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第 37 期 · 回应 Ⅱ·10「真理是客观，还是共识？」
Taking Time Seriously: Richard Rorty on Philosophy (1994)
节目发布 2021-10-31章节 · 点击跳转视频
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哲学从逃离时间到认真对待时间
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从祭司圣贤到工程师医生
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杜威：哲学是新旧信念的中介
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三个冲突：新科学、达尔文、大众民主
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杜威与罗素：手段之争而非目的之争
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去专业化与反基础主义的陷阱
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三种危险：先锋、经院、沙文
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诚实中间人与非自满的世界主义
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全球民主乌托邦与温和说服
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从真理的仆人到民主的仆人
本期讲者
理查德·罗蒂美国哲学家（1931–2007），新实用主义代表人物，曾任普林斯顿、弗吉尼亚、斯坦福大学教授。代表作《哲学与自然之镜》（1979）、《偶然、反讽与团结》（1989），主张放弃「作为自然之镜」的知识论，把哲学理解为文化对话与社会希望的工具。
01哲学从逃离时间到认真对待时间
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philosophers became preoccupied with images of the future only after they gave up hope of attaining knowledge of the Eternal philosophy began as an attempt to escape into a world in which nothing would ever change the first philosophers assumed that the difference between the flux of the past and the Flux Of The Future would be negligible only as they began to take time seriously did their hopes for the future of this world gradually replace their desire for knowledge of another world Hans blumenberg has suggested that European philosophers began to lose interest in the Eternal toward the end of the Middle Ages and that the 16th century the century of Bruno and bacon was the period in which philosophers began trying to take time seriously blumenberg is probably right but this loss of SE this loss of interest in the Eternal only became fully self-conscious in the 19th century this was the period in which Western philosophy under the agis of Hegel developed detailed and explicit doubts not only about platonic attempts
哲学家们是在放弃了获得永恒之知识的希望之后，才开始沉迷于关于未来的种种图景哲学最初是一种试图逃入某个一切都永不改变的世界的尝试。最早的哲学家们假定过去之流变与未来之流变的差别是微不足道的。只有当他们开始认真对待时间，他们对这个世界之未来的希望才逐渐取代了他们对另一个世界之知识的渴求汉斯·布鲁门伯格曾提出，欧洲哲学家大约在中世纪末期开始对永恒失去兴趣而16世纪，也就是布鲁诺和培根的那个世纪，正是哲学家们开始试图认真对待时间的时期。布鲁门伯格大概是对的，但这种对永恒的兴趣的丧失，直到19世纪才变得完全自觉。正是在这一时期，西方哲学在黑格尔的旗帜下，发展出了细致而明确的怀疑——不仅怀疑柏拉图式的逃离时间的企图，也怀疑康德式的那种为时间性现象寻找非历史性
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to escape from Tom time but about Conan projects of discovering ahistorical conditions for the possibility of temporal phenomena it was also the period in which it became possible thanks to Darwin for human beings to see themselves as continuous with the rest of nature as temporal and contingent through and through but none the worse for that the combined influence of Hegel and Darwin moved philosophy away from the question what are we to the question might what might we try to become this shift has had consequences for the philosophers image of themselves whereas Plato and even Kant hoped to survey the society and the culture within which they lived from an outside standpoint the standpoint of ineluctable and changeless Truth later philosophers have gradually abandoned such hopes just in so far as we take time seriously we philosophers have to give up the priority of contemplation to action we have to agree with Marx that our job is to help make the future different from the p past rather than
可能性条件的方案。也正是在这一时期，多亏了达尔文，人类才有可能把自己看作与自然界的其余部分连续一体的存在，彻头彻尾是时间性的、偶然的，但也并不因此就更糟黑格尔与达尔文的合力，把哲学从“我们是什么”这个问题，推向了“我们可以尝试成为什么”这个问题。这一转变对哲学家的自我形象产生了后果：柏拉图，甚至康德，都曾希望从一个外部的立场——一个不可回避且永不改变的真理的立场——来俯察他们身处其中的社会与文化而后来的哲学家们逐渐放弃了这样的希望。只要我们认真对待时间，我们这些哲学家就不得不放弃把沉思提升到行动的优先地位，我们就必须同意马克思的看法：我们的任务是帮助未来变得不同于过去，而不是
02从祭司圣贤到工程师医生
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attempting to know what the future must necessarily have in common with the past we have to shift from the kind of role which philosophers have shared with priests and sages to a social role more like that of the engineer or the doctor whereas priests and sages can set their own agendas contemporary philosophers like engineers and doctors must find out what their clients need since Plato invented philosophy precisely in order to escape from transitory needs and to rise above politics taking time Hegel and Darwin seriously has often been described as giving up on philosophy or ending philosophy but giving up on Plato and Kant is not the same as giving up on Philosophy for we can give better descriptions of what Plato and Kant were doing than they were able to give themselves we can describe them as responding to the need to replace a human self-image which had been made obsolete by social and cultural change with a new self-image a self a self-image better adapted to the results of those
试图去认识未来必然与过去共有哪些东西。我们必须转变——从哲学家一直以来与祭司和圣贤共享的那种角色，转向一种更接近工程师或医生的社会角色。祭司和圣贤可以自己设定议程，而当代哲学家就像工程师和医生一样，必须去弄清楚他们的服务对象需要什么。既然柏拉图发明哲学，恰恰是为了逃离一时的需求、超越政治，那么认真对待黑格尔和达尔文，就常常被描述为放弃哲学或终结哲学。但放弃柏拉图和康德，并不等于放弃哲学，因为对于柏拉图和康德所做的事情，我们能给出比他们自己所能给出的更好的描述。我们可以把他们描述为在回应一种需求：去替换一种人类的自我形象，这种自我形象曾经是因社会和文化变迁而过时，代之以一种新的自我形象——一种更能适应那些变化所带来的结果的自我形象
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changes we can add that philosophy cannot possibly end until social and cultural change ends for such changes gradually render large scale descriptions of ourselves and our situation Obsolete and create the need for new language in which to formulate new descriptions only a society without politics that is to say a society run by tyrants who prevent social and cultural change from occurring would not require philosophers in societies where there is no politics philosophers can only be priests in the service of a state religion in free societies there will always be a need for their services for such societ is never stopped changing and hence never stop making old vocabularies obsolete John Dewey a philosopher who like Marx admired Hegel and Darwin equally suggested that in the course of dropping the self-image common to Plato and Kant the image of the knower of unconditional ahistorical Necessities we should shall come to see philosophy as springing from what Dewey called a conflict of inherited
我们可以补充说，只要社会和文化的变迁不停止，哲学就不可能终结，因为这类变迁会逐渐使那些大规模的关于我们自身及我们处境的描述变得过时，并催生出对新语言的需求，以便用它来表述新的描述。只有一个没有政治的社会——也就是由暴君统治、阻止社会和文化变迁发生的社会——才不需要哲学家。在没有政治的社会里，哲学家只能是为国家宗教服务的祭司。而在自由社会中，人们永远都需要哲学家的服务，因为这样的社会从不停止变化，因而也从不停止让旧的语汇变得过时。约翰·杜威，一位这样的哲学家……就像马克思推崇黑格尔一样，达尔文同样暗示：在我们抛弃柏拉图和康德所共有的那种自我形象——即认识无条件的、非历史的必然性者的形象——的过程中，我们将会把哲学看作源自杜威所说的那种冲突：继承下来的制度与互不相容的当代趋势之间的冲突。杜威说，那些
03杜威：哲学是新旧信念的中介
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institutions with incompatible contemporary Tendencies dwey said that which may be pretentiously unreal when formulated in metaphysical distinctions becomes intensely significant when connected with the struggle of social beliefs and ideals dwey took serously hegel's famous remark that philosophy paints its gray on Gray only when a form of life has grown old for Dewey that meant that philosophy is always parasitic on is always a reaction to developments elsewhere in culture and Society dwey construed hegel's insistence on historicity as the claim that philosophers should not try to be the onard of society and culture but should be content to mediate between the past and the future their job is to weave together old beliefs and new beliefs so that these beliefs can cooperate rather than interfere with one another like the engineer and the doctor the philosopher is useful in solving particular problems that arise in particulars situations situations in which the language of the past is in conflict with
用形而上学区分表述出来时显得故作高深、不切实际的东西，一旦与社会信念和理想的斗争联系起来，就变得极为重要。杜威认真对待了黑格尔那句名言：哲学只有在一种生活形式已经衰老之后，才把它的灰色画在灰色之上。对杜威来说，这意味着哲学永远是寄生性的，永远是对文化与社会中别处发生的变化的一种反应。杜威把黑格尔对历史性的强调理解为这样一个主张：哲学家不应试图充当社会与文化的先锋队，而应满足于在过去与未来之间做中介。他们的工作是把旧信念与新信念编织在一起，使这些信念能够彼此配合而不是相互干扰。就像工程师和医生一样，哲学家的用处在于解决在特定情境中出现的特定问题——在那些情境里，过去的语言与未来的需要发生了冲突。让我举三个这类冲突的例子。第一个是需要
04三个冲突：新科学、达尔文、大众民主
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the needs of the future let me offer three examples of such conflict the first is the need to reconcile the moral intuitions clothed in the language of Christian theology with the new scientific world picture which emerged in the 17th century in that century and and the next European philosophers tried to find a way of seeing moral intuitions as something other than the commands of an atemporal yet anthrop anthropomorphic deity a Divinity whose existence was hard to reconcile with the mechanized world picture offered by Galileo and Newton seen from this angle liet's K and Hegel systems are so many suggestions about how to reconcile Christian ethics and cernic and Galilean science how to keep these two good things from interfering with one another my second example is the darwinian suggestion that we think of human beings as more complex animals rather than as animals with an extra added ingredient called intellect or the rational soul this suggestion cast doubt not only on the hope to escape from time but on the
把披着基督教神学语言外衣的道德直觉，同十七世纪出现的新的科学世界图景调和起来。在那个世纪以及随后的世纪里，欧洲哲学家试图找到一种方式，把道德直觉看作某种不同于一位超时间却又拟人化的神祇之诫命的东西——这样一位神的存在很难与伽利略和牛顿提供的机械化世界图景相调和。从这个角度看，莱布尼茨、康德和黑格尔的体系不过是关于如何调和基督教伦理与哥白尼—伽利略科学的种种建议，是关于如何让这两样好东西不彼此干扰的建议。我的第二个例子是达尔文式的建议：我们应当把人看作更复杂的动物，而不是看作附加了某种叫做理智或理性灵魂的额外成分的动物。这一建议不仅使人怀疑逃离时间的希望，也使人怀疑认识实在与
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distinction between knowing reality and adapting to reality Darwin made philosophers realized that they would have to redescribe human activities in a way that required no sudden discontinuity in biological evolution this meant redescribing the relation between biological and cultural evolution in a way which blurred the distinction between nature and spirit the distinction which everyone in the west from Plato to Hegel except for occasional eccentrics like Hobbs and Hume had taken for granted the new demands on philosophers created by Darwin's explanation of the origin of humanity were interwoven with those created by my third example of extra philosophic iCal novelty the emergence of mass democracy unlike the first two this third novelty came from political experience rather than from scientific Ingenuity Mass democracy the successful working out in practice of the suggestion that all those affected by political decision should have the power to influence those decisions in danger es the platonic
适应实在之间的区分。达尔文让哲学家意识到，他们必须以一种不要求生物演化中出现突然断裂的方式，重新描述人类的活动。这意味着要重新描述生物演化与文化演化之间的关系，而这种重新描述模糊了自然与精神之间的区分——那是西方从柏拉图到黑格尔的每个人（除了霍布斯和休谟这样偶尔出现的怪人之外）都视为理所当然的区分。达尔文对人类起源的解释给哲学家提出的新要求，与我要举的第三个哲学之外的新事物所提出的要求交织在一起，那就是大众民主的出现。与前两者不同，这第三个新事物来自政治经验，而不是来自科学上的巧思。大众民主，也就是在实践中成功实现了这样一个主张：所有受政治决定影响的人都应当有权力去影响那些决定。它危及了柏拉图式的区分：智者对真理的理性追求
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distinction between the rational Pursuit Of Truth by the wise and the flux of passion characteristic of the many when taken together with Darwin's blurring of the human animal distinction the practice of mass democracy casts doubt on a whole range of further distinctions those between the cognitive and the non-cognitive reason and passion logic and rhetoric truth and utility philosophy and sophistry one of the assignments which the success of mass democracy gave to philosophers was to restate those distinctions in terms of the political difference between free and forced consensus rather than in terms of the metaphysical distinction between the unconditioned and the conditional Dy belon and Whitehead systems were attempts to reach an accommodation with Darwin to keep what was useful in the old dualisms while restating them in Thoroughly temporalized language Russell's and hell's attempts to partition Culture by drawing a line between ariori philosophical questions and aposteriori empirical questions was
与多数人特有的激情之流之间的区分。当它与达尔文对人与动物之区分的模糊化结合在一起时，大众民主的实践就使一整批更进一步的区分变得可疑：认知与非认知、理性与激情、逻辑与修辞、真理与效用、哲学与诡辩之间的区分。大众民主的成功交给哲学家的任务之一，就是用自由共识与强制共识之间的政治差别来重新表述这些区分，而不是用无条件者与有条件者之间的形而上学区分来表述。杜威、柏格森和怀特海的体系都是试图与达尔文达成妥协：保留旧二元论中有用的东西，同时用彻底时间化的语言重新表述它们。罗素和胡塞尔试图通过在先验的哲学问题与后验的经验问题之间划一条线来分割文化，这是另一种同样的尝试。罗素和胡塞尔试图通过这种分割，
05杜威与罗素：手段之争而非目的之争
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was another such attempt Russell and Hell attempted to make a democratic culture safe for transcendental Philosophy by partitioning it thus making Darwin irrelevant to Kant seen in this way the contrast between dwey and Russell or between belon and husel is not a contrast between two attempts to represent our ahistorical nature and situation accurately but rather between two attempts to mediate between historical epochs to reconcile old and new truth dwey and Russell were equally devoted to Newtonian mechanics darwinian biology and mass democracy further neither man thought that philosophy could provide foundations for any of these three both thought that the quest question was how to change familiar ways of speaking so as not to presuppose a metaphysics or a metaphysical psychology which conflicted with any of these three cultural developments there are differences were about means rather than ends about how radically one had to change the descriptions which Plato and Kant had given of themselves in order to preserve
让民主文化对超验哲学不构成威胁，从而使达尔文与康德无关。这样看来，杜威与罗素之间、或柏格森与胡塞尔之间的对比，并不是两种准确再现我们非历史的本性与处境的尝试之间的对比，而是两种在历史时代之间做中介、调和新旧真理的尝试之间的对比。杜威和罗素同样信奉牛顿力学、达尔文生物学和大众民主。而且，两人都不认为哲学能为这三者中的任何一个提供基础。两人都认为，问题在于如何改变我们熟悉的说话方式，以免预设某种与这三项文化发展中任何一项相冲突的形而上学或形而上学心理学。他们的分歧在于手段而非目的：在于为了保留柏拉图和康德著作中有用的成分、同时抛弃已经过时的东西，
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the useful elements in their work while discarding what had become obsolete if we adopt dy's image of the Philosopher's task however we have to drop both the Marxist distinction between science and ideology and the distinction deployed by Russell and husel between the AR priori and the aposteriori more generally we have to drop every attempt to keep philosophy as autonomous and activity as it had been thought to be before philosophers began taking time seriously Dewey but not Russell can adopt Lock's suggestion that the role of the philosopher is that of an under laborer clearing away the rubbish of the past in order to make room for the constructions of the future but dwey would have conceded I think that the philosopher can occasionally combine this role of janitor with the role of prophet such a combination was found both in bacon and deart both attempted to clear away Aristotelian rubbish to make room for visions of utopian future similarly dwi's attempt to get philosophy out from under Kant Hoss's
必须多么彻底地改变他们对自身所作的描述。然而，如果我们采纳杜威关于哲学家任务的形象，我们就得既抛弃马克思主义关于科学与意识形态的区分，也抛弃罗素和胡塞尔所使用的先验与后验的区分。更一般地说，我们必须放弃一切把哲学维持为一种自主活动的企图——即维持成哲学家开始认真对待时间之前人们所以为的那种自主活动。杜威（而非罗素）可以采纳洛克的建议：哲学家的角色是一名清道夫式的下手，清除过去的垃圾，为未来的建构腾出空间。不过我想，杜威也会承认，哲学家偶尔可以把这种看门人的角色与先知的角色结合起来。培根和笛卡尔身上就有这样的结合，两人都试图清除亚里士多德式的垃圾，为乌托邦式未来的构想腾出空间。同样，杜威试图让哲学摆脱康德的支配，胡塞尔
06去专业化与反基础主义的陷阱
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attempt to to untangle Philosophy from what he calls the philosophy of Consciousness and dared do attempt to liberate Philosophy from what he calls the metaphysics of presence are intertwined with Prophecies of the fully Democratic Society whose coming such extrication will hasten ceasing to worry about the autonomy of philosophy means among other things no longer longer wanting to draw nice clear lines between philosophical questions and political religious aesthetic or economic questions philosophy cannot play the modest but a cenal role which do we assigned it and will not succeed in taking time seriously unless we philosophers can accept a certain deprofessionalization unless we acquire a certain insuance about the question of when we are doing philosophy and when not we shall have to stop dramatizing ourselves not only in the grandiose way in which Hegel and Marx dramatized themselves but even in the less spectacular ways in which Russell and Hell dramatized themselves if we stop identifying our
试图把哲学从他所说的意识哲学中解脱出来，德里达试图把哲学从他所说的在场形而上学中解放出来，这些努力都与关于一个完全民主的社会的预言交织在一起——这种解脱将加速那个社会的到来。不再操心哲学的自主性，除别的以外，也意味着不再想在哲学问题与政治的、宗教的、审美的或经济的问题之间划出漂亮清晰的界线。哲学无法扮演杜威赋予它的那种谦逊而辅助性的角色，也不会成功地认真对待时间，除非我们哲学家能够接受某种程度的去专业化，除非我们对“什么时候我们在做哲学、什么时候不是”这个问题获得某种满不在乎的态度。我们必须停止把自己戏剧化——不仅要停止黑格尔和马克思那种宏大的自我戏剧化，甚至也要停止罗素和胡塞尔那种不那么惹眼的自我戏剧化。如果我们不再把自己的
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professional habits with rational thought or clear thought we shall be in a better position to Grant Dewey's point that our discipline is no more able to set its own agenda than is engineering or medicine such an admission would help us dispense with the idea that scientific or political developments require philosophical foundations the idea that judgment must remain suspended on the legitimacy of cultural Novelties until we philosophers have pronounced them authentically rational philosophers who specialize in anti-foundationalism however often see themselves as revolutionaries rather than as either rubbish sweepers or Visionaries then unfortunately they become a vangardist they start saying that our language and our culture need radical change before our utopian hopes can be realized and that we philosophers are just the people to initiate such change this insistence on radicality is foundationalism turned on its head it is the insistence that nothing changes until philosophical beliefs
职业习惯等同于理性思考或清晰思考，我们就更有条件承认杜威的观点：我们这门学科并不比工程学或医学更有能力自行设定议程。这样一种承认会帮助我们摆脱这样一种想法：科学或政治的发展需要哲学基础；摆脱这样一种想法：在我们哲学家宣布文化上的新事物确实合乎理性之前，对它们的正当性必须保持悬置判断。然而，专攻反基础主义的哲学家往往把自己看作革命者，而不是清扫垃圾的人或有远见的人。于是，不幸的是，他们变成了先锋派。他们开始说，我们的语言和文化需要激进的变革，我们的乌托邦希望才能实现，而我们哲学家正是发起这种变革的合适人选。这种对激进性的坚持其实是把基础主义倒过来：它坚持在哲学信念改变之前什么都不会改变。马克思和海德格尔共有的那种哲学上的
07三种危险：先锋、经院、沙文
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change the philosophical avanguard ism common to Marx and heiger the urge to make all things new to insist that nothing can change unless Everything Changes seems to me one of the Contemporary Tendencies within philosophy which should be discouraged another such tendency is as I've suggested the urge toward professionalization the urge to keep our discipline intact and autonomous by narrow ing its scope this defensive maneuver is apparent whenever one finds a philosopher saying that he intends to confine himself to what he calls the problems of philosophy as if there were a well-known list of such problems a list handed down from heaven and kept intact from generation to generation such an attempt to escape from time and change to forget Hegel and to reaffiliation oneself to Plato and Kant is currently wide spread in the anglophone philosophical Community the community which describes itself as practicing analytic philosophy Hillary putam seems to me right in saying that much analytic philosophy has degenerated into quarrels
先锋派做派——那种要让一切焕然一新、坚持除非一切都改变否则什么都改变不了的冲动——在我看来是哲学内部应当被抑制的当代趋势之一。另一种这样的趋势，正如我已经说过的，是走向专业化的冲动：通过缩小学科范围来保持它的完整与自主。每当有哲学家说他打算把自己限制在他所谓的“哲学问题”上，仿佛存在一份众所周知的问题清单——一份从天上传下来、代代原封不动保存的清单——这种防御性的动作就昭然若揭。这种试图逃离时间与变化、忘掉黑格尔、重新投靠柏拉图与康德的做法，如今在英语世界的哲学共同体中相当普遍，也就是那个自称在从事分析哲学的共同体。在我看来，希拉里·普特南说得对：许多分析哲学已经退化为哲学教授之间关于各自不同直觉的争吵。
19:25
between philosophy professors differing intuition itions putam says rightly I think that these intuitions are about questions which have neither practical nor spiritual significance the desire to harmonize pre-existent intuitions has in this sphere replaced the task of asking whether the vocabulary in which these intuitions were stated is still a useful one this refusal reinforces the conviction that philosophical problems are Eternal and there thereby suited to be studied by a professionalized discipline which works independently of Social and cultural changes such a refusal and such a conviction were characteristic of the period in the history of philosophy we now refer to as decadent scholasticism whenever philosophers begin to Pride themselves on the autonomy of their discipline the danger of such scholasticism will recur just as much anglophone philosophy has become over professionalized non-anglophone philosophy has frequently become overambitious and avanguard in authors like heiger and
普特南说——我认为他说得对——这些直觉所涉及的问题既无实践意义也无精神意义。在这个领域里，把既有的直觉调和一致的愿望，取代了这样一项任务：追问表述这些直觉所用的词汇是否仍然有用。这种拒绝强化了这样一种信念：哲学问题是永恒的，因而适合由一门独立于社会与文化变迁运作的专业化学科来研究。这样的拒绝和这样的信念，正是哲学史上我们如今称为“衰颓的经院哲学”的那个时期的特征。每当哲学家开始以自己学科的自主性自豪，这种经院哲学的危险就会重现。正如英语世界的哲学变得过度专业化一样，非英语世界的哲学也常常变得过于雄心勃勃、过于先锋。在海德格尔和福柯这样的作者那里，这类哲学提供的是
20:51
Fuko this kind of philosophy offers radical critique the sort of critique which marks our offered of the so-called bis culture of the 19th century such critique tends to be offered in the tones of contempt and disdain which the marxists have made so familiar distrust of both the Scholastic character of analytic philosophy and the impossibly high pretentions of avangard non-analytic philosophy has however led to a third Danger that of chauvinism occasionally one finds philosophers saying that their own country requires a distinctive philosophy that each Nation needs a philosophy of its own to express its own unique experience just as it needs its own national anthem and its own flag but whereas novelists and Poets can usefully create a national literature a literature in which the Youth of a Nation can find embedded A Narrative of the emergence and development of the country of which they are citizens I doubt that there is any analogist task to be performed by philosophers we philosophers are good
激进批判，就是马克思对十九世纪所谓资产阶级文化所作的那种批判。这类批判往往以马克思主义者让我们如此熟悉的那种轻蔑和不屑的口吻发出。然而，既不信任分析哲学的经院气，也不信任先锋的非分析哲学那种高得离谱的自命不凡，这又导致了第三种危险：沙文主义。人们偶尔会发现有哲学家说，他们自己的国家需要一种独特的哲学；说每个民族都需要一种属于自己的哲学来表达自己独特的经验，就像它需要自己的国歌和国旗一样。但是，小说家和诗人可以有益地创造一种民族文学，一种让一个民族的青年从中读到关于自己作为公民的国家如何出现与发展的叙事的文学；而我怀疑哲学家是否有任何类似的任务可做。我们哲学家擅长的
08诚实中间人与非自满的世界主义
22:15
rather at Building Bridges between nations at Cosmopolitan initiatives not at telling chauvinist stories when we do tell such stories they tend to be be very bad ones like the stories which Hegel and haiger told the Germans stories about the superior relation in which Germany stood to a supernatural Force I hope that we philosophy professors can find a way to avoid all three Temptations the Revolutionary urge to see philosophy as an Agent of Change rather than a Reconciliation the Scholastic urge to retreat Within disciplinary boundaries and the chauvinist urge it seems to me that we might do so if we adopted Dewey's notion of our job as one of reconciling the old with the new and our professional function as that of an honest broker between the generations between areas of cultural activity and between traditions this sort of reconcil activity however cannot be carried out in the manner of the complacent cosmopolitanism which is content with the status quo and defends it in the name of cultural diversity or
是在民族之间搭桥，是世界主义的倡议，而不是讲沙文主义的故事。当我们真的讲这类故事时，它们往往非常糟糕，比如黑格尔和海德格尔讲给德国人听的那些故事，那些关于德国与某种超自然力量之间有着优越关系的故事。我希望我们这些哲学教授能找到办法避开这三种诱惑：把哲学看作变革的推动者而非调和者的革命冲动；退回到学科边界之内的经院冲动；以及沙文主义的冲动。在我看来，如果我们采纳杜威的看法——我们的工作是调和新旧，我们的职业功能是在代际之间、在各文化活动领域之间、在各种传统之间充当诚实的中间人——我们或许就能做到这一点。然而，这种调和活动不能以那种自满的世界主义方式来进行——那种满足于现状、并以文化多样性或多元文化主义之名
23:44
multiculturalism such complacent cosmopolitanism was prudently and respectfully silent about stalinism and nowadays it remains prudently and respectfully silent about religious fundamentalis ISM and about the bloodstained autocrats who still rule much of the world the most contemptible form of this cosmopolitanism is a sort which explains that human rights are all very well for eurocentric cultures but that an efficient secret police with subservient judges professors and journalists at its disposal in addition to efficient torturers is better suited to the needs of other cultures the alternative to this Furious and self-deceptive kind of cosmopolitanism is one with a clear image of a specific Cosmopolitan human future the image of a planet-wide democracy a global society in which torture or the closing down of a university or a newspaper on the other side of the world is as much a cause for outrage as when it happens at home this future Cosmopolis may be in nonpolitical matters as Multicultural
为现状辩护的世界主义。这种自满的世界主义曾经对斯大林主义保持审慎而恭敬的沉默，如今它依然对宗教原教旨主义、对那些至今仍统治着世界大部分地区的血腥独裁者保持审慎而恭敬的沉默。这种世界主义最可鄙的形式，是那种声称人权对欧洲中心的文化来说固然很好，但对别的文化而言，一支高效的秘密警察——手里握着唯命是从的法官、教授和记者，再加上高效的施刑者——才更适合其需要的说法。这种虚假而自欺的世界主义的替代选择，是一种对某个具体的世界主义人类未来有清晰构想的世界主义：一个全球性民主的构想，一个这样的全球社会——在地球另一端发生的酷刑，或一所大学、一份报纸被关闭，同样会引起义愤，就像它发生在本国一样。这个未来的世界城邦，在非政治的事务上也许仍像以往一样多元、异质，但在这个
09全球民主乌托邦与温和说服
25:08
and heterogeneous as ever but in this utopian future cultural Traditions will have seized to have an influence on political decisions in politics there will be only one tradition that of constant vigilance against the predictable attempts by the rich and strong to take advantage of the poor and weak cultural tradition will never be permitted to override John rs's difference principle never permitted to excuse inequality of opportunity if such a Utopia should ever come into being we philosophers will probably have had a marginal though minor role in creating it for just as St Thomas aquinus had to mediate between the Old Testament and Aristotle and as Kant had to mediate between the New Testament and Newton and as bergon and dwey had to mediate between Plato and Darwin and as Gandhi and Nero had to mediate between the language of Lo and Mill and that of the Bhagavad Gita so somebody will have had to mediate between the egalitarian language of this utopian politics and the explicitly inegalitarian language of many different
乌托邦式的未来里，文化传统将不再对政治决定产生影响。在政治上只会有一种传统：对富人和强者可预料的、要占穷人和弱者便宜的企图保持持续的警惕。永远不允许文化传统压倒约翰·罗尔斯的差别原则，永远不允许它为机会不平等辩护。如果这样一个乌托邦有朝一日真的到来，我们哲学家在创造它的过程中大概只起了边缘的、次要的作用。因为，正如圣托马斯·阿奎那必须在《旧约》与亚里士多德之间做中介，正如康德必须在《新约》与牛顿之间做中介，正如柏格森和杜威必须在柏拉图与达尔文之间做中介，正如甘地和尼赫鲁必须在洛克与密尔的语言和《薄伽梵歌》的语言之间做中介，总得有人在这种乌托邦政治的平等主义语言与许多不同文化传统中明确的
26:34
cultural Traditions somebody will have had to gently and patiently weave egalitarian politics into the language of traditions which insist on a distinction between the rational or inspired wise and the disorderly confused many somebody will have had to persuade us to abandon our habits of basing political decisions on the difference between people like us the Paradigm human beings and dubious cases of humanity for example foreigners infidels Untouchables women homosexuals half breeds and cripples such distinctions are built into our cultural traditions and thus into our vocabularies of moral Liberation but Utopia will not arrive until the peoples of the world become persuaded that such distinctions do not matter this persuasion is going to be gradual and gentle and peacemeal not revolutionary and wholesale but such gentle and gradual persuasion is possible for even though Mass democracy may be a specifically European invention the idea of a democratic Cosmopolis finds resonance everywhere in
不平等主义语言之间做中介。总得有人温和而耐心地把平等主义政治编织进那些坚持要区分理性的或受启示的智者与混乱迷惑的芸芸众生的传统语言之中。总得有人劝说我们放弃这样的习惯：把政治决定建立在“像我们这样的人”——典型的人类——与那些可疑的人类个案之间的差别之上，比如外国人、异教徒、贱民、女人、同性恋者、混血儿和残疾人。这类区分已经嵌入我们的文化传统，因而也嵌入我们道德解放的词汇之中。但乌托邦不会到来，除非世界各民族被说服相信这类区分无关紧要。这种说服将是渐进的、温和的、零敲碎打的，而不是革命性的、全面的，但这种温和渐进的说服是可能的，因为尽管大众民主也许是一项特属于欧洲的发明，民主世界城邦的理念却在世界各地引起共鸣。在每一种文化传统内部，
28:04
the world within each cultural tradition there are stories of the many seeing farther than the wise of the tradition sanction cruelty of the high yielding to the sense of Injustice felt by the low within every such tradition there are stories of successful intermarriage with members of despised groups of ancient hatreds overcome by patience and civility every culture no matter how parochial contains material which can be woven into utopian images of a planet-wide democratic political Community it is self-contradictory to think of imposing democracy by force rather than persuasion of forcing men and women to be free but it is not self-contradictory to think of persuading them to be free if we philosophers still have a function it is just that sort of persuasion once upon a time we thought more about eternity and less about the future than we do now then we defined ourselves as Servants of the truth but recently we have spoken less about truth and more about truthfulness less about bringing truth
都有这样的故事：众人比智者看得更远，传统所认可的残酷向底层所感受到的不公正之感让步。在每一种这样的传统中，都有成功通婚的故事，与被鄙视群体的成员通婚，古老的仇恨被耐心和礼让所化解。每一种文化，无论多么狭隘，都包含着可以被编织进全球性民主政治共同体乌托邦图景的素材。想着用武力而非说服来强加民主，这本身就是自相矛盾的——强迫男男女女获得自由。但想着说服他们去获得自由，却并不自相矛盾。如果我们哲学家还有什么职能的话，那正是这样一种说服。曾几何时，我们更多地思考永恒，而较少思考未来，不像现在这样。那时我们把自己定义为真理的仆人，但最近我们谈论真理少了，谈论真诚多了；较少谈把真理带给权力，而更多谈让权力
10从真理的仆人到民主的仆人
29:33
to power than about keeping power honest I think this is a healthy shift truth is eternal and enduring but it's hard to be sure you've got it truthfulness like freedom is temporal contingent and fragile but you can recognize both when you meet them indeed the freedom Freedom we prize most is the freedom to be honest with one another and not be punished for it in a thoroughly temporalized intellectual world one in which hopes for certainty and changelessness had disappeared all together we philosophers would Define ourselves as Servants of that sort of Freedom as Servants of democracy to think of ourselves in that way would help us avoid the dangers of avang godism of chauvinism and of scholasticism it would be to agree with John dwey that as he said philosophy can profer only hypotheses and these hypotheses are of value only as they render men's Minds more sensitive to the life about them in a fully temporalized intellectual World contributing to such sensitivity would be as respectable a
说实话，我认为这是一个健康的转变。真理是永恒不变的，但你很难确定自己已经掌握了它；而真诚，就像自由一样，是有时间性的、偶然的、脆弱的。不过当你遇到它们时，你能认出这两者。事实上，我们最珍视的自由，正是彼此坦诚相待而不因此受到惩罚的自由。在一个彻底时间化的思想世界里，一个对确定性和永恒不变的期望已经完全消失的世界里，我们哲学家会把自己定义为这种自由的仆人，定义为民主的仆人。这样看待我们自己，将有助于我们避免先锋主义、沙文主义和经院主义的危险。这也就等于赞同约翰·杜威的说法，他说：哲学只能提出假设，而这些假设的价值仅仅在于，它们能让人们的心灵对周遭的生活更加敏感。在一个彻底时间化的思想世界里，为这种敏感做出贡献，将和
30:57
goal for an academic discipline as contributing to knowledge
为知识做出贡献一样，是一门学科同样值得尊敬的目标。
视频总结 · 一句话概括与核心要点
美国新实用主义哲学家理查德·罗蒂1994年的演讲，回应的核心问题是：当哲学放弃对永恒真理的追求、「认真对待时间」之后，哲学家的社会角色应当是什么。
论证脉络
罗蒂先追溯哲学史：哲学起源于柏拉图式「逃离时间」的冲动，16世纪起开始转向未来，19世纪在黑格尔（历史性）和达尔文（人是自然连续体的一部分）的合力下才完全自觉，哲学的问题从「我们是什么」变为「我们可以成为什么」。由此哲学家应放弃「祭司/圣贤」的自设议程，采取「工程师/医生」的服务姿态。
借杜威，他把哲学定义为「在过去与未来之间做中介」——当社会变迁使旧词汇过时，哲学负责编织新旧信念。他举三个历史冲突为例：机械论科学与基督教道德、达尔文与「理性灵魂」、大众民主与柏拉图的智者/众人之分。在此框架下，杜威与罗素之争被降格为「手段之争」。
关键转折
随后罗蒂转向批判：反基础主义者若自封革命者，是「倒转的基础主义」。他点名三种当代危险——先锋主义（马克思、海德格尔）、经院主义（分析哲学的直觉之争）、沙文主义（民族哲学）——并主张哲学家做「诚实的中间人」。但他立即划清界线：世界主义不是为独裁沉默的相对主义，而应有具体的全球民主图景，文化传统不得凌驾罗尔斯差别原则。
结论
哲学家的剩余职能是温和渐进的说服，从「真理的仆人」变为「民主的仆人」：少谈真理，多谈真诚；不是把真理带给权力，而是让权力保持诚实。
核心句型 · 10
1. only after / only as … did …（倒装强调）
“Only as they began to take time seriously did their hopes for the future of this world gradually replace their desire for knowledge of another world”
only 引导的状语置于句首时主句需部分倒装。用于强调某条件是先决前提。仿写：Only when we stopped arguing did the real work begin.
2. X is probably right, but …
“Blumenberg is probably right but this loss of interest in the Eternal only became fully self-conscious in the 19th century”
学术写作中先部分认可他人观点再作限定或推进，语气克制而有分寸。适合综述、评论。仿写：Smith is probably right, but the effect only becomes visible at scale.
3. shift from A to B / move away from … to …
“Moved philosophy away from the question what are we to the question what might we try to become”
描述观念或重心的转变，A、B 可为名词短语或嵌入问句。仿写：The debate has shifted from whether to regulate to how to regulate.
4. giving up on A is not the same as giving up on B
“Giving up on Plato and Kant is not the same as giving up on Philosophy”
用于澄清误解、区分两个容易混淆的命题，后接 for + 理由。仿写：Rejecting the method is not the same as rejecting the goal.
5. X cannot possibly … until …
“Philosophy cannot possibly end until social and cultural change ends”
cannot possibly 加强否定，until 给出唯一终止条件。适合表达结构性必然。仿写：The problem cannot possibly be solved until the incentives change.
6. seen from this angle / seen in this way, …
“Seen from this angle liet's K and Hegel systems are so many suggestions about how to reconcile”
分词短语引出重新解读框架，后接主句给出新描述。so many 此处意为「不过是一些」。仿写：Seen in this way, the crisis was an opportunity.
7. A is B turned on its head
“This insistence on radicality is foundationalism turned on its head”
指某立场是另一立场的颠倒版本，表面相反实质同构。锋利的批评句式。仿写：This policy is austerity turned on its head.
8. just as A had to …, and as B had to …, so somebody will have had to …
“Just as St Thomas aquinus had to mediate between the Old Testament and Aristotle … so somebody will have had to mediate between”
多重平行类比后用 so 引出结论，将来完成时 will have had to 表示回望未来。仿写：Just as X did, and as Y did, so someone will have to …
9. it is self-contradictory to … but it is not self-contradictory to …
“It is self-contradictory to think of imposing democracy by force rather than persuasion … but it is not self-contradictory to think of persuading them to be free”
正反对举，用同一评价词划出界线。适合概念辨析。仿写：It is naive to expect consensus, but not naive to seek it.
10. less about A and more about B
“We have spoken less about truth and more about truthfulness less about bringing truth to power than about keeping power honest”
对比强调重心转移，可叠加使用形成排比。仿写：Good management is less about control and more about trust.
生词精讲 · 122 · 按出现顺序
preoccupied
/priˈɑːkjəpaɪd/
adj.
0:01
全神贯注的，沉迷于（be preoccupied with）
the Eternal
/ɪˈtɜːrnəl/
n.
0:01
永恒者，永恒的事物（哲学用语，指不变的实在）
flux
/flʌks/
n.
0:01
流变，不断的变化（源自赫拉克利特「万物皆流」）
negligible
/ˈneɡlɪdʒəbəl/
adj.
0:01
微不足道的，可忽略的
self-conscious
/ˌselfˈkɑːnʃəs/
adj.
0:01
（此处）自觉的，有明确自我意识的
under the agis of
phr.
0:01
在……的庇护/主导下（aegis，原义为宙斯的神盾；此处转写为 agis）
platonic
/pləˈtɑːnɪk/
adj.
0:01
柏拉图式的，柏拉图哲学的
ahistorical
/ˌeɪhɪˈstɔːrɪkəl/
adj.
1:28
非历史的，脱离历史脉络的
temporal
/ˈtempərəl/
adj.
1:28
时间性的，与时间有关的（对立于 eternal）
contingent
/kənˈtɪndʒənt/
adj.
1:28
偶然的，非必然的（哲学术语，对立于 necessary）
through and through
phr.
1:28
彻头彻尾，完全地
none the worse for that
phr.
1:28
并不因此而更糟
survey
/sərˈveɪ/
v.
1:28
俯瞰，全面审视
ineluctable
/ˌɪnɪˈlʌktəbəl/
adj.
1:28
不可避免的，无法逃避的
in so far as
phr.
1:28
在……的范围内，就……而言
contemplation
/ˌkɑːntəmˈpleɪʃən/
n.
1:28
沉思，静观（与 action 对举）
sages
/seɪdʒɪz/
n.
3:02
圣贤，智者
set their own agendas
phr.
3:02
自行设定议程
transitory
/ˈtrænsətɔːri/
adj.
3:02
短暂的，一时的
obsolete
/ˌɑːbsəˈliːt/
adj.
3:02
过时的，被淘汰的
render
/ˈrendər/
v.
4:37
使成为（render sth obsolete 使……过时）
formulate
/ˈfɔːrmjəleɪt/
v.
4:37
（用语言）表述，制订
tyrants
/ˈtaɪrənts/
n.
4:37
暴君
in the service of
phr.
4:37
为……服务，效力于
vocabularies
/voʊˈkæbjəleriz/
n.
4:37
（罗蒂术语）词汇系统，描述世界的一整套语言
springing from
phr.
4:37
源自，产生于
pretentiously
/prɪˈtenʃəsli/
adv.
6:07
故作高深地，矫饰地
metaphysical
/ˌmetəˈfɪzɪkəl/
adj.
6:07
形而上学的
parasitic on
/ˌpærəˈsɪtɪk/
adj.
6:07
寄生于……的，依赖于……的
construed
/kənˈstruːd/
v.
6:07
理解为，解释为（construe A as B）
historicity
/hɪˌstɔːrˈɪsəti/
n.
6:07
历史性
mediate between
/ˈmiːdieɪt/
phr.
6:07
在……之间做中介、调和
weave together
phr.
6:07
把……编织在一起，融合
reconcile
/ˈrekənsaɪl/
v.
7:35
调和，使一致（reconcile A with B）
clothed in
phr.
7:35
以……为外衣，用……包装
atemporal
/eɪˈtempərəl/
adj.
7:35
超时间的，无时间性的
anthropomorphic
/ˌænθrəpəˈmɔːrfɪk/
adj.
7:35
拟人化的
deity
/ˈdiːəti/
n.
7:35
神，神祇
cast doubt on
phr.
7:35
使人怀疑，令……可疑
discontinuity
/ˌdɪskɑːntəˈnuːəti/
n.
9:06
断裂，不连续
blurred
/blɜːrd/
v.
9:06
模糊（区分）
eccentrics
/ɪkˈsentrɪks/
n.
9:06
怪人，行为离经叛道者
interwoven with
/ˌɪntərˈwoʊvən/
phr.
9:06
与……交织在一起
Ingenuity
/ˌɪndʒəˈnuːəti/
n.
9:06
巧思，独创性
sophistry
/ˈsɑːfɪstri/
n.
10:30
诡辩（源自古希腊智者派）
consensus
/kənˈsensəs/
n.
10:30
共识
the unconditioned
/ˌʌnkənˈdɪʃənd/
n.
10:30
无条件者（康德术语，指不受条件限制的绝对者）
dualisms
/ˈduːəlɪzəmz/
n.
10:30
二元论（如心/物、理性/激情）
partition
/pɑːrˈtɪʃən/
v.
10:30
分割，划分
aposteriori
/ˌeɪ pɒstɪriˈɔːraɪ/
adj.
10:30
后验的（a posteriori，源于经验）
transcendental
/ˌtrænsenˈdentəl/
adj.
11:59
先验的（康德术语）
epochs
/ˈepəks/
n.
11:59
时代，纪元
presuppose
/ˌpriːsəˈpoʊz/
v.
11:59
预设，以……为前提
autonomous
/ɔːˈtɑːnəməs/
adj.
13:28
自主的，自律的
under laborer
n.
13:28
下手，小工（洛克自喻：为科学清理地基的人）
clearing away the rubbish
phr.
13:28
清除垃圾（比喻清扫过时观念）
conceded
/kənˈsiːdɪd/
v.
13:28
承认，让步
janitor
/ˈdʒænɪtər/
n.
13:28
看门人，清洁工
get philosophy out from under
phr.
13:28
让哲学摆脱……的压制
untangle
/ʌnˈtæŋɡəl/
v.
14:58
解开，理清
extrication
/ˌekstrɪˈkeɪʃən/
n.
14:58
解脱，摆脱
hasten
/ˈheɪsən/
v.
14:58
加速，促进
deprofessionalization
/diːprəˌfeʃənələˈzeɪʃən/
n.
14:58
去专业化
insuance
/ˌɪnsuːˈsiːɑːns/
n.
14:58
（应为 insouciance）漫不经心，无所谓的态度
grandiose
/ˈɡrændioʊs/
adj.
14:58
浮夸的，宏大得过分的
dispense with
/dɪˈspens/
phr.
16:27
摒弃，省去
suspended
/səˈspendɪd/
adj.
16:27
悬置的（judgment remain suspended 暂不作判断）
Novelties
/ˈnɑːvəltiz/
n.
16:27
新事物，新奇之物
anti-foundationalism
/ˌæntifaʊnˈdeɪʃənəlɪzəm/
n.
16:27
反基础主义（否认知识需要不可怀疑的基础）
turned on its head
phr.
16:27
被彻底颠倒
discouraged
/dɪsˈkɜːrɪdʒd/
v.
17:56
抑制，劝阻
intact
/ɪnˈtækt/
adj.
17:56
完整无损的
defensive maneuver
/məˈnuːvər/
n.
17:56
防御性动作，策略性防守
confine himself to
/kənˈfaɪn/
phr.
17:56
把自己限制在……
handed down
phr.
17:56
传下来的
anglophone
/ˈæŋɡləfoʊn/
adj.
17:56
英语世界的，说英语的
degenerated into
/dɪˈdʒenəreɪtɪd/
phr.
17:56
退化为，堕落成
harmonize
/ˈhɑːrmənaɪz/
v.
19:25
使协调一致
decadent
/ˈdekədənt/
adj.
19:25
衰颓的，堕落的
scholasticism
/skəˈlæstɪsɪzəm/
n.
19:25
经院哲学；（贬）烦琐哲学
Pride themselves on
phr.
19:25
以……自豪
recur
/rɪˈkɜːr/
v.
19:25
再度出现，重现
overambitious
/ˌoʊvəræmˈbɪʃəs/
adj.
19:25
野心过大的
contempt
/kənˈtempt/
n.
20:51
轻蔑
disdain
/dɪsˈdeɪn/
n.
20:51
鄙视，不屑
pretentions
/prɪˈtenʃənz/
n.
20:51
（pretensions）自命不凡，虚饰的主张
chauvinism
/ˈʃoʊvɪnɪzəm/
n.
20:51
沙文主义，狭隘民族主义
embedded
/ɪmˈbedɪd/
adj.
20:51
嵌入的，内含的
Cosmopolitan
/ˌkɑːzməˈpɑːlɪtən/
adj.
22:15
世界主义的
honest broker
n.
22:15
诚实的中间人，公正的调停者
complacent
/kəmˈpleɪsənt/
adj.
22:15
自满的，安于现状的
status quo
/ˌsteɪtəs ˈkwoʊ/
n.
22:15
现状
prudently
/ˈpruːdəntli/
adv.
23:44
审慎地（此处含讽刺）
fundamentalis ISM
n.
23:44
（fundamentalism）原教旨主义
bloodstained
/ˈblʌdsteɪnd/
adj.
23:44
血迹斑斑的，沾满鲜血的
autocrats
/ˈɔːtəkræts/
n.
23:44
独裁者
contemptible
/kənˈtemptəbəl/
adj.
23:44
可鄙的
eurocentric
/ˌjʊroʊˈsentrɪk/
adj.
23:44
欧洲中心的
subservient
/səbˈsɜːrviənt/
adj.
23:44
唯命是从的，屈从的
at its disposal
phr.
23:44
供其支配
self-deceptive
/ˌselfdɪˈseptɪv/
adj.
23:44
自欺的
outrage
/ˈaʊtreɪdʒ/
n.
23:44
义愤，愤慨
heterogeneous
/ˌhetərəˈdʒiːniəs/
adj.
25:08
异质的，多元混杂的
vigilance
/ˈvɪdʒɪləns/
n.
25:08
警惕
override
/ˌoʊvərˈraɪd/
v.
25:08
凌驾于，推翻
egalitarian
/ɪˌɡælɪˈteriən/
adj.
25:08
平等主义的
inegalitarian
/ˌɪnɪˌɡælɪˈteriən/
adj.
25:08
不平等主义的
Paradigm
/ˈpærədaɪm/
n.
26:34
典范，范例（paradigm human beings 典型的人类）
dubious
/ˈduːbiəs/
adj.
26:34
可疑的，靠不住的
infidels
/ˈɪnfɪdəlz/
n.
26:34
异教徒，不信者
Untouchables
/ʌnˈtʌtʃəbəlz/
n.
26:34
贱民（印度种姓制度中的最底层）
peacemeal
/ˈpiːsmiːl/
adv.
26:34
（piecemeal）零敲碎打地，逐步地
wholesale
/ˈhoʊlseɪl/
adj.
26:34
全面的，大规模的
resonance
/ˈrezənəns/
n.
26:34
共鸣
sanction
/ˈsæŋkʃən/
v.
28:04
认可，批准
yielding to
phr.
28:04
向……让步，屈服于
civility
/səˈvɪləti/
n.
28:04
礼让，文明礼貌
parochial
/pəˈroʊkiəl/
adj.
28:04
狭隘的，地方性的
self-contradictory
/ˌselfˌkɑːntrəˈdɪktəri/
adj.
28:04
自相矛盾的
truthfulness
/ˈtruːθfəlnəs/
n.
29:33
真诚，诚实（与 truth 真理相对）
prize
/praɪz/
v.
29:33
珍视
profer
/ˈprɑːfər/
v.
29:33
（proffer）提出，提供
理解自测 · 11 题 · 是真懂了，还是以为自己懂
1. 罗蒂说哲学「最初是一种什么尝试」？他认为这种取向何时开始失去主导地位？
罗蒂认为哲学最初是「试图逃入一个一切永不改变的世界」的尝试，即柏拉图式对永恒知识的追求。据他引述布鲁门伯格的说法，欧洲哲学家在中世纪末开始对永恒失去兴趣，16世纪（布鲁诺和培根的世纪）开始「认真对待时间」；但这种转变直到19世纪才在黑格尔旗下变得「完全自觉」，并因达尔文而得到自然科学支撑。这些论述在开篇第一章。
2. 罗蒂用哪两组职业来对比哲学家的旧自我形象和新自我形象？区别的关键是什么？
旧形象是「祭司和圣贤」，新形象是「工程师和医生」。关键区别在于议程由谁设定：祭司和圣贤可以自己设定议程，声称接触超越性的真理；而工程师和医生必须去弄清「客户需要什么」，为特定情境中的具体问题服务。罗蒂借此表明哲学在「认真对待时间」后应放弃沉思优先于行动，转向马克思所说的「帮助未来不同于过去」。见第二章。
3. 罗蒂列举了哪三个「哲学之外的新事物」，迫使哲学家重新描述人类？
第一是17世纪伽利略、牛顿的机械化科学世界图景，需要与基督教神学语言中的道德直觉调和；第二是达尔文的建议——把人看作「更复杂的动物」而非「动物加理性灵魂」，这模糊了自然与精神的区分；第三是大众民主的出现，它来自政治经验而非科学，动摇了柏拉图「智者的理性 vs. 众人的激情」的区分。三者构成第四章的主体。
4. 罗蒂在结尾指出哲学家应避免哪三种诱惑？各自的代表是谁？
三种诱惑是：革命/先锋主义冲动，把哲学视为变革推动者而非调和者，代表是马克思和海德格尔「让一切焕然一新」的姿态；经院冲动，通过缩小范围退回学科边界，代表是自称只处理「哲学问题」清单的英语世界分析哲学（引普特南的批评）；沙文主义冲动，主张每个民族需要自己的哲学，坏例子是黑格尔和海德格尔讲给德国人的故事。见第七、八章。
5. 为什么罗蒂认为「只要社会文化变迁不停止，哲学就不可能终结」？这一论证的前提是什么？
前提是杜威式的哲学观：哲学是对文化中别处变化的反应，其任务是当旧词汇因社会变迁而过时时，提供新语言来重新描述我们自身。既然自由社会永不停止变化，就永远在制造过时词汇，因此永远需要哲学家做新旧信念的编织者。推论是只有「没有政治的社会」（暴政）才不需要哲学家，那里哲学家只能是国家宗教的祭司。这一论证把哲学的存在理由与自由社会绑定，为后文「哲学家是民主的仆人」铺路。
6. 罗蒂如何把杜威与罗素、柏格森与胡塞尔的分歧「降格」？这样做的用意是什么？
他指出这两对哲学家的对比不是「谁更准确地再现了我们的非历史本性」，而是「两种在历史时代之间做中介的方式」。杜威和罗素同样信奉牛顿力学、达尔文生物学和大众民主，也都不认为哲学能为它们提供基础；分歧只在手段——需要多彻底地改写柏拉图和康德的自我描述。用意是消解分析/大陆之争的形而上学意义：双方都是在调和新旧真理，差别只在于罗素、胡塞尔想通过划分先验/后验来保住哲学自主性，使「达尔文与康德无关」。见第五章。
7. 罗蒂为什么说反基础主义者的革命姿态是「倒转的基础主义」？
基础主义主张文化新事物的正当性必须悬置，直到哲学家宣布其合乎理性——即哲学是一切的地基。而专攻反基础主义的哲学家若自封革命者，声称「语言和文化需要激进变革，乌托邦才能实现，而哲学家正是发动变革的人」，实际上仍在坚持「哲学信念不变则一切不变」，同样把哲学置于文化的中心和前端。两者表面相反、结构相同。这一洞察在第六章，是罗蒂区分自己与马克思、海德格尔的关键。
8. 罗蒂主张的世界主义与「自满的世界主义」有何本质区别？他给出的正面图景是什么？
自满的世界主义以文化多样性或多元文化主义之名为现状辩护，对斯大林主义、宗教原教旨主义和独裁者「审慎而恭敬地沉默」，最可鄙的形式是声称人权只适合欧洲中心文化，别的文化更适合秘密警察和刑讯者。罗蒂的替代方案是一个具体的图景：全球性民主，其中地球另一端的酷刑或关闭大学、报纸引起的义愤与发生在本国时相同；非政治事务上保持多元，但政治上只有一种传统——对强者剥削弱者的持续警惕，且文化传统永不得凌驾罗尔斯的差别原则。见第八、九章。
9. 从「真理」到「真诚」的转变，为什么在罗蒂看来是「健康的」？这与全篇主线如何呼应？
真理是永恒不变的，但你很难确定自己已经拥有它；真诚和自由一样是时间性的、偶然的、脆弱的，但你遇到时能认出来。这一对照正是全篇「永恒 vs. 时间」主线的收束：认真对待时间意味着放弃对确定性和不变性的期望，转而服务于可辨认、可维护的东西——彼此坦诚而不受惩罚的自由。于是哲学家从「真理的仆人」变为「民主的仆人」，从「把真理带给权力」变为「让权力保持诚实」，这一自我定义也顺带避开了先锋、经院、沙文三种危险。见末章。
10. 如果有人反驳：「罗蒂一边说哲学不该自设议程、只能做中介，一边又描绘全球民主乌托邦并要求文化传统服从差别原则，这不是自相矛盾吗？」罗蒂会如何回应？
罗蒂可能会回应：第一，他明确承认哲学家可以偶尔把「看门人」与「先知」角色结合，培根和笛卡尔就是先例，所以描绘乌托邦并不违背中介角色；第二，全球民主的理念不是哲学家发明的先验原则，而是从大众民主这一政治经验中生长出来的，哲学家只是把它编织进各传统的语言——这仍是「为客户需要服务」；第三，他强调手段是「渐进、温和、零敲碎打」的说服，而非强制或革命，这与先锋主义的自设议程有本质区别。不过反驳者仍可追问：判定「哪些区分无关紧要」本身是否已是一种议程设定。
11. 把罗蒂「哲学是编织新旧词汇的中介，而非提供基础」的观点放到今天的 AI 伦理讨论中，是否仍然成立？
按罗蒂的框架，AI 是与新科学、达尔文、大众民主同类的「哲学之外的新事物」：它来自技术实践，使「智能/机器」「理解/预测」「作者/工具」等旧词汇发生冲突。罗蒂会主张哲学家不应宣布「在给出意识或理性的哲学基础之前不得部署 AI」（基础主义），也不应宣称「必须先彻底改变语言文化」（先锋主义），而应像医生一样弄清社会的具体需要，把既有道德直觉与新技术现实编织起来。支持这一观点的是：当前实际有效的 AI 治理多是渐进的规范调整。可质疑的是：若技术变化速度远超「温和说服」的节奏，仅做中介可能来不及；且谁是「客户」（公司、公众还是弱者）本身就是政治问题，罗蒂对此仅以「对强者的警惕」作答。
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