们是非常乐意这么说的，而且总在出版名为《信仰与逻辑》之类的书。他们的书名往往就是这种调调。因为这件事有一个相当奇特、颇具讽刺意味的两面性。因为尽管语言哲学，比方说，正如你所说，对宗教语言比逻辑实证主义要宽容——实证主义至少还算给了它一点面子，把它当作经验上无意义的东西请出门外——而语言分析哲学家则有点倾向于说，好吧，我们这里有这么一种话语形式，它和其他任何一种人类生活形式一样。而当然，这实际上已经隐含地给宗教作出了一种极其人本主义的解释。
03语言哲学 ≠ 语言的哲学
6:43
It tended just to regard religion and religious belief as a form of human life, as an expression of human needs. And while there are many, including some now among the clergy who would agree with that, it wasn't perhaps everybody's traditional idea of religious belief. We've distinguished linguistic philosophy from logical positivism. There's another distinction which I think is very important that we should make at the outset of this program. And that's the distinction between linguistic philosophy and the philosophy of language. Those two phrases are so similar.
它倾向于仅仅把宗教和宗教信仰看作一种人类生活形式，看作人类需求的一种表达。虽然有很多人——包括如今某些神职人员——会同意这种看法，但这也许并不是每个人心目中传统意义上的宗教信仰。我们已经把语言哲学和逻辑实证主义区分开了。我认为还有另一个区分非常重要，我们应该在本节目一开始就讲清楚。这就是语言哲学和语言的哲学之间的区别。这两个说法太相似了。
7:14
But I think someone unfamiliar with philosophy could easily be forgiven for mixing the two up or for supposing that they were names for the same thing. But they're not, are they? And I wonder if you would make clear what the distinction is? Well, I think that there is an important distinction there in the following sense. That the philosophy of language as I understand it is a branch of philosophy. It's an area of philosophy. It's that part of philosophy which particularly concerns itself with questions raised by language itself. It's now a very flourishing and indeed in many ways a very technical subject. And of course, it borders very closely on theoretical linguistics.
但我觉得，一个不熟悉哲学的人把这两者搞混，或者以为它们指的是同一个东西，那也是完全可以理解的。但它们并不是同一回事，对吧？我想请您说明一下，这两者的区别到底在哪里？嗯，我认为在下面这个意义上，两者确实有一个重要的区别。在我的理解中，语言的哲学是哲学的一个分支，是哲学的一个领域。它是哲学中特别关注由语言本身所引发的那些问题的部分。它现在是一门非常兴盛的学科，而且在很多方面也是一门非常专门化的学科。当然，它和理论语言学的边界靠得非常近。
7:53
Whereas I think we understood linguistic philosophy or linguistic analysis to be not a branch of philosophy, but a method of philosophy which addressed itself to philosophical questions raised all over the place. I mean, the questions of metaphysics, of ethics, questions about the meaning of ethical statements, what one ought to do and so on, and all other branches of philosophy, but offered a certain method for addressing those same questions, one which particularly laid emphasis on being self conscious about language in which those questions were raised.
而我认为，我们所理解的语言哲学，或者说语言分析，并不是哲学的一个分支，而是哲学的一种方法它所处理的是各个领域中冒出来的哲学问题。我是说，形而上学的问题、伦理学的问题，关于伦理陈述含义的问题、人应该做什么之类的问题，以及哲学的其他所有分支，但它为处理这些同样的问题提供了一种特定的方法，这种方法特别强调要对提出这些问题所用的语言保持自觉。
04「消解而非解决」的许诺
8:29
And of course, it did offer a certain promise, didn't it? I mean, precisely because the idea was that there was no content in any part of our conceptual scheme that was not put there by us, and therefore, if you carried out a thorough analysis of the way a particular concept functioned, there was no remainder. Nothing was left over. The projection of this into philosophical investigation was expected to result in the problem's being finally solved, wasn't it? Well, yes. The phrase that so often was used, and I think still can be. It was not solved but dissolved. The idea was that many of the traditional problems of philosophy had been based on a misunderstanding, a very simple idea of how our language worked.
当然，它确实给出了某种许诺，不是吗？我是说，正因为那个想法是：我们概念框架中的任何部分，其内容无一不是我们自己放进去的，因此，如果你对某个概念的运作方式做了彻底的分析，就不会有剩余，什么都不会留下。把这一点投射到哲学研究上，人们就期待问题最终会被解决，对吧？嗯，是的。当时经常被使用的说法——我想现在仍然可以用——是：问题不是被解决，而是被消解了。这个想法是，哲学的许多传统问题都建立在一种误解之上，一种关于我们语言如何运作的过于简单的看法。
9:17
And once the two became self conscious about the way our language worked, came to understand the kind of meaning that we'd given our expressions, you'd see that, as it were, you couldn't just put some words together and hope that these problems would find their own destination, if I can put it that way. Thought couldn't just whiz through the words and get to reality. Our questions meant just what we made them mean, as it were. It was only our practice which determined what these questions meant. Now that meant that a lot of questions of philosophy weren't one question at all. The idea was they were often a collection of different worries, different puzzles which had been put together under some simplifying formula, that when you saw through that-- and remember it's also called linguistic analysis-- and analytically taken the problems apart-- then you'd find that many of the traditional questions of philosophy had not just been solved, but had disappeared.
而一旦人们对语言的运作方式变得自觉，理解了我们赋予自己表达式的那种意义，你就会发现，你不能只是把一些词凑在一起，然后指望这些问题自己找到归宿，如果可以这么说的话。思想不可能就那样嗖地穿过词语，直接抵达实在。我们的问题，其含义就是我们所赋予它的，可以这么说。只有我们的实践才决定了这些问题意味着什么。这就意味着，哲学中的很多问题根本就不是一个问题。这个想法是，它们往往是一堆不同的困扰、不同的谜团，被硬凑在某个简化的公式底下；当你看穿这一点——别忘了它也被称作语言分析——并用分析的方式把问题拆开，你就会发现，哲学的许多传统问题不只是被解决了，而是消失了。
10:16
You no longer needed to ask them anymore. And the promise that this offered of this being so was very great and extremely exciting. And I mean, there really were people around who were saying the whole of philosophy would be over in 50 years. It would all be finished. We'd have exhaustively analyzed the use of all the basic concepts. And when we've done that, there'll be nothing left to do. Or at least you'll have got rid of the ones that give rise to the problems. The characteristic philosophical problems.
你再也不需要去问它们了。而这种前景所许诺的东西非常宏大，也极其令人兴奋。我是说，当时真的有人在说，整个哲学会在五十年内终结，全都会结束。我们将把所有基本概念的用法都彻底分析清楚。等做完这件事，就没什么可做的了。或者至少你会摆脱掉那些引发问题的概念。那些典型的哲学问题。
05哲学可用于一切领域？
10:41
The traditional philosophical problems. Yes. Sure. But of course, that's slightly at odds with another promise, as it were, held up by linguistic philosophy, and it's this. The logical positivists kept philosophy tied to science's apron strings in a way that you described a moment ago. But as you explained, the linguistic philosophers were prepared to look at anything and everything. Yeah. And one consequence of that was that philosophical techniques were thought of as being techniques that could be applied to literally every field of human discourse that there is.
那些传统的哲学问题。是的，没错。不过当然，这跟语言哲学所举起的另一个许诺略有冲突，是这样的：逻辑实证主义者把哲学拴在科学的围裙带上，就像你刚才描述的那样。但正如你所解释的，语言哲学家们愿意去看任何东西、一切东西。是的。而这带来的一个后果是，哲学的技术被认为是可以应用于人类话语的每一个领域的技术。
11:17
Mmm. There's no reason why you shouldn't, on these assumptions, have a philosophy of medicine, a philosophy of economics, a philosophy of population theory, a philosophy of sport, a philosophy of anything. Because in any field, let's take medicine for example, you could take some of the characteristic and central concepts. In medicine it would be, shall we say, health, disease, cure. All of which are in fact, deeply problematic concepts once you start seriously considering them. And you could, as it were, give them the treatment. You could turn the blowtorch, as it were. You could use these philosophical techniques of analysis on them, thereby clarifying all discourse in that particular field. Now the very fact that this was thought to be applicable to all fields of human discourse seems to present you with an endless task-- Ah.
嗯。按照这些前提，没有理由说你不能有一门医学哲学、一门经济学哲学、一门人口理论哲学、一门体育哲学，一门关于任何东西的哲学。因为在任何领域里——就拿医学来说吧——你都可以挑出一些典型的、核心的概念。在医学中，那可能是比方说健康、疾病、治愈。而所有这些其实一旦你开始认真思考，都是极成问题的概念。于是你就可以给它们来上那么一套。你可以把喷灯对准它们，可以对它们使用这些哲学分析技术，从而澄清那个特定领域中的全部话语。而正因为这被认为适用于人类话语的所有领域，这似乎就给你摆出了一项没有尽头的任务——啊。
12:10
If you're thinking in terms of exhaustive analysis. Yes. That's why I think one wouldn't want to say that anyone ever thought that all the concepts could be clarified. What they thought was that the problems could be. I mean, the major problems could be dissolved. And that's because there was a view about where the major problems came from. Of course, there are philosophical conceptual questions to be answered about medicine. And I mean, there are. I mean, people now are equally interested in, and perhaps even more interested in these same issues you just referred to about health and so on. Interesting application of course, that is in the case of mental health, where the very concept of mental illness has been found problematical by some people and philosophical inquiry has gone on on that basis.
如果你是按穷尽式分析来设想的话。是的。所以我想，没有人会愿意说曾有谁认为所有概念都能被澄清。他们认为能被澄清的是那些问题。我是说，主要的问题是可以被消解的。这是因为当时有一种关于主要问题从何而来的看法。当然，关于医学确实存在有待回答的哲学性的概念问题。确实有。我是说，如今人们同样感兴趣，甚至更感兴趣于你刚才提到的关于健康之类的这些议题。一个有意思的应用当然是在心理健康这方面，有些人认为精神疾病这个概念本身就成问题，围绕这一点已经展开了哲学探究。
12:53
But no, to go back to the preoccupations of linguistic philosophy, the central problems, I think, were found to arise in two sorts of ways. First of all, with enormously general concepts. Not concepts as specific as health, but ones that arise all over the place. Like the notion of something being the same as something else or the notion of something causing something else or just the notion of something changing. The concepts of time and space and so on, these are notions which we use in all fields of discourse. And their very general character gave rise to, as indeed traditionally has given rise to, a central corpus of philosophical problems in trying to understand these notions.
不过还是回到语言哲学关注的东西吧，那些核心问题，我认为被发现是以两种方式产生的。首先，是那些极其一般的概念。不是像健康那样具体的概念，而是到处都会出现的那些。比如某物与另一物相同这个概念，或者某物引起另一物这个概念，或者仅仅是某物发生变化这个概念。时间和空间的概念等等，这些是我们在一切话语领域中都会用到的观念。而它们极其一般的性质引发了——正如传统上一直引发的那样——一批在理解这些观念时产生的核心哲学问题。
13:34
The second important area was perceived, and I think rightly perceived, to arise on the borderline between two different kinds of discourse. For instance, on the borderline between talking about physical things and talking about psychological things. And the book by Ryle to which you referred, The Concept of Mind, was specifically an attempt to apply the sorts of techniques that linguistic analysis used to questions like how do we know that other people have experiences? What is it for a living solid thing to have faults? And questions of this kind.
第二个重要的领域，被认为——我想这看法是对的——产生于两种不同话语之间的边界地带。比如说，在谈论物理事物和谈论心理事物之间的边界上。而你提到的赖尔那本书《心的概念》，正是试图把语言分析所用的那类技术应用于这样的问题：我们怎么知道别人有体验？一个活着的、有形的东西具有种种缺陷意味着什么？以及诸如此类的问题。
06魔咒何来：日常例子的深意
14:07
Now indeed, these were not new problems. Put in that form, they are very old problems of philosophy. And the whole point was that if you took that area where the problems were very pressing and used these techniques, the problems wouldn't look the same as they did before. They would dissolve into a series of separate conceptual issues that we might be able to handle. Apart from this promise of solutions to all problems, which is obviously extremely attractive, what was the special appeal of linguistic philosophy to so many very clever people? Because it did seem to have a sort of spellbinding people for many people. People caught it almost like a disease.
的确，这些并不是新问题。以那种形式提出来，它们是非常古老的哲学问题。而关键在于，如果你抓住那个问题极为紧迫的领域，运用这些技术，问题看上去就不会和从前一样了。它们会消解成一系列彼此分离、我们或许有能力处理的概念性议题。除了这种解决一切问题的许诺——它显然极具吸引力——之外，语言哲学对那么多非常聪明的人还有什么特别的吸引力？因为它对很多人来说似乎确实有一种令人着迷的力量。人们几乎像染上一种病似的被它感染。
14:43
Yeah. I think there were less deep and more deep reasons for that. I think that one of the deeper ones was that it presented, in almost all its forms, it presented some contrast or other between the depth and serious of the motivation and the everydayness of the style. The examples were everyday. There was a rather deliberate attempt to avoid portentous philosophical technical terminology of any kind. It didn't sound high flown. There was possibly a rather downbeat style. And because one felt at the same time that actually, though it didn't necessarily look like it, one was doing something rather serious, that provided a particular kind of what might be called Socratic pleasure. It had, as it were, the everyday, rather dry ironical aspect of the material serving what, as it were, we all knew was a deeper purpose. Now that came out rather differently in the Wittgenstein style to which you referred and in the Oxfordian style, which is rather more deliberately dry.
是的。我想原因有比较浅的，也有比较深的。我认为较深的原因之一是，它在几乎所有形态中都呈现出某种反差，即动机的深刻与严肃，和风格的日常化之间的反差。例子都是日常的。它相当刻意地避免任何一种故作高深的哲学专门术语。它听上去并不高蹈。风格可能相当低调。而正因为你同时感到，尽管表面上未必看得出来，你其实是在做一件相当严肃的事，这就带来了一种特别的、可以称之为苏格拉底式的愉悦。可以说，那种日常的、相当干巴巴而带反讽意味的材料，服务于一个我们都心知肚明的更深的目的。这一点在你提到的维特根斯坦式风格中，和在牛津式风格中表现得相当不同，后者刻意干巴的程度更高一些。
15:48
Yes. There's a remark of Austin's which was rather famous at the time. When he would give one of these seminars and he would be concerned with what, I mean, portentous [INAUDIBLE] problems about free will and responsibility and so on. But actually he would never say that. What he was doing, he was discussing the difference between doing something inadvertently or by mistake or accidentally and so forth. And at some point, some visitor would say, Professor Austin, what great problems of philosophy are illuminated by these inquiries? To which Austin would say, "Roughly all of them."
是的。奥斯汀有一句话当时相当有名。他在开这类研讨班的时候，他关心的其实是那些我是说，关于自由意志和责任之类故作宏大的问题。但他实际上从不这么说。他在做的事，是讨论无意间做某事、弄错了做某事、偶然做某事等等之间的区别。到某个时候，会有个来访者说：奥斯汀教授，这些探究照亮了哪些伟大的哲学问题？奥斯汀会回答：“大致上，所有的。”
16:20
[LAUGHS] And this somehow struck the note. Yeah. I mean, as you can see in the-- I think a lot of people were misled by the triviality of the examples. I mean, mind you, this has gone on throughout the history of philosophy. Yeah. I mean, in an earlier generation there was a well known moral philosopher who wrote chapter after chapter about the problems raised by whether or not you ought to give a book back once you'd borrowed it, and what kind of an ought that was and how-- Well, only one chapter, to be fair. [LAUGHS] Well, one chapter, yes. But I mean, that was the subject of many jokes.
（笑）这话不知怎么就点中了那个调子。是的。我是说，正如你能看到的——我想很多人被那些例子的琐碎给误导了。我是说，不过话说回来，这种情况在哲学史上一直都有。是啊。我是说，上一代有一位很有名的道德哲学家，一章接一章地写关于借了书之后该不该还所引出的问题，那是哪一种“应当”，以及如何——嗯，公平地说，只有一章。（笑）嗯，一章，是的。不过我是说，那成了许多笑话的题材。
16:52
Yeah. But of course, the point there was that this was not a man agonizing over whether or not to return a book, but considering the whole nature of moral obligation and so on. Now in the case of linguistic philosophy, I think this was also true, wasn't it? Although linguistic philosophers, as you say, deliberately adopted a rather deflationary style and deliberately employed trivial seeming examples, there was a serious reason for employing trivial examples. Namely they wanted nothing in what they were saying to hinge on the particular example.
是啊。但当然，关键在于，那并不是一个人在为要不要还书而痛苦纠结，而是在考察道德义务的整个性质等等。那么在语言哲学这个例子上，我想情况也是一样的，不是吗？虽然语言哲学家们，像你说的，刻意采取了一种相当降调的风格，刻意使用看似琐碎的例子，但使用琐碎的例子是有严肃理由的。也就是说，他们不希望自己所说的东西有任何一点取决于那个特定的例子。
17:25
That's right, that's right. And they realized that I think part of the idea was that if you took some immediately obvious grand or dramatic or apparently profound example, then you were faced with two alternatives. Either it really was profound, in which case it was almost certainly too complex and hard to start with. We ought to have gotten there by taking some more everyday concern first. Or else it wasn't and it was just bogus. It was part of, as it were, the traditional rhetoric of philosophy.
对，没错。而且他们意识到——我想这个想法的一部分是——如果你选了某个一眼看去宏大、戏剧性或者看似深刻的例子，那你就会面临两种可能。要么它确实是深刻的，那样的话它几乎肯定太复杂、太难，不适合当起点。我们本该先从某个更日常的问题入手才对。要么它并不深刻，那它就纯属虚张声势，属于哲学传统修辞的一部分。
17:54
And of course, part of the charm of doing the subject this way was that it deflated, it exposed much of a traditional rhetoric of philosophy. I think myself that there was a deep concern behind the choice of the simple examples, the downbeat style. Though to be fair, it was probably rather more urgently felt in the Wittgensteinian styles than it was in some of the Oxfordian styles, where I think some of it really was just done because it was fun. Yeah. I mean, and so on. Now I think one has to say-- this isn't our major point I think at the moment-- but I myself want to say that I think this was a much sounder enterprise when people were talking about perception or the theory of knowledge. I think you really should be able to talk about that in a very everyday context. Or again, when one was talking about certain problems and theory of meaning that it was when one was talking about ethics or politics.
当然，用这种方式做哲学的魅力之一，正在于它戳破了、揭穿了哲学传统修辞中的许多东西。我自己认为，在选择简单例子、采用低调风格的背后，有一种深切的关怀。不过公平地说，这种关怀在维特根斯坦式的风格里，大概比在某些牛津式风格里感受得更为迫切，在后者那里，我觉得有些做法真的只是因为好玩。是啊。我是说，诸如此类。现在我想必须说——我觉得这眼下并不是我们的主要论点——但我自己想说的是，我认为这门事业要稳健得多，当人们谈论知觉或知识论的时候。我认为你确实应该能在非常日常的语境里谈论这些。或者再比如，当人们谈论意义理论中的某些问题时，它比谈论伦理学或政治时要稳健得多。
07清晰的责任与文学传统
18:48
And it's not uncharacteristic that in fact, political philosophy never never prospered under this regime at all. It's just not a subject that ever took to it. And I think that's connected with this fact. I mean, it's because the categories of the dramatic and the serious are themselves political and moral categories. Yeah. And that's not true about seeing and knowing and counting and these other concepts. I suppose another aspect of the appeal of linguistic philosophy to clever people is the inculcation of the very salutary self consciousness about the use of language. I mean, almost the inculcation of a new kind of responsibility.
而且事实上，政治哲学在这套体制下从来就没有兴旺过，这并非偶然。它就是一门从来没有接受这套做法的学科。我认为这跟这一点是有关联的。我是说，因为「戏剧性的」和「严肃的」这些范畴本身就是政治和道德的范畴。是啊。而看、知道、计数以及其他这类概念，情况就不是这样。我想，语言哲学之所以吸引聪明人，另一个方面在于它培养出一种对语言使用极其有益的自觉。我是说，几乎可以说是培养出一种新的责任感。
19:28
The insistence that it really does matter that you express yourself scrupulously clearly. Yes. I think this is extremely important, what the nature of this self awareness was. And it's interesting that though some people have criticized linguistic philosophy for being pedantic or just lexicographical or trivial in these respects or worrying too much about small points of verbal formulation, in fact it's the same demand that is being made often by poets. For instance, by Auden in much of his work. And by very self conscious writers, in particular, oddly enough by Yeats, who felt that somehow the integrity of meaning, the fact that you should say no more and less than what you mean or that you should be self aware about what that is is itself a bulwark against, as it were, dissolution, terror, splurge.
它坚持认为，你能不能一丝不苟地把自己表达清楚，这真的很重要。是的。我认为这一点极其重要，也就是这种自觉究竟是什么性质。有意思的是，尽管有人批评语言哲学在这些方面迂腐、只是在做词典编纂式的工作、琐碎，或者过分纠结于措辞上的细枝末节，但事实上，诗人们常常提出的正是同样的要求。比如奥登在他的许多作品中就是如此。还有那些非常有自觉意识的作家，尤其是——说来也怪——叶芝，他觉得意义的完整性，也就是你说的话不多不少正好是你想说的意思，或者说你对自己想说的是什么保持自觉，这本身就是一道堤坝，抵御那种消解、恐惧和泛滥。
20:26
Karl Kraus, George Orwell. There's almost a literature articulating that point of view, isn't there? The feeling of the resistance of the pollution of the mind by muddled speech. And that the resistance that they wouldn't have been put in the downbeat tone that was then prevailing, certainly at the Oxford end of the proceedings. It would rather more in the Wittgensteinian way. And we have to remember that Wittgenstein came from Vienna, where this had for a long time been a very deeply felt concern.
卡尔·克劳斯、乔治·奥威尔。几乎有一整套文学在阐发这种观点，不是吗？那种抗拒——抗拒含混的言辞对心灵的污染。而这种抗拒，当时在牛津那一头流行的那种低调口吻里，是不会那样表述出来的。倒是更接近维特根斯坦的方式。我们得记住，维特根斯坦来自维也纳，在那里，这早已是一件让人深切关注的事情。
20:53
At the Oxford end, it wouldn't have been put like that. Because that would itself sound rather high flown. But in fact, that was undoubtedly part of the motivation, and in my view an important one. I think this is a point worth making, that this did make it at Oxford for example, where you and I both studied the subject. I think it did make it enormously valuable form of intellectual training for young people, for students. This insistence on clarity, on responsibility, on paying serious attention to very small differences and distinctions in meaning.
在牛津那一头，人们不会那么说。因为那听起来会显得过于高调。但事实上，那无疑是动机的一部分，而且在我看来是很重要的一部分。我认为这一点值得一提：这确实使得——比如在牛津，你我都在那里学这门学科——它确实成了一种极有价值的智性训练，对年轻人、对学生而言。这种对清晰的坚持，对责任的坚持，对意义上极细微的差别与区分的认真对待。
08维特根斯坦与黑格尔：清晰是什么
21:20
It's a very good form of mental training, quite apart from its philosophical importance. Yes, it certainly had very positive aspects. I think it has to be said that it had some negative aspects in that respect as well. Yeah, I want to come to those later and not quite yet. Yeah, sure. Yeah. We've talked about the commitment to clarity. But this raises one or two questions in one's mind immediately. For example, the most distinguished of all the linguistic philosophers I suppose most people would agree was the later Wittgenstein. And no one could say that he is clear. On the contrary, a profoundly difficult philosopher to understand.
这是一种非常好的心智训练，撇开它在哲学上的重要性不谈也是如此。是的，它确实有非常积极的方面。不过我想也必须说，它在这方面也有一些消极的方面。是的，这些我想稍后再谈，现在还不急。好的，当然。是的。我们谈到了对清晰的执着。但这立刻让人想到一两个问题。比如说，所有语言哲学家当中最杰出的一位，我想多数人会同意，是后期的维特根斯坦。可没人能说他是清晰的。恰恰相反，他是一位极难理解的哲学家。
21:58
And I might link this with another point, which you may want to take separately, I don't know. But I'll make it now. I do think that the linguistic philosophers, because of their passionate commitment to clarity, profoundly-- and I mean the word profoundly-- underrated the value of some philosophers who aren't clear, because they're not clear. And the outstanding example there I would say is Hegel. When we were undergraduates, Hegel was dismissed with utter contempt by most professional philosophers, largely because he is obscure. Difficult to read, difficult to follow. It was dismissed as being garbage, rubbish, not worth serious intellectual consideration.
我或许可以把这一点和另一点联系起来，你可能想分开来谈，我不知道。但我现在就说出来。我确实认为，语言哲学家们由于对清晰的执着，深深地——我用「深深地」这个词——低估了某些不清晰的哲学家的价值，就因为他们不清晰。我想那里最突出的例子就是黑格尔。我们读本科的时候，大多数职业哲学家对黑格尔是极其轻蔑地一笔带过，很大程度上就因为他晦涩。难读，难以跟上。他被斥为垃圾、废话，不值得认真的智性考量。
22:37
Now that was obviously a profound mistake. In other words, clarity was given importance as a value in philosophy, which I think in retrospect, it can be seen not actually to have. I think clarity turns out to be a more complex notion than perhaps people thought, or some people thought at the time. I think the case of Hegel is complex, because I don't think it just was because he was difficult. It was certainly because he was difficult in a certain way. For instance, I don't think that Kant ever underwent the degree of dismissal to which you refer.
这显然是个严重的错误。换句话说，清晰在哲学中被赋予了一种价值上的重要性，而我认为回过头看，可以发现它其实并不具有那样的地位。我认为清晰这个概念，比当时有些人所设想的要复杂。我觉得黑格尔的情况很复杂，因为我不认为仅仅是因为他难懂。那当然是因为他以某种特定的方式难懂。比如说，我不认为康德曾经遭受过你所说的那种程度的摒弃。
23:11
No, no. And I don't think anyone could say that Kant or [INAUDIBLE] language were of a preeminently easy kind at the very least. I think also, one has to add that there were certain historical reasons why Hegel was ideologically suspect to a extremely high degree. I mean, it was thought that a particular-- [INAUDIBLE] totalitarian. Totalitarianism. And he was thought, I think somewhat erroneously, to be connected with as it were, Hitlerian deformations in the German consciousness. And errors of this kind were committed, but of a kind which are not unfamiliar. I think there was a historical context to that.
不，没有。而且我想没人会说康德的语言是特别容易的那一类，至少可以这么讲。我还想说，必须补充的是，黑格尔在意识形态上被高度怀疑，是有某些历史原因的。我是说，人们当时认为——（听不清）极权主义的。极权主义。而且人们认为——我觉得这多少是错的——他跟德国意识里那种希特勒式的畸变有关联。这类错误确实被犯下了，但这种错误并不陌生。我认为那背后是有历史语境的。
23:41
But you're right in saying that the view of the history of philosophy was very selective and in a way, governed by some concept of clarity. Now there's certainly a difference, if you look at the writings of Austin, and you look at the writings of Wittgenstein. Now it's not because when one says that the difference is the Austin's are clear in a way that Wittgenstein's isn't. I think what one means is, doesn't one, that Austin's is somehow more literal minded than Wittgenstein? Yeah. Sure. You see, there are very few sentences in the Philosophical Investigations which you referred to which aren't perfectly straightforward sentences. They don't have ambiguous grammar or obscure nouns in them. They-- What is difficult to understand is why he's saying them.
不过你说得对，当时对哲学史的看法非常有选择性，而且在某种程度上受某个清晰概念的支配。现在确实有个差别，如果你去看奥斯汀的著作，再去看维特根斯坦的著作。当人们说这个差别在于奥斯汀清晰而维特根斯坦不清晰时，其实并不是那个意思。我想人们的意思是——不是吗——奥斯汀不知怎么地比维特根斯坦更拘泥于字面？是的，没错。你看，在你提到的《哲学研究》里，几乎每一句都是完全直白的句子。它们并没有歧义的语法或晦涩的名词。难以理解的是他为什么要说这些话。
24:31
That's right. I mean, they contain sentences like, "If a lion should speak, we would not understand him." Yeah. Now that sentence, the point is, the question is, why is it there? Yeah. And I think that why it's difficult to follow is because of an ambiguity, a very deep ambiguity, about how far it's harnessed to an argument. In Austin, or any of another of many other linguistic philosophies we could refer to, there are, as in some other philosophers, pretty explicit arguments. There's a good deal of therefore and since and because and it will now be proved in a certain way.
对。我是说，书里有这样的句子：「如果一头狮子会说话，我们也无法理解它。」是啊。那么这句话，关键在于，问题在于：它为什么会出现在那里？是啊。我认为它之所以难以跟上，是因为一种含混，一种非常深的含混：它在多大程度上是服务于某个论证的。在奥斯汀那里，或者在我们可以提到的许多其他语言哲学家那里，跟某些别的哲学家一样，有相当明确的论证。有大量的「因此」「既然」「因为」，还有「现在将以某种方式加以证明」。
25:06
[LAUGHS] Yeah. In Wittgenstein, there are extremely few. I mean, it consists of curious sorts of conversations with himself. And epigrams and apothegms and reminders and things of this kind. And this is connected with a very deeply radical view he had about philosophy that had got nothing to do with proof or argument at all. So radical was his view about the peculiarity of philosophical problems that he thought that so unlike was his approach to them to that of solving a problems in the sciences that he thought you didn't do it by trying to argue somebody into something. You did it by, as he says at one point, "Assembling reminders of the way we normally go on." Which philosophy tends to disposes us to forget.
（笑）是啊。而在维特根斯坦那里极少。我是说，它由一种奇特的自言自语式对话组成。还有警句、格言、提醒之类的东西。这跟他关于哲学的一个极其激进的看法有关：哲学跟证明或论证毫不相干。他关于哲学问题之特殊性的看法如此激进，以至于他认为自己处理这些问题的方式跟解决科学问题的方式如此不同，所以他认为你不是靠把某人论证到某个立场上去来做这件事。你做这件事的方式，用他某处的话说，是「汇集我们通常如何行事的提醒」。而哲学往往使我们忘掉这些。
25:48
It's more like trying to get people to see things in a certain way-- That's right. Which works of art commonly do, don't they? Yeah. Plays and novels and so on. With the suggestion that when we see them in this way, we will see them in a way uncorrupted by the theoretical oversimplifications of philosophy. Yes. Yes. Whereas now that strain is common to all versions of linguistic philosophy. It's very important idea that, that the idea of clarity here is connected oddly enough with substituting complexity for obscurity. It's allowed to be complex, because life is complex.
这更像是设法让人们以某种方式看待事物——对，就是这样。而这正是艺术作品通常在做的事，不是吗？是啊。戏剧、小说之类的。并且暗示：当我们这样去看它们时，我们看到的方式就不会被哲学的理论化过度简化所败坏。是的，是的。不过这条线索是各种版本的语言哲学所共有的。这个想法非常重要：这里的清晰概念，说来也怪，是跟以复杂性取代晦涩联系在一起的。它允许复杂，因为生活本来就复杂。
26:23
Yes. And while one of the great accusations against previous philosophers is that, although they've been dark and difficult and solemn, what they've actually done is vastly oversimplified. They've produced contrast between appearance and reality or something. But the suggestion is if you actually think about the various ways in which things can appear to be one thing or really be another and so on, or what reality might be taken to be, you'll find that our whole collection of thoughts about this is much more complex than we'd originally supposed.
是的。而针对以往哲学家的一大指控就是，尽管他们晦暗、艰深、庄严，但他们实际做的却是极大地简化了事情。他们造出了现象与实在之类的对立。但这里的意思是，如果你真的去想想事物显得是这样、实际却是那样的种种方式，或者实在可能被理解成什么，你就会发现，我们关于这件事的全部想法要比原先设想的复杂得多。
09根本局限：低估理论
26:53
We were saying a few minutes ago how, whatever it was, say 20 years ago in the new dawn of linguistic philosophy, people were inclined to think that given enough time by the use of these techniques, the fundamental problems of philosophy would be solved in about 20 years. Well, 20 years has now passed, and of course, the fundamental problems of philosophy have not been solved. And although linguistic philosophy had these very great merits that we've talked about, the commitment to clarity and all the other things we've just been discussing, there was clearly something fundamentally mistaken in its expectations for itself or its attitude to the subject. And let's now talk about what its shortcomings were.
我们几分钟前说到，大概是二十年前吧，在语言哲学的新黎明里，人们倾向于认为，只要给足时间，用这些方法，哲学的根本问题大约二十年就能解决。可是二十年已经过去了，哲学的根本问题当然并没有被解决。尽管语言哲学具有我们谈到的这些巨大优点，对清晰的执着，以及我们刚刚讨论的其他种种，它对自身的期待，或者说它对这门学科的态度，显然有某种根本性的错误。现在我们来谈谈它的不足之处。
27:38
Fair to say of course that all bright dawns of philosophical revolutions-- and we can list about five immediately which people have said, we have now found the right path-- why is philosophy been floundering around before? Now we now have the right path. They all tend to encounter their own problems of their own methods before very long, and that of linguistic analysis is not alone in that. I think that what the basic mistake, if we can speak of a basic mistake, it's basic limitation was that it underestimated, in my view, the importance of theory.
当然，公平地说，所有哲学革命的明亮黎明——我们马上就能列出五个左右，人们都曾说：我们现在终于找到了正确的道路，哲学以前为什么一直在瞎摸索？我们现在有了正确的路径。它们全都会在不太久之后遇到自身方法带来的问题，语言分析在这一点上并不特殊。我认为，如果可以谈一个根本错误的话，它根本的局限在于，在我看来，它低估了理论的重要性。
28:13
It above all underestimated the importance of theory inside philosophy. It had a rather ancillary tendency to underestimate the importance of theory in other subjects as well. I don't think it had a very clear idea about the importance of theory, even in the sciences. Let me make sure that I know what you mean when you talk about the unimportance of theory. The linguistic analysts tend to pick up with their tweezers one concept at a time and analyze it, sometimes in Austin's case, almost in dissociation from everything else, without any reference to an explanatory area as background and so on. Is that what you're referring to?
它首先低估了哲学内部理论的重要性。它还附带地倾向于低估其他学科中理论的重要性。我不认为它对理论的重要性有很清楚的认识，哪怕是在科学里。我想确认一下，你说理论不受重视时，指的是什么。语言分析者倾向于用镊子一次夹起一个概念来分析，有时候在奥斯汀那里，几乎是把它跟其他一切都割裂开来，完全不参照任何作为背景的解释性领域之类的东西。你指的是这个吗？
28:53
That's the sort of idea. Yes. I think that what we tend to do is to pick up some distinction or opposition and go very carefully into that and the various nuances that might be attached to that, and order or state them. Without perhaps enough reflection on what background made this distinction or set of distinctions rather than some other set of distinction of any interest or importance. 'Cause you were doing the subject in a piecemeal way. And indeed the word piecemeal-- That's right. Was one that you yourselves often used, wasn't it?
大致就是这个意思。是的。我认为我们惯常的做法是，拈起某个区分或对立，非常仔细地探究它以及可能附着于其上的种种细微差别，把它们排列或陈述出来。却或许没有充分反思：是什么样的背景使得这一组区分——而不是别的某一组区分——变得有意思或重要。因为你们是以零敲碎打的方式在做这门学科。而且「零敲碎打」这个词——对。正是你们自己常用的一个词，不是吗？
29:25
Frequently. Piecemeal was a term of praise. And there was rather an interesting analogy which Austin used at one point when people complained about the multiplication of distinctions. And he said, why are people so afraid of the multiplication of distinctions, distinctions of sorts of language or whatever it may be. He said, whatever there are, there are over 10,000 subspecies of a certain kind of beetle or beetles or some sort of insect. And why can't we just discover that number of distinctions about language?
经常用。「零敲碎打」是个褒义词。有一个挺有意思的类比，是奥斯汀在人们抱怨区分太多时用过的。他说，人们为什么这么怕区分越分越多呢，不管是语言种类的区分还是别的什么。他说，无论如何，某一类甲虫，或者某种昆虫，有一万多个亚种。那我们为什么就不能发现语言上同样数量的区分呢？
29:57
But the answer of course is that our grounds for distinguishing species of beetles from one another are grounded in a certain theoretical understanding of what makes species different, an understanding given by the theory of evolution. Unless you've got some background theoretical understanding, anything's as different from anything else as you like. You've got to have it rooted in the sense of what makes one distinction more important than another. You've got to have a frame of reference. A frame of reference.
但答案当然是：我们把甲虫的不同物种区分开来的依据，是建立在某种关于物种差别成因的理论理解之上的，那是进化论提供的理解。除非你有某种背景性的理论理解，否则任何东西跟任何别的东西都可以随你说有多不同。你必须把它扎根于某种感觉之中：是什么使一个区分比另一个更重要。你必须有一个参照框架。一个参照框架。
10脱离题材、缺乏历史感
30:20
And that framework is a theory. I think that has to be said, yes. And I think that that wasn't adequately acknowledged. I mean, people did say, they varied to the degree to which they said you can do it bit by bit or you have to do more at a time. But I think the acknowledgement that the problems were only set by, the distinctions were only given as substance by a background of some more theoretical or systematic understanding. That point, I think, was more generally overlooked. I was talking earlier about the way linguistic philosophers tended to bring the tool kit to any one of a variety of different fields of discourse. And that I think relates now in our present stage of this discussion to one of the important shortcomings of linguistic philosophy in practice as an approach. And that was that philosophers tended to regard philosophy too much as separated from, or at least separable from any subject matter.
而那个框架就是理论。我想这是必须承认的，是的。而我认为这一点当时没有得到充分承认。我是说，人们确实说过，只是在「你可以一点一点做」还是「你必须一次做得更多」上程度不同。但我认为，那种承认——问题只有靠某种更具理论性或系统性的理解作为背景才被提出来，区分也只有靠这样的背景才获得实质——这一点，我想更普遍地被忽略了。我先前谈到语言哲学家倾向于把这套工具箱带到各种不同的话语领域去。而我认为，在我们讨论的现阶段，这就关联到语言哲学作为一种进路在实践中的一个重要缺陷。那就是，哲学家们倾向于过分把哲学看作与任何题材相分离，或者至少是可以分离的。
31:18
I remember one of the most distinguished philosophers in the country saying to me about 15 years ago, you don't have to do anything to be good at philosophy. All you have to be is clever and interested in the subject. [LAUGHS] Well, I think that he was certainly more honest than some. Why, I think that a lot of people thought that, but wouldn't have had the cheek to say it. I think that remark sounds-- and perhaps it's quite interesting historical reflection as you imply on how things looked-- that that remark would certainly have sounded at least a great deal less quaint when it was uttered than I think it indisputably does know.
我记得大约十五年前，这个国家最杰出的哲学家之一对我说：要想在哲学上出色，你什么都不必去做。你只需要聪明，并且对这门学科感兴趣就行了。（笑）嗯，我想他肯定比某些人更诚实。为什么呢，我觉得很多人都这么想，只是没那个脸说出来。我想那句话听起来——而且正如你所暗示的，这或许是一个挺有意思的历史反思，关于当时事情看上去是什么样子——那句话在当时听起来，肯定远没有那么古怪。在当时被说出来的时候，比起如今无可争议的情形来说。
31:51
Yes. And this was connected with-- and I think this is in a way, another side of the point we were making earlier about the revolutionary sense of this philosophy. You see, it worked in part by making one feel that the nature of philosophy had been misunderstood. That people had gone on about philosophy just as if they were charting the philosophical realm or doing a sort of special kind of super science. And now we had a sort of self consciousness about philosophy, which meant you couldn't assume it was like that.
是的。而这跟——我想在某种意义上，这是我们先前谈到的这种哲学的革命性意味的另一面。你看，它部分是通过让人感到哲学的性质一直以来都被误解了，才起作用的。人们大谈哲学，就好像他们是在给哲学领域绘制地图，或者在做某种特殊的超级科学。而现在我们对哲学有了一种自觉，这意味着你不能再假定它是那样的了。
32:21
And as I said already, in the case of Wittgenstein, the self consciousness was so profoundly doubting that he had grave doubts about the existence of philosophy at all, except as a kind of-- well sometimes some of his followers said neurosis or aberration or something that happens when our conceptions of ourselves go wrong. Now that radical feeling, revolutionary feeling about philosophy, also made people frightfully and overly self conscious about what philosophy was and encouraged the feeling that it was frightfully different from anything else.
而正如我已经说过的，在维特根斯坦那里，这种自觉的怀疑如此之深，以至于他严重怀疑哲学究竟是否存在，除非把它当作某种——嗯，他的一些追随者有时说是神经症、是偏差，是我们对自身的构想出了问题时发生的事情。而这种关于哲学的激进感受、革命性感受，也让人们对哲学究竟是什么变得极度而过分地自觉，助长了一种感觉，好像它跟别的一切都截然不同。
32:53
That in turn made everybody think that the sciences for instance, were not, in themselves, philosophical. They didn't have a philosophical part to them. There was philosophy and there were the first order subjects. Now I think now that people would once more be very conscious that there are parts of science which are themselves the philosophy of science. There's parts of linguistics which are the philosophy linguistics. There's a good deal of psychology which is the philosophy of psychology. And here there's a no man's land which you both have to have philosophical skills and also you have to know about these sciences or the other relevant subjects and that this dichotomy can't be made.
这反过来又让所有人都认为，比如说各门科学本身并不具有哲学性。它们内部没有一个哲学的部分。有哲学，然后有那些一阶的学科。而我认为，如今人们会重新非常清楚地意识到，科学中有些部分本身就是科学哲学。语言学中有些部分就是语言学哲学。心理学中有相当一部分就是心理学哲学。这里存在一片无人地带，在那里你既得有哲学的功夫，又得懂这些科学或其他相关学科，而这种二分是做不成的。
33:32
Another way in which looking at philosophy in this disassociated way made the approach defective was that it resulted in its lacking any historical sense, didn't it? I mean, there was very little sense among the linguistic philosophers that the concepts that they were analyzing actually have histories. They change their use. And they were so concerned with use. Their use changes over the course of time. And paid played remarkably little attention to the intentions of the language users who use of language they were discussing if these were figures from the past.
以这种割裂的方式看待哲学，还在另一方面使这种进路有缺陷，那就是它导致缺乏任何历史感，对吧？我是说，语言哲学家们几乎没有意识到，他们所分析的那些概念其实是有历史的，它们的用法会变。而他们那么关注用法，可用法是随时间变化的。他们还极少关注语言使用者的意图，尽管他们讨论的正是这些人的语言用法，如果这些人是过去的人物的话。
34:04
Ah. Well, I think there's two different points there. I mean, I think there's a point about all concepts having a history. I mean, that any concept you care to take has got some history. And with regard to that, I think that they had, if a slightly narrow line, a perfectly defensible one, which was to say let's look at it now as a functionally operating system. And it's like, in a way it was like a certain kind of anthropology, as it were. I mean, it wasn't anthropology, but it shared the idea of-- But it meant that when they considered the ideas of Locke or Descartes-- Ah, yes.
啊。我想这里有两个不同的问题。我是说，有一个关于所有概念都有历史的问题。任何你想拿来看的概念都有某种历史。关于这一点，我认为他们的立场虽然稍嫌狭窄，却是完全站得住脚的，那就是说：让我们把它当作一个正在运作的功能系统来看待。这在某种程度上有点像某种人类学。我是说，它不是人类学，但它分享了那种想法——不过这也意味着，当他们思考洛克或笛卡尔的观念时——啊，是的。
34:36
Or any dead philosopher, they tended to argue with this dead figure as if he was a colleague in their common room. That's right. Indeed. No, that's an important point, because I mean, when you come to the history of philosophy, there of course you get something else. And there's no doubt at all that the approach to a lot of the philosophy of the past was of a. Might be called a sturdily anachronistic character. And the remark about saying treating it all as if it was written in the philosophical magazine this month or something was actually made by somebody in praise of this method.
或者任何已故哲学家的观念时，他们往往跟这位死去的人物争论，仿佛他是自家教师休息室里的一位同事。没错，确实如此。不，这是个重要的点，因为我是说，当你谈到哲学史时，那当然就是另一回事了。毫无疑问，对过去许多哲学的处理方式带有一种可以说是理直气壮的时代错置的性格。而那句话——把这一切都当作是本月哲学杂志上刚发表的东西来对待——实际上正是某个人为称赞这种方法而说的。
35:05
[LAUGHS] What can be said about it is a very curious fact that of course it's theoretically indefensible. I mean, it's not difficult to see that that's quite a funny way of going about looking at these writings that come from the past. The odd fact is that as a matter of fact, he's rather productive. And in fact, rather stimulating and in fact, has had a more robust legacy then you might have expected in a way. And indeed, more robust than kinds of the history of philosophy which were just rather passively guided by excessive concern for being anachronistic.
（笑）关于这一点可以说的是，一个非常奇特的事实是，它在理论上当然是站不住脚的。我是说，不难看出，用那种方式去看待来自过去的这些著作，是相当滑稽的。奇怪的是，事实上他相当高产。而且实际上相当有启发性，某种意义上，他留下的思想遗产比你可能预期的要更有生命力。确实，比那些哲学史研究更有生命力——那些研究只是被过度担心时代错置的顾虑所被动地牵着走。
11「琐碎」指控与句子即意思
35:41
Yes. We've been talking about shortcomings in linguistic philosophy. And I think each one that we've considered now has some substance to it. I want to raise one which you may not think has much substance to it, but which was the commonest criticism of all. And that is that non-philosophers tended to regard, and still tend to regard linguistic philosophy as footling. Yes. And linguistic philosophers were accused of just playing with words, just being frivolous and so on. What would your comment be on that?
是的。我们一直在谈语言哲学的种种不足。我觉得我们目前讨论的每一点都有其道理。我想再提一个，你可能觉得它没多少道理，但它却是所有批评中最常见的一个。那就是，非哲学专业的人过去倾向于、现在仍然倾向于把语言哲学看作是琐碎无聊的。是的。语言哲学家被指责只是在玩弄词句，只是在故作轻浮，等等。你对此有什么评论？
36:06
Well, the answer to that is that some of it of course was. I mean, some of it was pedantic, footling, and boring. But I think that the reason it's very boring fact, which is very important here, which is that at all times in all eras, and whoever's doing it, at least 90% on a generous estimate, of philosophy that's done is not much good. It's never going to be of any interest much to anybody later on except historians. And that's true of most subjects, but it's especially true about philosophy. And so it's not surprising that a lot of linguistic philosophy wasn't much good, because a lot of philosophy of any kind isn't much good. It had a special way of being bad, we which was being footling and frivolous and pedantic instead of being pompous, empty and boring in that sort of way as a lot of other philosophy is.
嗯，回答是：其中有些确实如此。我的意思是，有一部分确实是迂腐的、琐碎的、乏味的。但我想，这里有一个很乏味却很重要的事实：在任何时代、任何地方，无论是谁在做哲学，往说得宽厚一点，至少有百分之九十的哲学都算不上好。后来除了历史学家，它对谁都不会有太大意思。这对大多数学科都成立，但对哲学尤其成立。所以，很多语言哲学不怎么样，这并不奇怪，因为任何一种哲学都有很大一部分不怎么样。它只是有一种独特的糟糕方式，就是琐碎、轻浮、迂腐，而不是像很多别的哲学那样，夸夸其谈、空洞乏味。
36:58
I mean, there are really two ways in which philosophy can be. And it can either be pedantic or it can be bogus. Linguistic philosophy made a speciality out of being bad by being pedantic. Well, in some ways, a more honorable way of being bad than being bogus. If you go beyond its deformation to the bad examples, it's not true. What is read as the frivolity of worrying about what these sentences actually sound like was exactly an essential and constitutive part of that kind of self understanding about language.
我是说，哲学变糟其实有两种方式：要么迂腐，要么虚假。语言哲学把“迂腐”这种糟法做成了自己的招牌。不过在某些方面，迂腐地糟糕总比虚假地糟糕来得体面一些。如果你越过它的畸变形态，去看那些真正好的例子，这种批评就站不住脚了。那种被读作“斤斤计较这些句子听起来到底怎么样”的轻浮，恰恰是那种关于语言的自我理解中不可或缺、构成性的一部分。
37:32
Ringing it to hear exactly what note the sentence makes, which we referred to before and which is-- But what you're dead against-- and I know this from previous discussions with you-- is the idea which is so popular because it's self indulgent. Oh, don't worry about what I actually say. It's what I mean that matters. That's right. That was what linguistic philosophy was frightfully good at stopping people saying. And what was much more important, stopping them feeling. That the idea that somehow I have my meaning here, my little sentence I'm trying to convey it to. If it doesn't convey it to you, that's partly through some failure of imagination on your part.
像敲一下听听这个句子发出什么音——我们前面提到过这个。但我知道你坚决反对的——这我从以前跟你的讨论中就知道了——是那种因为纵容自己而广为流行的想法。哦，别管我实际说了什么，重要的是我的意思。没错。语言哲学极其擅长制止人们这么说，而更重要的是，制止他们这么感觉。那种想法是：我的意思就在我这儿，我的小句子只是想把它传达给你。如果没传达到，那部分是因为你想象力不够。
12遗产：工具袋的形状
38:08
We have a responsibility to make our words express what our means, 'cause in the end we don't have these meanings just inside ourselves independent of what we're disposed to say. Our sentences are our meanings. Our meanings are not just independent of them. I think you've drawn up a very good balance sheet now of, as it were, what was good about linguistic philosophy and what was not so good about linguistic philosophy. What do you think we are left with at the end? What is the legacy of it? I mean, I would start answering my own question making one point and that is that the legacy is an enormous one. It's a very big one. I have stressed I think a couple of times already in this discussion that the way everybody does philosophy has been influenced by linguistic philosophy.
我们有责任让自己的话表达出自己的意思，因为归根到底，我们并不是在自己内心拥有某些独立于我们倾向于说出的话的意思。我们的句子就是我们的意思。我们的意思并不独立于句子之外。我觉得你现在已经列出了一份很好的清单，可以说是语言哲学好在哪里、不那么好在哪里。你认为最后留给我们的是什么？它的遗产是什么？我想先自己回答一下自己的问题，提一点：这份遗产是巨大的，非常之大。我在这次讨论中已经强调过好几次，每个人做哲学的方式都受到了语言哲学的影响。
38:50
What other things are we left with at the end of this? Well, I think that the point we touched on last, this point about our responsibility to our meanings rests with us. And I think that the idea also that philosophical problems won't necessarily have the shape which the tradition gave them. This rather radical thought that what was called the philosophical problem is often just a bracket or a bag in which there's an area of disquiet which has to be unraveled by the kind of sensitivity which linguistic analysis encouraged. I think these are very positive inheritances indeed.
除此之外，最后还留下了什么？嗯，我想我们最后触及的那一点，就是我们对自己所说意思负有责任，这责任在我们身上。另外还有一个想法：哲学问题未必具有传统赋予它们的那种形状。这是一个相当激进的想法：所谓的哲学问题，往往只是一个括号或一个口袋，里面装着某个令人不安的领域，需要用语言分析所培养的那种敏感去把它一点点拆解开来。我认为这些确实是非常正面的遗产。
39:28
And I think that when you join it to the new concern, the regained concern with theory, which philosophy now very much manifests, you get an extraordinarily fruitful combination, if you see what I mean, from these two elements from the past. And I think it's worth saying, and I think this is quite interesting, as it were, short term historical fact. That although philosophy is now very different than what it was even 25 years ago-- this is 25 years ago that we're talking about, and people now are doing things rather different than what we were doing at that point in the '50s-- there's been in our tradition, in our locality, much less disowning of that way of doing philosophy than is often the case under such a change. I would say there's less disowning than the linguistic analysts showed towards positivism, for instance.
而且我认为，当你把它和一种新的关切——重新恢复的对理论的关切——结合起来，也就是哲学如今非常明显表现出来的那种关切，你就得到了一种异常富有成果的组合，你明白我的意思吧，来自过去的这两种元素。我觉得这一点值得一提，而且我认为这是个挺有意思的、可以说是短期的历史事实。虽然哲学如今和二十五年前很不一样了——我们谈的就是二十五年前，如今人们做的事和我们五十年代那时做的相当不同——但在我们的传统里、在我们这个地方，对那种做哲学的方式的否认，要比这类转变通常出现的情况少得多。我想说，这种否认比当年语言分析学派对逻辑实证主义的否认还要少。
40:20
That in fact, it's regarded, although the limitations and the deformations that we've touched on are perceived and I think properly emphasized, there's much less disposition to say, oh they were just going on in a fuddy-duddy, pointless way. We now have the way of doing it. I mean, people do say we now have the way of doing it, all right. But then they always did and they never had. Yes. But the sense that a positive contribution has made to that by not just an added sensitivity to language, but the grasp of this fundamental proposition that we can't get to philosophical reality independent of these actual words we are disposed to say. And it's a very important fact about ourselves and our pattern of our life and our philosophical needs that these are the words we are disposed to say, this consciousness I think, remains.
事实上，尽管我们谈到的那些局限和畸变都被看到了，我认为也被恰当地强调了，但人们远没有那么愿意说：哦，他们不过是在那儿老气横秋、毫无意义地折腾。我们现在才掌握了正确的做法。当然，人们确实会说我们现在掌握了正确的做法。但他们向来都这么说，而且从来没真掌握过。是的。但那种感觉——一种积极的贡献已经做出，不只是对语言多了一份敏感，而是抓住了这个根本命题：我们无法脱离我们倾向于说出的这些实际词句去抵达哲学上的实在。关于我们自身、我们的生活样式以及我们的哲学需求，有一个非常重要的事实，那就是这些正是我们倾向于说出的词句——我认为这种意识留了下来。
41:16
Something that I value enormously and which linguistic philosophy has obviously has a great deal to do with is the extension of philosophical inquiry to new areas of subject matter. I mean, the notion that we have touched on already that you can apply techniques of linguistic analysis to concepts in any field has resulted in the development of the philosophy of economics, of history, of population theory I mentioned earlier. Some of the most surprising things. And I think this is very valuable and very important.
有一件我极为看重、而且语言哲学显然与之大有关系的事，就是哲学探究扩展到了新的主题领域。我是说，我们已经提到过的那个观念：你可以把语言分析的技术应用于任何领域的概念，这带来了经济学哲学、历史哲学，还有我前面提到的人口理论哲学的发展。一些最出人意料的东西。我觉得这非常有价值、非常重要。
41:46
And this is partly a product of that willingness to look at each thing by itself that we referred to. Yes, yes. It's helped now, the point we made before, by the fact that the harsh borderline between philosophy and these first order sciences themselves has been much dissolved. I think there's one further point that I think might be added there, which I think's an important one if we could just mention it. I think that in the '50s, particularly in the Oxford variety of linguistic philosophy, it tended to think that what philosophy should do is tidy up and make neater the untidy borders between the concepts between the ideas in these various subjects, either within the subject itself or between that subject and common sense.
这在一定程度上正是我们提到的那种意愿的产物——愿意就每样东西本身来考察它。是的，是的。如今还有一点帮了忙，就是我们之前提到的：哲学与这些一阶科学之间那条生硬的界线已经大大消解了。我想还有一点或许可以补充进来，我觉得挺重要的，我们不妨提一下。我认为在五十年代，尤其是牛津那一路的语言哲学，往往认为哲学该做的事，是把各门学科中概念之间、观念之间那些杂乱的边界收拾整齐、弄得更清爽，无论是在学科内部，还是在该学科与常识之间。
42:34
For instance, let's take the rather problematical case of psychoanalysis. A lot of concepts used in psychoanalysis, like an unconscious wish or again, possibly an unconscious belief, cause a lot of trouble to our ordinary conceptual ideas. We're not used to this idea. And perhaps the philosophers then thought, well, we can, as it were, tidy this up. We can analyze it, we can make clear what the situation is. I think they'd underestimated the important sense in which new scientific discoveries make their own conceptual room. That as it were, they just tear down pieces of language and thought that are around them in an essentially untidy and indeterminate way. And the fact that a lot of our most fruitful thought at any given moment might just necessarily be indeterminate, poorly thought out, and unclear is an important notion, which you've got a bit more room for now. And I think perhaps linguistic philosophy didn't have enough room for.
比如说，我们拿精神分析这个相当成问题的例子来看。精神分析中用的很多概念，比如无意识的愿望，或者可能还有无意识的信念，都给我们平常的概念框架带来不少麻烦。我们不习惯这种想法。于是当时的哲学家也许就想，好，我们可以把这个收拾干净。我们可以分析它，可以把情况弄清楚。我认为他们低估了很重要的一点：新的科学发现会自己开辟出概念空间。可以说，它们只是以一种本质上杂乱而不确定的方式，拆掉了周围的一部分语言和思想。而这个事实——在任何特定时刻，我们最富成果的一些思想可能就是必然不确定的、没想清楚的、不清晰的——是个重要的观念，如今这个观念的空间更大了一些。我想语言哲学当时也许没给它留出足够的空间。
43:25
Yes. Well, we're coming to the end of our discussion now. I think the point I would want to make finally about linguistic philosophy is that I think that used as a technique, it's of enormous and permanent value. And that it was only radically defective so long as it was regarded as being in itself a total conception of philosophy. There was a period, the period that we were talking a lot about in the '40s and '50s, where many philosophers thought that the whole of philosophy consisted of doing this. Well, that I think, is clearly not the case. And probably very few people now would believe that it is. Provided it's kept in its place as an ancillary technique, then I think it is of enormous and permanent value.
是的。好，我们的讨论快要结束了。关于语言哲学，我最后想说的一点是：我认为作为一种技术来用，它具有巨大而持久的价值。它之所以有根本性的缺陷，只是因为它曾被当作哲学本身的一整套构想。有那么一个时期，就是我们大谈特谈的四十、五十年代，许多哲学家认为哲学的全部就在于做这件事。可是我想，情况显然不是这样。如今大概也很少有人还会相信是这样。只要把它放在恰当的位置上，当作一种辅助技术，那我认为它就具有巨大而持久的价值。
44:05
Yes. As long as one accepts that, if I can put it this way, the bag in which the tools come has an absolutely fundamental idea in it which gives it its shape. This idea we've talked about about the non-independence of language and thought. It's not just a bag of tools which can be applied to any old set of tasks. Because the idea that shapes those tools themselves is one which has modified our understanding of the mind and our understanding of language. Well, thank you very much, Bernard Williams.
是的。只要人们接受这一点——如果可以这么说的话——装这些工具的袋子里有一个绝对根本的观念，是它赋予了这个袋子形状。就是我们谈过的这个观念，关于语言与思想不可分离。它不只是一袋可以拿去应付任何杂七杂八任务的工具。因为塑造这些工具本身的那个观念，已经改变了我们对心灵的理解和对语言的理解。好，非常感谢你，伯纳德·威廉斯。
视频总结 · 一句话概括与核心要点
一句话概括
伯纳德·威廉姆斯与布莱恩·马基回顾1940–50年代牛津-剑桥的"语言哲学"（linguistic philosophy）：它以"意义即用法"取代对抽象实体的追问，承诺"消解"传统哲学问题，带来了清晰与语言责任感的宝贵遗产，但因低估理论、割裂学科与历史而未能兑现"五十年内终结哲学"的预言，最终应被定位为一种具有根本洞见的辅助技术而非哲学的全部。
核心要点
- 核心信条是"意义即用法，没有词背后的实体"：自苏格拉底以来，哲学家问"什么是真/美/正义"时假定这些词对应独立于用法的（抽象）实体；语言哲学家斥之为深刻错误——语言是人的创造，理解"真"这个词就是完全掌握它及"true""truthfulness"等的用法总和。代表作为维特根斯坦《哲学研究》（1953）与赖尔《心的概念》（1949）；牛津核心人物是奥斯汀（其次赖尔），剑桥则"无可比拟地"是维特根斯坦。
- 与逻辑实证主义的决裂在于对"话语多样性"的承认：实证主义以科学为一切有意义话语的标尺，把伦理、美学、宗教乃至许多日常心理陈述判为无意义；语言哲学则主张先细察各种话语如何运作。但威廉姆斯指出其讽刺之处：它对宗教语言更"友善"，却把宗教默认解读为"一种人类生活形式、人类需要的表达"，实际上给出了一种人本主义诠释，未必符合传统信仰者的自我理解。
- "语言哲学"是方法，"语言哲学（philosophy of language）"是分支，二者不可混淆：后者是专门处理语言本身问题的领域，如今高度技术化并与理论语言学接壤；前者是一种可施于形而上学、伦理学等一切领域的方法，强调对提问所用语言保持自觉。
- 承诺的是"消解"（dissolve）而非"解决"问题：既然概念内容全由我们放入，彻底分析后"无余数"；许多传统问题被视为在简化公式下捆绑的一堆不同困惑，拆开后便消失。当时确有人断言"整个哲学五十年内完结"。但威廉姆斯澄清：他们承诺的是消解主要问题，而非穷尽分析所有概念（那将是无穷任务）；问题主要源自两处——极一般的概念（同一、因果、变化、时空）和两类话语的边界（如物理话语与心理话语，赖尔正是处理"如何知道他人有经验"这类老问题）。
- 吸引聪明人的是"严肃动机与日常风格的反差"：刻意回避高调术语、用琐碎例子，产生一种"苏格拉底式的快感"。奥斯汀讨论"无意地/错误地/偶然地"的区别时被问"这照亮了哪些重大哲学问题"，答曰"大致全部"。选琐例的正当理由是：不让论证依赖于例子本身，戏剧性例子要么太复杂不宜起步，要么只是传统哲学的虚假修辞。威廉姆斯补充这在知觉论、知识论、意义理论上很稳健，但在伦理与政治上失效——政治哲学在此体制下"从未繁荣"，因为"戏剧性/严肃性"本身就是政治与道德范畴。
- 对清晰的执着有价值也有代价：它培养了对语言的自觉与责任感，与奥登、叶芝、卡尔·克劳斯、奥威尔以精确表达抵御思想污染的诉求同源（维特根斯坦来自维也纳，此关切在那里根深蒂固）；作为学生的智力训练"极有价值"。但代价是把清晰当作被高估的哲学价值，导致对黑格尔的彻底轻蔑（康德同样晦涩却未遭此待遇；黑格尔另受"与极权主义/希特勒式扭曲相关"的错误意识形态怀疑）。
- 维特根斯坦的"晦涩"不在句子而在论证结构：《哲学研究》的句子几乎都语法平实（如"若狮子会说话，我们也听不懂它"），难的是"为何在此说这句"。奥斯汀有大量"因此/既然/将证明"，维特根斯坦几乎没有——他认为哲学问题与科学问题根本不同，不靠论证说服，而靠"汇集我们平常行事方式的提醒"，更接近艺术作品让人"以某种方式看"。所有版本的语言哲学共有的洞见是：以复杂性取代晦涩，因为生活本身复杂，而传统哲学的"现象/实在"式对比是过度简化。
- 根本缺陷是低估理论：以镊子逐个夹出概念做"零碎"（piecemeal，当时是褒义词）分析，缺乏解释背景。奥斯汀曾反问：某类甲虫有上万亚种，为何不能发现同样多的语言区分？答案是：物种区分植根于进化论这一理论框架，没有背景理论，任何东西与任何东西的差别都可任意。
- 把哲学与题材、科学、历史割裂：某著名哲学家约15年前曾说"做好哲学不需要做任何事，只要聪明并感兴趣"——此话在当时不显古怪，如今则"无可争议地"古怪。对哲学本性的过度自觉使人认为科学中没有哲学部分，而今人们重新看到科学哲学、语言学哲学、心理学哲学都存在于学科内部的"无人地带"。对历史的忽视表现为把洛克、笛卡尔当作"公共休息室里的同事"来争论——理论上站不住脚的"顽强时代错置"，但奇怪地富有成果，其遗产比那些过度戒惧时代错置的哲学史更有生命力。
- "玩弄词句"之讥的回应：威廉姆斯承认部分作品确实迂腐无聊，但"任何时代至少90%的哲学都不怎么样"；哲学变坏有两种方式——迂腐或虚假，语言哲学专攻前者，这比虚假"更体面"。而对句子"到底发出什么音"的反复掂量，正是语言自觉的构成性部分。
结论与值得注意的细节
- 遗产巨大且未被否弃：与语言分析者对实证主义的态度相比，当代哲学对语言哲学的"否认"程度小得多；其持久贡献有三——(1) "我们的句子就是我们的意义"，意义不独立于言说而藏在心里，因此有责任让言辞精确表达所思，拒绝"别管我说了什么，重要的是我的意思"这种自我放纵；(2) 哲学问题未必具有传统赋予的形状，所谓"问题"常是一个装着一片不安的"口袋"；(3) 与如今重获的理论关切结合，构成"极其丰饶的组合"。
- 将哲学探究扩展到新领域：语言技术可用于任何领域的概念（健康、疾病、治疗；精神疾病概念本身的可疑性），由此发展出经济学哲学、历史哲学、人口理论哲学等，且哲学与一阶科学的硬边界已被消融。
- 对"整理边界"雄心的修正：50年代牛津派认为哲学应整理概念间的杂乱边界（如精神分析的"无意识愿望/信念"扰乱常识概念），但低估了新科学发现会"自行开辟概念空间"、粗暴撕开周边语言的事实——当下最富成果的思想可能必然是不确定、未想清楚、不清晰的，当代哲学为此留出了更多空间。
- 马基的最终定位：作为技术，它具有"巨大而永久的价值"；它的根本缺陷仅在于曾被当作哲学的全部。威廉姆斯补充：这不是一袋可用于任何任务的工具，袋子本身的形状来自一个根本观念——语言与思想不可分离——它已改变我们对心灵与语言的理解。
核心句型 · 9
1. It was not X but Y.
“It was not solved but dissolved.”
用一对近音/近义词制造对比，凸显关键区别。适合总结性表述。仿写：It was not learned but memorized.
2. nothing more nor less than …
“Understanding what a word means is nothing more nor less than knowing how to use it.”
强调「恰好就是、不多不少」，用于给出严格定义或还原式主张。
3. I think it's fair to say that …
“I think it's fair to say that the way almost everybody since then has done philosophy has been influenced by it.”
表达有把握但不过分的判断，学术讨论中缓和语气的常用开头。
4. Whereas A …, B …
“Whereas linguistic analysis or linguistic philosophy was tremendously and self consciously aware of the variety …”
用 whereas 引导对照两个立场，是比较论述的骨架。注意 whereas 可置于句首。
5. It's not because …; I think what one means is …
“Now it's not because … Austin's are clear in a way that Wittgenstein's isn't. I think what one means is …”
先排除一种表面解释，再给出更准确的表述，用于精细化一个含混的说法。
6. Either … in which case …, or else …
“Either it really was profound, in which case it was almost certainly too complex … Or else it wasn't and it was just bogus.”
两难论证结构，穷尽两种可能并各自推出结论。in which case 承接前一分支。
7. Provided (that) …, then …
“Provided it's kept in its place as an ancillary technique, then I think it is of enormous and permanent value.”
条件式肯定：只要满足某条件，才成立。用于有保留地赞同。
8. be of enormous / permanent value
“Used as a technique, it's of enormous and permanent value”
be of + 抽象名词 = 具有某性质，比 very valuable 更正式。可换 of great importance / of little use。
9. what X was frightfully good at (doing)
“That was what linguistic philosophy was frightfully good at stopping people saying.”
英式口语强调句：frightfully / terribly 作强化副词，后接 good at + 动名词。
词汇精讲 · 113 · 按出现顺序
came to fruition
phr.
0:14
开花结果，趋于成熟
incomparably
/ɪnˈkɑːmpərəbli/
adv.
0:47
无可比拟地
tenets
/ˈtenɪts/
n.
0:47
基本信条、主张
pierce through
phr.
0:47
穿透，刺穿
incorporeal
/ˌɪnkɔːrˈpɔːriəl/
adj.
2:12
无形体的，非物质的
come to terms with
phr.
2:12
设法理解、接受（现实）
exercised an enormous spell on
phr.
2:50
对……施加了巨大的魔力/吸引力
heyday
/ˈheɪdeɪ/
n.
3:24
全盛期，鼎盛时期
breakaway
/ˈbreɪkəweɪ/
n.
3:24
脱离，决裂
prevailing orthodoxy
phr.
3:24
占主导地位的正统观念
canon
/ˈkænən/
n.
4:08
准则，标准；正典
discourse
/ˈdɪskɔːrs/
n.
4:08
话语，论述
empirically verifiable
phr.
4:44
可经验证实的
in virtue of
phr.
5:20
凭借，由于
disposed to
phr.
5:58
倾向于，乐于
showing it off the premises
phr.
5:58
把它请出门外（premises 此处指房舍/场所）
clergy
/ˈklɜːrdʒi/
n.
6:43
神职人员（集合名词）
at the outset
phr.
6:43
一开始，起初
flourishing
/ˈflɜːrɪʃɪŋ/
adj.
7:14
兴盛的，繁荣的
borders on
phr.
7:14
与……接壤；近乎
addressed itself to
phr.
7:53
致力于处理（问题）
conceptual scheme
phr.
8:29
概念框架（哲学术语）
remainder
/rɪˈmeɪndər/
n.
8:29
剩余部分，余数
dissolved
/dɪˈzɑːlvd/
v.
8:29
消解，使消散（与 solved 对举）
whiz through
phr.
9:17
飞快地穿过
saw through
phr.
9:17
看穿，识破
exhaustively
/ɪɡˈzɔːstɪvli/
adv.
10:16
详尽无遗地
at odds with
phr.
10:41
与……不一致、相冲突
apron strings
/ˈeɪprən strɪŋz/
n.
10:41
围裙带；tied to sb's apron strings 指受人牵制、依附
give them the treatment
phr.
11:17
（口语）给它们来一套，好好处理一番
blowtorch
/ˈbloʊtɔːrtʃ/
n.
11:17
喷灯（此处比喻严格审视）
problematical
/ˌprɑːbləˈmætɪkl/
adj.
12:10
成问题的，有疑问的
preoccupations
/priˌɑːkjuˈpeɪʃnz/
n.
12:53
关注的焦点，念念不忘之事
corpus
/ˈkɔːrpəs/
n.
12:53
（文献、问题的）总集，语料
pressing
/ˈpresɪŋ/
adj.
14:07
紧迫的
spellbinding
/ˈspelbaɪndɪŋ/
adj.
14:07
令人着迷的
portentous
/pɔːrˈtentəs/
adj.
14:43
故作庄严的，自命不凡的
high flown
adj.
14:43
高蹈的，夸张浮华的
downbeat
/ˈdaʊnbiːt/
adj.
14:43
低调的，不张扬的
inadvertently
/ˌɪnədˈvɜːrtəntli/
adv.
15:48
无意地，不经意地
illuminated
/ɪˈluːmɪneɪtɪd/
v.
15:48
阐明，照亮
struck the note
phr.
16:20
点中了调子，恰如其分地表达了那种精神
triviality
/ˌtrɪviˈæləti/
n.
16:20
琐碎，微不足道
agonizing over
phr.
16:52
为……痛苦纠结
deflationary
/dɪˈfleɪʃəneri/
adj.
16:52
降调的，去浮夸的（哲学中亦指「紧缩论的」）
hinge on
phr.
16:52
取决于
bogus
/ˈboʊɡəs/
adj.
17:25
虚假的，伪造的
rhetoric
/ˈretərɪk/
n.
17:25
修辞，华丽辞藻
sounder
/ˈsaʊndər/
adj.
17:54
更稳健的、更可靠的（sound 的比较级）
prospered
/ˈprɑːspərd/
v.
18:48
兴旺，繁荣
inculcation
/ˌɪnkʌlˈkeɪʃn/
n.
18:48
反复灌输，培养
salutary
/ˈsæljəteri/
adj.
18:48
有益的（尤指看似不快却有好处）
scrupulously
/ˈskruːpjələsli/
adv.
19:28
一丝不苟地
pedantic
/pəˈdæntɪk/
adj.
19:28
迂腐的，学究气的
lexicographical
/ˌleksɪkəˈɡræfɪkl/
adj.
19:28
词典编纂的
bulwark
/ˈbʊlwərk/
n.
19:28
堡垒，屏障
splurge
/splɜːrdʒ/
n.
19:28
泛滥，放纵（此处指言辞的失控）
muddled
/ˈmʌdld/
adj.
20:26
含混的，糊涂的
underrated
/ˌʌndərˈreɪtɪd/
v.
21:58
低估
utter contempt
phr.
21:58
极度的轻蔑
obscure
/əbˈskjʊr/
adj.
21:58
晦涩的
in retrospect
phr.
22:37
回顾起来
preeminently
/priˈemɪnəntli/
adv.
23:11
突出地，卓越地
ideologically suspect
phr.
23:11
在意识形态上可疑的
deformations
/ˌdiːfɔːrˈmeɪʃnz/
n.
23:11
畸变，变形
literal minded
adj.
23:41
拘泥字面的，缺乏想象的
harnessed to
phr.
24:31
被用于服务于，被套在……上
epigrams
/ˈepɪɡræmz/
n.
25:06
警句
apothegms
/ˈæpəθemz/
n.
25:06
格言，箴言
disposes us to
phr.
25:06
使我们倾向于
uncorrupted
/ˌʌnkəˈrʌptɪd/
adj.
25:48
未被败坏的
strain
/streɪn/
n.
25:48
（思想的）倾向、脉络
solemn
/ˈsɑːləm/
adj.
26:23
庄严的，肃穆的
new dawn
phr.
26:53
新黎明，新纪元
shortcomings
/ˈʃɔːrtkʌmɪŋz/
n.
26:53
缺点，不足
floundering around
phr.
27:38
挣扎摸索，手足无措
ancillary
/ˈænsəleri/
adj.
28:13
附属的，辅助的
tweezers
/ˈtwiːzərz/
n.
28:13
镊子
in dissociation from
phr.
28:13
与……割裂开来
nuances
/ˈnuːɑːnsɪz/
n.
28:53
细微差别
piecemeal
/ˈpiːsmiːl/
adj./adv.
28:53
零碎的，逐步的
subspecies
/ˈsʌbspiːʃiːz/
n.
29:25
亚种
frame of reference
phr.
29:57
参照框架
tool kit
n.
30:20
工具箱（比喻一套方法）
had the cheek to
phr.
31:18
有脸、厚着脸皮做某事
quaint
/kweɪnt/
adj.
31:18
古雅的，老派而奇特的
indisputably
/ˌɪndɪˈspjuːtəbli/
adv.
31:18
无可争辩地
charting
/ˈtʃɑːrtɪŋ/
v.
31:51
绘制地图；勾画
aberration
/ˌæbəˈreɪʃn/
n.
32:21
偏差，反常
frightfully
/ˈfraɪtfəli/
adv.
32:21
（英式口语）极其，非常
first order
adj.
32:53
一阶的（指直接研究对象的学科，与「元」层面相对）
no man's land
n.
32:53
无人地带，两不管的中间地带
dichotomy
/daɪˈkɑːtəmi/
n.
32:53
二分法
common room
n.
34:36
（英国大学的）教师/学生休息室
sturdily anachronistic
phr.
34:36
理直气壮地时代错置的
indefensible
/ˌɪndɪˈfensəbl/
adj.
35:05
站不住脚的，无法辩护的
robust legacy
phr.
35:05
有生命力的遗产
footling
/ˈfuːtlɪŋ/
adj.
35:41
（英式）琐碎无聊的
frivolous
/ˈfrɪvələs/
adj.
35:41
轻浮的，无聊的
on a generous estimate
phr.
36:06
往宽处估计
pompous
/ˈpɑːmpəs/
adj.
36:06
浮夸的，自大的
constitutive
/ˈkɑːnstətuːtɪv/
adj.
36:58
构成性的
dead against
phr.
37:32
坚决反对
self indulgent
adj.
37:32
自我放纵的
balance sheet
n.
38:08
资产负债表；比喻利弊清单
disquiet
/dɪsˈkwaɪət/
n.
38:50
不安，忧虑
unraveled
/ʌnˈrævld/
v.
38:50
解开，拆解
disowning
/dɪsˈoʊnɪŋ/
n.
39:28
否认，断绝关系
fuddy-duddy
/ˈfʌdi dʌdi/
adj.
40:20
老派守旧的
tidy up
phr.
41:46
收拾整齐
indeterminate
/ˌɪndɪˈtɜːrmɪnət/
adj.
42:34
不确定的，不明确的
make their own conceptual room
phr.
42:34
自己开辟出概念空间
kept in its place
phr.
43:25
被安置在恰当位置，不越界
理解自测 · 11 题 · 是真懂了，还是以为自己懂
1. 马基在开场中把语言哲学的核心主张概括为什么？它反对的传统假设是什么？
核心主张是：意义即用法，理解一个词不多不少就是知道如何使用它；一个词的意义是其一切可能用法的总和，而非某个抽象领域中的无形实体（第 2–3 段）。它反对的是自苏格拉底以来的假设——「什么是真理/美/正义」这类问题预设了每个词背后有一个独立于用法而存在的东西，哲学家试图「穿透语言」抵达那个非语言的实在（第 1 段）。语言哲学称这是一个深刻的错误，并会引出思维中其他严重谬误。
2. 威廉斯认为语言哲学与逻辑实证主义的「真正差别」在哪里？
威廉斯说，实证主义把科学当作人类有意义话语与知识的准则，其他话语都用科学标准来衡量，哲学几乎等于科学哲学（第 6 段）；按其可证实性原则，伦理、美学、宗教乃至许多日常心理陈述都被判为无意义（第 8 段）。而语言哲学自觉意识到话语形式的多样性，任务是弄清各种意义如何运作，而不是拿科学准则宣判其他话语无意义（第 7 段）。他还指出一个反讽：语言分析虽对宗教更「宽容」，却隐含地把宗教降格为「一种人类生活形式」，这是一种人本主义解读（第 9–10 段）。
3. 「语言哲学」与「语言的哲学」有什么区别？
威廉斯在第 11–12 段区分：语言的哲学（philosophy of language）是哲学的一个分支或领域，专门研究由语言本身引发的问题，如今高度技术化，与理论语言学接壤。而语言哲学（linguistic philosophy）不是分支而是一种方法，用于处理形而上学、伦理学等一切领域的哲学问题，其特点是对提问所用的语言保持自觉。前者是「研究什么」，后者是「怎么研究」。
4. 为什么语言哲学家刻意使用琐碎的例子？请给出两个理由。
第一个理由是方法论的：他们不希望论证的任何部分依赖某个特定例子的特殊性（第 25 段）。第二个理由是威廉斯的两难论证（第 26 段）：若选一个宏大、看似深刻的例子，要么它真的深刻，那就太复杂、不宜作为起点，应先从日常问题入手；要么它并不深刻，那就是虚张声势，属于哲学的传统修辞。此外这种做法还有戳破传统修辞的「魅力」（第 27 段）。奥斯汀的「大致上，所有的」正体现了琐碎例子服务于自由意志等大问题的方式（第 23 段）。
5. 威廉斯如何反驳奥斯汀的「甲虫亚种」类比？这一反驳与他诊断的根本局限有何关系？
奥斯汀说既然某种甲虫有一万多亚种，语言为何不能有同样多的区分（第 45 段）。威廉斯反驳：甲虫分类的依据是进化论提供的理论理解；没有背景理论，任何东西与任何东西的差异都可以随意增多，必须有一个「参照框架」来判定哪个区分更重要，而这个框架就是理论（第 46–47 段）。这正是他所说的根本局限——低估理论的重要性（第 42–43 段）：零敲碎打地用「镊子」一次夹一个概念分析，却不反思是什么背景使这一组区分而非另一组值得关注（第 44 段）。
6. 「清晰」在本片中被如何复杂化？维特根斯坦为何既被视为最伟大的语言哲学家又「不清晰」？
马基指出，学派推崇清晰，其代表人物后期维特根斯坦却极难懂，且这种清晰崇拜导致黑格尔被轻蔑地摒弃（第 32–33 段）。威廉斯回应：清晰是个比当年设想更复杂的概念（第 34 段）。《哲学研究》的句子几乎都语法直白，难在「为什么说这句」——它与论证的关系含混（第 36–37 段）。这源于维特根斯坦的激进哲学观：哲学不靠论证说服，而是「汇集提醒」，像艺术作品那样让人以某种方式看事物（第 38–39 段）。因此这里的清晰是「用复杂性取代晦涩」，允许复杂，因为生活本就复杂。
7. 威廉斯为什么说政治哲学在语言哲学体制下「从未兴旺」？
威廉斯认为低调风格与日常例子在知觉、知识论、意义理论上稳健，用于伦理和政治则不然（第 27 段）。原因在于：「戏剧性的」「严肃的」这些范畴本身就是政治与道德范畴，而看、知道、计数等概念不涉及这种价值负载（第 28 段）。也就是说，把伦理政治问题「降调」处理，会把它们的核心特征——重大性与严肃性——本身抹掉，方法与对象不匹配。这一观察与他后来对分析伦理学的批评一脉相承。
8. 「我们的句子就是我们的意思」这一命题如何回应「玩弄词句」的指控？
面对「琐碎、轻浮」的指控（第 56 段），威廉斯先承认部分确实如此，但指出任何时代至少 90% 的哲学都不好，语言哲学只是「以迂腐的方式糟糕」而非「以空洞浮夸的方式糟糕」（第 57–58 段）。更关键的是，对句子「听起来怎么样」的计较是关于语言的自我理解的构成性部分：它制止人们说、更制止人们感觉「别管我怎么说，重要的是我的意思」（第 59 段）。因为意思并非先在于心中再用语言传达，我们的句子就是我们的意思，表达不清的责任在说者（第 60 段）。所以「斤斤计较措辞」正是承担意义责任的表现。
9. 结合第 13–15 段与第 41–42 段，「消解而非解决」的许诺为何落空？
许诺的前提是：概念框架中的一切内容都是我们放进去的，彻底分析后「没有剩余」，传统问题会显露为对语言运作的误解而消失，甚至有人预言哲学五十年内终结（第 13–15 段）。二十年后问题依然存在（第 41 段）。威廉斯的诊断是低估了理论：区分和问题只有在某种更系统的理论背景下才有实质（第 47 段），而语言分析把哲学视为可与任何题材分离的技能（第 47–48 段），又缺乏历史感（第 52 段）。此外新科学发现会「自己开辟概念空间」，最富成果的思想在当下可能必然不清晰（第 66 段），这直接动摇了「分析可以穷尽并收拾整齐」的假设。
10. 如果有人说「语言哲学只是一套可以随便用于任何任务的工具」，威廉斯会如何回应？
他会反对这种「纯工具」观。在第 68 段他明确说：装工具的袋子本身有一个根本观念赋予它形状，即语言与思想不可分离；它不是「一袋可以拿去应付任何杂七杂八任务的工具」，因为塑造这些工具的观念已经改变了我们对心灵和语言的理解。这与马基在第 67 段「只要当作辅助技术就有持久价值」的结论构成微妙修正：马基强调「放在恰当位置」，威廉斯强调「工具背后有实质命题」，第 63 段的「我们无法脱离倾向于说出的词去抵达哲学实在」正是该命题。
11. 把本片的「意义即用法、句子即意思」放到今天大语言模型的语境中，还成立吗？讲者可能怎么看？
本片主张意义在公共使用实践中而非在心中的私人意图里（第 2、60 段），这似乎对「只学用法就能有意义」的模型友好。但威廉斯同时强调「狮子会说话我们也无法理解」——理解依赖共享的生活形式（第 37 段），以及意义与「我们自身、生活样式和哲学需求」这一事实相连（第 63 段）。据此他可能认为：模型能复现用法的表面规则性，但用法是否等于意义，还取决于它是否嵌入一种生活形式并承担意义责任；他也会提醒，任何「我们现在找到了正确道路」的乐观都应参照第 42 段的历史教训。这属于推断，讲者并未直接讨论机器。
下载便签
手机：长按图片保存
← 上一期 · NO.066Immanuel Kant's Philosophy - Bryan Magee & Geoffrey Warnock (1987)
下一期 · NO.068 →The Social Context of Philosophy - Ernest Gellner & Bryan Magee (1977)
订阅苏菲周报
每周一封：本周入库的精读、一个值得带走的问题、一条苏菲按。免费，随时退订。
免费 · 每周一封 · 一键退订
苏菲拉底
THE SOPHIE LAB · ASK THE BEST MINDS THE BIG QUESTIONS
内容仅供学习 · thesophielab.com