Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age · 苏菲拉底
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Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age

节目发布 2012-11-23 · Library of Congress
曼纽尔·卡斯特 卡卡罗琳·布朗 迈迈克·尼尔森
EDITED TRANSCRIPT · 依据现场录音编译整理,可划线生成便签
2012年夏,社会学家曼纽尔·卡斯特以克鲁格讲席学者身份驻留美国国会图书馆,并在约翰·W·克鲁格中心作此讲演,题为《愤怒与希望的网络:互联网时代的社会运动》。讲演由中心学术项目主任卡罗琳·布朗主持,内容取自卡斯特即将出版的同名新书,梳理了2010年以来从冰岛、突尼斯到西班牙、美国的社会运动浪潮,并提出一套超越文化与制度差异的共同模式。本文依据现场录音编译整理,仅删去口语枝节,讲演后的听众问答一并收录。

克鲁格中心与主讲人

布朗: 各位下午好。我是卡罗琳·布朗,在国会图书馆约翰·W·克鲁格中心负责学术项目。今天下午能请到曼纽尔·卡斯特博士来作讲演,我由衷高兴,这一定是一场开阔眼界的讲演。讲题是《愤怒与希望的网络》。开始之前有一件事:今天要谈的是网络和数字世界,但请各位先把手里的数字设备关掉,免得铃声打扰录音和讲者。

克鲁格中心由约翰·W·克鲁格捐资设立,宗旨是在国会山建一个学术园地,让成熟的一流学者有机会把他们的智慧与学识带给国家的领导者和决策者。用我们爱说的话讲,这是一个让事务的世界与思想的世界相遇的地方,让思考的人和做事的人坐到一起,彼此受益。中心也资助一批全世界最有潜力的青年学者,希望资深与青年两代人不时聚首,形成一个有生气的学术共同体。围绕学者们的研究,我们办讲座,偶尔也办小型研讨会。想进一步了解中心,可以到后面的桌子留下电邮,我们会推送消息,桌上也有介绍手册。

今天的讲者卡斯特博士是克鲁格技术与社会讲席学者。他是研究信息时代及其社会学意涵的权威,现任南加州大学校级教授、沃利斯·安纳伯格传播技术与社会讲席教授,也是加州大学伯克利分校社会学与城市及区域规划荣休教授,在伯克利执教二十四年。他还有别的职务,我就不一一列举了。要说的是,卡斯特博士是本馆学者委员会成员。今年夏天他在这里的时间太短,但在这段时间里,他帮助图书馆认真思考了数字时代对我们工作的影响。

卡斯特博士追踪研究传播革命已有二十五年。很多人未必意识到这场革命已经持续了这么久,但事实如此。他著有二十六部以上的著作,书名细节我不念了。今年三月,挪威议会授予他霍尔堡国际纪念奖,我觉得授奖词最简明地概括了他这大半生的工作:「曼纽尔·卡斯特是研究城市以及新信息与媒介技术的领军社会学家。他的思想与著述塑造了我们对网络社会中城市经济与全球经济的政治动力的理解。他揭示了我们时代重大技术革命背后的权力结构及其后果,也帮助我们认识社会运动与政治运动如何同新技术协同演化。」今天是一个机会,让我们以新的方式向这位杰出的同事学习。我可以说他也是我的朋友,曼纽尔·卡斯特。

卡斯特: 谢谢卡罗琳。请允许我先用一句话向克鲁格中心,尤其是向中心主任布朗博士致谢,感谢他们给我这个机会,同各位分享我最近的研究。这项研究关心的正是新技术与新社会运动之间的关系。当然,这些社会运动不是技术造出来的。技术本身不生产任何东西。真正有分量的,是我们把技术织进社会、文化和政治的肌理之后发生的事。

两年间的运动浪潮

卡斯特: 过去两年,一批重大社会运动出乎意料地在世界各国蔓延开来。从冰岛(最重要的运动是从那里起头的)到突尼斯,再从突尼斯到多数阿拉伯国家;从西班牙到美国。这些传递都有具体的连接点,不是什么阴谋,而是一种病毒式的扩散,每一环都有实实在在的联系。然后从这些地方传向全世界。事实上,过去两年,全球数千座城市出现过示威和占领,仅美国就超过一千座。这些我在书里都绘了图。而且事情还在继续。就在本周,智利的学生运动又一次高涨。这是一道不肯停歇的社会运动浪潮,媒体大体视而不见,政客则漠不关心。

就连一些人们以为没有这类运动的国家也不例外。以色列在2011年7月到10月间出现了该国历史上规模最大的社会动员,一个人口只有几百万的国家,有超过五十万人连续数月参加示威和静坐。媒体照旧不认真报道,除非出了暴力事件,那才有好看的画面。

这些运动的动机和结果千差万别。在西方,主要是抗议政府对2008年爆发、至今未了的金融危机处置失当,问问今天的欧洲就知道。在阿拉伯国家,则是粮食危机加上对独裁政权的拒斥。那些政权之下,抗议早有过许多具体的表达,但多年来一次次遭到野蛮镇压和摧毁,最近的一次是2008年的埃及;可到了这一回,政府忽然应付不了了。

尽管差异如此之大,所有案例里都有一种个人的、也是集体的感受:对社会不公的愤怒(outrage),以及被当权者的傲慢所羞辱的感觉。这两种感受是关键。而我在这场讲演里要基于观察提出的论点是:存在一种超越文化与制度背景的、大体共同的模式。

田野调查与成书

卡斯特: 为了找出这个模式,过去两年我做了田野调查,有我自己做的,也有一个由合作者、同事和学生组成的网络在多个国家做的,包括西班牙、美国、几个欧洲国家和阿拉伯国家。我们还查阅了大量二手资料和互联网上的报告。成果是一本即将出版的书。可以说这是我第一次专门讲这本书的内容,各位不妨把今天看作新书发布,不过图书馆的规定大概不允许真的在这里发布,正式发布会十月初在伦敦举行。书名叫《愤怒与希望的网络》,由政体出版社(Polity Press)出版。我提这本书不是做广告,只是想告诉各位:今天我只讲问题的要害,所有经验细节、数据、附录都在书里。我不说那些论断已经得到证明,但至少书里搜集和呈现的材料可以为它们作注脚。

还要说明,我今天和书里给出的分析仍是初步的,因为我们还缺乏足够的距离,也没有足够的信息,所以一切都很试探。不过,这些分析扎根于一个更宽的理论框架,我称之为扎根理论(grounded theory),也就是始终有证据支撑的理论。我只做这一种理论。这个框架呈现在牛津大学出版社2009年出版的《传播力》(Communication Power)一书里。那本书提出了一种以传播为基础的权力理论,附有若干案例研究,但根本上是一部权力理论。我把六百页压缩成几句话讲给各位,作为进入具体运动之前的背景。因为它对得上。对不上的时候,我会改理论,不会改数据。

权力:暴力与心智

卡斯特: 我的看法是,权力关系是整个社会科学最重要的研究对象,理由很简单:它是社会的奠基性关系。掌握权力的人按照自己的价值与利益塑造社会的制度,就这么简单。所以不妨说,权力关系是社会的DNA。法国人说「找女人」(Cherchez la femme),我说,找权力(Cherchez le pouvoir)。

社会理论里关于权力有悠久的传统,基本上可以归结为两种形态,历史上常常合在一起。一条线从马基雅维利到马克斯·韦伯:权力是对暴力的合法垄断。我个人把「合法」两个字拿掉:权力就是对暴力的垄断,不管合法不合法,就是强制。这是国家权力。另一条线贯穿社会理论史,同样极其重要,但左右两边都比较少提:权力是说服,权力是文化霸权,从葛兰西到米歇尔·福柯。权力是塑造心智的能力。为了简化,我甚至可以给一个公式:长远看,塑造心智比折磨身体更有效。因为归根到底,我们的决定和行为受我们的大脑、我们的心智支配,幸好如此。如果人们最终想的东西不同于制度所确立的价值与利益,这种想法迟早会渗入制度,或者改变制度。所以从根本上说,权力在我们的头脑里。当然,强制与恫吓在一边,说服与「框定心智」(framing)在另一边,二者总是结合的。乔治·莱考夫和政治认知科学的一整个流派现在都主张:框定心智才是最要紧的事。

但这不等于说,我们都被一群居心不良的人操纵和压制着。这是权力关系,关系就有两方,不是单方面的。每个社会里都有权力,也有我所说的反权力(counterpower)。如果要给人类历史找一条唯一的规律,那就是:哪里有支配,哪里就有对支配的抵抗。抵抗如何表达、结果如何,那是另一回事,要看具体情境。但根本的历史动力就是:制度由掌权者塑造,然后受到那些价值和利益没有得到足够代表的人的抵抗;这种抵抗最终冲垮制度内既得利益的防线,有时靠暴力,有时靠选举,有时靠道德说服;然后建立新制度,新制度再生产出新的权力关系,又会受到新一批没有被代表的人的挑战,如此往复。各位可能说这是一种浪漫的历史观,我说这是有经验依据的历史观。这也是为什么革命总是被背叛,但在背叛的过程中,和先前相比总有些东西变了。

传播网络与人脑

卡斯特: 如果说服和重新框定人的心智是社会动力的根本一环,那它是怎么发生的?当然是通过心智,别无他途。心智怎么运作?我完全不是神经科学家,但神经科学家已经发现,心智通过传播过程运作。也就是说,抵达我们大脑的是来自社会网络和自然网络的信号,这些信号经由传播网络到达我们的神经网络;神经网络把这些信号和信息,同网络里已有的知识、观念、图像的存量放在一起处理,用这些材料工作。传播在这里的定义当然是:通过信息交换来分享意义的过程。

如果传播网络对我们的意图、价值和行为的形成如此关键,那就很明显:社会中传播方式的变革,会改变这些网络,进而改变人的心智,改变人的心智处理社会与自然环境信号的方式。而我们知道,过去二十年左右,传播领域发生了剧烈的变革,技术的、组织的、制度的变革。卡罗琳刚才说,人们以为是未来的东西,在我看来往往已经是过去了。我提醒各位,互联网1969年就第一次部署了。这是一项老技术,今天不过是从这个计算机网络的母体里长出新的化身、新的传播形式。

从大众传播到大众自传播

卡斯特: 这场变革是多维的,方方面面都在我的《传播力》里分析过,但如果用一句话概括,就是从大众传播(mass communication)转向大众自传播(mass self-communication)。不是说传统的大众传播消失了,而是它也被新的传播形式重塑了,这种新形式就是自传播。说它是「大众」的,因为它像传统大众传播一样能抵达任何地方;但同时,这些网络是多模态的、互动的,信息可以自己定向、自己创作、自己检索、自己组合。既然人人都这么做,整个传播网络最终就变成一个多模态、互动、既全球又本地的传播网络。这就是大众自传播。可以说就是互联网加上移动无线通信。如今互联网基本上都在无线上跑,将来更是如此。二者的结合,从最广的意义上说,构成了我很早以前定义的「网络社会」的社会结构的技术基础;就传播变革这个更具体的层面说,它意味着那个能够触及社会所有人的社会化传播系统发生了深刻的转型。

反权力在历史上始终围绕社会动员来组织,也就是我们通常所说的,至少是我所说的社会运动,这个概念稍后可以讨论。社会运动不一定有政治目标,它们瞄准的是改变社会的价值,改变我们看待一切事物的方式。妇女运动、环境运动,往前看还有争取自由的运动、民权运动。所以,社会运动就是专门要改变我们在社会中怎样思考问题的运动。顺带一句,它们可以有各种政治与意识形态色彩。不是社会运动都是好人,政治体制都是大灰狼。不是的。政治体制可以好也可以坏,社会运动同样如此,可以有种族主义的社会运动,可以有要恢复父权制的性别歧视运动,两个方向都有。这只是一个分析上的区分。

从这个角度出发,我要分析和呈现的,是互联网时代社会运动的共同模式。要紧的不是它们碰巧处在互联网时代,而是它们使用互联网和无线通信平台。当然,这只是媒介,不是原因,不是源头,但它很重要,有特定的后果,这正是我要设法展示的。请注意,我在这里不做规范判断。这一点常让人对我的研究和讲演恼火:尽管我的同情心是明摆着的(虽然也未必说得清楚),但一旦做分析、做研究,我会拉开很大的分析距离,不做规范判断。所以不管我个人同情其中某些运动,不是全部,请各位把今天的讲演当作我把发现的东西汇报给各位,然后我们再讨论。当有人说「这不对」的时候,我会告诉您运动里的人会怎么回答,而不是我自己怎么回答。这一点很重要。作为一个人、一个公民,我完全投身于社会;作为分析者,我是最传统的那种学者,力求按照科学研究的传统做法来确立我所发现的东西,不管「科学」在各种语境里是什么意思。下面就是我的报告。

运动的起点

卡斯特: 纵观历史,社会运动通常从两件事的结合中产生。一是生活条件的恶化,恶化到某一刻让人觉得日子过不下去了。二是对管理他们生活的政治制度的深深不信任。两者缺一不可:我们陷在困境里,本该管事的人却毫无回应,忙他们自己的事,不管我们的事。历史上每一个案例都是这两件事。我们也知道,过去几年这两个因素在世界大部分地方同时出现了。讨论环节我们可以谈谈世界不同地区的具体情形,给这个分析加些细节,但根本上就是这两者的结合。

当这种情况发生,也就是生活恶化,或者出了什么令人愤慨的事,而制度不予回应,人们就把事情抓到自己手里。这样做,他们就离开了制度的轨道,离开了制度规定的表达抗议、提出想法和方案的程序。这是有风险的行为。因为制度的设计就是:守规矩就奖励你,不守规矩就惩罚你。惩罚的方式很多,首先就是在媒体上把一切行动说成不正当:无政府主义者、恐怖分子、纳粹,随便什么帽子。不只是用警察镇压,还要在人们的头脑里镇压,把他们说成一群想毁掉民主的不负责任的人。他们只是忘了说一句:世界上多数人认为根本没有民主,这话在美国和西欧同样成立,通常只有斯堪的纳维亚是例外。过去十年各种来源的民调数据都在我书里,各位可以去查。用传统政治学的话说,这叫合法性危机。

恐惧、愤怒与希望

卡斯特: 从历史经验和我观察到的这些运动看,社会运动是情绪的运动。它们从情绪开始。在这一点上我接上了最新的神经科学研究,安东尼奥·达马西奥等人的工作表明,情绪在触发、塑造和组织人的心智方面起着根本作用:先有情绪,然后才有感受,再往后才有较为理性的决策。根子上是情绪。所以这些社会运动不是纲领性的运动,而是情绪性的运动,从情绪出发。哪些情绪?政治学和政治传播学里有一整个研究领域讨论这个问题。每个思想领域都有个小标签,这一个叫「情感智能理论」(theory of affective intelligence),大致相当于心理学里的「情绪智力」在政治学和政治传播学中的对应物。这些都源自同一个源头,也就是神经科学对情绪作为人类行为动机的理解。

具体来说,情感智能理论基于实验心理学的实验提出(这不是我的发明,我只是吸收了一系列研究):社会动员的触发器是愤怒(anger),这是一种有心理学定义的情绪;而压制器是恐惧(fear)。恐惧是压制器。顺带一提,有些心理学家解释为什么恐惧是人类生活最根本的情绪时,会把它和进化论联系起来,这没有科学证明,只是他们的一种玩味。为什么?因为我们都是懦夫的后代。那些因为勇敢而跑得不够快的人,都被吃掉了。于是物种选择的结果就是:越勇敢,越不容易活下来,你的子孙就越不可能存在。自我保存和怯懦相连,也就和恐惧相连。恐惧现在仍是压制器,但这不是宿命。恐惧可以被克服,也确实在被克服。

恐惧引发焦虑,焦虑让人躲避危险。但恐惧可以通过分享和与他人认同来克服。我在发抖,你也在发抖,那我们拉起手来。你也在抖,我们拉起手。于是围成了一圈。为什么任何社会动员里人们都手拉着手?因为我们都在发抖。当警察来得太快、我们没法在街上拉手的时候,我们就在互联网上拉手。我们在互联网上聚到一起。我们分享,我们彼此认同,仅仅是待在一起,什么都不用同意,只同意一件事:愤怒。不同意任何纲领,不投票给任何政党,只是我们都很愤怒。通过分享愤怒,通过在一起,恐惧被克服了。恐惧一旦被克服,就进入动员过程,而心理学研究表明,动员又转向另一种极有力量的正面情绪:热情(enthusiasm)。于是从愤怒克服恐惧,走到「事情可以不一样」的热情。这就是希望。这就是我的书名,愤怒与希望,两者的连接。

这种希望和动员从一开始就通过分享来组织,通过人们所说的交往行动(communicative action)。人们交流,分享,然后分享方案,分享热情,一起成长,建立起传播网络。传播领域近年的变革让人们能在互联网上建立自主的传播。我不说完全不受控制,但既有权力,不管是政治权力、经济权力还是媒体集团,对它的控制程度比历史上任何时候都低。这一点稍后可以讨论,不过很清楚,即便有人说互联网仍受控制,事实上它不受控制,它是被监视的。控制和监视有什么区别?要紧的是把信息传出去,把网络建起来。如果你被监视,镇压者能查到是谁说的,然后去抓人。但信息已经传出去了。所以,如果你是信使,那是个麻烦;但如果你就是信息本身,你就永远活着,不用在乎。

因此,新系统内置了传播自主性,网络凭借自我重新编程的能力,可以不断地成形和再成形。我研究的这些运动,以及世界各地与之相似的运动,都出自这个模式:经济危机与合法性危机同时发生,不义之举激起愤怒,同时人们能在互联网上迅速而自主地结成网络,然后走向集体行动。它们需要一种由愤怒和对可能的变化的希望所触发的情绪动员。我要论证的是,这类运动越来越代表着一种新的社会运动模式的浮现,我称之为「互联网时代的社会运动」,因为没有互联网它们就不可能以这种特定形式出现。再说一遍,不是互联网造成了它们,但它们的形态是互联网造成的。就像十九世纪的工人运动,没有工业化进程,没有大规模的装配工厂,就不可能形成,工人阶级是在工厂里实实在在地形成的,再加上酒馆,运动在酒馆里连接起来。工厂是网络形成的时刻,酒馆是通向未来的希望的时刻。

无领袖的根茎网络

卡斯特: 我在这些国家研究的运动有一系列共同特征。与其东一个西一个地讲逸事(那些要是各位撑到讨论结束还可以讲),我不如把所有案例中共同的东西综合起来讲。要知道我们谈的是突尼斯,是冰岛。这本书没谈伊朗,但2009年伊朗的运动也相当类似。突尼斯和冰岛,天下没有比这更不相同的两个地方了,可它们有共同的模式。我们谈的还有西班牙和美国,智利,英国。运动的强度、成败、结果都非常不同,但模式非常相似。为什么相似?下面我把构成这个模式的各个方面列一遍清单。

第一,它们当然是网络化的。它们首先是网络,而且总是首先在互联网上成网。因为那里是传播自主的空间,人们可以在这个混乱的愤怒系统里成形、组织、浮现,彼此素不相识的人在网络里聚到一起。最重要的例子是埃及:2008年那次传统形式的动员还没成形就被碾碎了;而2011年,他们跟随突尼斯的榜样,从互联网起步,先在互联网上形成大规模的、达到临界点的力量,然后才走上街头,走向示威。所以它们先在传播网络里成形。为什么?因为纵观历史,传播网络始终是社会运动的源头,无论是小册子,是教堂或清真寺里的布道者,还是后来的广播、电视。传播一直是社会运动的核心,因为只有人们先在头脑里聚到一起,才能一起行动;否则他们早已被社会制度分割、组织、制度化、控制住了。

不过,虽然成网总是从互联网开始,有些情况下从手机网络开始(这两者当然越来越是一回事,两者兼有),这种成网的形式是多模态的。它包括线上和线下的社交网络,也包括原有的社会网络:家庭网络、朋友网络,在阿拉伯国家还有一个非常重要的东西,足球俱乐部的球迷网络。各位记得,几个月前塞得港那场警方挑起的事件中,开罗阿赫利队的球迷被杀了上百人,为什么?因为阿赫利球迷网络在革命初期起了决定性作用。他们通过互联网联系起来,但一旦上了街,靠的就是球迷网络。所以,一切都是网络。网络是什么意思?是个人与个人之间的连接,不是组织,不是横幅,不是旗帜,不是政党,没有领袖,只有网络。人和人相互连接,相互信任。

而且,网络不只在运动内部,还连着世界各地其他运动,连着互联网的博客圈,连着媒体,连着整个社会。网络技术在这里是根本性的,因为它提供了一个平台,让持续、广泛的结网实践随着运动形态的变化而演化。运动在演变,互联网上的网络就跟着轻松演变,不需要任何人拍板,不需要任何协议。

再者,它们不需要正式的领导层,没有指挥控制中心。决策由它们自己组织。没有人会说「去做这个」,一切都在网络里辩论,事情往哪走,就看网络往哪走。这又是一个根本特征。这种去中心的结构把参与的机会放到了最大,因为这些网络是开放的。不需要会员证,不需要同意任何东西。你进来参加辩论,参加某些动员而不参加另一些,取决于你怎么接入网络。它也降低了运动在镇压威胁面前的脆弱性:你怎么杀死一个网络?你杀掉一个节点,网络的特性是自我再生,它有一种生物学的逻辑,会一直走下去。你砍掉一个节点,还有许多别的节点。所以我提出一个说法:这些是根茎式的革命(rhizomatic revolutions)。它们是根茎,在地下,冒出来,又潜下去,但始终彼此相连。有时在网上浮现,有时不浮现,有时去广场,有时去政治动员,如此等等。

此外,运动的网络化不仅保护运动免于镇压,也保护它免于自身的威胁:官僚化和被操纵。任何人想操纵运动,或者未经任何人授权就想当运动的领袖,立刻会被群起围攻,没有活路。越想当领袖,越当不成领袖,网上的人越要把你干掉。

占领城市空间

卡斯特: 第二,它们虽然在互联网上起步,却是通过占领城市空间才成为运动的。它们总要走进城市空间。为什么?有几个原因。首先,「在一起」这件根本的事,到了某一刻需要情感纽带最直接的表达:你触摸到另一个人。在网上,你连接了对方,但还没有触摸到对方。而当你们真的在一起,共同面对危险,共享空间,在城市里以一种新的方式共处,就会发生别的事情,那是一个心理上和个人层面的转变时刻。

而且,在城市空间里,任何人只要走过去就能加入。哪怕不同意那些讨论、那些目标、那里的一切,也不必同意任何东西,只要在场,你就是运动的一部分。仅仅因为你在那里。在这个意义上,它是真正开放的。麻烦也由此开始:有些人加入的理由和别人正好相反。各位知道,美国茶党运动的一部分人也加入了本质上更偏民主派那一边的运动。但双方有一点是一样的:都拒斥传统的政治制度。所以我说,支持不支持这些运动取决于各位自己的看法,但运动本身就是如此自主、如此有力,并且分享着某些共同的诉求。

运动需要城市空间的另一个原因是:既然它们没有制度化的行动方式,就必须通过在场来在社会中存在,要让媒体看得见,让社会看得见,同时向制度发起挑战。如果你说我不许占这块地方,而我偏占了,你可以派警察来,但你不得不承认,社会的抗议正在发生。从策略上说,所有这些运动都有一条简单的规矩:我们二十个人,他们会把我们干掉;两千人,就难得多;两万人,只要我们一直有两万人,他们就只能让我们待着。

所以,这里有一种向社会发起挑战的能力,通过实体占领,形态就不一样了。在互联网网络的自主性和运动所占领的城市空间的自主性之间组织起来的那个空间,我称之为第三种空间:自主空间(space of autonomy)。既是网络里的自主空间,也是本地形成的社区里的自主空间。这个自主空间,就是新社会运动的存在形式。

本地与全球,火花与自发

卡斯特: 第三,这些运动全都既是本地的,又是全球的。它们因本地条件、本地文化、本地价值而起,用自己的语言,扎根在激起它们愤怒的具体处境里。它们信仰不同,政治取向不同,对性别、阶级、种族的态度不同。它们是本地的。但同时,它们立刻连上世界,立刻把世界的问题带进自己的讨论和辩论。两者同时成立。它们既本地又全球,如同互联网一样:互联网是本地的,也是全球的,这些运动也是。

就起源而言,这些运动大体上是自发的。通常由一粒愤慨的火花点燃。西班牙的运动就叫「愤慨者」(Indignados),人们因为某件事而愤慨。阿拉伯革命的火花是自焚,是镇压,是独裁政权的野蛮:叙利亚是十九个不到十四岁的孩子因为涂了一幅涂鸦而遭到酷刑,叙利亚革命就是这么开始的。在欧洲,在西班牙,当然也在美国,愤慨的对象与其说是金融精英的行为,不如说是政治精英对金融精英的俯首帖耳。在美国,人们说得很清楚:是银行的错,不是我们的错。有可靠的民调显示,美国有47%的人反对金融高管,认为他们要为经济危机负责;但要是问政府(不分党派)和银行家谁的责任更大,人们说政府。政府。因为政府本该保护我们,结果它保护的是银行家,用来对付我们。愤慨就从这里来。这就是为什么欧洲和美国都出现了和经济危机相连的反应。对各种立场的人来说,这场金融危机的意思都是:银行家把政府装在口袋里,他们毁了世界,毁了经济,控制了一切;等他们自己出了事,又用我们的钱把他们救出来。从希腊到俄亥俄,都是这样。

病毒式传播与审议

卡斯特: 这些运动是病毒式的,遵循互联网的逻辑。首先是因为信息在互联网上的病毒式传播,尤其是图像。图像的病毒效应极其强大。人们谈了很多脸书和推特,但就影响力而言,互联网上最重要的社交网络是YouTube,比其他都重要。因为人人都能生成图像,这就是公民新闻。任何人拿起手机就能马上录下画面、拍成视频、传上网。看到和你一样的人被屠杀,被殴打,在正当抗议时被胡椒喷雾喷进眼睛,什么都没做就遭此对待;在另一些国家,干脆被机枪扫射。各地情形不同,但人们立刻就愤慨了。镇压越暴力,运动得到的支持越多。恐惧更多,支持也更多,两者同时发生。

从愤怒到希望的转化,在所有运动里都是通过自主空间里的审议完成的。先有愤慨,有愤怒,而当人们建起自己的自主空间,既在互联网上也在占领的场地上,他们开始辩论:为什么会这样?我们能做什么?这是哈贝马斯所说的传统意义上的审议(deliberation),只不过它不发生在议会里,而发生在公民社会里。互联网和城市空间里的横向网络创造了我前面说的「在一起」,网络的横向性支撑合作与团结,同时消解了对正式领导的需求。

这里有一点要说。这些运动被认为效率极低:为了一件小事,他们辩论几小时、几天。所以效率低。可问题是,人们在用一种不属于它们的逻辑来要求它们有效率。一切都可以被质疑,这意味着每个人都觉得那里没有老板,自己可以在场,可以发言,可以贡献。是的,基层的审议民主非常慢,非常折磨人,很多人受不了。但我们的社会这些年已经把其他所有路子都试过了:给我一个领袖,给我一个纲领,我们就干。「我们就干」通常干不成,干成了也往往落入制度的僵局。

还有很重要的一点:这些运动对传统的激进政治极为挑剔,尤其是对左派中的左派,托派,正规的无政府主义者,有组织的无政府主义者(他们既然有组织,按定义就不是无政府主义者,这正是要害)。运动对这些团体全都很挑剔,他们说:这些人把革命的咒语翻来覆去念了一辈子,什么也没发生。他们在自己脑子里、在自己家里组织革命,社会里什么也没发生。那不如我们一起看看能做点什么。没有意识形态,除了「不要意识形态」这一种意识形态,那当然也不算意识形态,但它是另一种东西,不那么定型,不那么堵人。

它们高度自省,不停地问自己:我们要什么?我们是谁?我们能贡献什么,不能贡献什么?辩论没有尽头,提案没有尽头,各种各样的提案像雪片一样。我在巴塞罗那的占领营地见过最精深的关于海德格尔的讨论:海德格尔与革命,海德格尔与民主。顺便说,这些运动里的人通常比社会平均水平受教育程度高得多。有人说这是个问题:这不是真正的工人阶级。这话是在侮辱工人阶级。而且实际情形是,有些人在很高的层次上辩论、自省,可就算你没读过柏拉图,照样可以说你的看法,照样会被讨论,被吸收进辩论和提案里。

非暴力与叙利亚的代价

卡斯特: 在起源上,它们全是非暴力运动。我要强调这一点,因为它绝对关键,包括阿拉伯革命在内。我们如今为内战感到惊骇,先是利比亚,现在是叙利亚。可叙利亚的运动开始时是一场彻头彻尾的和平运动,持续了好几个月,规模很大。在叙利亚出现任何武装抵抗之前,已经有七千多人死于街头的和平示威。是的,如果他们一直屠杀你,总有一刻人们会忍无可忍。但运动里反复辩论过一个问题:一旦忍不住了,你就毁了自己,哪怕你赢了。为什么?因为赢的会是谁?是和平示威者,是公民社会吗?不是。是沙特阿拉伯和卡塔尔资助的人,是他们在中东逊尼派与什叶派之争的格局里组织起自由叙利亚军。好,你可以推翻阿萨德,但推翻阿萨德的是谁?运动就输了,然后开始分裂,在很大一部分民众中失去合法性。这很合逻辑,很正常。我只是说,当一个民主的、非暴力的社会运动变成内战中的一个交战派系,哪怕你打赢了内战,你作为社会运动的存在已经终结了。但坚持非暴力极其困难。在每一个国家,关于暴力与非暴力的辩论都是根本性的:非暴力意味着长期的、英雄式的抵抗,暴力意味着在短期内就失去社会的合法性。

无纲领:新民主的实践

卡斯特: 这些运动也很少是纲领性的。它们没有纲领,换句话说,它们有一千个纲领。人人都有主意,许多委员会、许多小组在起草纲领。在西班牙,我参与起草了一份选举法改革方案,这是最重要的事情之一,因为所有国家的选举法都是一笔烂账,是按写法律的政党的利益写的,不是按民主的利益写的。美国的选举人团制度,这种源自美国「中世纪」的怪东西,让所有人都抓狂:一人一票的原则哪里都不被尊重。好吧,有一个国家例外,以色列,这很有意思。直接的比例代表制。政治学家会说,这样效率低,人人都能有意见,我们必须把选票整合成大的阵营。可以这么做,效率确实高,但你会失去人民。希腊是个赤裸裸的例子。最近一次希腊大选,整个欧洲的建制派都在推动选民投给两个大党。赢了选举的保守党得票30%,对立的左翼政党得票28%。那为什么保守党拿到了绝对多数?因为希腊法律里有一条小条款:在三百人的议会里,哪怕只多一票的党,都在比例分配的席位之外再得五十席。就这样一次又一次。所以运动的反应是:任何纲领得以推行之前,先得改变权力结构。

与此同时,生活的每一个方面都有数不清的提案。欧洲最有力的运动之一是生态农业食品运动,在运动内部尝试实践新的生态农业原则,人们不能想吃什么就吃什么,分发任何食物之前都得先辩论一番。但总的来说,就纲领而言,它们的本质是:没有任何具体的纲领。它们根本上是民主运动。最重要的事是寻求民主,一种新形式的民主,但不是写在纲领里,而是在实践中。实践这种民主,做实验,看看它究竟是什么。基层民主是什么?它们并不是在传统意义上挑战代议民主。它们说的是:这个代议民主不代表人。代表的规则被扭曲了、被改掉了。它们的原则是给这种民主加一个补充。它们不用传统马克思主义的说法,不说「形式民主」「资产阶级民主」,不,不,不。它们说:代议民主没问题,只是它不代表我们。所以我们得发明新的民主形式,也就是人们所说的网络民主(network democracy)。这话说起来当然轻巧,可到集会上、到地方大会的辩论里去找,没人知道它到底是什么。

乌托邦与冰岛样本

卡斯特: 但各位知道它是什么吗?它是一个乌托邦。是乌托邦式的。人们会说,那又怎样?乌托邦不是幻想,不是蠢话。乌托邦是关于世界应当是什么样、政治世界应当是什么样的想法。而乌托邦是一种物质力量,因为乌托邦占据人的心智,心智可以生出新的方案。所有重大的政治意识形态和政治体制都曾经是乌托邦。自由主义是乌托邦,共产主义是乌托邦,无政府主义是乌托邦,传统意义上的社会主义是乌托邦。乌托邦是母体,人们想要的东西和社会里实际发生的事情之间经过种种中介、种种谈判,最后在现实生活里发生的一切,都从这个母体里来。

这就把我带到最后一点:政治变革和这些社会运动之间是什么关系?社会运动本身不是政治运动,尽管它们非常政治。在什么意义上?它们不想夺取国家。没有人想把运动变成政党去夺取国家。一旦那样做,它就成了政党,那是另一回事。它们想改变的是意识。通过意识的转变,通过这种觉悟和审议,它们期待到了某一刻,公民会以不同的方式改变国家的形式。疯了?不见得。冰岛?对,三十三万人,但绝不是傻子。各位知道,冰岛不仅把从1927年起轮流执政的整个政府联盟赶下了台,把一个向来边缘的生态社会民主派联盟送进了政府;而且改革了经济,把银行收归国有,把银行家送进监狱,把首相送上法庭;此外,他们还在互联网上众包了一部新宪法,一万六千人参与,现在冰岛有了一部在网上众包出来的新宪法。这不是冰岛故事的终点,但那里确实有些东西。顺便说,冰岛经济如今是欧洲表现最好的,比德国还好。按所有评级机构的说法,冰岛的主权债务比德国的更值得信任。因为他们稳定,因为他们清楚自己是谁、怎么连接。而德国归根结底得看别人的脸色:西班牙或意大利一旦垮掉,德国也跟着垮。所以,先别投资德国。

改革政治的不可能之恋

卡斯特: 既然它们不直接改造政治体制,那接下来会发生什么?很大程度上取决于政治体制怎么反应。所以我书里结论那一章的标题是「社会运动与改革政治:一场不可能的爱情?」也许可能,也许不可能。如果政治阶层明白,这些运动,不管多么扭曲、多么夸张、有时多么愤怒,是社会对当前政治制度根深蒂固的不信任的症状;如果他们真心想建设和重建民主,而不是想着把罪责糊弄过去;如果他们这么做(有些人可能会这么做,奥巴马没有在做,但有些人可能会),那么事情就可能改变。因为纵观历史,总是体制之外的社会运动,在某一刻把辩论和自由的空间打开到体制之内。不跟上的政党就会垮掉。

我拿十九世纪末的欧洲作比较。在那些民主国家,英国、意大利,某种程度上还有法国,政治建制是保守派和自由派。忽然社会变了,出现了带着新意识形态的新社会运动,无政府主义、社会主义,看起来像是疯了,可它们代表正在浮现却没有在政治制度中得到代表的新社会。结果怎样?自由派基本上消失了。保守派没有。为什么保守派没有?因为保守派从根本上不需要变,只需要换个名字、换个标签、换个意识形态的包装。捍卫社会的支配利益是最容易的事,随波逐流就行,谁在社会里当家就跟谁走。可如果你在社会里存在的理由,作为自由派、作为政治体制里的左翼,是代表社会的利益而不是精英的利益,那么你不这么做,就有麻烦了。同样的事正在今天的欧洲发生,某种程度上也发生在美国的民主党身上:如果他们不去代表那些因为政治精英臣服于金融精英而愤怒、绝望的人,那你就会有茶党;或者,我们会有欧洲,会有「没有一个政府是好的」这种观念。

那就我们自己来。自己来的第一步,就是从税收、从钱开始:我不信任你,凭什么把钱给你?所以不交税。自卫?我有枪,要你干什么?欧洲已经有同样的东西了。也许某一天,会有一家华盛顿的智库开始向欧洲传播这样的想法:只有武装起来的公民才能真正保卫共和国。所以在很大程度上,如果政治体制里所谓进步的力量不回应社会的新状况,运动就会来填补。但运动又没有制度能力去做这件事。

1%与99%:改写议题

卡斯特: 归根到底,运动对政治最积极的影响,可能发生在社会的基本观念和基本议题的改变上。在美国,先不管统计上的煽动,「1%与99%」之间的断裂这个说法,从前没人谈。我们早就知道收入不平等,这不是新闻。可现在整个社会,包括喜剧演员,更不用说国会,都开始谈1%和99%了。这对人们意味着什么?意味着这个社会,那个所谓的机会社会?不是了,是一个有着根本性社会不平等的社会。这个变化发生在这里,在头脑里。政治上怎么回应,那要看情况,可以是右翼政治,可以是煽动,等等。但辩论的条件已经变了。美国有一组民调数据很有意思:在公众心目中,美国向来拒绝承认贫富之间存在社会冲突,或者说阶级斗争,随你怎么叫。而根据皮尤研究中心的数据,2009年认为贫富冲突是社会的决定性冲突的人占45%,2011年是70%。也就是说,「贫富之间存在冲突」这个观念,恰恰与美国意识形态背道而驰。美国意识形态说,穷人唯一的问题是还没富起来,但他们终究会富起来。现在人们说,不,因为那99%。

最后,运动里的人,运动的语言,是这样回应关于「我们到底做成了什么,最终结果是什么」的所有讨论的。他们说,这种讨论本身就是资本主义生产主义逻辑的反映:你不生产点什么,你就什么都不是。可也许这场辩论本身就错了。也许要紧的不是结果,而是过程,因为过程是一种转化的力量。为什么?因为过程是你实实在在做的事。审议、讨论、构想,这一切都是物质性的实践,而正是物质性的实践改变人的心智,最终不可避免地会转化成某种东西。运动里的人是这么说的:我们当然会去投票,可那有什么要紧?我们知道下次选举解决不了问题。但二十年后的选举呢?二十年、二十五年前,妇女运动、环境运动、民权运动说的正是这句话。只是时间尺度不同:不是下一次选举,而是下一个社会。这才是社会运动施展的空间。

不过最重要的,仍然是传播自主性对克服恐惧的作用。我想用解放广场上的一条推文来结束。发推的女性名叫伊克巴尔·卡扎伊尼,署名「坚强的叙利亚」(Surya Strong)。她写道:「我们推倒了恐惧之墙。你们推倒了我们房子的墙。我们会重建家园,可你们再也建不起那堵恐惧之墙。」这就是那场转变。谢谢各位。

布朗: 卡斯特博士同意回答提问。请等话筒。

问答:企业治理与另类经济

纳尔逊: 我是迈克·纳尔逊,彭博政府(Bloomberg Government)的撰稿人,也在乔治敦大学教互联网研究。您出色地概述了旨在改变国家政府的社会运动。我想请您谈谈社会运动可能怎样改变企业治理:消费者抵制、股东行动,会不会因为社交媒体而更有力?对企业运作方式的改变,您乐观还是悲观?

卡斯特: 谢谢,当然。这些运动有意思的地方在于它们是多维的,触及一切;而这个「一切」,归根到底就是各种事情在各处是怎么管理的。所以您说得完全对。它们把矛头对准政府,是因为运动的兴起和金融危机相连,和政府对金融危机的灾难性处置相连。有些政府连危机都压不住;即便像美国这样多少压住了,代价也是砸碎了公民对这种治理的信任。所以运动的主流集中在那里。但各种讨论都有,您提到的企业治理正是其中之一。各位记得围绕美国银行手续费的那些讨论,很多人真的把账户从银行转到了信用合作社。在一些州,尤其是华盛顿州,人们在试验建立自己的社区银行,目前看来运作得并不比别的银行差。我在欧洲一直在调查一个规模很大的「伦理银行」运动,此刻欧洲已有五百多万人在做伦理银行业务。它实际上是合作社:利润归银行的成员,投资只求足够的回报让银行运转下去。

我今天没提这些,因为我集中讲的是政治取向更强的运动。我也没提我的另一项研究,就是我的下一本书,十一月出版,不是十月,叫《另一种生活是可能的:危机中的另类经济文化》。它同样有经验基础,讲的是人们正在用哪些方式改造自己的生活。这在运动内部是一场大辩论。比较传统的社会运动派说:我们得换掉议员,得走政治制度的路。运动里的许多其他人则说:好,这会很漫长,我们也会做,但太漫长了。我三十五岁,见鬼,我现在就要过上更好的生活,而不是等革命成功以后。革命可以等,我不能等。于是就有了大量的时间分享、时间银行、另类融资、自我消费、自我生产,各种经济实践,但遵循的是一套完全不同的逻辑。我倒同意您话里的意思:短期内,这些东西在物质上、实践上会更见效,因为人们知道自己已经在过另一种生活了。

眼下在欧洲,我不知道美国的精确数据,我想这里还不是,但在欧洲,多数人赞同「少工作、少拿钱」。为什么?因为生活不只是拿工资干活。有意思的是,与此同时欧洲又有大规模失业。失业可以当作悲剧,也可以当作机会:反正他们不会雇我,那就围绕另一套价值来安排生活。这个方向上的运动越来越多,就连意识形态最强的派别里也出现了一个庞大的「降增长」(degrowth)运动,许多人主张放慢经济增长,甚至开始负增长,不再追求国民生产总值的增加。各位也知道,经济学如今有一个正在壮大的分支叫幸福经济学,其中用到了不丹的国民幸福总值指数,这个指数在全世界引起过讨论。换句话说,我想说的是:在具体的政治运动之外,文化正在发生一场地壳式的变动。因为人们普遍不信任全球金融资本主义。不是不信任资本主义,不是不信任另一种形态的资本,而是不信任这一种资本主义。问起来,多数人说,不,资本主义没问题;是这一种资本主义有问题吗?是,这种不受控制的、投机的、非企业家式的全球金融资本,不创造财富,只发明财富,把我们的财富从我们手里拿走。这是一场根本性的运动,又和政治合法性危机叠在一起。把两者放在一起看:人们既不信任掌管他们钱的人,也不信任掌管他们选票的人。我们正处在一场地壳式的变动之中,它有各种不同的表现。

问答:文化差异与分享文化

提问者: 我对您理论中的跨文化面向感兴趣。您没怎么谈中国或远东文化,它们有相当鲜明的文化特征。您谈了很多普遍性的东西,可一旦涉及治理和社会运作方式,就会反映某种文化规范、某些共同价值,而您所说的互联网现象、传播,您所主张的理论,总会以某种方式影响这些。能否谈谈跨文化的方面,以及在您看来是什么使它成为普遍的?也就是说,规范性的价值,什么是对、什么是错、什么是好、什么是坏,一个社会由什么定义,这些如何受您的理论影响?

卡斯特: 谢谢。这有两个层次。一方面,从经验上说,世界上不存在文化的同质性,文化多样性在增加而不是减少。但在这之上,有某种全球性的世界主义文化,有两种。一种是消费主义,这是全球普遍的文化;另一种是把人类当作一个物种来看待的共同价值,物种的保存,自然的保存,也就是广义的生态。一个显然是资本主义的,另一个不是。这是两种正在扩张的普遍文化。在这个意义上,民族的、族群的、宗教的文化认同在加强,同时这两种主要文化也越来越被共享。

共享文化还有另一个方面,我认为是新的,和互联网相连。被共享的,是分享的文化本身。意思是,我上网,找到人,连接起来,建构一种新的亚文化,同时又和其他文化组合,但我们都同意一点:互联网是根本的。这就是分享的文化,也是为什么保卫互联网的战斗已经打响,不只是「匿名者」,还有很多别的。为什么?因为互联网是我们这个时代的公共地。如果人们觉得互联网被从自己手里夺走了,尤其是青少年和年轻人,那是唯一能让他们开始造炸弹的事。你要是拿走他们在互联网上想做什么就做什么的自由,那可真是一件大事。所以这种分享的文化相当根本。

至于政治文化,我认为在很大程度上,传统意义上的自由民主正在成长为共享的政治文化。多数国家的人都同意选举很重要、很根本,这一点上,今天的中国内部就存在矛盾。但另一方面,这种共享的政治文化在多数情况下,尤其在社会运动中,还包含另一个维度:参与式民主成了民主的新边疆。没有参与式民主的纯粹代议民主,实际上是空的,很快就会无力管理自治的进程。为什么参与式民主现在变得可能了?运动史上有些很有意思的讨论:十九世纪、二十世纪初,人们争论基层民主、参与式民主,大家其实都同意,可它不切实际,因为总得在某一刻做决定,而你没法把规模放大。互联网让你能放大规模。所以,网络民主的时代似乎到了。马克思主义者和无政府主义者有一场老争论。马克思主义者说:权力必须集中,否则没有效率。无政府主义者说:可一旦集中,就成了专制。现在的无政府主义者,我称之为新无政府主义者,因为他们不是组织化的无政府主义者,他们说:你们马克思主义者不是总说,生产力的发展使不同形式的社会组织成为可能吗?这正是发生了的事,只不过不是共产主义。共产主义是十九世纪的意识形态,无政府主义是二十一世纪的,因为互联网现在让去中心的民主、去中心的参与、集体决策成为可能。我觉得这是一场引人入胜的讨论。

问答:无互联网即无运动

布朗: 已经超时了,最后一个问题。我想是您排在下一个。

提问者: 在社会运动中工作、或者建设社会运动的人,怎样和这些技术相处?他们需要考虑什么?

卡斯特: 谢谢。这是一个根本的问题,理论上和实践上都是。简短地回答,我们可以稍后接着谈:没有互联网上的社交网络,这些运动就不存在,就这么简单。会有别的社会运动,也许有,但那是假设性的问题。这些运动中的每一个,所有地方的所有抗议、所有行动,都从互联网开始。所以在我看来,唯一相关的问题是:至少对运动和互动的相当一部分来说,经由互联网会带来哪些物质的和文化的后果。至于「革命能不能被推特」之类的讨论,我坦率地说是空洞的。革命没被推特?不,被推特了。从经验上说,确实被推特了。吉拉德·洛坦等人做的精彩分析,还有推文流的研究,这些优秀的研究者用数据展示了推文如何组织了阿拉伯革命。当然不只是推文,但没有推文,你解释不了这个过程、它的发展、它的参与,等等。这就是要点。技术一如既往,嵌在社会实践里。运动起于别的原因,但没有这项技术,它会再一次被碾碎。对我来说,埃及最重要的是这样一组对照:2008年那次尝试,尤其在开罗以北那座工人城市,是怎样被碾碎的,成千上万人丧生;而从那次幸存下来的同一批人组建了「四月六日运动」,以突尼斯为引信,在2011年1月于互联网上发起了另一种运动,成功了。

所以,到了今天,你无法想象没有互联网、不考虑互联网含义的社会运动、非营利组织、倡导团体,或者茶党。但互联网有它的含义:它需要互动,需要横向性。政治家们后来说,哦对,我们忘了互联网。奥巴马是世界上第一个真正理解互联网潜力的人,这对他竞选的筹款和组织起了决定性作用。现在所有政治家都想照做,把它当作魔法药水:做个好网站,建个好的网络,我们就赢了。可互联网的文化定义只有一个词:自主。互联网是自主的技术。如果你不打算把自主权交给跟着你的运动,最好别碰互联网,否则你会有麻烦。因为人们一旦当真看待自己的自主,又有了技术工具,他们就不再需要你。奥巴马现在还在继续他那一套互联网做法,可已经不灵了,对吧?因为人们自主地做了别的决定。

本期讲者
曼纽尔·卡斯特西班牙裔社会学家,南加州大学传播学讲席教授、加州大学伯克利分校荣休教授,《信息时代》三部曲提出「网络社会」概念。2012 年获霍尔堡奖,本讲基于其同年出版的《愤怒与希望的网络》。
卡罗琳·布朗美国国会图书馆约翰·W·克鲁格中心学术项目主任,负责邀请资深学者驻馆并组织讲座与研讨。
迈克·尼尔森彭博政府撰稿人、乔治城大学互联网研究教授,曾任克林顿政府科技政策顾问。问答环节第一位提问者。
章节 · 点击跳转视频
0:01 国会图书馆开场与讲者介绍 ▶ 正在看
5:31 两年间席卷全球的运动浪潮 ▶ 正在看
11:14 权力理论:强制与塑造人心 ▶ 正在看
19:06 从大众传播到大众自传播 ▶ 正在看
23:59 运动的两个前提与情感机制 ▶ 正在看
34:48 网络化、无领袖、根茎式结构 ▶ 正在看
40:43 占领城市空间与自主空间 ▶ 正在看
44:33 本地又全球,自发且病毒式 ▶ 正在看
48:14 商议民主与非暴力之争 ▶ 正在看
54:27 没有纲领的民主实验与乌托邦 ▶ 正在看
59:09 运动与政治变革:冰岛与 1% ▶ 正在看
1:09:46 问答:企业治理、文化、技术自主 ▶ 正在看
本期论点
本期回应
6:06
技术本身不产生任何东西,只有嵌入社会、文化与政治的肌理才有意义 制度与选择技术的后果由什么决定?
16:13
哪里有支配,哪里就有对支配的反抗,这是理解人类历史唯一的规律 总有反抗被支配的人还会不会反抗?
其他论点
14:34
从长远看,塑造头脑比折磨肉体更有效,权力根本上存在于人的心智之中
22:02
社会运动本身无所谓善恶,种族主义和性别歧视的运动同样是社会运动
24:03
社会运动源于生活条件恶化与对政治机构的深刻不信任这两者的结合
28:29
社会动员的触发器是愤怒,抑制器是恐惧,恐惧靠彼此分享与认同被克服
34:13
互联网没有制造社会运动,但塑造了它们的形态,正如工业化塑造19世纪工人运动
38:31
网络化社会运动的连接发生在个体之间,而非组织、政党或旗帜之间,也没有领袖 观察
41:13
社会运动可以起于互联网,但只有占领城市空间才真正成为一场运动
46:06
在欧美,人们的愤慨主要针对政治精英对金融精英的屈从,而非金融精英本身 观察
48:19
镇压越暴力,社会运动获得的支持就越多
58:32
乌托邦是一种物质力量,所有重大政治意识形态和制度最初都曾是乌托邦
59:17
社会运动不试图夺取国家政权,它们要改变的是人的意识
1:07:48
社会运动的价值不在结果而在过程,商议本身就是改变人们想法的物质实践
1:21:03
共产主义是19世纪的意识形态,无政府主义才是21世纪的意识形态
01国会图书馆开场与讲者介绍
0:01
From the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C.
来自华盛顿特区的美国国会图书馆
便签引用
0:24
Well, good afternoon, everybody. I am Carolyn Brown. I direct the office of scholarly programs in the John W. Kluge Center here at the Library of Congress. Um and it's my great and sincere pleasure to welcome you here uh this afternoon for what I know will be a very um interesting and um mind-expanding lecture by Dr. Manuel Castells. And the title of the lecture is Networks of Outrage and Hope. Um before we begin the program, which is about networks and digital things, I'm going to ask you though to turn off the buzzing of your digital things. If you would turn off cell phones and anything else that will go off and interfere with the uh program recording and the speaker.
好的,大家下午好。我是Carolyn Brown。我负责国会图书馆约翰·W·克鲁格中心(John W. Kluge Center)的学术项目办公室。就在这里,国会图书馆。嗯,今天下午我非常荣幸、也由衷地欢迎各位来到这里,我相信这将是一场非常有意思、非常能打开思路的讲座,主讲人是曼纽尔·卡斯特(Manuel Castells)博士。讲座的题目是《愤怒与希望的网络》。嗯,在开始今天的活动之前——虽然它讲的是网络和各种数字产品——我还是要请大家关掉你们手上数字产品的提示音。请关闭手机以及任何可能响起来、干扰活动录音和主讲人的设备。
便签引用
1:17
Uh the John W. Kluge Center, um which has organized this event, was established by none other than John W. Kluge with a very generous endowment to create a scholarly venue on Capitol Hill where the finest mature scholars might have opportunities to bring their wisdom and their knowledge to the nation's leaders and policy makers. Um a space where, as we like to say, the world of affairs and the world of ideas, where the thinkers and doers might have the opportunity to come together in mutually enriching uh conversation.
约翰·W·克鲁格中心,也就是本次活动的主办方,正是由约翰·W·克鲁格本人所创立,他慷慨捐赠了一笔基金,在国会山上打造一个学术平台,让最优秀的资深学者有机会把他们的智慧和学识带给国家的领导者与政策制定者。嗯,用我们喜欢的说法,这是一个让事务的世界与思想的世界相遇的空间,让思考者和实干者有机会聚到一起,展开彼此都有收获的交流。
便签引用
1:54
The center also um supports a rising generation of um the world's most promising junior fellows as well. And the idea is that these two groups, the seniors and the juniors, will have an opportunity, at least from time to time, to come together and and form a um a very vibrant intellectual community. Um in connection with that, we also have a number of lectures, occasionally small symposia, um based primarily on the work of our scholars, although occasionally we'll do a a um small conference on something else.
中心同时也资助新一代学者,也就是全世界最有潜力的初级研究员。我们的想法是,让这两个群体——资深学者和青年学者——至少能时不时地聚在一起,形成一个非常有活力的学术共同体。嗯,与此相关,我们还举办一系列讲座,偶尔也有小型研讨会,内容主要来自我们学者的研究,不过偶尔我们也会就其他主题办一场小型会议。
便签引用
2:31
Um if you want to know more about the center and the programs, you can sign up at the back table. Uh leave your email and we'll send you RSS feeds, and there are also brochures that will tell you more about the Kluge Center. Today's speaker, Dr. Manuel Castells, is the Kluge Chair in Technology and Society. An authority on the information age and its sociological implications, Dr. Castells is a university professor and the Wallis Annenberg Chair in Communication Technology and Society at the University of Southern California.
嗯,如果你想更多了解中心和我们的项目,可以在后面的桌子上登记。留下你的邮箱,我们会给你发送RSS订阅,那里还有介绍手册,可以让你更多地了解克鲁格中心。今天的主讲人曼纽尔·卡斯特博士,是克鲁格中心技术与社会讲席学者。他是研究信息时代及其社会学意涵的权威,卡斯特博士是南加州大学的大学教授,并担任该校传播技术与社会方向的沃利斯·安纳伯格讲席教授。任教于南加州大学。
便签引用
3:07
He's professor emeritus of sociology and professor emeritus of city and regional planning at the University of California, Berkeley, where he taught for 24 years. Um he has other appointments, but I'm not going to go into all of those. I could go on too long about him, but I am going to uh say that Dr. Castells is a member of the Library's Scholars Council. Um and in his time here, this summer, which has been too short, uh but in his time here this summer, he's been very helpful to the Library as we've thought through um for ourselves the implications of the digital age on our work.
他也是加州大学伯克利分校的社会学荣休教授、城市与区域规划荣休教授,他在伯克利任教了24年。嗯,他还有其他一些职务,但我就不一一列举了。关于他我可以讲很久,但我还是要说一句,卡斯特博士是国会图书馆学者理事会的成员。嗯,在他这个夏天来这里的这段时间——虽然太短了——但在他今年夏天在这里的这段时间里,他给了图书馆很大帮助,我们一起深入思考了我们自己去体会数字时代对我们工作的影响。
便签引用
3:46
Uh Dr. Castells has been tracking and studying the communications revolution for 25 years. Many Many of us may not really realize it's been going on that long, but in fact it has. Um I'm not going to provide the titles and details of the over 26 books he's he's authored. Um but to give you what I think is the most concise statement of what he's been up to for these 25 years. Um well, I guess it's more than 25 years, but um over the major part of his career, I wanted to cite read a citation Um oops, that was um read he in March um he received the Holberg International Memorial Prize from the Parliament of Norway. And I think their citation very wonderfully and concisely sums up his uh accomplishments.
卡斯特尔博士研究和追踪这场传播革命已经有25年了。我们中的很多人可能没有真正意识到这件事已经持续了这么久,但事实确实如此。我就不一一列举他撰写的26本以上著作的书名和细节了。但为了给大家一个我认为最简明扼要的概括,说明他这25年来所做的工作。嗯,我想其实不止25年,而是他职业生涯的绝大部分时间。我想引用一段评语——哦,不好意思,是这样的:今年3月,他获得了由挪威议会颁发的霍尔堡国际纪念奖。我觉得那段授奖评语非常精彩、非常简洁地概括了他的成就。
便签引用
4:37
Manuel Castells is a leading sociologist of the city and new information and media technologies. His ideas and writings have shaped our understanding of the political dynamics of urban and global economies in the network society. He has illuminated the underlying power structures of the great technological revolutions of our time and their consequences. He's helped us to understand how social and political movements have co-evolved with the new technologies. So, this is an opportunity for all of us to understand and learn in new ways from our distinguished colleague and I cannot say my friend Manuel Castells.
曼纽尔·卡斯特尔是研究城市以及新信息与媒体技术的顶尖社会学家。他的思想和著作塑造了我们对网络社会中城市经济与全球经济政治动态的理解。他揭示了我们这个时代几场伟大技术革命背后的权力结构及其后果。他帮助我们理解社会运动和政治运动是如何与新技术共同演进的。所以,这是一个机会,让我们所有人以全新的方式向这位杰出的同仁学习和理解——我不能不说,他也是我的朋友,曼纽尔·卡斯特尔。
便签引用
02两年间席卷全球的运动浪潮
5:31
Thank you, Caroline. Um I Let me just in 1 second um express my gratitude to the Kluge Center and particularly to its director uh Dr. Caroline Brown for giving me the opportunity to share with you this afternoon my most recent research. Which concerns precisely the relationship between and new technologies and new social movements. Certainly these social movements are not created by technology. Technology in itself doesn't produce anything. It's the technology we into the fabric of society, culture, politics uh which really become significant.
谢谢你,卡罗琳。请允许我用一秒钟时间,向克鲁格中心、尤其是中心主任卡罗琳·布朗博士表达我的感谢,感谢你们给我机会在今天下午与各位分享我最新的研究。这项研究恰恰关注新技术与新社会运动之间的关系。当然,这些社会运动并不是由技术创造出来的。技术本身不产生任何东西。是技术被编织进社会、文化、政治的肌理之中,才真正变得有意义。
便签引用
6:17
Um so um in the last 2 years uh unexpectedly a number of major social movements uh spread in countries around the world. From Iceland the most important movement started to Tunisia and then from Tunisia to uh most Arab countries. And then from Spain to the United States. And all these are specific connections. It's no conspiracy, but this virality. There are specific connections. And then from there to the world. In fact, they had been in the last 2 years, they had been demonstrations, occupations uh in thousands thousands of cities around the world including over 1,000 in the United States.
在过去两年里,出人意料地,一系列重大社会运动在世界各国蔓延开来。从冰岛——最重要的运动从那里开始——到突尼斯,然后从突尼斯扩散到大多数阿拉伯国家。接着从西班牙到美国。这些之间都有具体的联系。这不是什么阴谋,而是这种病毒式的传播。其中存在具体的联系。然后又从那里扩散到全世界。事实上,在过去两年里,全世界成千上万个城市都发生过示威和占领活动,其中光美国就有1000多个城市。
便签引用
7:11
They are mapped in my book. Um and this goes on. Just this week uh the student movement in Chile uh just uh uh searched again. Um and this is a relentless wave of social movements largely beyond the attention of the media and the indifference of the politicians. So even you know, in specific country that didn't have this kind of social movement Israel in July-October 2011 had the largest social mobilization of Israeli history with more than 500,000 people in a country of 1 million people participating in demonstrations, seatings, etc. for several months.
我在书里把它们都标注在地图上了。而且这还在继续。就在这个星期,智利的学生运动又一次重新兴起。这是一波接一波、持续不断的社会运动浪潮,大体上没有得到媒体的关注,也受到政客的漠视。即便是在一些看似没有这类社会运动的国家,比如以色列,在2011年7月到10月,也爆发了以色列历史上规模最大的社会动员,一个百万人口的国家里,有超过50万人参加了示威、静坐等活动,持续了好几个月。
便签引用
8:02
And again, the media have not reported carefully unless there is violence and then of course this nice footage. The motives and outcomes of these movements are very diverse. In the West, they were mainly prompted by protest against the mismanagement of government of the major financial crisis that is started in 2008 and still goes on. Ask Europe these days. In the Arab countries by combination of food crisis and the rejection of the dictatorial regimes that had had many specific expressions of protest but that were savagely repressed and destroyed over the years including the last one in Egypt in 2008 and suddenly the governments could not cope with it.
而媒体同样没有认真报道,除非出现暴力场面,那样当然就有好画面了。这些运动的动机和结果非常多样。在西方,主要是因为抗议政府对这场重大金融危机的处置不当,这场危机始于2008年,至今仍在延续。看看这些天的欧洲就知道了。在阿拉伯国家,则是粮食危机与对独裁政权的抵制相结合的结果。这些国家过去有过许多具体的抗议表达,但多年来都被残酷镇压和摧毁,包括2008年埃及最近的那一次;而突然之间,这些政府就应付不过来了。
便签引用
9:02
In even if there has been such a diversity in all cases there was an individual and collective feeling of outrage towards social injustice and of humiliation by the arrogance of the authorities. These are two key feelings in the matter. But what I want to argue in this lecture on the basis of observation is that there is a largely common pattern that transcends cultural and institutional context. To identify this pattern, I did over all these last 2 years field work in by myself and by network of collaborators, colleagues, and students in a number of countries including Spain, United States, several European countries, the Arab countries.
尽管存在如此大的多样性,但在所有这些案例中,都存在着个人和集体对社会不公的愤怒感,以及被当权者傲慢态度羞辱的屈辱感。这是其中两种关键的情感。但我在这场讲座中想基于观察提出的论点是:存在一种在很大程度上共通的模式,它超越了文化和制度的语境。为了识别这种模式,在过去这两年里,我自己以及由合作者、同事和学生组成的网络,在多个国家做了田野调查,包括西班牙、美国、几个欧洲国家和阿拉伯国家。
便签引用
10:03
And also we examine a number of secondary sources and reports on the internet. The result is a book about to be published. I could say even this is the first time I specifically addressed the content of this book. You could consider it the launching of the book, but probably the regulations of the library would not allow the actual launching of the book. That will take place in London in early October. It's a book titled Networks of Outreach and Hope. And it's published by Polity Press. And the only reason I'm citing it is not commercial advertising. It's simply to tell you that I will go to the essence of the matter and you can find in this book all the empirical details, all the data, all the appendixes, all the things that I'm saying. I'm not saying they are demonstrated, but at least they are illustrated by the material that is gathered and presented in this book.
我们还查阅了大量二手资料和互联网上的报告。成果是一本即将出版的书。我甚至可以说,这是我第一次专门讲述这本书的内容。你们可以把它当作这本书的发布会,不过图书馆的规定大概不允许在这里真的办发布会。发布会将在10月初于伦敦举行。这本书叫《愤怒与希望的网络》,由Polity出版社出版。我提到它的唯一原因不是做商业广告,而只是想告诉大家,我今天会直奔问题的核心,而所有的实证细节、所有数据、所有附录,我今天所讲的一切内容,你们都能在这本书里找到。我不是说这些都被证明了,但至少它们有书中收集和呈现的材料作为例证。
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03权力理论:强制与塑造人心
11:14
And more than that, the analysis that I will present here and in the book is still preliminary because we lack sufficient perspective and we don't have enough information. So, it all this is very tentative. However, uh analysis in fact is rooted in a much broader framework of uh theory what I call grounded theory, which is theory always uh supported by evidence. This is the only theory I do. Um presented in a book published in 2009 by Oxford University Press, Communication and Power. Communication and Power, uh that book presents a theory of power as based on communication.
更重要的是,我在这里和书中要呈现的分析仍然是初步的,因为我们缺乏足够的视角,也没有足够的信息。所以这一切都非常初步、非常试探性。不过,这些分析其实植根于一个宽广得多的理论框架,我称之为扎根理论,也就是始终有证据支撑的理论。我做的只有这一种理论。这个框架呈现在2009年由牛津大学出版社出版的《传播力》一书中。《传播力》——那本书提出了一种以传播为基础的权力理论。
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12:03
Um with number of cases studied, but fundamentally is is a theory of power. Uh and I will give you this theory in a nutshell. Uh so that's the convenient way to summarize 600 pages uh to um to express the notion that we This is the background of what we are going to go in specifically into the movements. Um because it fits. It fits. Um And when it doesn't fit, I will change the theory. I will not change the data. Um The My point is that power relations are the most important subject of a study in social sciences at large for the very simple reason that they are the foundational the foundational relationships of society.
书里有许多案例研究,但根本上它是一种权力理论。我先简要地把这个理论讲给大家听。这是把600页内容概括出来的一个便利方式,用来表达这样一个观念——这是我们接下来具体讨论那些运动的背景。因为它是契合的。它确实契合。而当它不契合的时候,我会改理论,而不会改数据。我的观点是,权力关系是整个社会科学中最重要的研究对象,原因很简单:它们是社会的奠基性关系。
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12:58
Because those who have power shape the institutions of society according to their values and interests. As simple as that. So let's say power relationships are the DNA of society. Right? Um Cherchez la femme? No. Cherchez le pouvoir. So power in social theory we have a long tradition of theories on power. Basically, you can reduce to two forms of power which are often combined in history. One is the trajectory of intellectual uh understanding of power that comes from Machiavelli to Max Weber. Power as the monopoly, the legitimate monopoly of violence.
因为掌握权力的人会按照自己的价值观和利益来塑造社会的制度。就这么简单。所以可以说,权力关系是社会的DNA。对吧?“找那个女人”?不,是“找那个权力”。在社会理论中,关于权力,我们有很长的理论传统。基本上,可以归结为两种形式的权力,它们在历史上常常交织在一起。一种是从马基雅维利到马克斯·韦伯这条思想脉络对权力的理解。权力即垄断,即对暴力的合法垄断。
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13:58
Myself, I take out the legitimate. Power as monopoly of violent, legitimate or not legitimate. Coercion. That is state power. But there's another tradition which throughout the history of social theory has been extremely important and less often cited by both right and left. Power as persuasion. Power as cultural hegemony from Gramsci to Michel Foucault. Power as the ability to shape the mind. I would even say in the formula just to simplify things uh that shaping the minds in the long run is more effective than torturing the bodies.
我自己会把“合法”去掉。权力即对暴力的垄断,无论合法与否。强制。这就是国家权力。但还有另一种传统,它在整个社会理论史上极为重要,却较少被左右两派引用。权力即说服。权力即文化霸权,从葛兰西到米歇尔·福柯。权力即塑造人心的能力。为了简化,我甚至可以用这样一句话来表述:从长远看,塑造头脑比折磨肉体更有效。
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14:48
Because ultimately our decisions, our behavior is governed, fortunately by our brains, by our minds that include at the heart, the brain. And therefore, if people ultimately think otherwise than what is established in the values and interests of the institutions ultimately, this will permeate the institutions or will change the institutions and therefore will change. And so, fundamentally fundamentally, the power is in our minds. Although there is always a combination between coercion and intimidation and um persuasion and framing the mind as George Lakoff and a whole uh stream in political uh cognition, cognitive science, argues now. Framing the minds is the most important thing.
因为归根结底,我们的决定、我们的行为,幸运的是,是由我们的大脑、我们的心智所支配的,而心智也包含了心,包含了大脑。因此,如果人们最终的想法不同于制度所确立的价值观和利益,那么这种想法最终会渗透进制度,或者改变制度,从而带来改变。所以,根本上说,权力存在于我们的头脑之中。尽管现实中总是强制与恐吓、说服与心智框架的某种结合,正如乔治·莱考夫以及政治认知、认知科学领域的一整个流派现在所主张的那样。塑造心智的框架是最重要的事情。
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15:51
However, this does not mean that we are all governed by ill- intentioned people manipulating or repressing us. This is power relationships, and therefore relationships are relationships. It's not one side, it's both sides. It's power and what I call counterpower in all societies. If we would have the one rule to understand history in the human species is wherever there is domination, there is resistance to domination. Now, how this resistance is expressed, with which kind of outcomes, but it's it's a it's a different matter and a matter of specific context. But fundamentally, the whole dynamics of history is institutions being shaped by those in power and then being resisted by those who don't have enough influence or representation in terms of their values and interests, and ultimately overrunning uh the resistance of the dominant interests in the institutions, sometimes through violence, sometimes through elections, sometimes through moral persuasion.
然而,这并不意味着我们都被一群心怀恶意、操纵或压制我们的人所统治。这是权力关系,而关系就是关系。它不是单方面的,而是双向的。是权力和我所说的反权力,在一切社会中都是如此。如果说有一条规律能让我们理解人类历史,那就是:哪里有支配,哪里就有对支配的反抗。至于这种反抗如何表达、会带来什么样的结果,那是另一回事,取决于具体的语境。但从根本上说,历史的整个动态过程就是:制度被掌权者塑造,然后被那些在价值观和利益上得不到足够影响力或代表性的人所抵抗,最终冲垮制度中占支配地位的利益的抵抗,有时通过暴力,有时通过选举,有时通过道德劝说。
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16:59
And ultimately creating new institutions which reproduce new power relationships which will be challenged later by new people who are not represented, etc. Now, you would say it's a romantic vision of history, but I say it's an empirically grounded vision of history. Uh Uh, that's why revolutions are always betrayed, but in the way of betraying them, there is some changes in relationship to what happened before. Now, if persuasion and reframing the human mind is a fundamental part of social dynamics, how this happens? Well, it happens through the minds, right?
最终创造出新的制度,而新制度又再生产出新的权力关系,日后又会被新的、得不到代表的人所挑战,如此循环。你可能会说这是一种浪漫主义的历史观,但我要说,这是一种有实证基础的历史观。这也是为什么革命总是被背叛,但在背叛的过程中,相比此前的状况,总还是发生了一些变化。那么,如果说服和重塑人类心智是社会动态的一个根本组成部分,它是怎么发生的呢?嗯,它是通过头脑发生的,对吧?
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17:44
Um, by necessity. And how the mind work, I'm not at all a neuroscientist, but neuroscientists have already detected that they work through communication processes. Meaning, what reaches our brains are signals from social networks, natural networks that through communication networks reach our neural networks. And our neural networks process these signals, this information in relationship to the stock of knowledge, ideas, images, etc. that are already installed in our networks, and they work with this material.
这是必然的。至于头脑如何运作,我完全不是神经科学家,但神经科学家已经发现,它们是通过传播过程来运作的。也就是说,抵达我们大脑的是来自社会网络、自然网络的信号,这些信号通过传播网络抵达我们的神经网络。而我们的神经网络会处理这些信号、这些信息,并将它们与已经安装在我们网络中的知识、观念、意象等存量相联系,用这些材料来加工。
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18:24
Communication being understood, of course, as the process of sharing meaning through information exchange. Now, if communication networks are critical in for the formation of uh, our intentions, our values, our behavior, it becomes obvious that if there is a transformation of communication in society, there has some effects on the transformation of these networks, and therefore, on the transformation of the human mind and the pro- and the way in which human mind processes the signals of our social and natural environment.
当然,这里所理解的传播,是通过信息交换来共享意义的过程。那么,如果说传播网络对于形成……是至关重要的,我们的意图、我们的价值观、我们的行为,这样一来就很明显了:如果社会中的传播方式发生了转变那就会对这些网络的转变产生影响,进而影响人类心智的转变,以及人类心智处理来自社会与自然环境的各种信号的方式。
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04从大众传播到大众自传播
19:06
And there has been, as we know, a dramatic transformation in communication technology, organizational transformation, and institutional transformation in the last, let's say, 20 years. Um Caroline was mentioning that what people think is the future, in fact, is the past uh to me in many cases. I remind you that the the internet was deployed for the first time in 1969. So, it's an old technology. Uh they are simply new incarnations and new forms of of communication from this matrix of the network computer networks.
而正如我们所知,在过去,比如说二十年里,传播技术、组织形态和制度都发生了剧烈的转变。嗯,Caroline 刚才提到,人们以为属于未来的东西,其实在很多情况下在我看来是过去的东西。我提醒大家,互联网最早是在 1969 年部署的。所以它是一项很老的技术了。呃,它们只是这个计算机网络母体所衍生出的新化身、新的传播形式罢了。
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19:45
This transformation, uh which is multidimensional, has many aspects, and that's what is analyzed in my Communication Power book, but in one word, is the shift from mass communication to mass self-communication. Not that traditional mass communication disappeared, but it's also been reshaped by the new forms of mass communication, which are self-communication. They are mass because they can reach everywhere, like the traditional mass communication. But at the same time, these are networks that are multimodal, interactive, the messages can be self-directed, self-created, self-retrieved, and self-combined.
这场转变是多维度的,有很多方面,这也正是我在《传播力》那本书里所分析的,但一句话概括,就是从大众传播转向大众自传播。并不是说传统的大众传播消失了,而是它也被新的大众传播形式重新塑造了,也就是自传播。它们之所以是「大众的」,是因为它们能抵达任何地方,就像传统的大众传播一样。但与此同时,这些网络是多模态的、互动的,信息可以自我定向、自我创造、自我提取、自我组合。
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20:30
And since everybody does this, ultimately the network of communication becomes a multimodal, interactive, global-local communication network. This is mass self-communication. You can say it's internet plus mobile uh wireless communications. Now, the internet is basically all and will be increasingly so uh in wireless. Uh it's the combination of of of both that uh provides the technological basis in the broadest sense of the social structure of the what I defined time ago as the network society, but in more specific terms in relationship to the transformation of socialized communication, of communication that can reach everybody in society, is a deep transformation of this system. Now, counterpower has been organized around social mobilizations throughout history, always, which is what we usually call, at least I call it, and we can discuss it later, social movements, which are not necessarily with political targets, but they're social movements aiming at uh changing the values of society, the way
而既然人人都这么做,最终整个传播网络就变成了一个多模态、互动的全球—本地传播网络。这就是大众自传播。你可以说,它就是互联网加上移动的、呃,无线通信。如今,互联网基本上全都是,而且会越来越多地,呃,是无线的。呃,正是二者的结合,为我很久以前所定义的「网络社会」这一社会结构提供了最广义上的技术基础,但更具体地说,就与社会化传播的转变——也就是能触及社会中每一个人的传播的转变——而言,这是整个系统的一次深刻转型。那么,纵观历史,反权力始终是围绕社会动员来组织的,一直如此,也就是我们通常所说的,至少我是这么叫的,我们待会儿可以讨论,社会运动。它们未必以政治为目标,而是旨在,呃,改变社会的价值观、改变我们
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21:42
we think about everything. Um women movement, environmental movement, but in history, the movement for liberty, the movement the civil rights movement. Uh so, movements that are specifically aimed at changing the way we think things in society. And by the way, they can be of different political and ideological tonalities. They're not the good guys of the social movement, and again, the big bad wolf for the political system. No. Uh political system can be nice and evil. And the same thing for the social movements. And can be racist social movements, sexist social movements to restore patriarchalism, et cetera, et cetera, in both ways. It's simply an analytical distinction.
看待一切事物的方式的社会运动。嗯,女权运动、环保运动,但在历史上还有争取自由的运动、民权运动。呃,所以,这些运动特别针对的是改变我们在社会中思考事物的方式。而且顺便说一句,它们可以有不同的政治和意识形态色彩。并不是说社会运动就是好人,而政治体制就是那只大灰狼。不是的。呃,政治体制可以是好的,也可以是恶的。社会运动同样如此。可以有种族主义的社会运动、性别歧视的社会运动、要恢复父权制的运动,等等等等,两边都有。这只是一个分析上的区分而已。
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22:24
Now, from this point of view, what I'm going to analyze and present is the common patterns of social movements in the internet age, not that it's essential that they are in the internet age. It is essential that they use the internet and wireless communication platform. But, of course, this is not uh this is the the medium. This is not the cause, this is not the search, but it's important, has a specific consequences, and this is what I will try to show. Um attention, here I'm not normative. That's something that usually gets people enraged with me in my work and in my lectures that even if my sympathies are obvious although not very clear um they when I do my analysis when I do my research I take a huge analytical distance and I am not normative.
那么,从这个角度出发,我要分析和呈现的,是互联网时代社会运动的共同模式。并不是说它们处在互联网时代这一点是本质性的,本质性的是它们使用互联网和无线通信平台。但当然,这个,呃,这只是媒介。它不是原因,不是根源,但它很重要,会带来特定的后果,这正是我要试图展示的。嗯,注意,我在这里不做规范性判断。这一点通常会让人在我的著作和讲座中对我很恼火——即便我的同情倾向很明显,虽然也不算特别明确,嗯,但当我做分析、做研究的时候,我会拉开很大的分析距离,我不做价值评判。
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23:17
So regardless of my personal sympathy with some of these movements not with all uh please take it as an attempt to report back to you what I have found. And then we can discuss on that. And when when you will argue well but this is not right I will tell you what the movement would respond not what I will be responding. That's very important because as a person as a citizen I'm fully involved in society. As an analyst I am the the most traditional kind of academic trying to establish what I find in terms of the traditional practices of um scientific research whatever scientific means in every context.
所以,不管我个人对其中某些运动——不是全部——抱有怎样的同情,呃,请把这当作我努力向各位汇报我的发现。然后我们可以就此讨论。当你们说「可这不对啊」的时候,我会告诉你们这些运动会怎么回答,而不是我会怎么回答。这一点非常重要,因为作为一个人、作为一个公民,我完全投身于社会之中。而作为一个分析者,我是最传统的那类学者,努力按照传统的,嗯,科学研究的规范去确认我的发现——无论「科学」在各种语境下意味着什么。
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05运动的两个前提与情感机制
23:59
And so here is my report. Um social movements throughout history usually emerge from a combination of two things. The the deterioration the degradation of living conditions that make the life of people at one point unbearable. And on the other hand by the deep distrust vis-a-vis the political institutions that manage their lives. It's a combination of two. We are in trouble and people who should manage our lives are not responsive and they do their thing and not our thing. It's throughout history in every instance the two things.
那么,以下就是我的报告。嗯,纵观历史,社会运动通常源于两样东西的结合。一是生活条件的恶化、退化,让人们的生活在某个时刻变得无法忍受。另一方面,是对管理他们生活的政治机构的深深不信任。是这两者的结合。我们陷入困境,而那些本该管理我们生活的人却毫无回应,他们只做自己的事,不做我们的事。历史上每一个例子里,都是这两样东西。
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24:53
Um and we know that in the last years the two the two elements had concur in most of the world. We can later talk in the discussion about uh uh the different uh the state of affairs in in different parts of the world which should uh provide some nuance to this uh analysis. But fundamentally, this is the combination of of both. Um so, when this happens, that is life deteriorates or something outrageous happen, and then institutions are not responsive, then people take matters into their own hands.
嗯,而且我们知道,最近这些年,这两个因素在世界上大多数地方都同时出现了。我们待会儿讨论时可以谈谈,呃,呃,世界不同地区的,呃,不同状况,这应该能为这个,呃,分析增添一些细微差别。但从根本上说,就是这两者的结合。嗯,所以,当这种情况发生时——也就是生活恶化了,或者发生了某件令人愤慨的事,而机构又毫无回应——人们就会把事情掌握在自己手里。
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25:38
And by doing so, they quit the institutional avenues, the procedure institutionally defined to express their protest and to present their ideas and their projects. Well, this is risky behavior. Because the institutions are constructed to reward you when you follow the rules and to punish you when you don't. In many different ways, starting with uh delegitimizing all actions in the media, anarchists, terrorists, uh Nazis, whatever. So, not only repressing with the police, but repressing in the mind these irresponsible people who want to destroy democracy.
而这么做,就意味着他们放弃了制度化的渠道,放弃了制度所规定的、用来表达抗议、表达自己的想法和计划的程序。而这是一种冒险行为。因为制度的构建方式就是:你守规矩,它就奖赏你;你不守规矩,它就惩罚你。方式有很多种,首先就是在媒体上让你的一切行动失去正当性——说你们是无政府主义者、恐怖分子、呃,纳粹,随便什么。所以,不光是用警察镇压,还要在头脑中镇压这些想要摧毁民主的不负责任的人。
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26:25
They just forget to say that most people in the world think there's no democracy, and this includes the United States and Western Europe, with the exception usually of Scandinavia. All the data on the on the opinion polls of different sources of the last 10 years are in my book, and you can check it there. That's crisis of legitimacy in the traditional political science uh um analysis. Now, in the historical experience and in the movements that I have observed, social movements are emotional movements.
他们只是忘了说,世界上大多数人认为根本就不存在民主,这其中也包括美国和西欧,通常只有斯堪的纳维亚是例外。过去十年里来自不同来源的民意调查数据都在我书里,你们可以去查。这就是传统政治学,呃,嗯,分析中所说的合法性危机。那么,从历史经验以及我所观察到的这些运动来看,社会运动都是情感性的运动。
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27:04
They start with emotions. And here I connect with the most recent neuroscientific research, Antonio Damasio and others that show the fundamental role of emotions in triggering, shaping, organizing the human mind from their feelings follow and from their this more rational decision-making follow. But the at the root, emotions are fundamental. So, these social movements are not programmatic movements, are emotional movements that they start with emotions. Which kind of emotions? And here we have a whole uh field of research in political science and in political communication, uh which is uh associated with the uh all every every field of thought has a a little label. Well, the label of this one is uh the uh theory of affective intelligence. What would be in political communication, political science the equivalent of the emotional uh intelligence in psychology. Because all comes from the main source, the neuroscience as uh understanding emotions are the motivation of human behavior.
它们始于情感。在这一点上,我和最新的神经科学研究连接起来——安东尼奥·达马西奥等人的研究表明,情感在触发、塑造、组织人类心智方面起着根本性作用,感受由此而来,而更理性的决策又随之而来。但在根源上,情感是根本性的。所以,这些社会运动不是纲领性的运动,而是情感性的运动,它们始于情感。是哪一类情感呢?在这里,我们有政治学和政治传播学中一整个,呃,研究领域,呃,与之相关的,呃,每一个思想领域都有一个小标签。那么,这个领域的标签就是,呃,「情感智能理论」(affective intelligence)。也就是在政治传播学、政治学中,相当于心理学里「情绪智力」的那个东西。因为这一切都来自同一个主源头,神经科学——呃,把情感理解为人类行为的动机。
便签引用
28:10
Um so, in specific terms, what the theory of affective intelligence, on the basis of experimental psychology, experiments in in psychology, argue, this is not me, this I'm just incorporating a whole series of studies, argue that the trigger of social mobilization is anger, which is a psychologically defined emotion, and the repressor is fear. The repressor is fear. And by the way, in some interpretations of why fear is the most fundamental emotion of human life, this is not scientifically proven, but some of the psychologists play with that. Um, it's linked to evolutionary theory.
嗯,所以具体来说,情感智能理论基于实验心理学、基于心理学中的实验所主张的——这不是我说的,我只是整合了一整批研究——它主张,社会动员的触发器是愤怒,这是一种在心理学上被界定的情绪;而抑制器是恐惧。抑制器是恐惧。而且顺便说一句,在某些关于「为什么恐惧是人类生活中最根本的情绪」的解释里——这并没有得到科学证明,但有些心理学家喜欢这么玩儿。嗯,它和进化论有关。
便签引用
29:00
Why? Because we are all the successors, the heirs of cowards. Because those who didn't run fast enough because they were courageous, they were eaten up. And therefore, there's a selection of the species in which the more courageous you are, the less likely you are to survive, and the less likely your children and grandchildren uh will be there to exist. So, self-preservation is linked to cowardice, therefore to fear. And fear is the repression now, but this is not a fatality. Fear can be overcome and is overcome.
为什么呢?因为我们全都是胆小鬼的后代、继承者。因为那些因为勇敢而跑得不够快的人,都被吃掉了。因此,物种选择的结果就是:你越勇敢,你存活下来的可能性就越小,你的子孙后代,呃,能存在的可能性也越小。所以,自我保存与怯懦相连,因而也就与恐惧相连。而恐惧就是当下的那个抑制器,但这并不是宿命。恐惧是可以被克服的,而且确实被克服了。
便签引用
29:46
Fear triggers anxiety, which is uh associated with the avoidance of danger. But fear is overcome by sharing and identifying with others. I am trembling, but you are trembling, too. Let's hold hands. And you are trembling, too. Let's hold hands. And then becomes a circle. Why people hold hands in any social mobilization? Well, we are all trembling. And when we cannot uh hold hands in the street because the police comes too quickly, we hold hands in the internet. We get together in the internet. We share, we identify, and just by being together, not agreeing on anything, just agreeing on the anger.
恐惧引发焦虑,而焦虑,呃,与躲避危险相关联。但恐惧可以通过与他人分享、彼此认同而被克服。我在发抖,可你也在发抖。那我们手拉手吧。你也在发抖。那我们手拉手吧。然后就形成了一个圈。为什么人们在任何社会动员中都要手拉手?因为,我们都在发抖啊。而当我们没法在街头手拉手——因为警察来得太快——我们就在互联网上手拉手。我们在互联网上聚到一起。我们分享、我们彼此认同,仅仅是在一起,不需要在任何事情上达成一致,只需要在愤怒上达成一致。
便签引用
30:36
On the anger, not agreeing on a program, not voting for a party, just we are all angry. And then by sharing anger by sharing it together through togetherness fear is overcome. And when fear is overcome, then there is process of mobilization which then shifts again psychological research shifts to another very potent positive emotion, enthusiasm. So you go from anger that overcomes fear to then enthusiasm that things can be different. Hope. That's the title of my book, Outrage and Hope, the connection between the two.
在愤怒上,而不是在某个纲领上达成一致,也不是去给某个政党投票,只是我们都很愤怒。然后,通过分享愤怒、通过共处来分享它,恐惧就被克服了。而当恐惧被克服,动员的过程就开始了,这时——心理学研究再次表明——它会转向另一种非常强大的正面情绪,那就是热情。所以你从克服恐惧的愤怒,走向「事情可以变得不一样」的热情。也就是希望。这就是我那本书的书名,《愤怒与希望》,讲的就是二者之间的关联。
便签引用
31:26
Now this hope and this mobilization is organized from the very beginning through this sharing, through what people call communicative action. Meaning people communicate, they share, and then they share projects, they share enthusiasm, and they keep growing together building networks of communication. The recent transformation in the field of communication allow people to build autonomous communication in the internet networks. With much less, I wouldn't say not control, but much less control than ever in history on the part of the established powers, be political or economic or media corporations.
那么,这种希望和这种动员,从一开始就是通过这种分享来组织的,通过人们所说的「交往行动」来组织。也就是说,人们相互沟通、彼此分享,然后他们分享计划、分享热情,并不断一起成长,搭建起传播的网络。传播领域最近的转变,让人们能够在互联网网络中建立自主的传播。受到的控制少得多——我不能说完全没有控制,但比历史上任何时候来自既有权力方——不论是政治的、经济的还是媒体公司的——控制都要少得多。
便签引用
32:17
We can discuss later about that, but it's clear that even if the internet is still controlled and so on, in fact it's not. It's surveilled. Surveilled. What is the difference between control and surveil? Well, the important thing is to share the message and to build the networks. Uh if you are surveilled, what the repressors will find is who said that and then go and get it. But, the message goes. The message goes. So, if you are the messenger, that's a problem. But, if you are the message, you live forever. You don't care.
我们待会儿可以讨论这一点,但很清楚的是,即便说互联网仍然受到控制之类的,其实并没有。它是被监控着。被监控。那么控制和监控之间有什么区别呢?嗯,重要的是把信息传播出去,把网络建立起来。呃,如果你被监控了,镇压者找到的是谁说了这句话,然后去把那个人抓走。但是,信息传出去了。信息传出去了。所以,如果你是那个信使,那就麻烦了。但如果你就是那条信息本身,你就永远活着。你不在乎。
便签引用
32:56
And therefore, therefore, there's communicative autonomy built into the new system, which therefore can form and reform networks constantly by the simple ability of these networks to reprogram themselves. So, movements that I have studied and those that are similar and are around the world come from this pattern. Come from crisis of um the economy, crisis of legitimacy simultaneously, outrage provoked by unjust actions, um and at the same time, they are able to form quickly and autonomously in the internet networks, and then they go into collective action.
因此,正因如此,新的体系里内建了一种传播上的自主性,所以这些网络能够不断地形成和重组,靠的就是它们自我重新编程的这种简单能力。所以,我研究过的那些运动,以及世界各地类似的运动,都源自这种模式。源自经济危机、同时发生的合法性危机、不公正行为激起的愤怒,与此同时,他们能够在互联网络里迅速地、自主地组织起来,然后走向集体行动。
便签引用
33:46
They require an emotional mobilization triggered by outrage and by hope of a possible change. I would argue that more and more this type of movements represent the emergence of a new pattern of social which I call in the internet age because they could not take place without the internet in this particular form. Again, it's not as caused by the internet, but their shape is caused by the by by the internet as, let's say, the working class movement in the 19th century could not have formed without the process of industrialization and the connection to large-scale assembly factories where the working class was materially formed in addition to the pubs where the movement then could be connected. So, the factories were the the moments of formation of the networks and the pubs were the moments of hope toward the future.
它们需要一种情绪上的动员,由愤怒触发,也由对可能的改变的希望所触发。我想说的是,这类运动越来越代表着一种新的社会运动模式的出现,我把它称为互联网时代的社会运动,因为如果没有互联网,它们不可能以这种特定的形式出现。再强调一次,这并不是说互联网造成了它们,而是说它们的形态是由互联网塑造的,就像,打个比方,19世纪的工人阶级运动如果没有工业化进程,就不可能形成,也离不开大规模流水线工厂的连结——工人阶级正是在那里被物质性地塑造出来的,此外还有酒馆,运动在那里才得以串联起来。所以,工厂是网络形成的场所,而酒馆则是孕育对未来希望的场所。
便签引用
06网络化、无领袖、根茎式结构
34:48
There are a number of characteristics of these movements of all these countries of what what I have studied. So, rather than giving you a nice anecdote from here and there, which we can do later if you resist till the end of the discussion, I am going to synthesize what I have found that is common in all cases. And look, we are talking about Tunisia. We are talking I did not talk about Iran in this book, but the 2009 movement in Iran was quite similar. We're talking about Tunisia and Iceland. Nothing could be more different.
我研究过的这些国家的这些运动,有一系列共同特征。所以,与其东一个西一个地给你们讲些有趣的轶事——如果你们能坚持到讨论结束,我们稍后可以聊——我打算把我发现的、在所有案例中都共通的东西综合起来讲。你看,我们说的是突尼斯。我们说的——这本书里我没有谈伊朗,但2009年伊朗的那场运动其实相当类似。我们说的是突尼斯,也是冰岛。再没有比这两个更不一样的了。
便签引用
35:25
But there are common patterns. We're talking about Spain and and and the United States. We're talking about Chile. We're talking about England. Now, the intensity of the movements, the success of the movements, and the outcomes of the movement are very different. But the pattern is very similar. Why similar? First of all, and I'm going to give you my my laundry list about the different aspects that together form a pattern. They are network, of course. They are network first, always first in the internet.
但它们有共同的模式。我们说的是西班牙,还有美国。我们说的是智利。我们说的是英国。当然,这些运动的强度、成败以及最终结果都非常不同。但模式非常相似。为什么相似?首先,我要给你们列一份清单,讲讲那些共同构成一种模式的不同方面。它们当然是网络化的。它们首先是网络,而且总是首先在互联网上。
便签引用
35:58
Uh because is the space of communicative autonomy where they can form and organize and emerge from this chaotic system of outrage and so that people without often knowing each other get together in the network. The most important case is Egypt in which the 2008 mobilization in traditional terms uh was crushed before it could emerge. While in 2011, uh they they started in the internet following the example of Tunisia and they form in the internet on a large scale a critical scale before going into the streets before going into demonstrations.
呃,因为互联网是传播自主性的空间,它们可以在那里形成、组织,并从这个混乱的愤怒体系中浮现出来,于是那些往往彼此并不认识的人在网络里聚到了一起。最典型的案例是埃及:2008年那场以传统方式进行的动员,呃,还没冒头就被镇压下去了。而2011年,呃,他们效仿突尼斯,从互联网上开始,在互联网上形成了大规模的、达到临界点的规模,然后才走上街头,走向示威。
便签引用
36:46
Um so they form first in communication networks. Why? Because communication networks have always been at the search of social movements right history. Would be pamphlet would be preachers from the church or from the mosque uh where could be later on radio, television. Communication has always been at the center of social movement because only by people getting together in their minds they can act together. Otherwise, they are already parcel organized institutionalized controlled by the institutions of society.
嗯,所以它们首先在传播网络中形成。为什么?因为纵观历史,传播网络一直都处在社会运动的核心位置。可能是传单,可能是教堂或清真寺里的布道者,呃,后来也可能是广播、电视。传播一直是社会运动的核心,因为只有当人们在思想上聚到一起,他们才能一起行动。否则,他们就已经被切割、被组织、被制度化、被社会的各种机构所掌控了。
便签引用
37:26
However, the networking even if it always starts in internet or in some cases in the mobile phone networks. Um which of course more and more is the same thing than the internet but is both things at the same time. Um but even so the networking form is multimodal. It includes social networks online and offline as well as pre-existing social networks, family networks, friends networks and very important in the case of the Arab countries soccer club networks, fans networks very important. Remember why unfortunately a few months ago in Port Said a police provocation killed the the the many literally hundreds of fans the Al Ahly the Cairo the Cairo soccer team because the Al Ahly fan networks have actually been decisive at the beginning of the revolution.
不过,这种网络化,即便总是从互联网开始,有些情况下是从移动电话网络开始。嗯,当然,移动网络越来越和互联网是一回事,但它同时又是两种东西。呃,即便如此,这种网络化的形式是多模态的。它既包括线上也包括线下的社会网络,还包括既有的社会网络、家庭网络、朋友网络,而在阿拉伯国家的案例里非常重要的是足球俱乐部的网络、球迷网络,非常重要。还记得吗,很不幸,几个月前在塞得港,一场警方的挑衅害死了成百上千名球迷——阿赫利,开罗的开罗足球队的球迷,因为阿赫利的球迷网络在革命之初其实起到了决定性作用。
便签引用
38:24
Connected through the internet, but once the thing were in the street, the soccer fan network. So, everything that is network meaning what? Connection between individuals, not organizations, not banners, not flags, not parties, no leaders, networks. People connecting to each other, trusting each other. Um Moreover, networks are within the movement with other movements around the world, with the internet blogosphere, with the media, and with society at large. Networking technologies are essential because they provide the platform for a continuing extensive networking practice that evolves with the changing shape of the movement. The movement evolves, the networks in the internet evolve easily without anything to be decided or agreed upon.
他们通过互联网连接起来,但一旦事情走上街头,靠的就是足球球迷网络。所以,一切都是网络化的——这意味着什么?意味着个体与个体之间的连接,不是组织,不是横幅,不是旗帜,不是政党,没有领袖,就是网络。人们彼此连接,彼此信任。嗯,而且,这些网络存在于运动内部,也连接着世界各地的其他运动、互联网上的博客圈、媒体,以及整个社会。网络技术至关重要,因为它们提供了平台,让一种持续而广泛的网络化实践得以进行,并随着运动形态的变化而演变。运动在演变,互联网上的网络也轻松地跟着演变,不需要任何人拍板或达成一致。
便签引用
39:20
Moreover, they do not need a formal leadership and no command and control center. They or they organize themselves in in terms of the decision. There's no anyone who would say, "Do that." It would be debated in the networks. And when things go, go where the network goes. Again, fundamental uh characteristic. This decentered structure maximizes chances of participation in the movement because they are open-ended networks. You don't need a membership card, you don't need to agree on anything. You go into the debate and you go in certain mobilizations and not in others depending on how you connect to the network.
而且,它们不需要正式的领导层,也没有指挥控制中心。它们,或者说它们在决策上是自我组织的。没有任何人会说:“去做那个。”事情会在网络里被讨论。事情推进的时候,就跟着网络走。再说一次,这是一个根本性的,呃,特征。这种去中心的结构最大化了参与运动的机会,因为它们是开放式的网络。你不需要会员卡,你不需要在任何事情上达成一致。你参与讨论,你参加某些动员而不参加另一些,取决于你怎么连接到这个网络。
便签引用
40:01
It also reduces the vulnerability of the movement to the threats of repression because how you kill a network? You kill one node in the network, the characteristic of the network they reproduce themselves. They have a biological logic. They keep going. You cut a node, there are many other nodes. That's why I have proposed the term that these are rhizomatic revolutions. They are rhizomes. They are underground, they emerge. They They go down, but they all are connected all the time. And sometimes emerging in the net, sometimes not, sometimes going to the squares, sometimes going to political mobilization, et cetera.
这也降低了运动面对镇压威胁时的脆弱性,因为你怎么杀死一个网络呢?你杀掉网络里的一个节点,而网络的特性就是它们会自我再生。它们有一种生物学的逻辑。它们会继续运转。你切掉一个节点,还有许许多多别的节点。这就是为什么我提出了一个说法:这些是根茎式的革命。它们是根茎,它们潜伏在地下,然后冒出来。它们又沉下去,但它们始终都是彼此相连的。有时在网上冒头,有时不冒头,有时走上广场,有时转向政治动员,等等。
便签引用
07占领城市空间与自主空间
40:43
Moreover, networking of the movement protects the movement not only against repression, but against its own threats of bureaucratization and manipulation. Anyone trying to uh manipulate or assume the leadership of the movement with no one telling him or her about that is immediately flamed. No survival. The more you want to be a leader, the less you will be a leader. The more people will kill you. On the net. Second, while they start in the internet, they become a movement by occupying the urban space.
而且,运动的网络化不仅保护运动免受镇压,也保护它免受自身官僚化和被操纵的威胁。任何人如果没跟大家商量就想去,呃,操纵运动或自任领袖,立刻就会被群起而攻之。活不下来。你越想当领袖,你就越当不成领袖。越多人会把你干掉。在网上。第二点,虽然它们从互联网开始,但它们是通过占领城市空间才成为一场运动的。
便签引用
41:23
They always go into the urban space. Why? There are a couple of things. First, the togetherness, which is fundamental, requires at some point the most direct expression of emotional bonding. You touch the other. In the net, you connect, but you don't still touch the other. But when you are together, when you share the danger, and when you share space, when you share a new form of being together in the city, then something else happen. There is a moment of psychological and personal transformation.
它们总是会走进城市空间。为什么?有这么几个原因。首先,那种“在一起”的感觉,这是根本性的,它在某个时刻需要情感联结最直接的表达。你触碰到了对方。在网上,你连接上了,但你还是没有触碰到对方。但当你们在一起,当你们共担危险,当你们共享空间,当你们在城市里共同创造出一种新的共处方式,那时就会发生别的事情。那是一个心理上、个人层面上发生蜕变的时刻。
便签引用
42:04
Moreover, if you are in the urban space, anyone can join by just going there. Even disagreeing with the discussions, with the goals, with everything, but you don't have to agree on anything. Just by being there, you're part of the movement. Simply by being there. So, it's literally open-ended in in that sense. And then the problems start. Some people join for the opposite reason that why other were, as you know, one part of the Tea Party movement in the United States joined movement that fundamentally was more on the democratic side when But both they share the same thing. They share the rejection of traditional political institutions. So, in that sense, that's why I say it depends on your opinion if if you are for these movements or not, but the movements are such autonomous, potent, and sharing certain projects.
而且,如果你在城市空间里,任何人只要走过去就能加入。哪怕不认同那些讨论、不认同那些目标、什么都不认同,但你不需要在任何事上达成一致。只要你在那里,你就是运动的一部分。仅仅因为你在那里。所以从这个意义上说,它真的是开放式的。然后问题就来了。有些人加入的理由,恰恰和另一些人的理由相反,你们知道,美国茶党运动的一部分人加入了一场本质上更偏民主派一边的运动,但两边有一个共同点。他们都拒斥传统的政治体制。所以从这个意义上说,这就是为什么我说,你支不支持这些运动取决于你的观点,但这些运动就是如此自主、有力,并共享着某些诉求。
便签引用
43:02
The other reason why movement need urban space is because since they don't have a form of institutional action, they have to exist in society by being there, by being visible, visible for the media, visible for society, and also by challenging institutions. If you say I cannot occupy this space and I occupy this space, well, you can send the police, but you have to acknowledge that something is going on in terms of the protest of society. That's what tactically speaking in all these movements, they always have a simple norm. If we are 20, they're going to kill us. If we are 2,000, much less. And if we are 20,000, they will let us quiet as long as we're 20,000.
运动需要城市空间的另一个原因是,既然它们没有一种体制化的行动形式,它们就必须通过身处其中、通过被看见而存在于社会之中——被媒体看见,被社会看见,同时也通过挑战各种制度。如果有人说我不能占领这块空间,而我偏偏占领了,好吧,你可以派警察来,但你必须承认,社会的抗议正在发生某种变化。这就是为什么从策略上讲,在所有这些运动里,他们都有一条简单的准则:如果我们只有20个人,他们会把我们干掉。如果我们有2000个人,就好得多。如果我们有20000个人,只要我们保持着两万人的规模,他们就会由着我们。
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43:47
Um so, there is the capacity to challenge society. Uh it's um it's a different it's a different form when goes through physical occupation. The space that is organized between this autonomy of this internet networks and the autonomy of urban space occupied by this movement. That is space is a form what I call a third space which I call the space of autonomy. Space of autonomy in the networks, the state the the space of autonomy in the communities that are formed locally. This space of autonomy is the form of existence of the new social movements.
嗯,所以,这里存在着挑战社会的能力。呃,这,嗯,这是一种不同的形式,当它通过实体占领来实现的时候。在互联网络的这种自主性和被这场运动占领的城市空间的自主性之间,被组织起来的那个空间——那个空间是一种形式,我称之为第三空间,我把它叫做自主的空间。网络中的自主空间,以及在本地形成的社群中的自主空间。这种自主的空间,就是新社会运动的存在形式。
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08本地又全球,自发且病毒式
44:33
Thirdly, these movements are all local and global at the same time. They they rise for local condition, local cultures, local values in in their own terms, in their own language, and rooted into the specific conditions that provoke their outrage. They have different faiths. They they have different political orientation. They have different relationship to gender, to class, to race, etc. They're local. But at the same time, they immediately connect to the world. And they immediately bring problems of the world into their discussion, into their debates. They're both things at the same time. They're local and global as the internet. Internet is local and global.
第三,这些运动同时既是本地的,又是全球的。它们因本地的状况、本地的文化、本地的价值观而兴起,用它们自己的方式、自己的语言,深深扎根于激起它们愤怒的那些具体境况之中。它们有不同的信仰。它们,它们有不同的政治取向。它们对性别、对阶级、对种族等等的态度也各不相同。它们是本地的。但与此同时,它们立刻就与世界连接起来。它们立刻把世界性的问题带进自己的讨论、自己的辩论中。它们同时是这两者。它们既是本地的又是全球的,就像互联网一样。互联网是本地的,也是全球的。
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45:18
These movements are local and global. In terms of their genesis, these movements are largely spontaneous in their origin. Usually, they are triggered by a spark of indignation. That's the name of the Spanish movement, the Indignants. People are indignated for by something. In some cases, uh in the cases of the Arab revolutions, self-immolation, repression, savagery from the dictatorship, the case of Syria, uh 19 children younger than 12, sorry, younger than 14 being tortured for having having given a graffiti. That's how it started the Syrian revolution.
这些运动既是本地的,也是全球的。就起源而言,这些运动在源头上很大程度上是自发的。通常,它们是由一个愤慨的火花引燃的。这就是西班牙那场运动的名字,“愤怒者”运动。人们因为某件事而感到愤慨。在某些情况下,比如在阿拉伯革命中,是自焚,是镇压,是独裁政权的野蛮行径;叙利亚的情况是19个不到12岁——抱歉,是不到14岁的孩子,因为写了涂鸦而遭到酷刑。叙利亚革命就是这样开始的。
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45:59
Um In other cases, like in in in Europe or in many countries in Europe, Spain, certainly the United States, is indignation against the behavior not so much of the financial elite, but of the political elite being subservient to the financial elite. The obvious thing in the United States, they say the banks, not us. That's the typical thing. Uh there are solid opinion polls that yes, the people consider that in America, 47% of the people are against the the financial executives and consider them responsible from uh for the economic crisis. But when asked about the relative responsibility between government of all political orientations and bankers, say government.
嗯,在另一些情况下,比如在欧洲,或者欧洲的很多国家、西班牙,当然还有美国,人们的愤慨与其说是针对金融精英的行为,不如说是针对政治精英屈从于金融精英。在美国最明显的一点是,他们说,是银行干的,不是我们。这是典型的说法。有不少可靠的民意调查显示,在美国,47%的人反对金融高管,认为他们要为这场经济危机负责。但当被问到各种政治派别的政府和银行家之间,谁的责任更大时,他们会说政府。
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46:50
Government. Because government was supposed to protect us. And in fact, they protect the bankers against us. And that's where the indignation comes. And that's why there is a reaction linked to the economic crisis both in Europe and the United States. The financial crisis has meant for people of all persuasions, the bankers have the governments in their pocket. They ruin the world. They ruin the economy. They control everything. And when they are in trouble, they are bailed out with our money. And this goes from Greece to Ohio.
是政府。因为政府本该保护我们。可事实上,政府保护的是银行家,而不是我们。愤慨就是从这里来的。这也是为什么在欧洲和美国,都出现了与经济危机相关的反应。这场金融危机让各种立场的人都感到:银行家把政府装进了自己的口袋。他们毁掉了世界,毁掉了经济。他们控制着一切。而当他们陷入麻烦时,却用我们的钱去纾困。从希腊到俄亥俄,都是如此。
便签引用
47:24
These movements are viral. They follow the logic of the internet networks. First because of the virality of messages in the internet and particularly images. Images have a tremendous viral effect. People talk a lot about Facebook and Twitter, etc. The most important social network in the internet in terms of the impact and more than YouTube. Because the power of the images that everybody can generate, citizen journalism, remember. Uh you have anybody can with a cell phone immediately record an image, make a video, upload it, and seeing people like you being massacred, being brutalized, being in the right state, being pepper gas in your eyes for doing nothing. In other countries, just machine gunned down.
这些运动是病毒式传播的。它们遵循互联网网络的逻辑。首先是因为信息在互联网上的病毒式传播,尤其是图像。图像有着极强的病毒式传播效果。人们经常谈论Facebook、Twitter等等。但就影响力而言,互联网上最重要的社交网络,莫过于YouTube。因为人人都能生成图像的力量——记得吗,公民新闻。任何人都可以用一部手机立刻拍下一张照片、拍一段视频、上传出去,让大家看到跟你一样的人被屠杀、被残暴对待、明明什么都没做,却被喷了胡椒喷雾。在另一些国家,人们干脆被机枪扫射。
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09商议民主与非暴力之争
48:14
Um but depending on every context, people immediately become indignant. The more there is a violent repression, the more there is support for the movement. There's more fear, but more support at the same time. The transition from outrage to hope is accomplished in all movements by deliberation in the space of autonomy. There is indignation, there is outrage, but then when people construct their space of autonomy, meaning both in the internet and the occupied space, they start debating. Why so? What can we do?
嗯,但根据各自的语境不同,人们会立刻变得愤慨。镇压越是暴力,对运动的支持就越多。恐惧更多了,但支持也同时更多了。从愤怒到希望的转变,在所有这些运动中,都是通过在自主空间里的商议来完成的。有愤慨,有怒火,但当人们构建起自己的自主空间时——既是在互联网上,也是在被占领的空间里——他们就开始辩论。为什么会这样?我们能做什么?
便签引用
48:52
Deliberation in the traditional Habermasian sense. The traditional Habermasian sense just does not happen in the parliament. Happens in the civil society. Horizontal networks, both in the internet and the urban space, create this togetherness that I was mentioning about, and the horizontality of networks supports cooperation and solidarity with while undermining the need for formal leadership. Now, here is one point. These movements have been considered to be very ineffective. They debate for hours, for days about what to do, a little thing.
传统哈贝马斯意义上的商议。传统哈贝马斯意义上的商议,在议会里根本不会发生。它发生在公民社会里。横向网络,既存在于互联网上,也存在于城市空间中,创造出我刚才提到的那种共同体感,而网络的横向性支持了合作与团结,同时削弱了对正式领导层的需求。这里有一点要说。人们认为这些运动非常没有效率。他们为一件小事就能辩论几个小时,甚至好几天。
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49:37
So, they are ineffective. Well, except that they are asking them to be effective on a logic that is not theirs. Uh because the fact that they everything can be challenged means that everybody feels that there are no bosses there. That they can be there and talk and contribute. And yes, grassroots deliberate democracy is very slow and very painful. Uh and many people get fed up. But they have tried our societies, they have tried in the last years every other possible avenue. Give me a leader, give me a program, we go. Well, we go usually doesn't work and when it works um it ends up in institutional blockage. But very important, these movements are extremely critical from traditional radical politics.
所以他们没效率。但问题在于,人们是在用一套不属于他们的逻辑来要求他们有效率。因为一切都可以被质疑,这意味着每个人都觉得那里没有老板,他们可以在场、可以发言、可以贡献。没错,草根式的商议民主非常缓慢,也非常痛苦。很多人会受不了。但我们的社会在过去这些年里,已经把其他所有可能的路都试过了。给我一个领袖,给我一个纲领,我们就上路。可是我们上路了通常也没用,就算有用,最后也会陷入制度性的僵局。但很重要的一点是,这些运动对传统的激进政治极为批判。
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50:30
From particular from left wing of left wing kind, Trotskyite, formal anarchists, organized anarchists who by definition they organize they're not anarchists, that's the point. Uh they are extremely critical of of all these groups because they say, "Well, they keep repeating the I the the revolutionary mantra for ever and nothing happens. Um so and they are organizing the revolution but in their minds, in their homes, but nothing happens in society. So, let's just see together what we can do." No ideology except the ideology of not having ideology, which is not an ideology of course.
尤其是对左翼中的那类左派:托洛茨基派、形式上的无政府主义者、有组织的无政府主义者——顾名思义,既然他们搞组织,那就不是无政府主义者了,这正是问题所在。他们对所有这些团体都极为批判,因为他们说:“这些人一直在重复革命的咒语,重复了一辈子,什么也没发生。他们是在组织革命,但只在自己脑子里、在自己家里组织,社会上什么都没发生。所以,我们不如一起看看我们能做点什么。”没有意识形态,除了“不要意识形态”这种意识形态——当然那并不算是一种意识形态。
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51:08
But it's a different one. Less formalized and less blocking. They are highly self-reflective. They keep all the time asking themselves, "What What do we want? Who we are? How we can contribute or not contribute?" They are endless debates and endless proposals. There's a flurry of every possible proposal. People in Valencia, I have seen in the Barcelona occupation the some of the most sophisticated discussion about Heidegger. Heidegger and the revolution, Heidegger and democracy. By the way, people in these movements are usually much more educated than the average of society.
那是另一种东西。更少形式化,也更少造成僵局。他们高度自我反思。他们不断地问自己:“我们想要什么?我们是谁?我们能贡献什么,或者不能贡献什么?”他们有没完没了的辩论和没完没了的提案。各种各样的提案层出不穷。瓦伦西亚的人们——我在巴塞罗那的占领行动中见过——就有一些关于海德格尔的极其复杂精深的讨论。海德格尔与革命,海德格尔与民主。顺便说一句,参与这些运动的人,通常受教育程度比社会平均水平高得多。
便签引用
51:48
And some people say, "Well, that's a problem. So, this is not a real working-class guy." Well, that's insulting the working-class guy. Um but but in addition, well, it's what happens is that some people debate at the very high levels, self-reflected, but if you have not read Plato, you still can say your thing and will be discussed and will be integrated into the debate and into the proposal. Now, in their origin, they are all non-violent movements. And I emphasize that because this is absolutely critical.
有人会说:“这不就是问题所在吗?这可不是真正的工人阶级。”这么说其实是在侮辱工人阶级。但除此之外,实际情况是,有些人是在非常高的层次上辩论,非常自我反思;可就算你没读过柏拉图,你照样可以说出你的想法,它会被讨论,也会被吸纳进辩论和提案之中。再说,就起源而言,它们全都是非暴力运动。我要强调这一点,因为这绝对是关键。
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52:26
Um including in the Arab revolutions. We are now horrified by the civil war in Libya, um first and then now in Syria. Well, the Syrian movement started as a absolutely peaceful movement for months and months and months. In which they were massive Before there was any armed resistance in Syria, over 7,000 people had been killed in peaceful demonstrations in the streets. Yes, at one point, if they keep massacring you, there is a moment in which people cannot overcome that. But by not overcoming that, and this has been debated many times in the movement, you destroy yourself, even if you win.
包括阿拉伯革命在内。我们现在对利比亚的内战感到震惊,先是利比亚,现在是叙利亚。可是,叙利亚的运动一开始是一场完全和平的运动,持续了好几个月、好几个月。在叙利亚出现任何武装抵抗之前,已经有超过7000人在和平示威中被杀害。是的,到了某个时刻,如果他们一直屠杀你,人们是没法一直忍下去的。但如果跨不过这一关——这在运动内部已经被反复辩论过——你就会毁掉自己,哪怕你赢了。
便签引用
53:12
Why? Because who are going to win? The peaceful demonstrators, the civil society? No. The people financed by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, who organize the Free Syrian Army in the Sunni-Shia debate in the Middle East. Okay? So, then yes, you can overthrow Assad. But but who is overthrowing Assad? And they lose and then they start fracturing and then they say they they lose the the the legitimacy among large segments of the population. At the same time, it's logical. It's normal. I'm just saying when a social movement goes from social movement democratic nonviolent social movement to a contending faction in a civil war even if you win the civil war, you have lost already your existence as a social movement. But it's very difficult to just keep the nonviolence And in every country, the debate about violence and nonviolence is fundamental because nonviolence means heroic resistance in the long term. Violence means losing the legitimacy in the society in the short term.
为什么?因为赢的会是谁呢?是和平示威者吗?是公民社会吗?不是。是那些由沙特阿拉伯、卡塔尔资助的人,是他们在中东逊尼派与什叶派之争中组建了“自由叙利亚军”。对吧?所以是的,你可以推翻阿萨德。但推翻阿萨德的究竟是谁?于是他们输了,然后开始分裂,然后他们就在大部分人口中失去了正当性。同时,这也合乎逻辑,这很正常。我只是想说,当一场社会运动从民主的、非暴力的社会运动,变成内战中的一个交战派别时,哪怕你赢了内战,你作为一场社会运动的存在已经输掉了。但要坚持非暴力又非常困难。在每个国家,关于暴力与非暴力的辩论都至关重要,因为非暴力意味着长期的英勇抵抗,而暴力意味着在短期内失去社会中的正当性。
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10没有纲领的民主实验与乌托邦
54:27
Movements are also rarely programmatic. They are not programmatic. They don't have a program. In other words, they have thousand programs. You know, everybody has an idea. And many commissions and many committees elaborate programs. I I In Spain, I participated in elaborating a reform of the electoral law, which is one of the most important things because all the laws in in all the countries are pipe. They're They're made in the interest of the parties who wrote the law, not in the interest of democracy. This crazy thing about the American Electoral College from the medieval institutions of the United States makes everybody crazy who the notion of one person one vote is not respected anywhere. Well, yes, one country, Israel. And that's interesting.
这些运动也很少是纲领性的。它们不是纲领性的。它们没有纲领。换句话说,它们有一千个纲领。你知道,人人都有个想法。很多委员会、很多小组都在起草方案。在西班牙,我参与起草过一份选举法改革方案,这是最重要的事情之一,因为所有国家的这类法律都很糟糕。它们是按照写法律的那些政党的利益制定的,而不是按照民主的利益。美国那套源自中世纪制度的选举人团的荒唐东西,简直让人抓狂——“一人一票”的原则在任何地方都没有被真正遵守。嗯,有一个国家算是,以色列。这很有意思。
便签引用
55:15
That's interesting. Direct proportionality. Then political scientists in the etc. Well, it's ineffective. How everybody can have an opinion. We have to consolidate blocks. Yeah, you can do that. It's very effective, but you lose the people. And in the in the case of Greece, if you want a blatant example uh in the last Greek election that the entire European establishment pushed to vote for the two large parties uh, the conservative party that won the election got 30% of the vote. The opposing left party got 28% of the vote.
这很有意思。直接比例代表制。然后政治学家之类的人就会说:这没效率,怎么能人人都有意见呢,我们得整合成几个大的板块。是啊,你可以那么做,那非常有效率,但你会失去民众。以希腊为例,如果你想要一个赤裸裸的例子:在上一次希腊大选中,整个欧洲建制派都在施压,让人们投票给两大政党。赢得选举的保守党拿到了30%的选票,对立的左翼政党拿到了28%的选票。
便签引用
55:54
But why then they got absolute majority in the conservative party? Because a little clause in the in the um Greek law says that in a parliament of 300 people the the the party that wins by one vote gets 50 seats more than allocated by the proportional vote, okay? So again and again and again. So uh, the the reaction is that um first we have to um change uh, the the power structure before any program can be implemented. And in the meantime uh, there are so many proposals on every aspect of life. And one of the most potent movements in Europe has been for agroecological food.
但为什么保守党却拿到了绝对多数席位?因为希腊法律里有一条小条款规定,在一个300人的议会里,哪怕只多赢一票的那个政党,也会比按比例分配多拿50个席位,明白吗?就这样一次又一次。所以,他们的反应是:在任何纲领能够实施之前,我们首先必须改变权力结构。而与此同时,关于生活的方方面面,涌现出了大量的提案。欧洲最有力量的运动之一,是关于生态农业食品的运动。
便签引用
56:42
The inside the movement uh, and trying to practice in the movement new principles of agroecology, people cannot eat whatever they want. Um, they they have to debate before uh, distributing food of any kind. Um but overall what they are in essence in terms of the program, they're not programmatic in the sense they don't have any specific program. They are fundamentally democratic movements. The most important thing is the search for democracy. A new form of democracy, but not in a program, but in a practice. Practicing this kind of democracy and experimenting with it to see what it is. What is grassroots democracy? What is the they are not challenging representative democracy in the traditional term. They are saying, you know, this representative democracy does not represent.
在运动内部,他们试图在运动中实践生态农业的新原则,人们不能想吃什么就吃什么。他们在分发任何食物之前,都必须先辩论。但总体而言,就纲领而言,它们本质上不是纲领性的,也就是说它们没有任何具体的纲领。它们从根本上说是民主的运动。最重要的是对民主的追寻。一种新形式的民主,但不是体现在纲领里,而是体现在实践中。实践这种民主,并通过试验去看看它到底是什么。什么是草根民主?他们所谓的……他们并不是在传统意义上挑战代议制民主。他们说的是,你知道,这种代议制民主并没有真正代表人民。
便签引用
57:35
Um the norms of representation are biased, are changed. Uh the principle is to complement this democracy which is They They don't use the traditional Marxist term formal democracy, bourgeois democracy. No, no, no, no. They say representative democracy is okay, it's just not representative. And therefore we have to invent new forms of democracy through through what people call network democracy, which of course is nice and easy to to say and try to find it in the in the uh in the debates, in the assemblies, the local assemblies, but uh no one knows what it is.
嗯,代表性的规范是有偏差的,是被扭曲的。他们的原则是补充这种民主,也就是……他们并不使用传统马克思主义的说法,什么形式民主、资产阶级民主。不,不,不,不。他们说代议制民主没问题,只是它没有真正代表人民。所以我们必须通过人们所说的网络民主,来发明新的民主形式,当然,这个说法说起来很好听、很轻松,你可以试着在各种辩论里、在大会上、在地方的大会上去找它,但是,没人知道它到底是什么。
便签引用
58:10
Uh but you know what it is? It's a utopia. It's utopian. And people say, so what? Uh utopias are not fantasies, are not the stupidities. Utopias are ideas about how the world should be. And how the political world should be. And utopias are material force because utopias take over the minds and the minds can generate new proposals. All major political ideologies and political systems had been utopias. Liberalism is a utopia. Uh communism is a utopia. Anarchism is a utopia. Socialism in the traditional sense of socialism is a utopia. Utopias are the matrixes of what happens then in real life to a number of intermediations, to a number of negotiations between what people want and what really happen in society.
不过你知道它是什么吗?它是一种乌托邦。它是乌托邦式的。然后人们会说,那又怎样?乌托邦不是幻想,不是蠢话。乌托邦是关于世界应该是什么样子的想法。以及政治世界应该是什么样子。而且乌托邦是一种物质力量,因为乌托邦会占据人的头脑,而头脑能催生新的方案。所有重大的政治意识形态和政治制度,最初都曾是乌托邦。自由主义是乌托邦。共产主义是乌托邦。无政府主义是乌托邦。传统意义上的社会主义也是乌托邦。乌托邦是母体,现实生活中发生的一切都由它衍生出来,经过种种中介、种种协商——在人们想要什么和社会中真正发生什么之间不断博弈。
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11运动与政治变革:冰岛与 1%
59:09
And this lead me to final point on what is the connection then between political change and these social movements. Well, social movements per se are not political movements, although they are very political, you see. Uh in in which sense? They are not trying to seize the state. No one thinks to transform into political party and seize the state. When they do that, become a political party and that's a different thing. Uh, they are trying to transform consciousness. To through this transformation of consciousness, through this awareness or this deliberation, then they expect that at some point citizens will change differently the forms of the state.
这就把我引向最后一点:政治变革和这些社会运动之间到底是什么关系。嗯,社会运动本身并不是政治运动,尽管它们非常具有政治性,你看。在什么意义上呢?它们并不试图夺取国家政权。没有人想着要变成一个政党去夺取国家政权。一旦他们那么做,就变成了一个政党,那就是另一回事了。呃,他们想要改变的是意识。通过这种意识的转变,通过这种觉醒或者这种商议,他们期待在某个时刻,公民会以不同的方式改变国家的形态。
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59:53
Crazy? Well, no. Iceland? Yeah, 330,000 people. Uh, but not exactly idiots. Um, they Iceland Iceland, uh, Iceland as you know, um, not only brought down the the entire government coalition that had been governing since 1927, one party or the other. And brought in a eco-social democrat coalition that was always marginal, brought into the government. Uh, but not only that, they reform the economy, they nationalize the banks, they sent to jail all the bankers, they put on trial the prime minister, and moreover, they crowd-sourced a new constitution over the internet. 16,000 people participated and they now have a new constitution crowd-sourced on the internet. Not that this is the end of of Iceland, but it's it's something there.
疯狂吗?其实,不。冰岛?是啊,33万人。但也不全是傻瓜。嗯,他们……冰岛,你知道的,嗯,冰岛不仅推翻了整个执政联盟——那个自1927年以来一直轮流执政的、这个党或那个党组成的政府。而且把一个一直处于边缘的生态社会民主派联盟送进了政府。而且不止如此,他们还改革了经济,把银行国有化,把所有银行家送进了监狱,把总理送上了法庭,更重要的是,他们通过互联网众包了一部新宪法。有1.6万人参与,现在他们有了一部在互联网上众包出来的新宪法。倒不是说冰岛的故事就此完结,但确实是有点名堂的。
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1:00:51
Um, and by the way, the Icelandic economy is the best performing economy in Europe uh, nowadays, better than Germany. According to all the rating agencies, you better uh, trust the sovereign debt of Iceland than the sovereign debt of Germany. Because they are a stable, because they have control on who who they are and how they connect. While Germany ultimately depends if a Spain or Italy go belly up, Germany it belly up. Uh, so, don't invest in Germany yet. Now, if they are not trying to transform the political system directly, what happened then? Well, a lot will depend on how the political system reacts.
嗯,顺便说一句,冰岛经济是如今欧洲表现最好的经济体,比德国还好。按照所有评级机构的说法,你信冰岛的主权债务,都比信德国的主权债务更靠谱。因为他们是稳定的,因为他们能掌控自己是谁、以及如何与外界连接。而德国归根结底要看西班牙或意大利会不会垮,它们一垮,德国也跟着垮。所以呢,现在先别投资德国。那么,如果他们并不试图直接改造政治体制,接下来会发生什么?嗯,很大程度上取决于政治体制如何回应。
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1:01:39
That's why the title of my conclusion in the book is um Social Movements and Reform Politics: An Impossible Love? Maybe, maybe not. Because if the political class understands that these are symptoms, whatever distorted, whatever exaggerated, whatever enraged sometimes, of a fundamental distrust in society toward the current political institutions. If they sincerely want to construct and reconstruct democracy rather than get away with crime. If they do that, and some may do. Obama is not doing it.
这就是为什么我在书里结论部分的标题是:《社会运动与改革政治:一场不可能的爱情?》也许是,也许不是。因为如果政治阶层能够明白:这些是症状——不管它们多么扭曲、多么夸张、有时多么愤怒——是社会对当前政治制度根本性不信任的症状。如果他们真心想要建构和重建民主,而不是想着犯了事还能全身而退。如果他们那么做——有些人可能会那么做。奥巴马没有这么做。
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1:02:19
Some may do. Well, things could change. Because throughout history, this has always been the movement of social movements external to the system that at one point open up a spaces of debate and freedom into the system. And then the parties that don't follow that fall apart. I make a comparison with late 19th century Europe in which the political establishment in the democratic countries, in the democratic countries, England, Italy, France to some extent, were the conservatives and the liberals, and suddenly the society is transformed.
但有些人可能会。那么,事情是可能改变的。因为纵观历史,一直都是体制外的社会运动在某个时刻为体制打开了辩论和自由的空间。而那些不跟上的政党就会分崩离析。我做了个类比,19世纪晚期的欧洲:在那些民主国家里,政治建制派,在那些民主国家——英国、意大利,某种程度上还有法国——是保守派和自由派,然后突然之间,社会发生了转型。
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1:03:03
There are new social movements with new ideologies that seem to be crazy. Uh anarchism, socialism, um because they represent the new society that was emerging and was not represented in the political institutions, what happened? The liberals disappear, basically. Not the conservatives. Why the conservatives not? Because the conservatives don't change fundamentally. They change their names, their labels, their their framing of the ideology, defending the dominant interests of society is the easiest way. You just go with the flow.
出现了新的社会运动,带着看起来很疯狂的新意识形态。无政府主义、社会主义,嗯,因为它们代表的是正在浮现、却没有在政治制度中得到代表的新社会。结果怎么样?自由派基本上消失了。保守派没有。为什么保守派没有?因为保守派根本上不会改变。他们改的是名字、标签、意识形态的包装方式,而捍卫社会中的支配性利益是最容易的路。你顺着潮流走就行了。
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1:03:36
We just go who whoever is in society. But, if you are raison d'être in society for the liberal, for the left of the political system, is to represent the interests of society, not the interests of the elites. Then, you have a problem if you don't do that. The same thing is happening now in Europe. And maybe to some extent in the United States with the Democrats, um if they do not represent all the outraged indignation and lack of hope vis-à-vis the subservience of the political lead on the financial leads, well, you will have tea party. And the or or you will have or we will have Europe and here the notion that no government is good.
社会里谁当道,我们就跟谁走。但是,如果你在社会中的存在理由(raison d'être),作为自由派、作为政治体制中的左翼,是代表社会的利益,而不是代表精英的利益,那么,你不那么做,就麻烦了。现在的欧洲正在发生同样的事。某种程度上,美国的民主党也是如此,嗯,如果他们不去代表那些愤怒、那种义愤,以及那种对政治领导层屈从于金融势力的绝望,那么,你们就会有茶党。而且,或者,你们会有——或者我们会有——欧洲那样的局面,还有这里这种“政府没一个好东西”的观念。
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1:04:27
So, let's do ourselves. And by doing ourselves, we start with our taxes, our money. Why I should give to you if I don't trust you. So, no taxes. Uh my defense, huh. I have my gun. Why need it? Well, in Europe, there are the same already. But, maybe, you know, it could be uh in a Washington-based think tank that will start distributing, diffusing in in Europe the idea that armed citizens are the only ones who they can really defend the republic. Um so, to a large extent, if the let's say progressive elements of the political system do not respond to the new conditions of society, then movement fill in. But, at the same time, they don't have the institutional capacity to do it.
所以,咱们自己来吧。而所谓自己来,先从我们的税、我们的钱开始。我凭什么把钱交给你,如果我不信任你?所以,不交税。呃,我的国防?哈。我有我的枪。还要国防干嘛?嗯,在欧洲,已经有同样的苗头了。但是,也许,你知道,可能会有某个华盛顿的智库开始在欧洲散播、传播这样一种观念:只有武装起来的公民才是真正能保卫共和国的人。嗯,所以,很大程度上,如果政治体制中所谓的进步力量不去回应社会的新状况,那么运动就会来填补这个空缺。但与此同时,他们又不具备制度性的能力去做这件事。
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1:05:19
But, ultimately, the most the most positive influence of the movement in politics may happen to through the change of the basic ideas and the basic themes of of society. In the United States, the notion that the um there is a cleavage, regardless of the statistical demagoguery, between the 9% and the 1% and the 99%. No one talk about this. We knew about the income inequality. We knew about this. But, now the whole society, including comedians, and let alone even the Congress, they started to talk about the 1% and the 99%.
但归根结底,这些运动对政治最积极的影响,也许会通过改变社会的基本观念和基本议题来实现。在美国,不管统计数字上怎么被拿来煽动,人们已经形成一种观念:存在一道鸿沟,1%和99%之间。以前没人谈这个。我们知道有收入不平等,我们早就知道。但现在整个社会,包括喜剧演员,更别说连国会都在谈,大家开始谈论1%和99%。
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1:06:04
That means what for people? Well, this society, apparently, the society of opportunity? No. is with fundamental social inequality. This change is up here. Up here. Now, the political response to that depends. Can be right-wing politics, can be demagoguery, etc. But, changes the the terms of the debate. You know, one very interesting opinion poll data in the in the United States is that uh the state has always has refused in the public mind the notion of social conflict between rich and poor, class struggle, if you want to call it.
这对人们意味着什么?意味着:这个社会,表面上是一个机会的社会?不。而是一个存在根本性社会不平等的社会。这个变化发生在这里(脑子里)。在这里。那么,对此的政治回应是什么,就不一定了。可能是右翼政治,可能是民粹煽动,等等。但它改变了辩论的框架。你知道,美国有一项非常有意思的民调数据:在公众心目中,这个国家一直以来都拒绝接受富人和穷人之间存在社会冲突的观念,也就是阶级斗争,如果你愿意这么叫的话。
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1:06:40
Well, according to the Pew Institute, in in 2009, the proportion of people who thought that the conflict between rich and poor was the defining conflict in society were 45%. In 2011, 70%. Meaning, the notion that there is a conflict between rich and poor that is exactly contrary to the American ideology, in which the only problem for the poor is that they're not rich yet, but they will. They will eventually become rich. Well, people are saying no because of the 99% of it because now and lastly, the people in the movement, the language of the movement say all this discussion about what what are we accomplishing?
然而,根据皮尤研究中心的数据,2009年,认为富人和穷人之间的冲突是社会主要矛盾的人,占45%。到2011年,是70%。也就是说,“富人和穷人之间存在冲突”这个观念,恰恰与美国的意识形态背道而驰——按美国的意识形态,穷人唯一的问题就是他们还没变富,但他们会的。他们最终会变富。而现在,人们说不是这样,因为那99%。最后一点,运动中的人、运动的语言是这么说的:所有这些关于“我们到底取得了什么成果”的讨论——
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1:07:32
What is ultimately the result? They say this is in fact a reflection of the productivist logic of capitalism. If you don't produce something, you are nothing. Well, maybe the debate is wrong. Maybe the outcome the important thing is not the outcome, but the process because the process is a transformative force. Why? Because it's what you do materially. Deliberation, discussion, projection, all this is the material practice and it's the material practice that changes people's mind. And that finally may have necessarily has to translate into something. That's what the movement people say. We don't We're going to vote, sure, but who cares? We know it's not going to solve the problems in the next election.
最终的结果是什么?他们说,这其实正反映了资本主义的生产主义逻辑。如果你不生产出点什么,你就什么都不是。那么,也许这个辩论本身就问错了。也许重要的不是结果,而是过程,因为过程本身就是一种改造的力量。为什么?因为它是你实实在在在做的事。商议、讨论、构想,所有这些都是物质性的实践,而正是这种物质性的实践改变了人们的想法。而这最终可能、也必然要转化成某种东西。这就是运动中的人所说的。我们当然会去投票,但谁在乎呢?我们知道下一次选举解决不了这些问题。
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1:08:23
But what about in the election 20 years from now? That's what social movements like the women movement, the environmental movement, the civil rights movement were saying 20 25 years ago. It's just a different timing. It's not the next election, it's the next society. And that's the space where social movements are being Still the most important thing is how communicative autonomy has impacted the overcoming of fear. I want to finish by reading a um tweet uh from Tahrir Square, from a woman named Iqbal Qazaini, but the tweet she signs Surya Strong, that tweet like this, "We have brought down the wall of fear.
但20年后的那场选举呢?那正是像妇女运动、环保运动、民权运动这些社会运动在二三十年前所说的话。只是时间尺度不一样而已。要改变的不是下一次选举,而是下一个社会。而这正是社会运动所处的空间。最重要的,仍然是传播自主性(communicative autonomy)如何帮助人们克服恐惧。我想以朗读一条推文来结束,一条来自解放广场的推文,发推的是一位女性,名叫伊克巴尔·卡扎伊尼(Iqbal Qazaini),但她署名为“Surya Strong”,那条推文是这样写的:“我们推倒了恐惧之墙。
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1:09:17
You brought down the wall of our house. We'll rebuild our homes, but you will never build again that wall of fear." And that is the transformation. Thank you for your attention.
你们推倒了我们家的墙。”我们会重建我们的家园,但你们再也建不起那道恐惧之墙了。」这就是那种转变。谢谢大家的聆听。
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12问答:企业治理、文化、技术自主
1:09:46
Okay, Dr. Castells Uh Dr. Castells has agreed to take questions. Please wait for the microphone. You handle that. You You point at people. Okay. Hi, I'm Mike Nelson. I'm a writer for Bloomberg Government, and I'm also a professor of Internet Studies at Georgetown University. I I think you've done a wonderful job of giving us an overview of what's happening in social movements targeted at changing national governments. I'm curious if you could talk a little bit about how social movements might change corporate government, and how boycotts by consumers, shareholder action, might be enabled by social media, and whether you're optimistic or pessimistic that that will change the way corporations function.
好的,卡斯特尔教授……卡斯特尔教授同意回答提问。请等麦克风递过去。你来负责。你来……你来点名。好的。你好,我是迈克·尼尔森,我是彭博政府(Bloomberg Government)的撰稿人,同时也是乔治城大学互联网研究的教授。我觉得你非常出色地为我们梳理了当前这些以改变国家政府为目标的社会运动的全貌。我很好奇,你能不能稍微谈谈社会运动可能如何改变企业治理,以及消费者抵制、股东行动这类做法如何借助社交媒体得以实现,还有你对这些是否会改变企业的运作方式,是乐观还是悲观。
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1:10:35
Thank you very much. Absolutely. Um you know, the interesting thing about these movements is that they are multi-dimensional. They touch on everything. And by this everything ultimately means how things are managed everywhere. So, you're absolutely right. Uh they focus on government because of the rise of the movement was linked to the financial crisis and the the the disastrous management that governments have done with the financial crisis. In some cases, they couldn't even tame the financial crisis. But even when they have more or less like in the United States, has been at the expense of breaking the trust of the of the citizens in in that in that management.
非常感谢。当然可以。嗯,这些运动有意思的一点在于,它们是多维度的。它们触及一切。而这里说的「一切」,归根结底是指各个领域的事情是怎么被管理的。所以你说得完全对。呃,它们之所以聚焦政府,是因为运动的兴起与金融危机有关,也与政府在应对金融危机时那种灾难性的管理有关。在某些情况下,政府甚至无法驯服金融危机。但即便是在多多少少做到了的地方,比如美国,代价也是打破了公民对那种管理的信任。
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1:11:16
So, therefore, the mainstream of the of the movement has concentrated there. But there are all kind of discussion and one of of those that you mentioned is absolutely about corporate governance. Remember all the discussions about the bank fees with the Bank of America uh about the the many people had actually switched from their banks to credit unions. Uh and in a number of state particularly in Washington state, there are a number of experiments in which people are creating their own community banks.
所以,运动的主流就集中在了那里。但其实还有各种各样的讨论,你提到的其中一个,确实就是关于企业治理的。还记得关于美国银行(Bank of America)银行手续费的那些讨论吗,呃,其实很多人已经把钱从银行转到了信用合作社。呃,而且在一些州,尤其是华盛顿州,有不少尝试,人们在创建自己的社区银行。
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1:11:49
And they don't work worse than the others at this point. Uh in I have been investigating in Europe a huge movement of what they call ethical banking in which are literally at this point there are over 5 million people in Europe uh doing ethical banking. Meaning you it's in fact a cooperative. I mean, you the profits are for the members of the of the of the bank. And and and they invest only in terms to get enough return to keep the bank going. Um I have not mentioned because I focused on the more political oriented movement.
而且到目前为止,它们运作得并不比其他银行差。呃,我在欧洲一直在研究一场规模庞大的运动,他们称之为伦理银行(ethical banking),到现在为止,欧洲实际上已经有超过五百万人在做伦理银行。意思是它其实就是一种合作社。我是说,利润归银行成员所有。而且它们投资的目的只是获得足够的回报来维持银行运转。嗯,我没有提到这些,是因为我把重点放在了更偏政治的那类运动上。
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1:12:28
I have not mentioned my other research, which is my next book meaning published in November, not in October. Um which is uh is called um is called another life is possible alternative economic culture during the crisis. Which is also empirically grounded and is about all the forms in which people are transforming their lives. And this is a huge debate within the movement. People who are more traditional social movement, we have to change the counselor, we have to go through a political institution. Many other people who are in the movement as well, say, "Well, you know, this is going to be long-term. Yeah, we'll do it, but it's going to be long-term. I am 35, what the hell? I want my better life now, uh not when we make the revolution. The revolution can wait, but I cannot wait.
我也没有提到我的另一项研究,就是我的下一本书,会在十一月出版,不是十月。嗯,这本书叫做……叫做《另一种生活是可能的:危机中的另类经济文化》。这本书同样有实证基础,讲的是人们正在以各种方式改变自己的生活。而这在运动内部也是一场很大的争论。那些更传统的社会运动的人会说,我们得改变议会,得通过政治制度来实现。而运动里的许多另一些人则说:「嗯,你知道,这会是个长期过程。是啊,我们会去做,但它会是长期的。我都35岁了,管它呢?我现在就想要更好的生活,呃,而不是等到我们搞革命的时候。革命可以等,但我等不了。」
便签引用
1:13:19
Um and therefore a huge movement of time sharing, uh time banks, um alternative financing, um self-con- self-consumption, self-production, economic practices, but under a completely different logic. And I would actually concur with Simon Pleaset, I think I enjoyed statement. This, in the short term, is going to be more materially, practically effective because people know that they already live differently. Uh at this point in Europe, here I don't I don't think so, but I don't know the precise data. In Europe, the majority of people agree with the notion of working less and being paid less.
嗯,于是就出现了一场规模庞大的运动,涉及时间共享、呃时间银行、嗯另类融资、嗯自我消费、自我生产这些经济实践,但遵循的是一套完全不同的逻辑。而我其实很认同西蒙·普利塞特的看法,我觉得他那个说法我很欣赏。短期来看,这在物质上、实际上会更有效,因为人们知道自己已经在过不一样的生活了。呃,目前在欧洲——在这里我觉得不是这样,不过我不知道确切数据——在欧洲,多数人认同「少工作、少拿钱」这个想法。
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1:14:09
Okay. And why? Because uh because well, life is something else than just a work for for a pay. Interesting, which at the same time is massive unemployment. Well, you can take massive unemployment as a tragedy or as an opportunity. Since they are not going to employ me anyway, uh let's organize the life around different set of values. And there is an increasing movement in those sense, even in the most ideological um uh factions, there is a huge degrowth movement. Uh many arguing for slowing economic growth and actually starting growing negatively, not growing more in terms of the national product. And as you know, there's a huge branch of economics now developing, economics of happiness.
是的。为什么呢?因为,呃,因为生活不只是为了一份薪水而工作。有意思的是,与此同时还存在大规模失业。嗯,你可以把大规模失业看成一场悲剧,也可以看成一个机会。既然反正他们也不会雇我,呃,那就围绕另一套价值观来组织生活吧。而且这方面的运动越来越多,即便在意识形态色彩最浓的那些嗯呃派别中,也有一场规模很大的去增长(degrowth)运动。呃,很多人主张放慢经济增长,甚至开始负增长,不再追求国民生产总值意义上的更多增长。而且如你所知,现在经济学里有一个很大的分支正在发展,叫幸福经济学。
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1:15:01
Which among other things use the the Bhutan Bhutan for places. Uh the Bhutan gross national happiness index. Uh which has been debated in the world. In other words, what I'm saying is that beyond the more specifically political movements, there is a tectonic change in the culture. Because there is universal distrust in global financial capitalism, not in capitalism, not in the another form of capital, in this particular form of capitalism. When you ask people, they're not the majority, they say, "No, capitalism is okay. Is this capitalism? Is this global financial capital with no control, speculative, non-entrepreneurial, not creating wealth, but inventing wealth and taking our wealth from us?" That one is is a is a fundamental movement coupled with the crisis of political legitimacy. You bring together two the two things. People don't trust those who have their money and don't trust those who have their votes.
这一分支除了其他内容之外,还会引用不丹……以不丹为例。呃,不丹的国民幸福总值指数。呃,这个指数在全世界都引起了讨论。换句话说,我想说的是,在那些更具体的政治运动之外,文化正在发生一场地壳式的变动。因为人们对全球金融资本主义有着普遍的不信任——不是对资本主义,不是对另一种形式的资本,而是对这种特定形式的资本主义。当你去问人们,他们中的多数并不是说「不,资本主义没问题」,而是说「问题是这种资本主义?是这种全球金融资本,没有管控、投机性、非创业性的,它不创造财富,而是凭空发明财富,并把我们的财富拿走?」那一点才是一场根本性的运动,再加上政治合法性的危机。你把这两件事放在一起看:人们既不信任掌管他们钱的人,也不信任拿到他们选票的人。
便签引用
1:16:06
We are in a tectonic change. That has different expressions.
我们正处在一场地壳式的变动之中。这种变动有不同的表现形式。
便签引用
1:16:19
Uh interested in the intercultural aspects of of your theory. You didn't didn't touch much on China or Far Eastern cultures with other quite distinctive cultural characteristics. There's a lot of universalism that you talk about, but when we get to these issues of governance and and the way societies work, they reflect some sort of cultural norm, some common values, and the internet phenomenon that you talk about, the communications, the theory you're espousing, has to affect that in some way or another. Could you Could you perhaps address the intercultural aspects and what makes this universal in your mind? This so that normative values, what's right, wrong, good, bad, what defines a society are affected by your theory.
呃,我对你这套理论中的跨文化面向很感兴趣。你没怎么谈到中国或远东的文化,那些文化有着相当独特的文化特征。你谈到了很多普遍性的东西,但当我们谈到治理这些问题、谈到社会运作的方式时,它们其实反映了某种文化规范、某些共同价值观,而你谈的互联网现象、传播现象,以及你所主张的理论,必然会以某种方式影响到这些。你能不能……你能不能谈谈跨文化的面向,以及在你看来是什么让这件事具有普遍性?也就是说,那些规范性价值——什么是对、什么是错、什么是好、什么是坏,什么界定了一个社会——会如何受到你这套理论的影响。
便签引用
1:17:10
Thank you. Um Well, two layers of this. On the one hand, there is no cultural homogeneity in the world, empirically speaking, but cultural diversity is increasing, not diminishing. Except that on top of this, some kind of a global cosmopolitan culture of two of two kinds, consumerism, that's a global universal culture, and at the same time, uh humankind as uh as a species with common values of preservation, preservation of the species, preservation of nature, let's say, ecology in the broader sense. They are the two things. So, one is clearly capitalist, the other is not. Um and these are the universal cultures expanding.
谢谢。嗯……好,这件事有两个层面。一方面,世界上并不存在文化上的同质性,从经验上看,文化多样性是在增加,而不是在减少。只不过在这之上,还有某种全球性的世界主义文化,有两种:一种是消费主义,那是一种全球通行的普遍文化;与此同时,另一种是把人类当作一个物种,有着共同的保存价值——物种的保存,自然的保存,也就是说,更广义上的生态。就是这两样东西。所以一种明显是资本主义的,另一种不是。嗯,这些就是正在扩张的普遍性文化。
便签引用
1:17:54
And in that sense, there is cultural identity in terms of national, ethnic, religious, etc., increasing, but two these two major cultures that are increasingly shared. The There is another um aspect of the shared culture, which I think is new and is linked to internet. What is shared is the culture of sharing. Meaning that I go into internet, I find I people, and I connect, and I construct a new subculture, but at the same time, in combination with other cultures, but we all agree that the internet is fundamental.
从这个意义上说,民族的、族裔的、宗教的等等文化认同是在增强的,但同时也有这两种越来越被共享的主要文化。还有另一个嗯共享文化的面向,我觉得它是新的,而且和互联网有关。被共享的,是分享的文化。意思是,我上网,我找到人,我建立连接,我构建出一种新的亚文化,但与此同时,它又与其他文化结合在一起,而我们都认同互联网是根本性的。
便签引用
1:18:37
That's the culture of sharing and that's why the battle is is being already launched. Not only Anonymous, many other things in terms of defending the internet. Why? Because the internet is the common grounds of our age. If if people feel expropriated from the internet, particularly teenagers and young people, that's the only way they can start making bombs. If you take away what they can do in the internet, whatever they want, that's really something. So, this culture of sharing is is quite fundamental.
这就是分享的文化,也正因如此,这场战斗已经打响了。不只是「匿名者」(Anonymous),还有很多其他力量在捍卫互联网。为什么?因为互联网是我们这个时代的公共领地。如果人们觉得自己被剥夺了互联网,尤其是青少年和年轻人,那才是他们会开始造炸弹的唯一原因。如果你把他们在互联网上能做的事——不管他们想做什么——夺走,那真的会出事。所以这种分享的文化是相当根本性的。
便签引用
1:19:09
The political culture, I would say, is to large extent um still, I would say, liberal democracy in the traditional term uh is is growing as the share political culture. In most countries, people agree that elections are important, are fundamental. But, on this and the fourth, there is the contradiction within China nowadays. But, on the other hand, um the the sharing of this political culture in most cases, particularly in the in the social movements, incorporate another dimension. Par- participatory democracy becomes the new frontier of democracy.
至于政治文化,我会说,在很大程度上嗯仍然是传统意义上的自由民主,呃它作为共享的政治文化正在增长。在大多数国家,人们都认同选举是重要的、是根本性的。但在这一点上,第四点,如今中国内部存在着矛盾。但另一方面,嗯,这种政治文化在多数情况下被共享时,尤其是在社会运动中,会纳入另一个维度。参……参与式民主成为民主的新边疆。
便签引用
1:19:50
Pure representative democracy without participatory democracy is, in fact, empty and will soon be ineffective in managing the processes of self-government. Now, why is participatory democracy now possible? And there are very interesting discussions about in terms of the history of the movement that we're arguing about gradual democracy, participatory democracy, and always in the 19th century, early 20th century, they think everybody agreed with that, but it was not practical. Because they have to at one point decide and you could not scale up.
没有参与式民主的纯粹代议制民主,实际上是空洞的,而且很快就会在管理自我治理的过程中变得无效。那么,为什么参与式民主现在成为可能了?关于这一点,从运动史的角度有很有意思的讨论,人们曾经争论渐进民主、参与式民主,而在19世纪、20世纪初,他们觉得大家都认同这个理念,但它不切实际。因为总得在某个时点做决定,而且你没法扩大规模。
便签引用
1:20:25
Internet allows you to scale up. So, the age of network democracy seems to have arrived. So, there's an old discussion between Marxists and anarchists. The Marxists say, "No, power has to be centralized because otherwise it's not effective." Anarchists say, "Well, but when it's centralized, then it becomes a dictatorship." Uh but now anarchists, what I call the neo-anarchists, are because they're not organizational anarchists, are saying, "You know what? The you Marxists always said the the the development of the productive forces allows different forms of social organization. That's exactly what happened, but was not communist. So, communism was the ideology of the 19th century, anarchism is the one of the 21st century because now the internet allows decentralized democracy, decentralized participation, collective decision-making, etc. And I find it's a fascinating discussion.
互联网让你能够扩大规模。所以,网络民主的时代似乎已经到来了。马克思主义者和无政府主义者之间有一场由来已久的争论。马克思主义者说:「不行,权力必须集中,否则就没有效力。」无政府主义者说:「可是一旦集中,它就会变成专政。」呃,但现在的无政府主义者,也就是我所说的新无政府主义者,因为他们不是组织性的无政府主义者,他们会说:「你知道吗?你们马克思主义者一直说,生产力的发展会带来不同形式的社会组织。事情恰恰就是这样发生的,只不过结果不是共产主义。所以,共产主义是19世纪的意识形态,无政府主义则是21世纪的意识形态,因为现在互联网使去中心化的民主成为可能,去中心化的参与、集体决策等等。」我觉得这是一场非常引人入胜的讨论。
便签引用
1:21:21
You already over town over time, but we just one last question. Um let's see who's next. That's my fault. I think he you were the next one in line. Prophets and people that work um in social movements or building them uh fit in with all this technology. So, what do you have to think about? Thank you very much. This is a fundamental question both uh theoretically and practically. Look, uh to give a a short answer, we can continue the discussion later. Um without uh social networks in the internet, these movements would not exist, simply.
时间已经超了,不过我们就再提最后一个问题。嗯,看看下一个是谁。是我的问题。我想他……你是下一个排队的。……那些在社会运动中工作或建设社会运动的先知和人们,如何与这一整套技术相契合。所以,你有什么想法?非常感谢。这个问题无论在理论上还是实践上都很根本。我先简短回答一下,我们稍后可以继续讨论。我们稍后可以继续讨论。嗯,如果没有互联网上的社交网络,这些运动根本就不会存在,就这么简单。
便签引用
1:21:59
Would be other social movements. Could be others, but this is a a a hypothetical question. Every of these movements, all the protest, all the actions everywhere start with the internet. And and therefore the only relevant question, in my opinion, is which are the material and cultural consequences of going through the internet at least for a substantial part of the movement of the interaction. Uh the discussion that I found frankly empty About and the revolution be tweeted or not. The revolution was not tweeted. Oh, yes, it was tweeted.
也许会出现别的社会运动。可能会有别的,但这只是个假设性的问题。这些运动里的每一场,所有的抗议、所有各地的行动,都是从互联网开始的。所有各地的行动,都是从互联网开始的。因此在我看来,唯一有意义的问题是:运动中相当一部分互动是通过互联网进行的,这带来了什么样的物质和文化后果?至少对运动中相当一部分互动来说是这样。坦白说,我觉得那种争论很空洞——革命到底有没有被推特化。有人说革命不是靠推特推动的。哦,不,它就是靠推特推动的。
便签引用
1:22:35
Well, empirically it was tweeted actually. You cannot explain the their wonderful analysis by Gilad Lotan and others and and in and in TweetFlow, good researchers that show empirically how the tweets organized the Arab revolutions. But at the same time, we're not only the tweets, but without the tweets, you cannot explain the process, the development, the participation, etc., etc. So, that's the point. Technology as always is embedded into the social practice. So, it starts with other reasons for but without the technology, this movement would have been crashed again. And for me, the most important thing in Egypt is the comparison between how the 2008 attempt um particularly in the in the working-class city northern of Cairo was crashed with thousands of people killed. And the same people who survived that created the April 6th movement that then using Tunisia as the trigger the same people started another kind of movement on the internet in January 2011 and it worked.
从经验数据上看,它确实是被推特推动的。你没法否认吉拉德·洛坦(Gilad Lotan)等��做的那些出色分析,还有 TweetFlow 里的那些优秀研究者,他们用经验数据展示了推特是如何组织起阿拉伯革命的。但与此同时,起作用的不只是推特;可是没有推特,你就无法解释这个过程、它的发展、人们的参与等等。等等。这就是关键所在。技术一如既往地嵌入在社会实践之中。所以,运动的起因是别的东西,但如果没有技术,这场运动又会被镇压下去。对我来说,埃及最重要的一点是做个对比:2008 年那次尝试是怎么被镇压的——特别是在开罗以北的那座工人阶级城市,上千人被杀。而那些幸存下来的人创立了「4月6日运动」,后来以突尼斯为导火索,同样是这批人在 2011 年 1 月在互联网上发起了另一种形式的运动,而且成功了。
便签引用
1:23:39
You see? So, uh therefore, I think at this point you cannot imagine social movements or non-profit organizations or uh advocacy uh groups or the tea party for that matter without the internet and the implications of the internet. But the internet has implications. Needs interactivity, needs horizontality. You know, when politicians decided that oh, sure, we forgot the internet. Um Obama was the first one in the world who really understood uh what the the potential of the internet and that was decisive for the financing of the campaign, for the organization of the campaign. We We that. Now, all politicians want to to the same. The magic potion. You will have a good website, a good internet network, and we win. Well, internet in one word, the cultural definition of internet is one word, autonomy.
明白吗?所以我认为,到了这个地步,你已经无法想象社会运动、非营利组织,或者倡导团体,甚至茶党,可以脱离互联网以及互联网带来的影响而存在。但是互联网是有其内在逻辑的。它需要互动性,需要横向性。你知道,当政客们意识到「哦,当然,我们把互联网给忘了」——嗯,奥巴马是全世界第一个真正理解互联网潜力的人,这对竞选筹款、竞选组织都是决定性的。我们都知道这一点。现在所有政客都想照做。就像灵丹妙药一样:你只要有个好网站、一个好的互联网网络,我们就赢了。可是,用一个词来概括互联网,互联网的文化定义就是一个词:自主。
便签引用
1:24:37
Internet is the technology of autonomy. If you are not ready to give autonomy to the movement behind you, you better don't try the internet because you may have a problem. Uh because if people really take seriously their autonomy and have the technological tools to be, they will not need you. So, uh and and now Obama continues with his things about the internet and so on, but it doesn't work in the same way, right? Uh because people autonomously decided otherwise.
互联网是关于自主的技术。如果你不准备把自主权交给你身后的那场运动,那你最好别碰互联网,因为你可能会遇到麻烦。因为如果人们真的认真对待自己的自主性,并且拥有实现它的技术工具,他们就不再需要你了。所以,现在奥巴马还在继续搞他那些互联网的东西,但已经不像当初那样奏效了,对吧?因为人们自主地做出了别的选择。
便签引用
1:25:16
This has been a presentation of the Library of Congress. Visit us at loc.gov.
以上是美国国会图书馆的一场演讲。欢迎访问我们的网站 loc.gov。
便签引用
视频总结 · 一句话概括与核心要点

一句话概括

卡斯特尔在国会图书馆的这场演讲,基于两年田野调查提出:从突尼斯、埃及、冰岛到西班牙、美国的新一波社会运动虽起因各异,却共享同一套「互联网时代」的模式——由愤怒压倒恐惧、在网络与广场之间构建「自主空间」、无领袖、非暴力、非纲领、以改变意识而非夺取国家为目标,其成效要以「下一个社会」而非「下一次选举」来衡量。

核心要点

  • 权力的根基在于塑造心智,而非仅靠强制。 卡斯特尔将社会理论中的权力传统归为两支:马基雅维利到韦伯的「暴力垄断」与葛兰西到福柯的「文化霸权/说服」。他直言「长远看,塑造心智比折磨身体更有效」,因为人的行为最终由大脑决定;而凡有支配必有反抗,这就是「反权力」。这套框架来自他 2009 年的《传播力》一书。
  • 传播体系已从「大众传播」转向「大众自传播」。 互联网 1969 年即已部署,并非新技术;真正的变化是传播变成多模态、互动、全球—本地、可自创自取自组合的网络(互联网+无线通信)。既然心智靠传播网络接收信号,传播的转型必然改变人们处理社会信号的方式,进而改变权力关系。
  • 运动由情绪触发,而非由纲领驱动。 引用达马西奥的神经科学和政治学中的「情感智能理论」:动员的触发器是愤怒,压制器是恐惧。恐惧靠「共享与认同」被克服——街头握手来不及,就在网上握手;人们不必就纲领达成一致,只要「都在愤怒」就够了。恐惧克服后转入热情与希望,这就是书名「愤怒与希望」的由来。
  • 运动的两个共同前提:生活恶化+制度不回应。 西方的直接诱因是 2008 年金融危机的政府失职,阿拉伯国家是粮食危机加独裁政权。民调显示美国人对银行家的指责(47%)低于对政府的指责,因为「政府本该保护我们,却保护了银行家」。他强调除北欧外,多数国家多数人认为本国「没有民主」,即传统政治学所说的合法性危机。
  • 互联网被「监控」但并未被「控制」,这造就了传播自主性。 他区分两者:监控只能事后找出「谁说的」并抓人,但信息本身已经传出去了——「你若是信使就有麻烦,你若是信息,就永生」。关键案例是埃及:2008 年的传统式动员被碾碎,同一批幸存者组成「4月6日运动」,2011 年先在网上形成临界规模再上街,于是成功。
  • 运动的组织形态是「根茎式」的多模态网络。 先在互联网上形成,再叠加线下既有网络(家庭、朋友,阿拉伯国家尤以足球球迷网络为要,开罗阿赫利队球迷曾在革命初期起决定作用)。没有领袖和指挥中心,去中心结构既最大化参与(不需会员证、不需同意任何东西),又难以镇压(砍掉一个节点,其余节点继续),还能防止官僚化——「越想当领袖,网上越被人喷死」。
  • 网络必须落地为对城市空间的占领,两者合成「自主空间」。 上街的两个理由:情感联结需要身体在场(「网上连接,但不能触碰」);没有制度化行动渠道的运动只能靠「在那里」获得可见性并挑战制度。他们的战术常识是:20 人会被清掉,2000 人难办,20000 人就只能放着。
  • 运动是本地又全球、病毒式传播,图像比推特更关键。 每场运动扎根本地语境(西班牙「愤怒者」、叙利亚因十几名少年涂鸦被酷刑而起),却即刻连通世界。他认为影响最大的社交平台不是 Facebook 或 Twitter 而是 YouTube:人人手机拍摄上传,看到「像自己的人」被喷辣椒水或机枪扫射,愤怒即刻扩散——镇压越暴力,恐惧越大,支持也越多。
  • 非暴力是生死线,暴力化即意味着运动死亡。 叙利亚运动最初和平了数月,在任何武装抵抗出现前已有逾 7000 人在和平示威中被杀。一旦转为内战,「即使赢了内战,你作为社会运动已经不存在了」——胜利者会是沙特、卡塔尔资助的自由叙利亚军,而非公民社会。
  • 非纲领、反传统激进左翼、自我反思、乌托邦,追求的是民主的「实践」而非「方案」。 运动不是没有纲领而是有一千个纲领;对托派和「有组织的无政府主义者」高度批判;巴塞罗那占领营地里有人讨论海德格尔与民主。核心诉求是「代议民主没问题,只是它不代表」——希腊 2012 年大选获 30% 的党拿绝对多数,靠的是给第一大党额外 50 席的条款。他们要的「网络民主」尚无人知其为何物,是乌托邦,但自由主义、共产主义、无政府主义也都曾是乌托邦,「乌托邦是物质力量」。
  • 成效体现在议题的改写与「20 年后的选举」。 冰岛:推翻自 1927 年以来轮流执政的联盟、银行国有化、银行家入狱、审判总理,16000 人参与在网上众包新宪法,且冰岛经济当时在欧洲表现最佳。美国:「1% 对 99%」从无人谈论变成连国会和喜剧演员都在说;皮尤数据显示,认为贫富冲突是社会主要冲突的美国人从 2009 年的 45% 升至 2011 年的 70%——这直接颠覆了「穷人只是还没变富」的美国意识形态。

结论与值得注意的细节

  • 对政治体制的警告: 书的结论章题为「社会运动与改革政治:不可能的爱?」他以 19 世纪末欧洲为镜——社会主义、无政府主义兴起后消失的是自由党而非保守党,因为保守党「顺流而下」即可,而左翼的存在理由是代表社会而非精英。若今日欧洲和美国民主党不回应这种愤怒,填补空白的将是茶党式「没有政府是好政府」的逻辑。他点名奥巴马「没有在做」。
  • 「过程即结果」: 运动内部认为追问「你们成就了什么」本身就是资本主义生产主义逻辑;审议、讨论、投射是改变人心的物质实践,正如女权、环保、民权运动在二三十年前所做的——「不是下一次选举,而是下一个社会」。
  • 问答中的补充: 政治之外正发生「文化的构造性变化」——欧洲逾 500 万人参与伦理银行/合作银行,美国大量储户转投信用合作社,时间银行、去增长运动、幸福经济学兴起;多数欧洲人接受「少工作少领薪」。人们不信任的不是资本主义本身,而是「不创造财富只发明财富」的全球金融资本主义,同时不信任「拿走我们选票的人」。
  • 关于跨文化普遍性: 世界文化多样性在增加而非减少,但两种全球文化在扩张——消费主义与作为物种的保护价值;互联网带来的新共享文化是「分享文化」本身。参与式民主在 19 世纪被认为不可扩展,而互联网使之可以扩展,因此他称「共产主义是 19 世纪的意识形态,无政府主义是 21 世纪的」——新无政府主义者反用马克思的「生产力决定组织形式」来论证。
  • 对政客的忠告: 互联网的文化定义一个词——「自主」。奥巴马是第一个真正理解互联网潜力的政客,但如果不准备把自主权交给背后的运动,「最好别碰互联网」,因为人们一旦拥有自主的工具就不再需要你。
  • 结尾引用: 一位署名 Surya Strong 的解放广场女性的推文——「我们推倒了恐惧之墙。你们推倒了我们房子的墙。我们会重建家园,但你们永远建不回那堵恐惧之墙。」
  • 说明性细节: 演讲时(2012 年夏)该书尚未出版(10 月伦敦发布,Polity 出版社),分析被作者本人定性为「初步且试探性」;两年内全球数千座城市有示威或占领,美国超过 1000 座;以色列 2011 年 7 至 10 月有逾 50 万人参与其历史上最大规模动员,但媒体「不见暴力不报道」。
核心句型 · 10
1. It's not X, it's Y.
“It's not the next election, it's the next society.”
用否定加肯定的对举重新定义焦点,短促有力。适合演讲收束或纠正听众预期。仿写时两边结构要平行,如 It's not the tool, it's the hand that holds it。
2. The more …, the less ….
“The more you want to be a leader, the less you will be a leader.”
双重比较级表达反比关系,此处制造悖论效果。仿写可用于任何「越努力越适得其反」的观察,如 The more you explain, the less they believe。
3. Not that X, but Y.
“Not that traditional mass communication disappeared, but it's also been reshaped.”
先排除一个可能的误读,再给出准确说法。学术写作中常用于精确限定论点,避免被过度解读。
4. Wherever there is X, there is Y.
“Wherever there is domination, there is resistance to domination.”
用 wherever 引导的普遍陈述句,把经验观察上升为规律。语气笃定,适合提出核心命题,但要确保命题经得起反例。
5. If you are X, that's a problem. But if you are Y, you ….
“If you are the messenger, that's a problem. But if you are the message, you live forever.”
两个平行条件句形成对照,靠词形相近的 messenger 与 message 制造记忆点。仿写时选一对同根词或近音词效果最好。
6. Doing X in the long run is more effective than doing Y.
“Shaping the minds in the long run is more effective than torturing the bodies.”
动名词短语作主语的比较结构,in the long run 限定时间尺度。适合表达策略层面的优劣判断,仿写注意两个动名词短语的对称。
7. whatever + adj., whatever + adj., …
“Whatever distorted, whatever exaggerated, whatever enraged sometimes”
省略了 however 从句的让步排比,口语中常见。连用三个 whatever 表示「不管多么……」,先承认缺陷再坚持判断,是说服性演讲的常用让步手法。
8. You can take X as A or as B.
“You can take massive unemployment as a tragedy or as an opportunity.”
用 take … as 提供两种解读框架,暗示选择权在听者。适合重新框定负面事实,仿写时 A 与 B 应是同一事实的两种评价。
9. …, let alone ….
“Including comedians, and let alone even the Congress”
let alone 接更极端的例子,意为「更不用说」。前面通常是否定或递进语境,此处讲者用法略松,标准用法如 He can't walk, let alone run。
10. X is one word: Y.
“The cultural definition of internet is one word, autonomy.”
先宣告「只有一个词」制造悬念,再抛出关键词。演讲收尾的高效句式,仿写时关键词要真的承载得起前面的全部论证。
词汇精讲 · 136 · 按出现顺序
mind-expanding /ˈmaɪnd ɪkˌspændɪŋ/ adj. 0:24
开阔思路的、拓展视野的
none other than phr. 1:17
正是、不是别人而是(强调身份出人意料或显赫)
endowment /ɪnˈdaʊmənt/ n. 1:17
捐赠基金(尤指给大学、机构的永久性资金)
venue /ˈvenjuː/ n. 1:17
场所、平台
symposia /sɪmˈpoʊziə/ n. 1:54
学术研讨会(symposium 的复数)
emeritus /ɪˈmerɪtəs/ adj. 3:07
荣休的(放在职称后,如 professor emeritus)
illuminated /ɪˈluːmɪneɪtɪd/ v. 4:37
阐明、揭示(原义照亮)
co-evolved /ˌkoʊ ɪˈvɑːlvd/ v. 4:37
共同演化
fabric of society phr. 5:31
社会肌理、社会结构(fabric 本义织物)
virality /vaɪˈræləti/ n. 6:17
病毒式传播性
relentless /rɪˈlentləs/ adj. 7:11
持续不断的、不松懈的
mobilization /ˌmoʊbələˈzeɪʃn/ n. 7:11
(社会、政治)动员
footage /ˈfʊtɪdʒ/ n. 8:02
影像素材、镜头画面(不可数)
savagely /ˈsævɪdʒli/ adv. 8:02
野蛮地、残暴地
cope with phr. 8:02
应付、处理(困难局面)
outrage /ˈaʊtreɪdʒ/ n. 9:02
义愤、愤慨
humiliation /hjuːˌmɪliˈeɪʃn/ n. 9:02
屈辱、羞辱
transcends /trænˈsendz/ v. 9:02
超越(界限、范畴)
empirical /ɪmˈpɪrɪkl/ adj. 10:03
实证的、基于观察和经验的
tentative /ˈtentətɪv/ adj. 11:14
试探性的、暂定的
grounded theory phr. 11:14
扎根理论(社会学方法:从数据中归纳理论)
in a nutshell phr. 12:03
简而言之、一言以蔽之
foundational /faʊnˈdeɪʃənl/ adj. 12:03
奠基性的、根本的
monopoly /məˈnɑːpəli/ n. 12:58
垄断、独占
coercion /koʊˈɜːrʒn/ n. 13:58
强制、胁迫
hegemony /hɪˈdʒeməni/ n. 13:58
霸权、支配地位(cultural hegemony 文化霸权)
permeate /ˈpɜːrmieɪt/ v. 14:48
渗透、弥漫
intimidation /ɪnˌtɪmɪˈdeɪʃn/ n. 14:48
恐吓、威慑
framing /ˈfreɪmɪŋ/ n. 14:48
框架设定(认知科学与政治传播术语)
domination /ˌdɑːmɪˈneɪʃn/ n. 15:51
支配、统治
stock of knowledge phr. 17:44
知识存量、既有知识储备
incarnations /ˌɪnkɑːrˈneɪʃnz/ n. 19:06
化身、具体形态
multimodal /ˌmʌltiˈmoʊdl/ adj. 19:45
多模态的(文字、图像、声音等多种形式并用)
tonalities /toʊˈnælətiz/ n. 21:42
色调、倾向(此处指政治色彩)
patriarchalism /ˌpeɪtriˈɑːrkəlɪzəm/ n. 21:42
父权制、家长制
normative /ˈnɔːrmətɪv/ adj. 22:24
规范性的、作价值判断的(与 descriptive 相对)
enraged /ɪnˈreɪdʒd/ adj. 22:24
被激怒的
deterioration /dɪˌtɪriəˈreɪʃn/ n. 23:59
恶化、退化
vis-a-vis /ˌviːz ɑː ˈviː/ prep. 23:59
相对于、面对(法语借词,书面语)
responsive /rɪˈspɑːnsɪv/ adj. 23:59
有回应的、反应积极的
concur /kənˈkɜːr/ v. 24:53
同时发生;(意见)一致
nuance /ˈnuːɑːns/ n. 24:53
细微差别
take matters into their own hands phr. 24:53
自己动手解决、不再依赖他人
delegitimizing /ˌdiːlɪˈdʒɪtəmaɪzɪŋ/ v. 25:38
使失去正当性
legitimacy /lɪˈdʒɪtɪməsi/ n. 26:25
合法性、正当性
programmatic /ˌproʊɡrəˈmætɪk/ adj. 27:04
纲领性的、有明确计划的
affective /əˈfektɪv/ adj. 27:04
情感的(心理学术语,区别于 effective)
repressor /rɪˈpresər/ n. 28:10
抑制物、压制因素
heirs /erz/ n. 29:00
继承者(h 不发音)
cowards /ˈkaʊərdz/ n. 29:00
懦夫、胆小鬼
self-preservation /ˌself ˌprezərˈveɪʃn/ n. 29:00
自我保存、求生本能
fatality /fəˈtæləti/ n. 29:00
宿命、不可避免之事(此处非「死亡事故」义)
avoidance /əˈvɔɪdəns/ n. 29:46
回避、躲避
potent /ˈpoʊtnt/ adj. 30:36
强有力的、效力强的
autonomous /ɔːˈtɑːnəməs/ adj. 31:26
自主的、不受外部控制的
surveilled /sərˈveɪld/ v. 32:17
监视、监控(surveil 由 surveillance 逆构)
assembly /əˈsembli/ n. 33:46
装配、组装(assembly factory 流水线工厂)
synthesize /ˈsɪnθəsaɪz/ v. 34:48
综合、归纳
laundry list phr. 35:25
一长串清单(略带琐碎意味)
pamphlet /ˈpæmflət/ n. 36:46
小册子、传单
preachers /ˈpriːtʃərz/ n. 36:46
布道者、传教士
provocation /ˌprɑːvəˈkeɪʃn/ n. 37:26
挑衅、故意激怒
blogosphere /ˈblɑːɡəsfɪr/ n. 38:24
博客圈
at large phr. 38:24
整体上、总体而言(society at large 整个社会)
decentered /ˌdiːˈsentərd/ adj. 39:20
去中心的
open-ended /ˌoʊpən ˈendɪd/ adj. 39:20
开放式的、无预设终点的
vulnerability /ˌvʌlnərəˈbɪləti/ n. 40:01
脆弱性、易受攻击性
rhizomatic /ˌraɪzoʊˈmætɪk/ adj. 40:01
根茎状的(哲学术语:无中心、多点相连的结构)
bureaucratization /bjʊˌrɑːkrətəˈzeɪʃn/ n. 40:43
官僚化
flamed /fleɪmd/ v. 40:43
(网络用语)被群起炮轰、围攻
togetherness /təˈɡeðərnəs/ n. 41:23
团聚感、在一起的感觉
bonding /ˈbɑːndɪŋ/ n. 41:23
情感联结的形成
tactically /ˈtæktɪkli/ adv. 43:02
战术上、策略上
spontaneous /spɑːnˈteɪniəs/ adj. 45:18
自发的
indignation /ˌɪndɪɡˈneɪʃn/ n. 45:18
义愤、愤慨
self-immolation /ˌself ˌɪməˈleɪʃn/ n. 45:18
自焚
savagery /ˈsævɪdʒri/ n. 45:18
野蛮行径、残暴
subservient /səbˈsɜːrviənt/ adj. 45:59
屈从的、卑躬屈膝的(subservient to)
bailed out phr. 46:50
(用公款)纾困、救助
have the governments in their pocket phr. 46:50
把政府攥在手心、操控政府
brutalized /ˈbruːtəlaɪzd/ v. 47:24
残暴对待
deliberation /dɪˌlɪbəˈreɪʃn/ n. 48:14
商议、审议(政治哲学术语)
horizontality /ˌhɔːrɪzɑːnˈtæləti/ n. 48:52
横向性、无等级结构
solidarity /ˌsɑːlɪˈdærəti/ n. 48:52
团结、声援
undermining /ˌʌndərˈmaɪnɪŋ/ v. 48:52
削弱、逐渐破坏
grassroots /ˈɡræsruːts/ adj. 49:37
草根的、基层的
get fed up phr. 49:37
受够了、厌烦
blockage /ˈblɑːkɪdʒ/ n. 49:37
阻塞、僵局
mantra /ˈmæntrə/ n. 50:30
口头禅、反复念叨的信条(原为梵语咒语)
self-reflective /ˌself rɪˈflektɪv/ adj. 51:08
自我反思的
flurry /ˈflɜːri/ n. 51:08
一阵密集涌现(a flurry of proposals)
massacring /ˈmæsəkərɪŋ/ v. 52:26
屠杀
contending /kənˈtendɪŋ/ adj. 53:12
交战的、争夺的
fracturing /ˈfræktʃərɪŋ/ v. 53:12
分裂、碎裂
elaborating /ɪˈlæbəreɪtɪŋ/ v. 54:27
起草、详细制定
blatant /ˈbleɪtnt/ adj. 55:15
赤裸裸的、明目张胆的
consolidate /kənˈsɑːlɪdeɪt/ v. 55:15
整合、合并
agroecological /ˌæɡroʊˌiːkəˈlɑːdʒɪkl/ adj. 55:54
生态农业的
bourgeois /ˌbʊrˈʒwɑː/ adj. 57:35
资产阶级的(法语借词)
utopia /juːˈtoʊpiə/ n. 58:10
乌托邦、理想社会
matrixes /ˈmeɪtrɪksɪz/ n. 58:10
母体、孕育之源(matrix 复数,亦作 matrices)
per se /ˌpɜːr ˈseɪ/ adv. 59:09
本身、就其自身而言(拉丁语)
coalition /ˌkoʊəˈlɪʃn/ n. 59:53
联合政府、联盟
crowd-sourced /ˈkraʊd sɔːrst/ v. 59:53
众包(向公众征集内容或意见)
sovereign debt phr. 1:00:51
主权债务、国债
go belly up phr. 1:00:51
破产、垮掉(口语,源于死鱼肚皮朝上)
get away with phr. 1:01:39
做了坏事而逃脱惩罚
fall apart phr. 1:02:19
分崩离析、瓦解
go with the flow phr. 1:03:03
随大流、顺势而为
raison d'être /ˌreɪzoʊn ˈdetrə/ n. 1:03:36
存在理由(法语借词)
think tank phr. 1:04:27
智库
diffusing /dɪˈfjuːzɪŋ/ v. 1:04:27
传播、扩散
cleavage /ˈkliːvɪdʒ/ n. 1:05:19
(社会)分裂、鸿沟(政治学术语)
demagoguery /ˈdeməɡɑːɡəri/ n. 1:05:19
煽动、蛊惑人心
let alone phr. 1:05:19
更不用说
productivist /prəˈdʌktɪvɪst/ adj. 1:07:32
生产主义的(以产出衡量一切价值)
boycotts /ˈbɔɪkɑːts/ n. 1:09:46
抵制
tame /teɪm/ v. 1:10:35
驯服、控制住
at the expense of phr. 1:10:35
以……为代价
credit unions phr. 1:11:16
信用合作社(会员所有的非营利金融机构)
cooperative /koʊˈɑːpərətɪv/ n. 1:11:49
合作社
concur with phr. 1:13:19
同意、赞同(某人观点)
degrowth /diːˈɡroʊθ/ n. 1:14:09
去增长(主张主动缩减经济规模的思潮)
tectonic /tekˈtɑːnɪk/ adj. 1:15:01
地壳构造的;引申为根本性的、巨大的(tectonic change)
speculative /ˈspekjələtɪv/ adj. 1:15:01
投机的
espousing /ɪˈspaʊzɪŋ/ v. 1:16:19
信奉、主张(理论、事业)
homogeneity /ˌhoʊmədʒəˈniːəti/ n. 1:17:10
同质性
cosmopolitan /ˌkɑːzməˈpɑːlɪtn/ adj. 1:17:10
世界主义的、四海一家的
expropriated /eksˈproʊprieɪtɪd/ v. 1:18:37
剥夺、征用
participatory /pɑːrˈtɪsəpətɔːri/ adj. 1:19:09
参与式的
scale up phr. 1:19:50
扩大规模
hypothetical /ˌhaɪpəˈθetɪkl/ adj. 1:21:59
假设性的
embedded /ɪmˈbedɪd/ adj. 1:22:35
嵌入的、内嵌于……之中的
advocacy /ˈædvəkəsi/ n. 1:23:39
倡导、游说(advocacy group 倡导团体)
magic potion phr. 1:23:39
灵丹妙药、万能药水
autonomy /ɔːˈtɑːnəmi/ n. 1:24:37
自主、自治
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