Immanuel Kant's Philosophy - Bryan Magee & Geoffrey Warnock (1987)

For several generations now, it's been a widely held view among serious students of philosophy that the greatest philosopher to have appeared in the West since the ancient Greeks is Immanuel Kant. Kant was born in the town of Königsberg in East Prussia in 1724 and died there at the age of almost 80 in the year 1804. Many jokes have been made about the fact that he rarely left Königsberg and never went outside his native province in the whole of his life. Also about the fact that he stuck so strictly to a daily routine that the inhabitants of Königsberg could literally set their watches by him as he walked past their windows. He never married and outwardly his life was entirely uneventful.

However, he was not at all the dry stick that my description so far would suggest. On the contrary, he was sociable and amusing, elegant in dress and witty in conversation. And his lectures at the University of Königsberg, where he was a professor for more than 30 years, were famous for their brilliance. Rather surprisingly, Kant was the first great philosopher of the modern era to be a university teacher. Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Rousseau, none of these were academics.

Nor were most of the major philosophers in the century after Kant, the 19th century. The obvious exception is Hegel, but Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill, Nietzsche, none of these were academic philosophers. It's only in the 20th century that nearly all important philosophers have been academics. Whether this professionalization of the subject is a good thing is very much a moot point. I suspect it's inevitable. However, to get back to the first of the great professors, the writings of Kant's youth and early middle age made him widely known, but all but a few of them are now virtually unread. His lasting fame rests on a series of publications which didn't begin till he was 57 and continued into his 70s. So, we have the rare spectacle of a creative genius of the first order producing all his greatest work in late middle age and old age.

His acknowledged masterpiece is the Critique of Pure Reason, which was published in 1781. It wasn't very well understood at first, so 2 years later he published a short exposition of its central argument as a separate book, usually referred to as the Prolegomena, and then brought out an extensively revised edition of the Critique of Pure Reason in 1787. There followed in quick succession his second great critique, the Critique of Practical Reason in 1788, and then his third critique, the Critique of Judgment, in 1790.

Meanwhile, he'd also published in 1785 a little book called The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics. In spite of its unseductive title, this book has had a simply immense influence on moral philosophy ever since. With me to discuss Kant's work is a well-known contemporary philosopher, Sir Geoffrey Warnock, Principal of Hertford College, Oxford, and a former Vice-Chancellor of Oxford University. Sir Geoffrey, Kant was perhaps the most famous system builder in the contemporary era in philosophy, and one notorious difficulty about expounding any system where everything fits in with something else is where to break into it, how to make a start. Where do you think is the the best point to break into Kant for an exposition of his philosophy?

There certainly is that problem. I mean, one of Kant's merits, in a way, was that he was very good at making an immense range of views fit together in a comprehensive and systematic way. But, um if we are um embarking on the discussion, I think it is important not to start off in too technical a way. I mean, to He's sometimes represented as conducting a sort of uh refereeing job uh between the merits and demerits of rationalism and empiricism, for example, or discussing how there can be synthetic necessary truths, but I think one ought to go rather further back to what the much wider and simpler concern was that really generated these other problems.

And that um I would submit was his concern with an apparent conflict between the findings of the physical sciences in his day and our fundamental ethical and religious convictions. He thought there was a prima facie um conflict inconsistency there. Can you spell out what he thought the conflict consisted in? Um I think the central and and simplest form of the conflict was that it seemed to be a presupposition and indeed Kant thought of well-founded and proper presupposition of the physical sciences uh that everything that happens is determined by antecedent happenings.

And that there is always a law um on the basis of which one can say that what happened was the only thing that could have happened. In the physical world. In the physical world. Yes. But of course, when we're thinking about our own conduct, when we're thinking, say, um about um moral predicaments we may find ourselves in, we believe that we and everybody else have alternatives before us and that there are various things we could do. And it's for that reason that we have to accept the responsibility for what we actually do.

That was one thing, and he thought that that was prima facie contradicted by a presupposition of physical science. In other words, how in a universe in which the motions of all matter are governed by Newtonian laws? Can there be free will? scientific laws, can there be free will? Yes. That that was Yes. Yes. He was also concerned with the question uh how uh a God would fit in to an essentially mechanical and physically determined universe. He wasn't the first philosopher, even the first major philosopher, to see these problems, was he?

No. No, certainly not. Um they'd been really quite a preoccupation of philosophers all through the 18th century. I mean, ever since the um sort of great leap forward, so to speak, in the physical sciences at the end of the 17th century. Um among the empiricists, for example, Berkeley had been preoccupied with this sort of problem. And among those in Kant's own tradition, conspicuously Leibniz. Now, he certainly wasn't the first. Why was he so deeply dissatisfied, as he obviously was, with what his predecessors had done about this problem?

Well, he thought, and I think correctly, that his predecessors had tried to somehow resolve this conflict or bring it to an end by downgrading the pretensions of the physical sciences. And that's certainly true of Berkeley, and I think it's true of Leibniz as well. And to um somehow present them as inferior and not having a claim to be an equal contestant with uh metaphysical doctrine and argument. And for one thing, I think Kant thought that the the record showed that that was not the right way to proceed, because on the one hand, the physical sciences seemed to proceed smoothly and progressively from triumph to triumph with everybody agreeing what had been established and what hadn't.

Um, and on the other hand, uh, philosophy looked to him like a sort of chaotic battlefield. I mean, no philosopher agreed with any other philosopher, no doctrine was accepted for more than a few years before somebody refuted it and so on. Um, that's one thing. But then, he also thought, and I think this is more important, that Hume, in particular, had raised serious doubts about the credentials of philosophy, um, as a sort of possible intellectual enterprise at all. And he thought that uh Hume's Hume's challenge, if one can call it that, had raised a serious doubt as to whether what the philosophers were professing to do was even in principle possible.

He made a famous remark once about reading Hume having woken him from his dogmatic slumber. I take it the virtual now saying refers to this. Yes. What was the awakening, in fact? What did What did Hume awaken him to? The problem, I think, in in, uh, a crude nutshell, was this, that, um, Hume and indeed Leibniz and such other philosophers had thought about it, had accepted the general view that propositions can be exhaustively divided into two classes. On the one hand, there are what used to be called truths of reason, which Kant called analytic propositions, where, um, in a sense, they're really true by definition. Like a triangle has three sides or a bicycle has two wheels, that sort of thing. Those they said could be known a priori, I mean independently of experience.

On the other hand, there were substantial propositions which tell us something not simply implicit in the terms we're using. Uh these they said um were substantial and informative, but couldn't be necessary. They were always contingent propositions and could be established only on the basis of experience or experiment. And Hume said, and Kant thought he was quite right to say that if that was right, then philosophy itself was in a serious predicament. Because it didn't put itself forward on the one hand as an empirical science based on observation and experiment. And on the other hand, it didn't want to say that all it was doing was elaborating a set of tautologies, analyzing the terms in which we speak and think.

And Hume's question was, well, is there anything else that a philosopher could possibly be doing if he isn't doing either of those? But didn't Hume realize, and Kant after him, that it also created a serious problem for the natural sciences? Because scientific unrestricted general scientific laws Yes. are also propositions that are neither analytic, they can't be deductively arrived at by logic, nor can they be proved from experience. And they both realized that, too, didn't they? I'm I'm not sure and it shouldn't be I think a diversion at the moment to go into it.

Really what Hume thought about that. I think Hume thought that the sciences could sort of carry on as a body of empirical knowledge. Um though of course in that case without the claim to establish that anything was necessarily so. Yeah. Um Kant's view though was certainly that um this belief in an exhaustive dichotomy uh was mistaken. He had no doubt that it was mistaken. Uh because uh while one might question the credentials of philosophers in claiming to put forward synthetic propositions that were both synthetic and necessary, that might be questionable.

Uh Kant had no doubt that this was perfectly in common form, so to speak, in the natural sciences and in mathematics. So that there certainly were, he thought, undoubtedly there were propositions which were not analytic but were not empirical and contingent either. In other words, propositions which applied to the world but yet we which we didn't as it were derive from the world. but which we could establish simply by argument. Yes. Yes. And he called them synthetic a priori, the technical term he used.

Now uh if such propositions apply to the world but are not, so to speak, read off from the world by experience, by observation, Yes. how do we arrive at them? Well, um yes. One has to introduce here, I think, one of Kant's most important distinctions between uh what he called things in themselves or the world as it is in itself and appearances. Uh now on the question of things in themselves, um Kant would have said we can't make any demands on the things in themselves simply are as they are and there's nothing we can do about that.

Um but if you move to the topic of the world as we experience it, as it presents itself to us as an object of experience, to the world what he called appearances, then he said it's a different matter uh because there are certain conditions, he claimed, which any world must satisfy if it is to be a possible object of experience at all for us. For well, us and other people, I think, too. Um he thought it um a crucial fact that the world is a common object of experience to an indefinite array of subjects of experience.

And if there is to be such a world that can be experienced and known about in common to a community of subjects of experience, then he argued there are conditions which it must satisfy. And we can say a priori that um appearances must satisfy these conditions. Would it be correct to put what you've just said in the following sort of way that what there is for us to experience or perceive or know must of course depend on what there is to experience or perceive or know, but it must also depend on what apparatus we have for experiencing or seeing or knowing.

And that the apparatus that we have is a contingent matter. I mean, to use a modern example, we we happen to be equipped to interpret electromagnetic waves of some frequencies but not others. That's to say we can receive and interpret heat waves and light rays but we don't receive and interpret radio waves and x-rays. Yes. And it's imaginable that we might apprehend reality in entirely different terms from those that Yes. Yes. Um Now, uh Kant is saying this being so for us to be able to experience anything at all it must be such as is apprehensible by our apparatus.

By the apparatus we've got. Yes. Yes. Now, that's not to say that nothing else can exist but only that it can't, so to speak, exist for us. That that we can't know it or apprehend it. Is that right? Well, I would qualify that in one way. I mean, Kant didn't, I think, want to get into considerations about what our sensory equipment specifically is. I mean, what kind of eyes and ears we have. Um I think he was trying to say something more general than that. That the notion of a subject of experience presented with a world as an object of experience uh requires that it should have sensory uh capacities of some kind and intellectual and conceptual capacities of some kind. But he didn't want to say they must be of this specific kind or that.

I mean, he didn't he wouldn't have been interested in whether our eyes were different from those of kestrels, say. I mean, just that we must have some way of perceiving. Yeah. But the point then is that we bring certain, as it were, predispositions Yes. and only what fits into those predispositions can be experienced for us. That's absolutely right. Yes. And this was something the nature of which I think had not occurred to any philosopher before. No, genuinely novel, I think. Yes. Now, what sort of entirely novel view of the nature of human knowledge did this begin to lead him towards?

Well, he he he put forward the claim that if one um sort of thought carefully enough and argued long enough, one could specify what he called the form of any possible experience. Um and this he he gave the name of this the metaphysic of nature or sometimes the metaphysic of experience to this enterprise. Um what he called the matter, that was a contingent matter and there might be this or that actually happening, but he thought one could spell out and think out what the form, as he called it, of any possible experience must be.

And this would be uh a body of doctrine that would tell you something about the world, of course, because it's telling you what its essential form is, but telling you something necessary, it couldn't be otherwise. And for this and because there are such uh propositions, uh that was why Hume and others of his predecessors were wrong in analyzing all possible propositions into either analytic, which would be true or false by nature of the terms used, and synthetic uh or a posteriori, which were true or false according to observation and experience.

We've now got a third kind. Yes. Yes. Now, can you give us an example or two of of of concepts or propositions which uh are of this sort? Well, um uh putting it in the most general terms, they divide into two broad classes. Um first of all, Kant tried to deal with what he called form of sensibility or perception. And he thought that here one could um spell out and work out the fundamental character of space and time. He thought these were imposed upon our experience by the nature of our sensibility.

Uh I I I want to stop you there cuz I think this is a very hard idea to for people to grasp to who it's new. He was saying that space and time don't characterize things as they are in themselves, but are inescapable modes of experience for us. That's right. That we can only experience things in these dimensions, but independently of our experience, these dimensions can't be said to exist. That's certainly right. And he would say if some disturbed well, what about the creation as it is in itself, uh what kind of spatial and temporal order does it display? Kant would say not a discussable topic. And all we can talk about is uh that world which is an object of experience to us.

Um the world as it appears. And he thought that here um it's very arguable whether he was right to have this thought, but he thought that in thus bringing in space and time as forms of sensibility, he was in effect bringing in geometry and arithmetic, amazingly, rather odd claim, but he thought that geometry and arithmetic dealt with forms of sensibility and were bodies of synthetic a priori truth for that reason. Given that he says that there are propositions of this special kind which apply to the world, but are not derived from experience.

Yes. Could I just Could I just intervene? Yes. I was going to say that his synthetic a priori propositions divide into two broad classes. We've only dealt with one of them, of course. If I could just very briefly bring in the second. Right. He thought that there are also what he called forms of the understanding. In the sense forms of thought. And I suppose the fundamental principles which he tried to show were conditions of the possibility of understanding would be first of all the principle of universal causal determinism, which he thought was one of them.

And then rather implausibly, he also tries to show that Newton's law of the conservation of matter states a condition of the possibility of experience, too. Now, in order to arrive at the sort of total picture that we are beginning to build up. Let me just recapitulate up to this point. That Kant is saying that because all of our knowledge and experience comes to us through our sensory and mental apparatus, it all comes to us in forms which are sense dependent and mind dependent. Yes. And that we have no direct access to things as they are in themselves independently of all possible experience. Now, given that the modes of apprehension that we have are whatever they are, uh possible experience must, as it were, fit in with them to be able to be experienced for us Yes.

at all. Absolutely. And part of his project as a philosopher, therefore, was to carry out a large-scale investigation into what the nature of these forms Mhm. Yes. And if that investigation is successful and complete, it will tell us what the limits of all possible knowledge Yes. Is that right? Yes. Yes. And that anything that's outside that is just simply unknowable to us. Yes. Yes. Now, the implications of this are absolutely radical, not only for what is included, but for what is left out up there.

That's certainly true and fundamentally true and um I find it hard to believe that it wasn't, so to speak, something of a disappointment to Kant that this is the position he got himself into because one gets the impression from the way he embarks on his inquiries that he would like to build a sort of firm foundation for theological speculation about God and the soul and metaphysical speculation about the cosmos. Um whereas what he actually finishes up doing is saying that there can be no such foundations because all we can establish foundations for uh is the notion of possible experience and what can be an object of possible experience.

And if you try to go beyond that if you try to raise questions about how the cosmos should be characterized quite independently of any possible experience or if you try to talk about God and the soul uh then your enterprise must collapse and be in principle vacuous, Kant is saying certainly. Now, Kant thought that it was impossible for us to know whether God exists or not or whether we have souls or not, but he did himself believe that God did exist and that we do have souls, didn't he? Yes, indeed.

He was very clear that this was a matter of faith and not something that was knowable. Yes. But how on his own premises is talk about God or the soul even intelligible? Yes. Well, that's a very good question and one on which he is I was going to say slightly shifty, I think. Um what he wants to say and this is rather interesting because it involves him sort of turning the whole issue upside down in a rather interesting way. Cuz it um some of his predecessors at any rate had made the supposition that moral convictions and attitudes and our religious convictions stand in need of some kind of metaphysical foundation and they tried to provide one in the form of theology and philosophical ethics.

Um well, Kant finishes up um putting the thing exactly the other way up. He says that we are not only entitled to moral convictions and religious convictions, he thought it inescapable that we should have them. Uh but and these would lead us to essentially metaphysical doctrines about God and the soul. But that those doctrines themselves, if they had any foundation at all um it consisted directly in our primitive moral convictions themselves, so that it's those that are fundamental. Is he saying this, that it just is an inescapable empirical fact that we're all directly familiar with?

Yes. But whether we like it or not, most of us at least simply do have moral convictions which we find ourselves unable to ignore even when we want to. Yes. And that's a fact. Now for these convictions to have any real validity or significance at all, the essential moral terms like good, bad, right, wrong, praise, blame, etc. For these to have any significance at all, there must be some freedom of choice. It must be possible for some of us some of the time to have done other than we did, otherwise the terms are meaningless. But how is that possible?

Uh on the one hand in a world in which all motions of matter are governed by Newtonian laws. That was one problem that you started us off with right at the very beginning of the discussion. Yes. But also for for us to have free will, which he thinks is an inescapable consequence of the direct experience we do have of moral categories, then there must be some sort of moral realm. Is that correct? Yes. Yes. Now, how does he get even further, as it were, from that to God or I mean, what he says about himself thinking about theology and religion, I think specifically, he says that he had denied knowledge in order to make room for faith.

He had simply shown why it was that the sort of subject matter of theology, if I put it like that, is not a possible topic of knowledge, but then he says, "What's alarming about that? Because we've all all known all along it's essentially a matter of faith." But as you rightly say, and one could claim that his arguments have really been rather more radical than that. It isn't just that when I talk about God, I am saying things that I don't know to be true. His argument really seems to lead to the conclusion that I don't know what I'm saying. I think what I'm saying doesn't really mean anything. But he was very reluctant to draw that conclusion.

What he tries to say is all I've done is to show that it's not a matter of knowledge or proof. Yes. And his point on that is you I suppose is this that it whereas it's superstitious to rest on faith over a question which can actually be decided Exactly. Exactly. If the question can't be decided one way or the way or the other, it's not irrational to have belief on one side. Absolutely. Yes. Yes. At the very beginning of this discussion, Jeffrey, you said that that what the problem that could usefully be regarded as having as it were launched Kant on his philosophical enterprise was a perception of an apparent a conflict between Newtonian physics and the requirements of ethics. How in the light of everything we've said up to this point did he solve that problem?

Um yes. Um to really quite minimal extent, I think. And I think this was something of which he was himself perfectly aware. What he would claim is that um by making clear the distinction between the world as a appearance as an object of experience and the world of things in themselves he is in a position to say there is the world of appearances and the physical sciences in principle give us the whole truth about that. And he believed that they did. He had no doubt that Newton had got it absolutely right. And that um a physicist's description of the world as an object of possible experience was correct and could be exhaustive.

But, he says, uh bear in mind that we are there talking about the world of appearances. There is also, um, the topic of things in themselves, and there is room, so to speak, there for other sorts of concepts altogether of free will, of rational agency, right and wrong, good and bad, the soul. There is a room for these concepts, not in the world of appearance, but, uh, outside the world of appearance. Uh, of course, he saw that on his own principles, he would have to say that these other matters couldn't be topics of knowledge.

And if I had you said to him, "Do you know that there is such a thing as free will?" He would consistently have said, "No, I do not know any such thing. All I know is that there is room for that possibility." And that I can't help believing that there is. Oh, certainly. Yes, he would have gone on to say that, too. Given that on this view, ethics comes to us somehow from outside the world of all possible knowledge, does he have a view about where it comes from, or how we get it? Um well, he thought it came out of reason.

I think it'll help us to understand that problem further if you if if you tell us what the main conclusions of his moral philosophy were. It's quite impossible, I think, in the context of this discussion to go into the arguments with which he supported those conclusions. Yes. But if you are able out to outline the conclusions for us briefly, I think that will contribute to an understanding. Mhm. I think one could say something quite briefly about that. Uh what he really tries to do in his moral philosophy is somehow extract the essentials of morality from the pure concept of rationality.

He says the the essential thing about any agent of whom one can think or speak in moral terms is that he must be a rational being capable of thinking of reasons for and against doing this and that. And he tries to argue that the essential requirements of morality are really built into the concept of rationality itself. Um essentially trying to show that uh well, he seems to try to show that um only uh a body of principles of action um corresponding to uh principles of morality could consistently, i.e. rationally, be universally adopted by a community of rational beings. That's what he tries to show.

And there is the famous categorical imperative, which of course directly derives from that. Yes. Perhaps I should ask you to formulate it rather. Well, he says act only on that maxim which by which you can at the same time will that it should be a universal law. Um and I think that is the idea. He He He wants to say that what morality really imposes on us is conditions on conduct um which require and I think he also thinks uniquely determine the ascent of any possible community of rational creatures.

That's what he's trying to do. Now, Kant's philosophy is notoriously difficult to understand at the first encounter and I'm sure that many of the people listening to this discussion between you and me are experiencing this difficulty now. I think fundamental to the difficulty is his contention that of things as they are in themselves, we simply have no knowledge and no way of acquiring knowledge, that we are as it were permanently screened off from this by our own limitation. And these are partly limitations as it were in time and space.

Is it helpful, do you think, to say to point out to people, "Look, in a quite different context, something very much of this sort is what many religious people have always believed, that as it were real reality is outside this world of our experience, outside space and time, and that this world of our experience is ephemeral and perhaps illusory in some metaphysical sense." Is it helpful to say that or do you think that just obscures the issue? No, I don't think it does. Um I mean, if for example, I mean, one raises the rather um in a sense hypothetical and perhaps idle question, "What sort of being one would have to be to be acquainted with things as they are in themselves.

The only possible answer you can get out of Kant is you'd have to be God, in fact. Um that's to say you would be acquainted with things in some timeless way and without any kind of spatial limitations and with no particular sensory limitations on the mode of your acquaintance. And I'm not thinking in English or French or any other particular language. Your acquaintance with the universe would be not subject to any of these limitations. And if you say well, and what would I have to be to be like that? You The only answer is I'd have to be God.

It's a very striking feature, I think, of Kant's philosophy that although he conducted his philosophy impeccably in accordance with the criteria of philosophy, he didn't call on faith or revelation or anything of that kind, but relied purely on argument and was working, as it were, entirely from within the central tradition of Western philosophy. Yes. Through predecessors like Locke and Hume and Leibniz and so on. Nevertheless, he does arrive at conclusions which are strikingly um capable of cohabiting with religious belief.

Well, yes, except for the uncomfortable fact which we mentioned earlier that um he has to say that strictly speaking all discourse on those topics is unintelligible to us. We don't really know what we mean. And that's a proposition that theologians have been a bit chary of accepting. They might might even say that nowadays more and more are accepting Well, that may be true. May be true. Yes. Yes. Another difficulty about reading Kant is is simply the prose style. I mean, there are philosophers um Hume is one, Plato is another, Schopenhauer is another who are beautiful writers and a pleasure to read, but Kant's best friend couldn't say that about him. It's It's opaque, it's difficult, it's obscure.

Why did he write so badly? I think there are perhaps three things that one might say. I think partly um it's uh due to the fact which you mentioned right at the beginning that he was by profession and very single-mindedly by profession an academic. And he does write in a very heavily academic style with a great taste for technical terminology and jargon and um what he called architectonic. It is all very academic. Um but another important point I think to remember about the critiques and this again connects with something you said at the beginning.

Uh was that um by the time he was seriously launched on writing what he knew to be his sort of master works, he hoped would be his master works, he was nearly 60 and he was actually dogged by the thought that he might die before he'd got it all done. And there's no doubt that those hundreds of pages uh between the ages of 16 and 60 and 70 were written extremely fast. He was just writing in a hurry. And I think that has a lot to Of course, 200 years ago the expectation of life simply was very much shorter than now and it was perfectly reasonable to him to think that he might die quite early, I suppose.

Yes. So, that he was writing in a hurry. Another point that slightly less obvious one is that um he was and still by that date somewhat unusually writing in German. Uh which had at that date barely become accepted as a sort of decent language for academic and learned use. Um I Leibniz I don't believe Leibniz ever wrote German. It was all either French or Latin. Either French or Latin. Yes. And um there just wasn't a sort of established style of academic learned German prose for Kant to adopt and as for example for Berkeley and Hume there was. I mean English had become a well-established uh language for that kind of learned use.

And I think that may have been a problem to him. He had no sort of models. It's a great sadness I think cuz it it's it's a huge unnecessary obstacle Yes. the work of somebody who after all Yes, it is. Yes. incomparable thinker. Yes. I said at the very beginning of this discussion that he's been regarded for generations by large numbers of professionals philosophers as the greatest philosopher since the ancient Greeks. Why is his reputation at quite that pinnacle? I think that there were I think I would mention as two qualities as entitling him to his pinnacle of fame.

I think he was quite exceptionally penetrating in in the sense that he was able to see an intellectual problem in something which had previously been taken for granted and as not worth much attention. Um he was able to see where the problems were. Um and I think and that's one of the greatest philosophical gifts to be able to see that there is a problem where everybody else is going on quite happily without thinking about it much. Um then I think the other thing and this connects perhaps with his academic professionalism, um he was extremely good at seeing how how it all fitted together and how what he'd said on this topic might repercuss, so to speak, on what he'd said somewhere else. And he was very self-conscious about and so professional and methodical in this sort of way. He does, I must say, to me make writers like, say, Locke and Berkeley and indeed Hume, excellent there they are, look rather like amateurs.

Thank you very much, Sir Geoffrey. Mhm.