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第 64 期 · 回应 Ⅱ·06「语言塑造思想吗？」
The Two Philosophies of Wittgenstein - Anthony Quinton & Bryan Magee (1977)
节目发布 2022-03-29章节 · 点击跳转视频
0:00
罗素与维特根斯坦：两种影响
2:12
从工程师到哲学家的生平
4:15
《逻辑哲学论》：语言何以可能
8:26
图像论：名称、对象与事态
12:56
真假无意义与不可说之物
18:34
怪异、文学性与写作风格
23:53
真值函项与逻辑数学的同语反复
27:14
维也纳学派的改造与沉寂十年
31:27
后期哲学：意义即用法
35:42
哲学作为治疗：打破误导性图画
40:54
生活形式与相对主义的影响
42:58
昆顿的评价与两种哲学的定位
本期小问 · 档案清单
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语言塑造思想吗？
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语言还承载意义吗？
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我们真的在理解世界吗？
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知识从哪里来？
本期讲者
布莱恩·马基英国哲学家、广播人、工党议员（1974–1983），BBC 系列《Men of Ideas》(1978)与《The Great Philosophers》(1987)主持人，著有《Confessions of a Philosopher》《Wittgenstein 相关通俗哲学著作》。
安东尼·奎因顿英国哲学家，牛津新学院研究员，后任牛津三一学院院长（1978–1987），1982 年受封终身贵族。著有《The Nature of Things》《Utilitarian Ethics》等，以清晰的分析哲学写作和哲学史研究著称。
01罗素与维特根斯坦：两种影响
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[Music] i don't think anyone could quarrel with the assertion that in this century the two most influential philosophers in the english-speaking world have been bertrand russell and ludwig wittgenstein russell besides being a great philosopher was a tremendous public figure immersed in political and social affairs nearly all his life he became exceedingly familiar to the general public as a broadcaster and journalist and social critic so people came to associate him quite rightly with certain general ideas and with a particular approach to social problems even if they didn't know much about his philosophy the best of which in any case was highly mathematical and technical and therefore not really accessible to the non-specialist wittgenstein was quite different he was only a technical philosopher he took no part in public activity shunned exposure even within his own profession published very little the result of this is that for a long time his influence though immense was confined to full-time students of
[音乐]我想没有人会反对这样一个说法：在本世纪，英语世界最有影响力的两位哲学家是伯特兰·罗素和路德维希·维特根斯坦。罗素除了是一位伟大的哲学家之外，还是一位了不起的公众人物，几乎一生都投身于政治和社会事务。他作为广播人、记者和社会批评家，为普通大众所熟知。所以人们理所当然地把他和某些一般性的观念、以及某种看待社会问题的特定方式联系在一起，哪怕他们对他的哲学所知不多——他最好的哲学著作无论如何都高度数学化、技术化，因此对非专业人士来说其实难以企及。维特根斯坦则完全不同。他只是一位技术性的哲学家，不参与任何公共活动，回避抛头露面，即便在他自己的专业圈子里也是如此，而且发表的东西极少。结果就是，在很长一段时间里，他的影响虽然巨大，却局限于全职研究哲学的人当中。直到相对晚近，这种影响才开始渗透到
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philosophy only comparatively recently has this influence begun to seep out into surrounding areas of thought and affect people in other fields of activity so the situation now is that a very large number of people have heard of wittgenstein who don't really have any idea at all of what he did or why it's important in this program we're going to try and rectify that a bit and as far as is possible in the short space of a single program to bring out clearly the main lines of wittgenstein's thought and say something about what its influence has been outside as well as inside philosophy this not easy task is being taken on by anthony quinton fellow of new college oxford where he's been teaching philosophy now for over 20 years mr clinton is currently also writing a history of philosophy in which wittgenstein will be treated at some considerable length but before i invite anthony clinton to start talking about wittgenstein's ideas i'd like myself if i may to say something about wittgenstein the man
周边的思想领域，并影响到其他行业的人。所以现在的情况是，有非常多的人听说过维特根斯坦，却完全不知道他做了什么、或者为什么这很重要。在这期节目里，我们要试着稍微弥补这一点，并且在一期节目这么短的篇幅内尽可能清晰地呈现维特根斯坦思想的主要脉络，同时谈一谈他在哲学界内外产生的影响。承担这个不轻松任务的是安东尼·昆顿，牛津大学新学院的研究员，他在那里教哲学已经二十多年了。昆顿先生目前还在撰写一部哲学史，其中维特根斯坦将被相当详尽地论述。不过在我请安东尼·昆顿开始谈维特根斯坦的思想之前，如果可以的话，我想先自己说说维特根斯坦这个人。他1889年生于维也纳，1951年在剑桥去世，顺带一提，他在中年时
02从工程师到哲学家的生平
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he was born in vienna in 1889 and died in cambridge in 1951 having incidentally become a british subject in his middle age his father was the richest and most powerful steel magnet in austria and as a young child wittgenstein developed a passionate interest in machinery which was to set the pattern for his whole education his parents sent him to a school that specialized in mathematics and the physical sciences and he went on from there to become a student in mechanical engineering at the age of 19 he came to britain as a research student in engineering at manchester university and it was while he was there that he became fascinated by what were in fact philosophical questions about the foundations of the mathematics he was using he read bertrand russell's great book the principles of mathematics and this seems to have been a kind of revelation to him he threw up engineering and went to cambridge to study logic under russell and within a very short time indeed he was producing original work of
加入了英国国籍。他的父亲是奥地利最富有、最有权势的钢铁大亨。维特根斯坦小时候就对机械产生了强烈的兴趣，这为他整个求学历程定下了基调。他的父母把他送进一所专攻数学和自然科学的学校，之后他又去学机械工程。19岁时他来到英国，在曼彻斯特大学做工程学的研究生。也正是在那里，他开始着迷于一些其实属于哲学的问题——关于他所使用的数学的基础问题。他读了伯特兰·罗素的巨著《数学原理》，这对他来说似乎是一种启示。他放弃了工程学，去剑桥跟随罗素研究逻辑，而且在很短的时间内他就做出了自己的原创性工作，
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his own which many people have regarded from that day to this as work of genius it resulted in the only it resulted in the only book of his to be published during his lifetime a book with the somewhat off-putting title tractators logico philosophicas usually referred to by philosophers simply as the tractators it was published in austria in 1929 and in england in 1920 it was published in austria in 1921 and in england in 1922. it's very short but certainly one of the most influential works of philosophy to be published in this century however while it was exerting this tremendous influence over the subsequent years wittgenstein himself was becoming more and more discontented with it in fact he came to the view that it was fundamentally mistaken and he produced a whole new philosophy which repudiated his earlier one during his lifetime this second philosophy was disseminated only to and through his students at cambridge but after his death the whole mass of writings came out which embodied it too
从那时起直到今天，许多人都把这些工作视为天才之作。它最终成就了他生前出版的唯一一本书，一本名字有点让人望而生畏的书——《逻辑哲学论》，哲学家们通常简称它为《逻辑哲学论》。它1929年在奥地利出版，1920年在英国出版。它1921年在奥地利出版，1922年在英国出版。这本书非常短，但无疑是本世纪出版的最有影响力的哲学著作之一。然而，就在它对之后的思想发挥着这种巨大影响的时候，年间，维特根斯坦本人对它越来越不满，事实上他后来认为它根本上是错的，于是他提出了一整套全新的哲学，彻底否定了自己早期的哲学。在他生前，这第二套哲学只在剑桥的学生中间传播，通过他们扩散出去；但在他去世后，体现这套哲学的大量著作陆续问世。其中最重要的一部书叫《哲学研究》
03《逻辑哲学论》：语言何以可能
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the most important of these was a book called philosophical investigations which was published in 1953 and which then proceeded to have as great an influence as the tractators had had 30 years before this is a unique phenomenon in the whole history of philosophy a philosopher of genius producing two different and incompatible philosophies each of which decisively influenced a whole generation well now we must go back to the beginning and follow this story through in terms of the ideas involved first the tractatus then produced during the second decade of this century anthony quinton it's a very short book it's less than 80 pages in the standard edition what would you say are the central problems that wittgenstein was trying to solve in it i think the shortest way of stating the central problem of the book is as follows how is language possible people had assumed made all sorts of assumptions about meaning previously how people attach meaning to words wittgenstein immensely generalized the question and said how in
它于1953年出版，随后产生的影响力，不亚于三十年前《逻辑哲学论》所产生的影响这在整个哲学史上都是独一无二的现象：一位天才哲学家提出了两套彼此不同、互不相容的哲学，而每一套都决定性地影响了整整一代人。好，现在我们得回到起点，顺着这个故事、循着其中的思想脉络往下讲。首先是《逻辑哲学论》，写于本世纪第二个十年。安东尼·昆顿，这是一本很短的书，标准版还不到八十页你认为维特根斯坦在书中想要解决的核心问题是什么？我想，要用最简短的方式来陈述这本书的核心问题，可以这样说：语言是如何可能的？以前人们对意义作出过种种假定，即人们如何把意义赋予词语。维特根斯坦把这个问题极大地普遍化了，他问：一般说来，
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general is it possible for human beings by producing marks on paper or making noises to represent something that was utterly different in character from the marks and noises used to represent them i think many of the people watching this program might not see at once why that is a problem people are inclined to take language for granted why should the very existence of language present a philosophical problem well if one looks at the world in a more or less statistical way in a great deal of it things interact causally with each other rocks bang against rocks moons influence tides and so on but just here and there in the world is this extraordinary phenomenon of some elements in the world intelligently reproducing other elements of it in themselves agree i agree of course it's that the texture of our whole inner lives the use of language the understanding of language our communication with our fellow men of course principally they're not exclusively takes place through it i think it's just one of those questions
人类怎么可能通过在纸上留下记号、或者发出声音，来表征某种在性质上与用来表征它的那些记号和声音截然不同的东西？我想，收看这个节目的许多人可能一下子看不出这为什么是个问题。人们往往把语言看作理所当然的。为什么语言的存在本身会构成一个哲学问题呢？嗯，如果我们多少用统计的眼光来看这个世界，其中绝大部分事物是以因果方式相互作用的：岩石撞击岩石，月亮影响潮汐，等等。可偏偏在世界的某些地方，出现了这样一种非凡的现象：世界中的某些要素在自身之内理智地再现了世界的其他要素。我同意，我当然同意。我们整个内在生活的质地、语言的使用、对语言的理解、我们与同类的交流，当然主要地、但不是排他地，都是通过它进行的。我想这正是那类
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that seems so obvious that most people don't bother to ask it rather like newton asking seriously why the planets didn't charge off in all directions why stones dropped when released from the hand it's got the same naive pristine fundamentalness in other words we have this ability to think about and therefore handle in a sense things which are not present to us and this is made possible by language or nation partly made possible by language and this raises two sets of questions what is the relationship of language to the world and what is the relationship of language to thought and i take you to a degree that both of these questions are central to what the tractators is trying to do yes people had asked questions about these things as it were in a piecemeal way before the great fascination of the tractatus is they're asked with the utmost conceivable generality and to both of the things you mentioned he has answers to give there's this apparently not very uh helpful answer in the first at first
看上去太过显然、以至于大多数人懒得去问的问题，就像牛顿认真地追问：行星为什么不朝四面八方飞散？石头一松手为什么会落下？它具有同样天真质朴的根本性。换句话说，我们有这样一种能力：去思考、并因而在某种意义上去处理那些并不在场的事物，而这是由语言使之成为可能的，或者说部分地由语言使之成为可能。这就引出了两组问题：语言与世界的关系是什么？语言与思想的关系是什么？我想你会同意，这两个问题都是《逻辑哲学论》试图处理的核心问题。是的，以前人们也问过关于这些的问题，不过是零零碎碎地问。《逻辑哲学论》最大的魅力在于，它是以可以设想的最大普遍性来提出这些问题的，而对你刚才提到的两点，他都给出了答案。乍看之下，第一个答案似乎不怎么
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glance that language represents the world by depicting it propositions are pictures he says of facts and equally propositions are expressions of thought they're the vehicles of thought they're what we think with now there's another side to this coin isn't there that he was also concerned with the very fact that he was concerned with the limits of what could be expressed in language and discovering what the limits were to what language could do meant that he was also concerned with what language can't do this was a very essential feature of the whole operation and perhaps in some ways one of those that's had the largest possible influence is insistence that the limits of language were clearly stateable and all this followed from his idea that language is essentially and i have to insist literally pictorial in character there's a well-known anecdote about wittgenstein hearing of the use of some models in a french law court i think it was to represent the state of affairs in some street accident and he had confronted
有帮助：语言通过描画世界来表征世界。他说，命题是事实的图像；同样，命题也是思想的表达，是思想的载体，是我们用来思考的东西。不过这里还有另一面，对吧？他同时也关心——他关心的正是——语言所能表达的界限，而弄清语言所能做的事情的界限，也就意味着他同时关心语言不能做什么。这是整个工作中一个非常本质的特征，而且在某些方面，或许也是影响最为深远的一点：他坚持认为语言的界限是可以被清楚地陈述出来的。而这一切都源自他的这个想法：语言在本质上——我必须强调，是字面意义上——具有图像的性质。有一则关于维特根斯坦的著名轶事：他听说在一家法国法庭上使用了一些模型，我想是用来表现某起街头事故的情形。面对这件事，他获得了阿基米德喊出“尤里卡”时的那种体验——就是它了，
04图像论：名称、对象与事态
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with this the sort of experience that archimedes cried eureka about this is it i've got it he said that is the essence of language and this put very serious constraints on language that language had exactly to mirror states of affairs in which objects were engaged and so this put limits to a very marked kind on what could be said in his view in particular he thought that the relation of language to the world itself couldn't be meaningfully represented in language or disgusted language let's i think we we've we've got a a pretty clear view now of what uh what the problems were that he was addressing himself to in this book we now have to start considering what the solutions were that he put forward what did he come around to saying the scope of language was and to saying the limits to its use were the fundamental thing i think here can be put in two points first of all that language has to fit the world very directly in that it has to be constituted a meaningful assertion a meaningful proposition has to be
我找到了！他说，这就是语言的本质。而这给语言加上了非常严格的约束：语言必须精确地映现对象所处的事态。因此，这就给什么是可说的划下了一道非常鲜明的界限。在他看来，尤其是，他认为语言与世界本身的关系无法在语言中被有意义地表征，或者说无法被语言所讨论。我想我们现在已经相当清楚地看到，他在这本书里所要处理的问题是什么了。接下来我们得开始考察他提出的解决方案是什么。关于语言的范围，以及语言使用的界限，他最后是怎么说的？我想这里最根本的东西可以归为两点。首先，语言必须非常直接地契合世界：一个有意义的断言、一个有意义的命题，必须由直接对应于对象的名称构成，这些名称与它们所指称的对象精确
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constituted names that fit directly onto objects that are exactly correlated with the objects they're the names of and then a true proposition a genuine proposition will be an arrangement of names that mirrors the arrangement of the objects it treats of now this limits language in a sense to description of that which is outside language that's the limiting uh feature of that oh god i'm sorry i've foozed it i've lost the second thing that's right now well let's you said there were uh you've mentioned you've mentioned what's often referred to as the picture theory of language i think it's very difficult for uh people to see in what sense a sentence can be a picture of a fact or a sentence can be a picture of any piece of reality can you explain that a bit better well i think his point is that the sentences of ordinary language don't look like pictures but his contention is if they are to have any meaning they must be capable of being analyzed or decomposed into a set of ultimate elementary sentences which
对应；然后，一个真命题、一个真正的命题，将是名称的一种排列，它映现出它所谈论的那些对象的排列。这样一来，语言在某种意义上就被限制在对语言之外的东西的描述上了，这就是那个限定性的特征。哦天哪，抱歉，我搞砸了，第二点我一下子想不起来了。那么，你刚才说有两点——你提到了通常所说的语言图像论。我想人们很难理解，一个句子在什么意义上可以是一个事实的图像，或者说一个句子怎么会是某一片实在的图像。你能再解释得清楚一点吗？我想他的意思是，日常语言中的句子看上去并不像图像，但他主张，如果它们要有任何意义，就必须能够被分析、或者说分解成一组最终的初等句子，而这些初等句子确实是图像：它们纯粹由直接对应于所
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really are pictures which consist purely of names directly correlated with the objects that are being taught talked about and in which the arrangement of names mirrors the arrangement of the objects let me recapitulate this to see if if we've got it absolutely clear between us the wittgenstein thought that if you analyzed any utterance about the world you could analyze it down into words which were names of things and the relationship between the words in the sentence corresponded to the relationship between things in the real world and in this way the sentence was able to picture the world that's right and that was a purely argumentative assumption as it were he argued that from first principles he argued that he was necessitated by the requirement he laid down that every genuine proposition must have a definite sense and he thought no proposition could have a definite sense unless it was ultimately made up of these fundamental pictorial propositions well sorry i i wasn't given the examples
谈论的对象的名称构成，并且其中名称的排列映现了对象的排列。让我把这个复述一遍，看看我们之间是不是完全弄清楚了。维特根斯坦认为，如果你分析任何一个关于世界的陈述，你可以把它分析成一些词，这些词是事物的名称，而句子中词与词之间的关系对应于现实世界中事物之间的关系，正是通过这种方式，句子才能够描画世界。对而这纯粹是一个论证性的假定，可以说，他是从第一原理出发论证出来的。他论证说，这是由他所设定的要求所必然导致的：每一个真正的命题都必须有确定的意义。而他认为，任何命题都不可能有确定的意义，除非它归根结底是由这些最基本的图像性命题构成的。抱歉，我还没有举例子。
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of these pictorial propositions other philosophers he influenced came forward with examples of them but he abstains all together from giving the examples he just says it can he thinks we prove that there must be propositions of this ultimate pictorial kind but now one immediate uh uh query that occurs to one is this a great many of the things that we say are false or untrue uh that means that i in those cases utter something to which there is nothing in the world that corresponds now how does he explain that well it emerges fairly simply from what's come out so far objects can be arranged in various different ways and the names we have for those objects it can also be arranged in various different ways a significant proposition assembles a set of names in one of the possible configurations that those names allow for and the possibilities of combination of the names is directly parallel to the possibility of the combinations of the objects so a meaningful proposition as such depicts a possible state of affairs if
他所说的那些图像式命题，受他影响的其他哲学家倒是举出了例子，但他自己完全避免举任何例子，他只是说，他认为我们可以证明，必定存在这种终极图像式的命题但现在一个立刻会浮现的疑问是：我们所说的很多话是假的、不真的，也就是说，在那些情况下，我说出的东西在世界上并没有任何与之对应的东西那他怎么解释这一点呢？从目前讲到的内容里，其实很容易就能得出答案：对象可以有各种不同的排列方式，而我们为这些对象所取的名称，也同样可以有各种不同的排列方式。一个有意义的命题，就是把一组名称按照这些名称所允许的某一种可能配置组合起来，而名称之间组合的可能性，与对象之间组合的可能性是直接平行对应的。所以一个有意义的命题本身描绘的是一种可能的事态。如果命题所指称的那些对象的排列方式，与命题中那些
05真假无意义与不可说之物
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the arrangement of the objects referred to by the proposition is identical with the arrangement of the names of the objects in the proposition then the proposition is true so the counters can be moved around as it were in various configurations most of these will represent simply possible states of affairs when they're configured or arranged in the way the objects referred to are arranged then the proposition is true a lot of the things that we say in ordinary life and indeed in philosophy too aren't about states of affairs at all we make moral judgments aesthetic evaluations and so on and so forth how are these explained by this theory of language well as far as ethical and aesthetic judgments are concerned they're not in fact explained they're just said to be not part of language proper this is a very eccentric thing for anyone to say isn't it ethics is transcendental ethics he maintains does not deal with fact and his he insists that the real function of language is the describing truly if possible
名称的排列方式相同，那么这个命题就是真的。所以这些筹码可以说是能被挪来挪去，摆成各种配置，其中大多数只是表示可能的事态；当它们的配置或排列方式与所指称的对象的排列方式一致时，这个命题就是真的。我们在日常生活中，乃至在哲学中所说的很多话，根本就不是关于事态的。我们做道德判断、审美评价等等，这些在这套语言理论里是怎么解释的呢？就伦理判断和审美判断而言，它们实际上并没有得到解释，只是被说成不属于严格意义上的语言。这话不管谁说出来都非常古怪，不是吗？伦理是超验的——他坚持认为，伦理不处理事实。他坚持认为，语言真正的功能是描述，如果可能就是真的描述，如果只是有意义那就可能是假的描述，但那就是语言根本上的样子。换句话说，当我说出一个关于世界的句子时，
14:02
mean falsely if meaningful but that is what language fundamentally is in other words uh when i utter a sentence about the world i am arranging names together in a way which corresponds to a possible arrangement in the world if that arrangement is actualized in the world then my statement is true if it's a possible statement of a state of affairs in the world which is not actualized then my statement is false if the state of affairs isn't possible in the world at all then my utterance is meaningless that's correct so we've got a three-fold analysis into true false meaningless now this theory of language implies that the world must be of a certain kind that is to say that the world independently of our sort of language must consist of ultimately simple objects which are related to each other in certain ways is that so that's precisely what he says and that is what he asserts right at the beginning of the book in an unargued way he says the world consists of facts facts or arrangement of objects objects
我是在把一些名称按照某种方式排列起来，这种排列对应于世界中一种可能的排列。如果那种排列在世界中确实实现了，那么我的陈述就是真的；如果它表示的是世界中一种可能但并未实现的事态，那么我的陈述就是假的；如果那种事态在世界中根本不可能，那么我说的话就是无意义的。没错。所以我们就有了一个三分的分析：真、假、无意义。那么这套语言理论就意味着，世界必定是某种样子的，也就是说，独立于我们语言的那个世界，最终必定是由一些简单对象构成的，而这些对象以某些方式彼此关联。是这样吗？他说的正是这个意思，而且这正是他在书的一开头就以不加论证的方式断言的。他说，世界由事实构成，事实就是对象的排列；用你刚才的说法，对象
15:07
must be simple to take up the word you used and these come at one as one reads the book simply as dogmatic affirmations but they receive their support later on from the thesis that language has to have a definite sense and it can have a definite sense only if it is of a certain structure and therefore the world must be of that structure in order to be capable of being represented in language now what about the unsayable we were talking earlier about wittgenstein's concern with what can't be said is the other side of the same coin with his as his concern with what can be said what does the theory of language as we've now drawn it out have to say about what can't be said i suppose the central feature of the doctrine of what can't be said the one that's most philosophically important about it is that nothing can be said about the relation of language to the world this is the vital paradox of the tractatus that right towards the end he says anyone who understands my propositions will recognize that they're senseless and
必定是简单的。读这本书的时候，这些话扑面而来，简直就像是些独断的断言，但它们在后面得到了支持，那个论点就是：语言必须有确定的意义，而语言只有具备某种结构才可能有确定的意义，因此世界也必须具有那种结构，才可能被语言所表征。那么不可说的东西呢？我们前面谈到过维特根斯坦对不可说之物的关切，这和他对可说之物的关切其实是一枚硬币的两面。我们现在梳理出来的这套语言理论，对于不可说的东西又说了些什么呢？我想，关于不可说之物这一学说的核心特征，也是哲学上最重要的一点，就是关于语言与世界之间的关系，什么都说不了。这就是《逻辑哲学论》里那个关键的悖论：在快结尾的地方，他说，凡是理解我这些命题的人，都会认识到它们是无意义的；然后他又试图缓和这个悖论，说你必须把它们看作一架梯子，他借着它爬到了某个
16:15
then tries to mitigate the paradox by saying you must conceive them as a ladder on which he's mounted to a level of understanding which he then kicks away his thesis after all is that language and the world have to share a certain structure for it to be possible for language to represent the world and then says that this is not a fact about which discourse can um proceed it's something that shows itself in language but language can't be used to report and so philosophy as it were undermines itself in this mode of argument would it be true to say that that this is what he's doing then that that uh for a sentence to mirror the world there's not only got to be a one-to-one correlation between names in the sentence and objects in the world there's also got to be a structure internal to the sentence which relates the names in the sentence to each other in a way that corresponds to the way that objects in the world are related to each other and that this structure is exhibited by the proposition it's not something
理解的高度，然后就把梯子踢开。他的论点毕竟是：语言和世界必须共有某种结构，语言才可能表征世界；然后他又说，这并不是一个可以对之展开论述的事实，它是在语言中自行显示出来的东西，而语言无法用来报道它。所以哲学在这种论证方式中可以说是自我瓦解了。这样说是否准确：他所做的其实是，一个句子要映现世界，不仅句子中的名称与世界中的对象之间必须有一一对应，句子内部还必须有一种结构，把句子中的名称彼此关联起来，其方式对应于世界中对象彼此关联的方式；而这种结构是由命题展示出来的，不是由它陈述出来的，因此它是在命题中显示的，而这是无法用语言
17:28
that's stated by it and therefore it's shown in the proposition that can't be expressed in language yes in the light of that then he has to represent his own remarks in the tractatus as drawing our attention to what is open to view what is there shown if we only look the right way but that the propositions themselves are literally senseless but of course much else is to be is said to be nonsensical by him you mentioned a few moments ago judgments of value these he says are in a rather unhelpful word transcendental but it simply means they're not matters of describable fact and he gives no positive account in this book as to what they are then as an alternative and of course he's extremely hostile to past philosophy which purports to tell one all sorts of things about the world when what it is in fact doing is saying things in a hidden dialogue in a hidden dialect a code almost about the relation of language to the world which has to be shown and can't be described why do people think that this doctrine
表达的。是的。照这么看，他就不得不把自己在《逻辑哲学论》中的那些说法，表述为在提请我们注意那些本来就一目了然的东西，那些只要我们用对了眼光就能看见的、在那里显示出来的东西；但那些命题本身在字面上是无意义的。当然，他还认为别的许多东西也是无意义的。你刚才提到价值判断，这些他用了一个不太有帮助的词，说它们是超验的；但那只是意思是说，它们不属于可描述的事实，而他在这本书里对它们究竟是什么，没有给出任何正面的说明。那么作为一种替代……当然，他对以往的哲学极为敌视，那些哲学号称在告诉人们关于世界的种种事情，而它们实际上在做的，是用一种隐藏的对话、一种隐藏的方言、几乎可以说是一种密码，在谈论语言与世界的关系，而这种关系只能被显示，无法被描述。人们为什么会觉得这套学说如此了不起呢？我是说，为什么这种哲学会产生那么巨大的影响？
06怪异、文学性与写作风格
18:34
was so marvelous i mean why why did this philosophy have the enormous impact that it did because it does seem to me to be a very strange one and it does seem to me to leave an awful lot out uh for example uh i would have thought that the most expressive use of length uses of language that there are are those in creative art in poetry drama novels and so on both the most sophisticated uses of language and the profoundest and yet this theory of wittgenstein simply a lot seems to allow no place for an explanation of these uses of language at all it seems very limited very partial would you accept that criticism of it yes um it is limited but i think if called upon to defend it he would perhaps say that all other uses of language insofar as they can be taken seriously and aren't some form of word play require the explanation of this fundamental descriptive employment world describing employment of language first of all but about why people thought it was important you mentioned as an argument
因为在我看来它似乎非常古怪，而且在我看来它似乎遗漏了太多东西。比如说，我本来会认为，语言最富表现力的用法，是在创造性艺术中，在诗歌、戏剧、小说等等之中，这既是语言最精妙的用法，也是最深刻的用法；然而维特根斯坦的这套理论似乎完全没有给这些语言用法的解释留下任何位置。它显得非常有局限、非常片面。你接受这种批评吗？接受，它确实有局限。不过我想，如果要他来辩护，他也许会说，语言的其他一切用法，只要还能被认真对待、不是某种文字游戏，都首先需要以这种根本的描述性用法、这种描述世界的用法来加以解释。但说到人们为什么认为它重要——你把它古怪这一点当作反对它重要的理由，
19:39
against it's being important that was that it was strange but i thought part of the fascination just was that it was so strange it's not one might say a terribly modestly expressed book in the preface he says i am convinced that the final solution to all philosophical problems is contained here and of course quite compatibly with that he there and then gave up philosophy once for a considerable period ten years or so once he completed the tractators so it's strangeness is part of its appeal but it's not only that it's it's it's literally quality is rather striking it's like a voice speaking out of a whirlwind these short pregnant aphoristic sentences i'll give you a couple of examples the first one the world is everything that is the case it's one of those baffling announcements that one doesn't quite know what to make of the last one whereof one cannot speak thereof one must remain silent um one first sight that looks like a truism and then one realizes it isn't quite a truism he says it's the
可我认为，它的魅力恰恰有一部分就在于它如此古怪。可以说这不是一本表达得特别谦逊的书；在序言里他说，我确信，一切哲学问题的最终解答都包含在这里。当然，与此完全相符的是，他随即就放弃了哲学，而且放弃了相当长的一段时间，大概十年左右。他完成了《逻辑哲学论》，它的怪异本身就是它魅力的一部分，但不止于此——它的文学品质其实相当惊人就像有个声音从旋风中说话，那些简短、意蕴丰富、格言式的句子，我给你举几个例子，第一句是「世界就是一切实际情况」，这属于那种让人摸不着头脑的宣告，你不太知道该拿它怎么办；最后一句是「对于不可言说之物，人必须保持沉默」，嗯，乍看之下像是一句不言自明的老生常谈，但接着你会发现它并不完全是老生常谈。他说整本书的核心信息，就是要划定什么是可以
20:39
essential message of the whole book is to draw the limits of what can intelligently intelligibly be said i suppose the first thing that strikes anyone about the book when they pick it up for the first time is the way it's written because it's written in not in continuous prose at all but in very brief paragraphs numbered according to a very elaborate system of subdivisions and sub subdivisions and even subs up some divisions and some of these paragraphs are only one sentence long and as you've just indicated what you said the connections between them aren't always very obvious nor is there meaning in itself very obvious either why did he write in this enigmatic almost hermetic way well he was an immensely fastidious man in all respects i presume but certainly there's evidence for any reader of what one might call his intellectual fastidiousness he detested what i suppose what i have to call bourgeois academic philosophy the idea of philosophy is a trade a nine to five occupation which you do with a part of
被有意义地、可理解地说出来的界限。我想任何人第一次拿起这本书时，最先注意到的就是它的写法，因为它根本不是用连贯的散文写的，而是用非常简短的段落，按照一套极其精细的编号系统来划分，有子项、子子项，甚至还有子子子项，其中有些段落只有一句话。而且正如你刚才所说的，这些段落之间的联系并不总是很明显，它们本身的意思也不见得清楚。他为什么要用这种谜一般、近乎晦涩封闭的方式来写？嗯，我想他在各方面都是个极度讲究的人，而任何读者都能看出他所谓的知识上的洁癖。他厌恶——我想只能称之为——布尔乔亚式的学院哲学，那种把哲学当成一门行当、一份朝九晚五的工作的观念：你用自己的一部分去做它，然后下班走人，
21:44
yourself and then you go off and lead the rest of your life in independence of it he was a man of the utmost moral intensity of extreme passionate seriousness he took himself with very great seriousness he took his own work with very great seriousness when it wasn't going well he got into a desperate and agonized condition the result of this uh displays itself in his manner of right is displayed in his manner of writing that you feel that his whole idea of himself is behind everything that he says well this also means that he'd rather tends to disregard or to despise philosophy produced in a more easy going relaxed business-like vocational manner that he wishes to distance himself from that altogether he doesn't want to make the thing too easy he doesn't want to express himself in a way that people can pick up by simply running their eyes over the pages this is an instrument for changing the whole intellectual aspect of its readers lives and so the way to it is made difficult i think that could be a justification relative
过你与之无关的其余人生。他是个道德强度极高的人，有着极端而热烈的严肃性。他非常严肃地对待自己，也非常严肃地对待自己的工作。当工作不顺利时，他会陷入绝望而痛苦的状态。这一切的结果就体现在他的写作方式上，体现在他的写作方式里——你会感到他对自身的全部理解都支撑着他所说的每一句话。这也意味着他相当轻视甚至鄙夷那种以更轻松、随意、事务性、职业化的方式produce出来的哲学，他要彻底与之划清界限。他不想把事情弄得太容易，他不想用一种让人只要目光扫过书页就能领会的方式来表达自己。这本书是一件工具，要改变读者整个思想生活的面貌，所以通往它的路被刻意弄难了。我想，就他的意图而言，这或许可以为他的这种
22:51
to his intentions of the his way of proceeding i must say the prose does seem to me to have extraordinary quality i find the sentence is supercharged they have uh this haunting capacity to stay in the mind that one finds oneself quoting them very easily after one's read the book i would regard wittgenstein as one of those few philosophers like plato or schopenhauer or nietzsche who are also great literary artists great writers uh would you agree with that i think he is he's certainly a very conscious artist he was a distinguished mind a cultivated man he didn't make a mess of it therefore there's nothing you couldn't say of his work as it was ever pretentious it pretends to great things it makes claims of itself but it seems to me the literary garment of his thought is worthy of the seriousness with which he presented those thoughts i think we must go back a bit now to what some of the doctrines were we talked about this central notion of language picturing the world and you explained how he distinguished
写法辩护。我必须说，这些散文在我看来确实有一种非凡的品质，我觉得那些句子像是被高度充电了，有一种萦绕不去、留在脑子里的能力，读完书之后你会发现自己很容易就引用起它们来我会把维特根斯坦列为少数几位同时也是伟大文学艺术家、伟大作家的哲学家之一，就像柏拉图、叔本华或尼采你同意吗？我认为他是。他无疑是一位非常自觉的艺术家，他心智出众、修养深厚，没有把事情搞砸。因此你不能说他的作品有任何矫饰之处——它确实自命不凡、自我期许甚高，但在我看来，他思想所穿的那件文学外衣配得上他呈现这些思想时的严肃。我想我们现在得稍微回头谈谈书中的一些学说。我们谈过语言图示世界这个核心观念，你也解释了他如何区分真的陈述和
07真值函项与逻辑数学的同语反复
23:53
between true arteries utterances and false utterances does he provide us with any way of seeing if a statement pictures the world of seeing if our utterances are true or false what kind of analysis of the utterance will show us whether it's true or false there's absolutely no explanation as i said earlier of what the simple objects are and therefore there's no account given of so to speak how we come to be aware of the simple objects all he talks about is what the relation between the basic propositions of discourse and the objects to which they relate must be what he does do is suggest various ways in which the sentences of ordinary discourse can be analyzed or decomposed into these ultimate basically pictorial sentences that his theory is that every genuine proposition that isn't itself one of these ultimate sentences and he doesn't give any examples of actual everyday propositions that are every such proposition must be decomposable into them and his thesis is to put it in a slightly technical way that every
假的陈述。那他有没有给我们提供某种办法，去判断一个陈述是否图示了世界，去判断我们的陈述是真是假？对陈述做什么样的分析才能显示它是真是假？正如我先前说过的，他完全没有解释简单对象是什么，因此也就没有交代我们究竟如何意识到简单对象。他谈的只是话语中的基本命题与它们所指涉的对象之间的关系必须是什么样的。他确实做的是提出若干方式，说明日常话语中的句子如何能被分析或分解成这些终极的、基本上是图像式的句子。他的理论是，每一个本身不是这类终极句子的真正命题——而他并没有举出任何实际的日常命题作为例子——每一个这样的命题都必须可以被分解成它们。用稍微技术性的说法，他的论点是：任何真正的命题都是初等命题的真值函项，
25:01
genuine proposition whatever is a truth function of elementary propositions which in effect means that it's just an abbreviate an abbreviated formula for a vast assemblage a conjunction of elementary propositions in the negations thereof well i think before we move away from the tractators and its doctrines which wittgenstein himself did because he came to think that they were unsatisfactory uh it would probably be helpful if you would summarize if you now could what the central adoptions of that book are well the central doctrine i think is that language in its fundamentally distinctive use as a means for describing the world can work only by picturing the world how it pictures the world is through configuring names of objects names of simple objects into arrangements that correspond where the proposition is true to an actual arrangement of objects which correspond where the proposition is false to a possible arrangement of objects uh from this of course it follows that the world is an array of some sort of simple
这实际上意味着，它不过是一个庞大集合的缩写公式，是初等命题及其否定的合取。嗯，我想在我们离开《逻辑哲学论》及其学说之前——维特根斯坦本人后来就离开了它，因为他开始认为这些学说并不令人满意——如果你现在能总结一下这本书的核心主张，可能会很有帮助。嗯，我认为核心学说是：语言在其最根本、最独特的用途上，即作为描述世界的手段，只能通过图示世界来运作。它图示世界的方式，是把对象的名称、简单对象的名称配置成某种排列，当命题为真时，这种排列对应于对象的一个实际排列；当命题为假时，它对应于对象的一个可能的排列。由此当然可以推出，世界是某种简单对象的阵列，呈现出它们所能有的
26:09
objects exhibiting one of the possibilities of combination that are open to them connected with this is the view that although many genuine propositions we utter don't seem to be of this form they can be dismantled analyzed into propositions of this form there is one thing we haven't talked about which is of very great influence his view of lodge the nature of logic and mathematics he insisted that this the propositions of logic and mathematics don't describe the world there so to speak a byproduct of the abbreviated nature of actual language what a logical truth does is state what should be evident namely that one proposition contains within itself another proposition that is some complex of pictures of the elementary pictures of the world contains in its content certain other but some of them in other words according to that theory all the truths of mathematics like all the truths of logic are tautologies are tautologies unpacking what is already there in the proposition yes that they
组合可能性中的一种。与此相关的观点是：尽管我们说出的许多真正的命题看起来不是这种形式，它们仍可以被拆解、分析成这种形式的命题。还有一件事我们没有谈到，而它影响极大，就是他关于逻辑和数学之本性的看法。他坚持认为，逻辑和数学的命题并不描述世界，它们可以说是实际语言之缩写性质的副产品。一条逻辑真理所做的，是陈述某种本应显而易见的东西，即一个命题本身就包含着另一个命题，也就是说，某种由世界的初等图像组成的复合图像，在其内容中包含了某些别的图像。换句话说，按照这套理论，所有数学真理就像所有逻辑真理一样都是同语反复——都是同语反复，只是把命题里已经有的东西展开来。是的，它们
08维也纳学派的改造与沉寂十年
27:14
give no information about the world itself they're simply symbolic in character as it were they talk about the relation of symbolism and again he said that these propositions were senseless in that they had no factual content they didn't tell us anything about how things were when how things were was different from how they might have been they simply reflect the character of the language we use now what was the influence of this early philosophy of wittgenstein it was in fact very great wasn't it very considerable but it was exercised through only a small part of the work he produced the greater part of the tractatus is concerned with this theory of propositions as pictures words as names the things propositions related to as configurations of simple objects or facts that's the great bulk of the book the first say two-thirds of it or something like that and in that form i think it's fair to say that nobody took it up at all people were baffled and astounded and puzzled by it but the group of philosophers who
完全不提供关于世界本身的信息，它们纯粹是符号性的，可以说它们谈的是符号系统之间的关系。他还说这些命题是「无意义的」（senseless），因为它们没有事实内容，当事物的状况不同于它们本可以有的状况时，它们并不告诉我们任何关于事物如何存在的信息。它们只是反映了我们所用语言的性质那么维特根斯坦这套早期哲学的影响是什么？事实上影响非常大，对吧？相当可观，但这影响只是通过他所写作品的一小部分发挥出来的。《逻辑哲学论》的大部分内容处理的是这套理论：命题即图像，词即名称，命题所关联的事物是简单对象的配置或事实。这构成了全书的绝大部分，比如说前三分之二左右。而以那种形式，我想可以公允地说，根本没有人接受它——人们对它感到困惑、震惊、摸不着头脑。但那群
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claimed to derive their main inspiration from wittenstein namely the positivists of the vienna circle although they accepted the view that there must be some basic propositions which relate as it were directly to the world there must be a point in language where direct contact with the world is made they gave a much more straightforward and easily intelligible account of this relation in essence it was that these elementary propositions simply describe the sense experiences of individual observers so they report immediate occurrences of experience feeling perceptions uh by individual persons and then that everything else could be all the other beliefs we held could be analyzed out into propositions of this kind propositions about continuing material objects that exist unperceived propositions about minds other than our own propositions about social institutions that all of these could be analyzed in the end down to simple reports of um private experience now when wittgenstein began to become
自称主要灵感来自维特根斯坦的哲学家，也就是维也纳学派的实证主义者，虽然他们接受了这个观点：必须存在某些基本命题，直接与世界相关联，语言中必须有一个与世界发生直接接触的点，但他们对这种关系给出了一个远为直白、也容易理解得多的说明。其要旨是：这些初等命题不过是描述个别观察者的感觉经验，也就是说，它们报告个别的人当下发生的经验、感受、知觉，然后其他一切、我们所持的其他一切信念都可以被分析成这类命题：关于未被感知却持续存在的物质对象的命题、关于我们自己之外的其他心灵的命题、关于社会制度的命题，所有这些最终都可以被分析成简单的私人经验报告。那么，当维特根斯坦自己开始对他在《逻辑哲学论》中发表的这套哲学
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dissatisfied himself with this philosophy of his that he published in the tractatus which way did his own dissatisfaction proceed i think pastor might say a little bit here about what wittgenstein was doing in the interim you spoke earlier in general terms about his career the engineering at manchester the becoming interested in the nature of mathematics the studying of russell going to cambridge to work with russell and at this period he was an extremely isolated figure perhaps locked up mainly in his own thoughts talking to one or two people particularly russell and the philosophy of the tractatus reflects that in a way by being an immensely individualistic philosophy there's no suggestion of uh language in a way being a communicative instrument it's an instrument for reporting to oneself to for describing there's no emphasis on it being a medium exchange as i said quite compatibly with the doctrines of the tractators he thought he got all the answers and so at that point he gave up the subject and in the
感到不满时，他的不满是朝哪个方向发展的？我想也许该先在这里稍微讲一下维特根斯坦在那段过渡期里做了些什么。你先前笼统地谈过他的经历：在曼彻斯特学工程，开始对数学的本性产生兴趣，研读罗素，去剑桥与罗素共事。而在这个时期他是个极其孤立的人物，也许主要是封闭在自己的思想里，只跟一两个人交谈，尤其是罗素。《逻辑哲学论》的哲学在某种意义上也反映了这一点，因为那是一种极端个人主义的哲学。书里完全没有暗示语言在某种意义上是一种交流工具；它是一种向自己报告、进行描述的工具，完全没有强调它是一种交换的媒介。正如我说过的，跟《逻辑哲学论》的学说完全一致，他认为自己已经得到了全部答案，所以那时他就放弃了这门学问。在1920年代的若干年里，他
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for a number of years in the 1920s he was an elementary school teacher then he worked as a monastery gardener helped design a house for his sister and it wasn't until the end of the 1920s that he took the subject up again he got into conversations with various leading figures of what was to become the vienna circle and this interested him in philosophy again i mean one could reasonably suppose that philosophical thoughts were going through his mind in the interim but it clearly wasn't part of his plan of life to continue thinking about philosophy after the publication of the tractatus then he was stimulated into thinking about philosophy again and of course the very different second philosophy of wittgenstein developed from that period onward now at first it seems that he was quite well disposed towards the particular interpretation that the vienna circle gave of his account of what the fundamental elements of language are namely um their view of them as reports of experience not just configurated
当过小学教师，然后做过修道院的园丁，还帮姐姐设计了一栋房子。直到1920年代末，他才重新拾起这门学问。他与后来成为维也纳学派的几位重要人物开始有了交谈，这重新引起了他对哲学的兴趣。我是说，我们有理由推测，在那段过渡期里哲学思考仍在他脑中进行，但在《逻辑哲学论》出版之后继续思考哲学，显然并不在他的人生计划之内。后来他被重新激发去思考哲学，当然，与前期截然不同的维特根斯坦第二哲学就从那个时期开始发展起来。起初看来，他对维也纳学派对他关于语言基本要素之说法的那种特定解释，是相当认可的，也就是他们把这些要素看作经验报告，而不只是简单对象的名称配置、
09后期哲学：意义即用法
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names of simple objects with no explanation of how those objects relate to our awareness but he moved away from that i think reasonably soon remember he returned to cambridge in 1929 and stayed there in various capacities until getting involved in various sorts of war work and in this period he produces a completely different philosophy which is no does not offer one clear definite abstract principles about the essential nature of language but approaches language is a natural human phenomenon something that we find going on around us a very complicated overlapping array of human practices like one another in some ways different from one another in other ways and an essential feature of this later philosophy is that language is essentially a public or social phenomenon that it can only function if there are rules that are accepted by more than one person so that any one person's use of the rules which guide him in speaking is open to correction and improvement by another person's observations i think probably the
却对这些对象与我们的意识有何关联毫无解释。但我想他相当快就离开了那个立场。记得他在1929年回到剑桥，此后以各种身份留在那里，直到卷入各类战时工作。在这段时期他产生了一套完全不同的哲学，这套哲学不再提出关于语言本质的清晰、确定、抽象的原则，而是把语言当作一种自然的人类现象来处理，当作我们在周遭看到正在发生的东西——一大片非常复杂、相互重叠的人类实践，彼此在某些方面相像，在另一些方面又彼此不同。这套后期哲学的一个核心特征是：语言本质上是一种公共的或社会的现象，它只有在存在被不止一个人接受的规则时才能运作，这样一来，任何个人对指导他说话的那些规则的运用，都可以被另一个人的观察所纠正和改进。我想，进入维特根斯坦后期哲学、
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easiest way into the later philosophy of wittgenstein and into seeing how it differs from the earlier philosophy is to start with the two different theories of meaning in the two different philosophies we talked earlier about how the uh the central theory of meaning in the early philosophy was that a proposition is a picture of the world a picture of reality this central metaphor is changed in the later philosophy he no longer sees meaning as being a picture of the world at all or anything like that he sees the meaning of an utterance as consisting in the use to which it can be put in other words he sees a sentence as a not a picture but a tool and the meaning of this sentence is so to speak the sum total of its possible uses and this of course as you were just saying relates it to human activity and ultimately indeed different ways of life now this shift in what in the view of what meaning is is absolutely fundamental to the whole philosophy and a whole massive changes from the earlier
并看清它与前期哲学差别的最简便途径，大概是从这两套哲学中两种不同的意义理论入手。我们先前谈过，前期哲学中意义的核心理论是：命题是世界的图像，是实在的图像。这个核心比喻在后期哲学中变了。他不再把意义看成世界的图像，或任何类似的东西。他把一个话语的意义看作在于它可以被派上的用场。换句话说，他把句子看作不是图像，而是工具，而这个句子的意义可以说就是它一切可能用法的总和。当然，正如你刚才说的，这就把它和人类活动、并且最终和不同的生活方式联系了起来。那么，这种关于意义是什么的观点转变，对整套哲学来说是绝对根本的，随之而来的是相对于前期哲学的一整套巨大变化，对
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philosophy then follow from that don't they can you can you so speak take the story up from there yes what we've got here i think is in a way best expressed through the two metaphors that i think both cropped up in what you just said then first of all the reference constant reference from language to games which is incorporated in a crucial technical term of the later philosophy the notion of a language game incidentally can i just interrupt to say i think that this metaphor has been extremely unfortunate because a lot of people have concluded from the fact that wittgenstein is always talking about language games and the use of language as a game that he somehow regarded all utterance as frivolous and that confirms a lot of the prejudices that some people have about linguistic philosophy that they were playing with words that was certainly not his intention it was just to draw uh notice to two features of games the first one simply that they're rule-governed practices and a lot follows from this in a way
吧？你能不能从这里接着讲下去？可以。我想我们这里遇到的东西，也许最好通过两个比喻来表达，这两个比喻刚才你说的话里都出现了。首先是不断地从语言指向游戏，这被吸收进了后期哲学的一个关键术语里，即「语言游戏」这个概念顺便打断一下，我想说这个比喻其实非常不幸，因为很多人从维特根斯坦总是谈语言游戏、谈把语言的使用当作一种游戏这一点出发，断定他多少把一切言说都看成轻浮的儿戏，而这就坐实了某些人对语言哲学的许多偏见，觉得他们是在玩弄文字。那当然不是他的用意，他只是要让人注意游戏的两个特征。第一点很简单：游戏是受规则支配的实践，而由此可以推出很多东西，
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about how the rules of a game can change and uh the games can be resemble one another in all sorts of different ways that second point leads on to the second feature about games which is that there's no common characteristic to all games games as he says are related to one another by family resemblance and that applied back to language means the various kinds of activity we perform with language asking questions cursing greeting praying to give some examples he enumerates these are all different things we do with language now the game analogy i agree might seem to carry with the suggestion that therefore these things are just for fun or past times or what have you but the other analogy that you mentioned was the analogy of language to a system of a set of tools which are used with a purpose i mean there's these two things about language it's a purposive undertaking and yet it's carried out with items which are governed by conventional and alterable rules well now uh this notion of language uh had a lot of
比如游戏的规则可以如何改变，以及游戏之间可以在各种各样不同的方面彼此相像。第二点引出了游戏的第二个特征：所有游戏并没有一个共同特征。他说，游戏之间是通过「家族相似」而彼此关联的。把这一点用回语言上，就意味着我们用语言进行的各种各样的活动——提问、咒骂、打招呼、祈祷，举几个他列举过的例子——都是我们用语言做的不同的事。至于游戏这个类比，我同意，它可能会让人觉得因此这些事情只是为了好玩、消遣之类的。但你提到的另一个类比，是把语言比作一套工具系统、一组带着目的被使用的工具。我是说，语言有这两面：它是一项有目的的活动，然而它是用那些受约定俗成、可以更改的规则支配的项目来进行的那么，这种语言观在哲学之外也产生了很大影响，对吧？尤其是在人类学和社会学领域
10哲学作为治疗：打破误导性图画
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influence outside philosophy didn't it especially in anthropology and sociology can you say something about how they were affected by this new notion of meaning well i think one needs to precede that by one remark about his view of later view of the nature of philosophy itself there is a great continuity between his earlier and later general view about philosophy namely that it's essentially an activity and not a theory to use the formula of the tractators it's something that you have do philosophy it's not something you arrive at and can it's not a body of doctrine final body of doctrine um he says that quite explicitly in the tractatus it remains the case in the investigations he says one shouldn't put forward philosophical theories they simply augment confusion what one does as a philosopher is to assemble reminders about the way in which language is actually used in its various forms the various distinct but not utterly unrelated games language games in which it is employed one assembles reminders of
你能谈谈它们如何受到这种新的意义观念影响吗？嗯，我想在谈这个之前得先讲一点别的谈谈他后期对哲学本身性质的看法——他早期和后期关于哲学的总体看法之间有着很强的连续性，也就是说，哲学本质上是一种活动，而不是一套理论。用《逻辑哲学论》的说法，哲学是你要去做的事情，而不是你最终得出的东西，它不是一套学说，不是一套最终的学说体系。他在《逻辑哲学论》里就说得很明确，到了《哲学研究》里情况依然如此。他说，人不应该提出哲学理论，那只会增加混乱。作为一个哲学家，你要做的是收集提示，提示语言在其各种形式中实际是怎样被使用的，提示那些各不相同却又并非全然无关的游戏，也就是语言游戏，语言正是在其中被使用的。你收集这些提示，是为了防止人们被误导性的类比带着跑偏。他心里
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these to prevent people from running away with misleading analogies the misleading analogy he had perhaps most prominently in mind was the tendency to think because we say i felt a pain or i have a pain a pain is some kind of definite identifiable inner object private to us which we notice within ourselves and report to other people and he a very great deal of the investigations is concerned to break the hold of that picture of how we talk about our own mental life that's the reporting of private experiences that picture is precisely the sort of picture that his earlier theory of language has put out in the tractatus would lead one to adopt do you think that there's any truth in the following that that when uh wittgenstein published the tractators he was as it were bewitched by a single theory of language namely the picture theory that he later came to realize that this was false and that being bewitched by a misleading theory of language had resulted in a whole wholly mistaken way of doing philosophy
最突出的那个误导性类比，大概就是这样一种倾向：因为我们说“我感到疼”或者“我有一阵疼”，就以为疼是某种确定的、可辨识的内在对象，是我们私有的，我们在自身之内注意到它，然后报告给别人。而《哲学研究》中有非常大的篇幅，就是要打破这幅关于我们如何谈论自己心灵生活的图画，也就是所谓对私人经验的报告。而这幅图画，恰恰就是他早期在《逻辑哲学论》中提出的那种语言理论会引导人去接受的那种图画。你觉得下面这个说法有几分道理：当维特根斯坦发表《逻辑哲学论》时，他可以说是被一种单一的语言理论——即图像论——迷住了；后来他意识到这是错的，而被一种误导性的语言理论所迷惑，导致了一整套完全错误的做哲学的方式；因此他开始认为，在你真正能做哲学之前，你必须先进行一场
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and therefore he came to think that before you could really do philosophy you had to carry out an investigation of the different ways in which language can mislead us so as not to be misled in our thinking about the world and that this itself became a way of doing philosophy in other words and invest a multiple investigation into the different ways in which false assumptions about language can mislead us in our thinking about the world do you think there's any truth in that well it's undoubtedly true that a great deal of the investigations takes the form of a criticism of his earlier doctrine certainly the first quarter of it is largely directed towards attacking the notion that words are essentially names his view is that the use of names is one of these language games one element in language the teaching of names is a language game we have to understand a great deal of language he maintains in order to understand the activity the activities that someone's engaging in who's trying to tell us what the name of something is
对语言可能误导我们的各种方式的考察，以便我们在思考世界时不被误导，而这本身就成了一种做哲学的方式，换句话说，就是对关于语言的错误假设可能如何误导我们思考世界的多重考察。你觉得这种说法有道理吗？嗯，毫无疑问，《哲学研究》中很大一部分内容都是以批判他自己早期学说的形式出现的。当然，这本书的前四分之一主要是针对'词本质上是名称'这一观念展开攻击。他的看法是，使用名称只是众多语言游戏中的一种，是语言中的一个元素；教人名称是一种语言游戏。他坚持认为，我们必须理解大量的语言，才能理解某个人在试图告诉我们某样东西叫什么名字时所从事的那种活动。
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so he wants to argue there's no absolute or fundamental priority to the notion of naming it's just one of the things that language does from that he goes on to attacking this idea that there are ultimately simple objects and ultimately simple propositions he's insists that simplicity is always relative to some particular investigation and so there's this enormous sense that has developed of language as a public available social reality not language is some kind of essence which you can work out in your head by pure reasoning in the later work one analogy that's been drawn a great deal is with psychoanalysis in the following sense that wittgenstein is saying that that we first of all become as it were knotted up in our view of some particular aspect of reality by a false use of language and that the task of philosophy is to untie these knots and this so to speak therapeutic aspect of philosophical activity has often been said to be very like what freud thought the psychoanalyst was doing in another
所以他想论证的是，命名这个概念并不具有绝对的或根本性的优先地位，它只是语言所做的事情之一。由此他进一步去攻击那种认为存在终极简单对象和终极简单命题的想法。他坚持认为，简单性总是相对于某个特定的考察而言的。于是就发展出了这样一种强烈的意识：语言是一种公共的、可获得的社会实在，而不是某种可以靠纯粹推理在头脑中推演出来的本质。在他的后期著作中，有一个被反复援引的类比是与精神分析的类比，意思是这样：维特根斯坦是在说，我们首先由于错误地使用语言，而在对实在的某个特定方面的看法上打上了结，而哲学的任务就是解开这些结。这种所谓哲学活动的治疗性面向，常常被人说成非常接近弗洛伊德的想法。精神分析师是在另一个方向上做这件事，你觉得这两者之间存在某种相似性吗？是的，我认为确实有相似之处，那就是
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direction do you think that uh a similarity exists there yes i think there certainly is a similarity in that uh wittgenstein's abstention from theory in his later philosophy is just like the freudian analysts abstention from saying what's wrong with you is you're madly in love with your mother which doesn't produce any effect at all the procedure has to be much more circuitous in that the person has to be brought by recon reliving a whole lot of past experiences by being reminded of all sorts of thoughts and feelings he's had that his emotions have a certain peculiar structure so that something is eventually brought up out of the unconscious in wittgenstein's case what is hidden isn't hidden in quite the same way what is what is has to be made evident to the philosophically confused or perplexed person is the way the rules of the language games that people actually use what has happened to him is he's on the basis of an analogy he's seen between the way words work in one game and the way they worked and worked
维特根斯坦在其后期哲学中对理论的克制，就像弗洛伊德派分析师克制着不去直接说出你的问题在于你疯狂地爱着你的母亲——这样说根本不会产生任何效果。整个过程必须迂回得多，必须让这个人通过重新经历大量过往的经验，通过被唤起他曾有过的种种想法和感受，来意识到他的情绪具有某种特殊的结构，从而让某些东西最终从无意识中被带出来。而在维特根斯坦那里，被隐藏的东西并不是以完全相同的方式隐藏着的。对于在哲学上感到困惑或迷惑的人来说，必须让他看清楚的，是人们实际使用的那些语言游戏的规则。他身上发生的情况是，他基于自己在一种游戏中词语的运作方式和另一种游戏中词语的运作方式之间看到的某种类比，把前一种游戏的规则套用到了后一种游戏上，
11生活形式与相对主义的影响
40:54
at another he applies the rules of the first game to the second one and gets into a fix thinks that because in a shop i say that's a bicycle that's a television set that's a so-and-so i'm doing something just analogous to that when i look within myself and say i have an acute pain in my left knee a pronounced desire for a cup of tea and i wish that it was friday um he won't say these are two utterly different operations not just listing off things that one finds within oneself in self-description and the way to do this he maintains is to consider language in its natural setting to see all the circumstances in which people say things the behavior that characteristically accompanies their saying certain things can i now bring you back to the question of what the influence of this philosophy has been especially outside philosophy i fail to take up that question you're quite right the influence of it has been i suppose to encourage a certain kind of relativism because the abstention from theory means and
结果陷入了困境。他以为，既然在商店里我可以说那是一辆自行车、那是一台电视机、那是个什么什么，那么当我向内审视自己，说我左膝有剧烈的疼痛、我强烈地想喝一杯茶、我希望今天是星期五时，我就是在做某种类似的事情。而他会说，这是两种完全不同的操作，后者并不是在自我描述中把自己内心发现的东西一一列举出来。他主张，要做到这一点，办法就是在语言的自然情境中考察语言，去看人们说出某些话时所处的全部环境，以及他们说这些话时通常伴随的行为。现在我能不能把你带回那个问题：这种哲学产生了什么样的影响，尤其是在哲学之外？我刚才没有接住那个问题，你说得对。我想它的影响大概是助长了某种形式的相对主义，因为对理论的克制意味着、并且关联着一种可以说是
41:56
is connected with a recognition so speak of the equal rights of all language games provided that it passes the test of workability as a social instrument of communication then it constitutes what he calls a form of life and he doesn't think you can really understand some as it were unfamiliar language game without actually participating without playing it so to speak well now the you spoke of influence of this on anthropology and sociology all right a certain form of anthropology and sociology who like looks at social orders utterly different from those in which the student of the subject himself lives and he then proceeds to criticize what's going on there in the light of the accepted rules of his own society when the whole notion as it were of the savage where people say well presumably savage languages because their life is so technologically unadvanced their language is presumably going to be a few grunts whereas of course this is not true at all the languages of technically primitive people are of an enormous
承认所有语言游戏享有平等地位的态度——只要它通过了可行性的检验，能作为一种社会性的交流工具，它就构成了他所说的一种生活形式。而且他认为，你其实无法理解某种陌生的语言游戏，除非你真的参与其中，可以说是亲自去玩这个游戏。那么，你刚才提到这对人类学和社会学的影响。好的，有那么一种人类学和社会学，它们考察与研究者本人所生活的社会截然不同的社会秩序，然后他就按照自己社会中被接受的规则去批评那里正在发生的事情。而所谓“野蛮人”这整套观念——人们会说，大概野蛮人的语言，因为他们的生活在技术上如此落后，他们的语言大概就是一些咕哝声——可事实当然完全不是这样。技术上原始的民族，其语言复杂程度极高。然后人们又会看到，我不知道，某些禁忌规则，或者我们称之为禁忌的规则，而这个词
12昆顿的评价与两种哲学的定位
42:58
degree of complexity and then one sees or i don't know rules of taboo or rules that we call taboo which is already a somewhat derogatory phrase because it's just this is a rule which this is based on false assumptions of what connects with what and he would say i think that it's just a misunderstanding bred by not actually being a party to not fully being within the form of life in which these taboo rules operate what's speaking for yourself do you think is is wrong with this later philosophy unless of course you you buy it whole no i certainly don't buy it hell what i think is important about it i do think the philosophy of mind the account of our discourse about our own mental life and that of others has given very good reason for abandoning an assumption that was traditionally made that there was a kind of huge cleavage between our thought and discourse about the physical world and our thought and discourse about the mind it did bring to light that the great deal of what we have to say about our
本身已经带有几分贬义了，因为这不过是一条规则，人们认为它建立在关于什么与什么相关联的错误假设之上。而他会说，我想，那只是一种误解，是由于没有真正置身其中、没有完全进入这些禁忌规则所运作于其中的那种生活形式而产生的。那么就你自己而言，你认为这种后期哲学有什么问题呢？当然，除非你全盘接受它。不，我当然不会全盘接受。我认为它重要的地方在于，我确实认为它的心灵哲学，即关于我们谈论自己和他人心理生活的那套说明，为放弃一个传统上被作出的假设提供了非常充分的理由认为我们关于物理世界的思考和话语，与我们关于心灵的思考和话语之间，存在着一种巨大的裂痕它确实揭示出，我们对自己和他人心理生活所说的很多东西，
44:03
own and other people's mental lives is essentially tied to behavior as it were being generous the test of whether a person is generous is what they give and when not whether they have generous impulses a person who claims to have endless generous impulses but actually always lets the plate pass by uh one supposes he's either being insincere or is at best deceiving himself well the generous impulse is where wittgenstein's point is that neither here nor there it's just for a person to be generous is for them to act in a certain way in certain circumstances but yet after all generosity is a character trait it's part an aspect of an individual's mind the mind isn't a hidden private thing altogether and that i think is important in the later work what i object to myself is the abstention from theory if you like that nothing ever seems to come to an end nothing ever gets settled the examples are heaped up and then as it were they're offered to you to take or to leave it seems to me an intellectually
本质上是与行为联系在一起的，比如说慷慨——判断一个人是否慷慨的标准，在于他给予了什么，而不在于他是否有慷慨的冲动。一个声称自己有无穷慷慨冲动、却总是让捐款盘从眼前过去的人，人们会认为他要么不真诚，要么至少是在自欺欺人。而那个慷慨的冲动，维特根斯坦的观点是，它无关紧要；一个人之所以慷慨，就在于他在特定情境下���某种方式行事。可归根结底，慷慨毕竟是一种性格特征，是一个人心灵的一部分、一个方面，心灵并不完全是隐秘的、私人的东西。我认为这一点在后期著作中很重要。而我本人所反对的是那种对理论的回避，如果可以这么说的话——似乎什么都没有个了结，什么都没有定论。例子堆积如山，然后就好像摆在你面前，任你取舍。在我看来，这在思想上是一种令人不满意的做法。《哲学研究》整个
45:07
unsatisfactory practice the whole manner of exposition of the investigations is a kind of cumulative and disorderly persuasion rather than definitely setting out something that is to be discussed and saying well in favor of it so and so is to be said against it so and so is to be said it's i don't say this isn't any sense of mannerism on wittgenstein's part it represents a commitment a belief on his father this is the way the subject should be done i just don't believe it can be done like that or that um understanding of a lasting kind is achieved by this consciously inconclusive way of proceeding if one takes three pages back and looks at the two philosophies of wittgenstein the area the later one uh there seem to me to be at least three ways in which they are viewed by other philosophers who are themselves very distinguished uh i suppose a large number of philosophers perhaps most regard both the early and the late philosophy as being works of genius but some bertrand russell as an example regarded
的论述方式，是一种累积式的、杂乱无章的劝说，而不是明确地摆出某个有待讨论的东西，然后说：支持它的理由是这样这样，反对它的理由是那样那样。我并不是说这在任何意义上是维特根斯坦的一种做作。它代表了一种承诺、一种信念，在他看来这就是哲学应该有的做法。我只是不相信哲学可以那样做，也不相信那种自觉不下结论的推进方式，能带来某种持久的理解如果我们往回退三页，来看维特根斯坦的两种哲学，也就是后期的那一种呃，在我看来，其他一些同样非常杰出的哲学家对它们的看法，至少有三种我想，很大一部分哲学家，也许是绝大多数，都认为他的前期哲学和后期哲学都是天才之作但也有人，比如伯特兰·罗素，认为第一种哲学是天才的产物，而后期的
46:10
the first philosophy as being the product of genius but the later philosophy is being trivial and well really he kept saying he thought a worthless exercise there are other philosophers and karl popper is one for example who doesn't think at all highly of either of them how do you evaluate them in their relation to each other well i'm perhaps docile enough to be quite convinced that wittgenstein is a genius and that both stages of his work are works of genius but as so often in philosophical works this isn't because everything is said in them is true the who would deny after all that plato was a genius yet who would believe plato's view of the universe that what really exists is abstract timeless entities in the world of things in space and time is a sort of shadowy appearance one could recognize the genius of a philosopher without in fact accepting very much of what he says the genius might consist as it one might say very evidently in the case of kant in asking questions of a more fundamental and powerful kind than
哲学则琐碎无聊，说真的，他一直说他认为那是毫无价值的折腾。还有一些哲学家，卡尔·波普尔就是一个例子，他对这两者都评价极低。你自己是怎么评价它们、以及它们彼此之间的关系的呢？嗯，我这个人也许够顺从的，我完全相信维特根斯坦是个天才，他两个阶段的作品都是天才之作。但正如哲学著作中常有的情况，这并不意味着里面说的每一句话都是对的。毕竟，谁会否认柏拉图是个天才呢？可又有谁会相信柏拉图的宇宙观——真正存在的是抽象的、永恒不变的实体，而时空之中的事物世界不过是一种影影绰绰的表象？一个人完全可以承认一位哲学家的天才，而实际上并不接受他所说的大部分内容。这种天才也许在于——就像人们在康德身上看得非常清楚的那样——在于提出比前人所提出的更为根本、更为有力的问题，挑战
47:16
people had asked before challenging assumptions that had gone either to unchallenged and i think in both parts of his work this is achieved thank you very much i think i must say that i think that you could succeeded in doing something that is very difficult to do that is making two philosophies uh intelligible in the space that in this series we're normally devoting to one thank you very much anthony quinton
那些一直未被挑战的假定。而我认为，在他作品的两个部分中，这一点都做到了。非常感谢你，我必须说，我认为你做成了一件很难做到的事，那就是在我们这个系列通常只用来讲一种哲学的篇幅里，把两种哲学都讲明白了。非常感谢你，安东尼·昆顿。
视频总结 · 一句话概括与核心要点
本期为 BBC 1978 年播出的《Men of Ideas》系列，主持人 Bryan Magee 与牛津哲学家 Anthony Quinton 对谈，回应的问题是：维特根斯坦的两套互不相容的哲学各自说了什么、为何都影响了一代人。
生平与前期：Magee 先交代生平——维也纳钢铁巨头之子、工程学出身、因罗素《数学原理》转向逻辑，生前唯一著作《逻辑哲学论》（1921/22）。Quinton 把该书核心问题概括为「语言何以可能」，答案是图像论：命题由直接对应简单对象的名称构成，名称的排列映现对象的排列。由此推出真/假/无意义三分法，伦理美学被划为「超验」，逻辑数学是同语反复；书的关键悖论在于语言与世界的共享结构只能「显示」不能「说出」，因此全书自认无意义，读者须「踢开梯子」。两人还讨论了该书格言式、编号式的写法与其道德强度的关系。
转折：写完后他放弃哲学约十年，维也纳学派用「感觉经验报告」改造了他的初等命题，他一度认可但很快离开。
后期：1929 年回剑桥后，意义从「图像」变为「用法」，语言是受规则支配、只有家族相似的公共实践（语言游戏、生活形式）；哲学不再是理论而是治疗，Quinton 以精神分析类比，并以「疼痛」「命名」为例说明如何解开语言误用打下的结。这一立场影响了人类学与社会学的内部理解进路。
评价：Quinton 肯定后期心灵哲学消解了心物话语的鸿沟，但反对其拒绝理论、永不下结论的方式；最后以柏拉图与康德为例说明，天才在于提出更根本的问题，两期著作在此意义上都是天才之作。
核心句型 · 9
1. I don't think anyone could quarrel with the assertion that …
“I don't think anyone could quarrel with the assertion that in this century the two most influential philosophers … have been bertrand russell and ludwig wittgenstein”
开场定调句式，用「没人会反对」引出一个强判断而不显武断。适合演讲或文章开头；可换成 few would dispute / it is hard to deny that。
2. The result of this is that …
“The result of this is that for a long time his influence though immense was confined to full-time students of philosophy”
承接因果的过渡句，把前文的事实转化为后果。中间插入 though immense 这类让步短语，能在一句里同时表达「影响巨大」与「范围有限」。
3. I think the shortest way of stating X is as follows: …
“I think the shortest way of stating the central problem of the book is as follows how is language possible”
回答复杂问题时先声明「最简表述」，再抛出一句话。适合口头解释术语或核心问题，避免一上来就展开细节。
4. It's rather like X asking why …
“Rather like newton asking seriously why the planets didn't charge off in all directions”
用历史类比解释「为什么这个显而易见的问题值得问」。结构简洁，能迅速把抽象问题具体化，是学术口语常用的说服手段。
5. This is the other side of the same coin with …
“Wittgenstein's concern with what can't be said is the other side of the same coin with his … concern with what can be said”
表达两件事互为表里、不可分割。写论证时用来把两个看似独立的主题合并为一个议题。
6. Let me recapitulate this to see if we've got it absolutely clear …
“Let me recapitulate this to see if we've got it absolutely clear between us”
访谈中主持人复述对方观点以确认理解。在讨论或面试中用来「回放」对方的话，既礼貌又能检验自己是否听懂。
7. One could recognize X without in fact accepting very much of what …
“One could recognize the genius of a philosopher without in fact accepting very much of what he says”
「承认 A 但不接受 B」的让步结构，用于做出有分寸的评价：肯定价值的同时保留批评空间。
8. What I object to myself is …
“What i object to myself is the abstention from theory if you like”
分裂句（cleft sentence）把反对的焦点前置，明确表态。myself 强调「这是我个人的看法」，语气坚定但不咄咄逼人。
9. It seems to me to be … and it does seem to me to leave … out
“It does seem to me to be a very strange one and it does seem to me to leave an awful lot out”
用 seem to me 缓冲主观判断，重复结构加强语势。适合礼貌地提出批评，尤其是在对方是专家时。
生词精讲 · 119 · 按出现顺序
quarrel with
phr.
0:00
对……提出异议，不同意（某说法）
immersed in
phr.
0:00
沉浸于、专注投身于
shunned
/ʃʌnd/
v.
0:00
回避，躲开（shun 的过去式）
seep out
phr.
1:12
（液体、影响）渗出，慢慢扩散
rectify
/ˈrektɪfaɪ/
v.
1:12
纠正，矫正
at some considerable length
phr.
1:12
用相当大的篇幅（详细地）
magnate
/ˈmæɡneɪt/
n.
2:12
巨头，大亨（原文听写误作 magnet）
set the pattern for
phr.
2:12
为……定下基调/模式
revelation
/ˌrevəˈleɪʃən/
n.
2:12
启示；令人恍然大悟的发现
threw up
phr.
2:12
（英式）放弃（工作、学业）
off-putting
/ˈɔːfˌpʊtɪŋ/
adj.
3:12
令人望而却步的，让人反感的
discontented with
phr.
3:12
对……不满
repudiated
/rɪˈpjuːdieɪtɪd/
v.
3:12
否认，摒弃（repudiate）
disseminated
/dɪˈsemɪneɪtɪd/
v.
3:12
传播，散布
incompatible
/ˌɪnkəmˈpætəbəl/
adj.
4:15
不相容的，互相矛盾的
utterly
/ˈʌtərli/
adv.
5:20
完全地，彻底地
take language for granted
phr.
5:20
把语言视为理所当然
texture
/ˈtekstʃər/
n.
5:20
质地；（此处喻）内在生活的整体肌理
pristine
/ˈprɪstiːn/
adj.
6:19
原初的，未经触碰的
piecemeal
/ˈpiːsmiːl/
adj./adv.
6:19
零碎的，一点一点地
with the utmost conceivable generality
phr.
6:19
以可以设想的最大普遍性
depicting
/dɪˈpɪktɪŋ/
v.
7:21
描绘，描画
vehicles of thought
phr.
7:21
思想的载体
stateable
/ˈsteɪtəbəl/
adj.
7:21
可陈述的
anecdote
/ˈænɪkdoʊt/
n.
7:21
轶事
constraints
/kənˈstreɪnts/
n.
8:26
约束，限制
states of affairs
phr.
8:26
事态（哲学术语，对象的排列组合）
assertion
/əˈsɜːrʃən/
n.
8:26
断言
correlated with
phr.
9:36
与……相关联、对应
contention
/kənˈtenʃən/
n.
9:36
论点，主张
decomposed
/ˌdiːkəmˈpoʊzd/
v.
9:36
分解
recapitulate
/ˌriːkəˈpɪtʃəleɪt/
v.
10:48
扼要重述，概括
from first principles
phr.
10:48
从第一原理出发（不依赖经验或例子）
necessitated
/nəˈsesɪteɪtɪd/
v.
10:48
使成为必要，必然导致
abstains
/əbˈsteɪnz/
v.
11:49
克制不做，避免（abstain from）
configurations
/kənˌfɪɡjəˈreɪʃənz/
n.
11:49
配置，排列组合
counters
/ˈkaʊntərz/
n.
12:56
筹码，棋子（此处喻名称）
transcendental
/ˌtrænsenˈdentəl/
adj.
12:56
超验的（超出经验事实范围）
eccentric
/ɪkˈsentrɪk/
adj.
12:56
古怪的，反常的
actualized
/ˈæktʃuəlaɪzd/
v.
14:02
实现，成为现实
three-fold
/ˈθriːfoʊld/
adj.
14:02
三重的，三分的
dogmatic
/dɔːɡˈmætɪk/
adj.
15:07
武断的，教条的
the other side of the same coin
phr.
15:07
同一枚硬币的另一面（同一事物的两面）
mitigate
/ˈmɪtɪɡeɪt/
v.
16:15
缓和，减轻
kicks away
phr.
16:15
踢开（梯子），弃置不用
undermines
/ˌʌndərˈmaɪnz/
v.
16:15
暗中破坏，逐渐削弱
purports to
phr.
17:28
声称，号称（常含不实之意）
marvelous
/ˈmɑːrvələs/
adj.
18:34
了不起的，非凡的
leave an awful lot out
phr.
18:34
遗漏了太多东西
insofar as
phr.
18:34
就……而言，在……范围内
once for a considerable period
phr.
19:39
一度长时间地
pregnant
/ˈpreɡnənt/
adj.
19:39
（言辞）意味深长的，含蓄丰富的
aphoristic
/ˌæfəˈrɪstɪk/
adj.
19:39
格言式的，警句体的
baffling
/ˈbæflɪŋ/
adj.
19:39
令人困惑的
truism
/ˈtruːɪzəm/
n.
19:39
不言自明的道理，老生常谈
intelligibly
/ɪnˈtelɪdʒəbli/
adv.
20:39
可理解地，清晰易懂地
enigmatic
/ˌenɪɡˈmætɪk/
adj.
20:39
谜一般的，费解的
hermetic
/hɜːrˈmetɪk/
adj.
20:39
密封的；（文风）晦涩封闭的
fastidious
/fæˈstɪdiəs/
adj.
20:39
极为讲究的，挑剔的
detested
/dɪˈtestɪd/
v.
20:39
憎恶，厌恶
agonized
/ˈæɡənaɪzd/
adj.
21:44
极度痛苦的
easy-going
/ˌiːziˈɡoʊɪŋ/
adj.
21:44
随和的，不紧不慢的
running their eyes over
phr.
21:44
目光扫过，草草浏览
supercharged
/ˈsuːpərtʃɑːrdʒd/
adj.
22:51
高度增压的；（喻）能量充沛的
haunting
/ˈhɔːntɪŋ/
adj.
22:51
萦绕心头、挥之不去的
pretentious
/prɪˈtenʃəs/
adj.
22:51
矫饰的，自命不凡的
garment
/ˈɡɑːrmənt/
n.
22:51
衣服；（喻）外衣
so to speak
phr.
23:53
可以说，打个比方
truth function
phr.
25:01
真值函项（逻辑术语）
conjunction
/kənˈdʒʌŋkʃən/
n.
25:01
合取（逻辑中的「与」）；连接
dismantled
/dɪsˈmæntəld/
v.
26:09
拆解，拆除
byproduct
/ˈbaɪˌprɑːdʌkt/
n.
26:09
副产品
tautologies
/tɔːˈtɑːlədʒiz/
n.
26:09
同语反复，恒真式
unpacking
/ʌnˈpækɪŋ/
v.
26:09
展开、解析（已经蕴含的内容）
astounded
/əˈstaʊndɪd/
adj.
27:14
震惊的
positivists
/ˈpɑːzətɪvɪsts/
n.
28:19
实证主义者
unperceived
/ˌʌnpərˈsiːvd/
adj.
28:19
未被感知的
in the interim
phr.
29:23
在此期间，过渡期内
medium of exchange
phr.
29:23
交换媒介
well disposed towards
phr.
30:28
对……持友善/赞同态度
in various capacities
phr.
31:27
以各种身份
overlapping
/ˌoʊvərˈlæpɪŋ/
adj.
31:27
相互重叠的
open to correction
phr.
31:27
可被纠正的
the sum total of
phr.
32:37
……的总和
cropped up
phr.
33:39
突然出现，冒出来
frivolous
/ˈfrɪvələs/
adj.
33:39
轻浮的，无聊的
rule-governed
/ˈruːl ˌɡʌvərnd/
adj.
33:39
受规则支配的
family resemblance
phr.
34:35
家族相似（维特根斯坦术语）
purposive
/ˈpɜːrpəsɪv/
adj.
34:35
有目的的
alterable
/ˈɔːltərəbəl/
adj.
34:35
可更改的
a body of doctrine
phr.
35:42
一套学说体系
augment
/ɔːɡˈment/
v.
35:42
增加，扩大
assemble reminders
phr.
35:42
收集提示（维特根斯坦对哲学工作的描述）
running away with
phr.
36:46
被……冲昏头脑，不加节制地采纳
break the hold of
phr.
36:46
打破……的支配/控制
bewitched
/bɪˈwɪtʃt/
adj.
36:46
被迷惑的，着魔的
knotted up
phr.
38:53
打结、缠住
therapeutic
/ˌθerəˈpjuːtɪk/
adj.
38:53
治疗性的
circuitous
/sərˈkjuːɪtəs/
adj.
39:53
迂回的，绕弯的
perplexed
/pərˈplekst/
adj.
39:53
困惑的
gets into a fix
phr.
40:54
陷入困境
acute
/əˈkjuːt/
adj.
40:54
剧烈的，急性的
neither here nor there
phr.
40:54
无关紧要（第 41 段出现）
workability
/ˌwɜːrkəˈbɪləti/
n.
41:56
可行性，可操作性
form of life
phr.
41:56
生活形式（维特根斯坦术语）
grunts
/ɡrʌnts/
n.
41:56
咕哝声
derogatory
/dɪˈrɑːɡətɔːri/
adj.
42:58
贬损的
bred by
phr.
42:58
由……滋生
buy it whole
phr.
42:58
全盘接受
cleavage
/ˈkliːvɪdʒ/
n.
42:58
分裂，裂痕
lets the plate pass by
phr.
44:03
让捐款盘过去（喻不肯掏钱）
deceiving himself
phr.
44:03
自欺
character trait
phr.
44:03
性格特征
exposition
/ˌekspəˈzɪʃən/
n.
45:07
阐述，论述
mannerism
/ˈmænərɪzəm/
n.
45:07
矫揉造作的习气
inconclusive
/ˌɪnkənˈkluːsɪv/
adj.
45:07
不下结论的，无定论的
trivial
/ˈtrɪviəl/
adj.
46:10
琐碎的，微不足道的
docile
/ˈdɑːsəl/
adj.
46:10
温顺的，易受教的
shadowy
/ˈʃædoʊi/
adj.
46:10
影影绰绰的，模糊的
理解自测 · 11 题 · 是真懂了，还是以为自己懂
1. 主持人为什么说罗素和维特根斯坦对公众的可见度截然不同？
因为罗素既是哲学家又是公众人物，一生投身政治社会事务，通过广播、新闻和社会批评为大众熟知，人们即便不懂他高度数学化的哲学也能把他与某些观念联系起来；维特根斯坦则只是技术哲学家，不参与公共活动，回避曝光，发表极少。结果他的影响长期局限于全职哲学学生，直到晚近才渗入周边领域，导致「很多人听说过他却不知道他做了什么」。这段出自开场（第 0–1 段），也是本期节目「补课」的动机。
2. 《逻辑哲学论》出版的基本情况以及维特根斯坦之后的经历是什么？
《逻辑哲学论》是他生前出版的唯一著作，1921 年在奥地利、1922 年在英国出版，标准版不到 80 页，却是本世纪最有影响力的哲学著作之一。写完后他认为已经解决了所有哲学问题，于是放弃哲学约十年，先后当小学教师、修道院园丁、为姐姐设计房子；1920 年代末与维也纳学派成员交谈后重新对哲学产生兴趣，1929 年回到剑桥，发展出与前期截然不同的第二哲学，其代表作《哲学研究》于他去世后的 1953 年出版（第 3–4、18、27–29 段）。
3. Quinton 用什么概念解释「假命题」为什么仍然有意义？
他用「可能事态」来解释：对象可以有各种不同的排列方式，对象的名称也可以有平行的各种排列方式；一个有意义的命题就是把名称按照某一种允许的配置组合起来，它描绘的是一种可能的事态。若对象的实际排列与命题中名称的排列一致，命题为真；若那种排列可能但未实现，命题为假；若那种事态根本不可能，命题就无意义。由此得出真/假/无意义的三分法（第 11–13 段）。
4. 图像论是从哪个前提「推演」出来的？Quinton 为何强调这是「论证性的假定」？
图像论不是从例子归纳出来的，而是从「每一个真正的命题都必须有确定的意义」这一要求先验地推出：命题只有最终由直接对应简单对象的名称构成的图像式初等命题组成，才可能有确定意义。Quinton 特别指出维特根斯坦从不举出简单对象或初等命题的例子，只是「证明必定存在」这类命题。这一空缺后来成为维也纳学派用「感觉经验报告」填补的入口，也是维特根斯坦后期自我批判的靶子（第 10–11、22、36 段）。
5. 为什么说《逻辑哲学论》包含一个「自我瓦解」的悖论，维特根斯坦如何处理它？
书中的论点是：语言与世界必须共享某种结构，语言才可能表征世界；但这种结构本身只能在命题中「显示」，不能被另一个命题「说出」。于是关于语言与世界关系的一切讨论——包括本书自己的命题——按本书标准都是无意义的。维特根斯坦在结尾直接承认这一点，并用「梯子」比喻缓和：读者借助这些命题爬到理解的高度后，必须把梯子踢开。Quinton 称这是全书的「关键悖论」，也是「哲学在这种论证方式中自我瓦解」的原因（第 14–16 段）。
6. 前期哲学「极端个人主义」这一特点与其人生阶段有什么关系？它如何与后期形成对照？
Quinton 指出，写《逻辑哲学论》时维特根斯坦是极其孤立的人物，主要封闭在自己的思想中，只与一两人（尤其罗素）交谈。书中的语言观相应地是「向自己报告、描述」的工具，完全没有交流维度。后期哲学则把语言视为本质上公共的、社会的现象：只有存在被不止一人接受的规则，语言才能运作，个人对规则的使用才能被他人纠正。这一对照不仅是学说之别，也是他从孤立走向剑桥师生共同体的人生变化的反映（第 27–29 段）。
7. 「语言游戏」比喻的两个要点是什么？Magee 为什么认为这个比喻「不幸」？
两个要点：一是游戏是受规则支配的实践，规则可以改变；二是所有游戏没有共同本质，只靠「家族相似」彼此关联，因此提问、咒骂、打招呼、祈祷等都是用语言做的不同事情。Magee 认为「游戏」一词让很多人误以为维特根斯坦把一切言说看成轻浮儿戏，从而坐实了对「语言哲学是玩文字」的偏见。Quinton 补充另一比喻——语言是带目的的工具系统——以说明语言既有目的性又受约定规则支配（第 31–32 段）。
8. Quinton 如何用精神分析类比说明后期哲学的「治疗」方法？两者的区别何在？
相似之处在于都克制直接给出理论：分析师不会直接说「你疯狂爱着你母亲」，因为直说无效，必须让病人重历经验、被唤起记忆，最终自己把无意识内容带出来；维特根斯坦同样不提出理论，而是「收集提示」，让哲学困惑者自己看清语言游戏的规则。区别在于「隐藏」的方式不同：精神分析所挖掘的是无意识，而哲学困惑源于把一种语言游戏的规则误套到另一种上（如把「内省报告疼痛」当作「商店里指认物品」），需要在语言的自然情境中被显明（第 36–38 段）。
9. Quinton 肯定后期心灵哲学的哪一点，又批评它的什么？
他肯定的是：后期哲学有力地反驳了「关于物理世界的话语与关于心灵的话语之间存在巨大鸿沟」的传统假定，揭示出心理概念本质上与行为相连——判断一个人慷慨看的是他给了什么，而不是他自称有多少慷慨冲动；心灵不是完全隐秘的私人之物。他批评的是「对理论的回避」：什么都没有了结，例子堆积任人取舍，整个《哲学研究》是累积式、无序的劝说而非明确摆出正反论证。他承认这是维特根斯坦有意的方法论承诺，但不相信持久理解能由此获得（第 40–42 段）。
10. 如果有人反驳「一位哲学家提出两套互不相容的哲学，说明至少有一套是错的，怎能都是天才之作」，Quinton 会如何回应？
他会援引自己在结尾给出的标准：承认一位哲学家的天才不等于接受他的结论。柏拉图的理念论几乎无人相信，但没人否认他是天才；康德的伟大在于提出比前人更根本、更有力的问题，挑战未被质疑的假定。以此衡量，《逻辑哲学论》以最大普遍性提出「语言何以可能」，《哲学研究》则拆解「词皆名称」「内心对象可私下观察」等根深蒂固的图画——两者都在挑战假定这一意义上达成了天才的工作。Quinton 自己也不「全盘接受」任何一套，这正说明评价标准是问题的深度而非结论的对错（第 43–44 段）。
11. 把「意义即用法」放到今天的大语言模型情境下，它支持还是削弱「会说话就等于理解」？
从视频论证看，两个方向都能推出。支持一面：后期哲学把意义定位于公共实践和用法，而非内在心理图像，那么一个系统若能在各种语言游戏中恰当地使用语言，按这一标准就已具备意义，不需要额外的「内心理解」——这与 Quinton 所说「慷慨在于行为而非冲动」同构。削弱一面：维特根斯坦强调语言游戏嵌入「生活形式」，理解陌生游戏必须真正参与（第 39 段），而语言模型并未参与人类的实践、身体与社会生活，其「用法」只是对用法记录的统计再现。视频没有直接回答，但它提供的框架把问题从「机器内部有没有理解」转移为「机器是否真正参与了某种生活形式」。
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