The Ethical Algorithm | Michael Kearns & Aaron Roth | Talks at Google
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0:05
AARON ROTH: The starting point of our book is the observation that although machine learning has been around for a long time, we are now starting to use it for increasingly consequential tasks, as many people here at Google will know. So for example, as was in the news recently, lending decisions, like if you apply for an Apple credit card, will you get a high credit limit or a low credit limit, are now often made without any human intervention at all, just an algorithm. HR departments make hiring and compensation decisions informed by machine learning algorithms.
AARON ROTH:我们这本书的出发点是这样一个观察:虽然机器学习已经存在很长时间了,但我们现在开始把它用在越来越事关重大的任务上,在座的许多 Google 同仁都清楚这一点。比如说,就像最近新闻里报道的,信贷决策——比如你申请一张 Apple 信用卡时,你会拿到高额度还是低额度——现在往往完全没有人工介入,就只是一个算法说了算。人力资源部门做招聘和薪酬决策时,也会参考机器学习算法的结果。
便签笔记
0:39
And in a number of states, including in Pennsylvania, bail and parole decisions are informed by trained models. And so it's sort of natural when you start using machine learning to make important decisions about people that you start worrying that maybe those algorithms will violate some of the social norms that we would expect of human decision makers when they were making those decisions. And indeed, there's lots of evidence that this happens. We've seen these articles every week, and there's a number of very good popular books that have pointed out the problem.
And here's three books here that we admire, but what these books do is very much point out the problem. But where they say less is about what you can do to fix these problems, what the solutions are. They talk about the need for regulation, for example, which we by and large agree with. But they don't talk about technically what you would do to make the algorithms better behaved, and that's the goal of our book to explain in plain English the emerging science of what we talk about as embedding ethical norms into algorithms.
Then there's now a community of hundreds of people, including us, working on these problems. One comment we often get, in fact, something that one of our early reviewers asked us is, does the very premise of the book, like the title of the book, does it make any sense, the ethical algorithm? Because algorithms are, in the end, tools. They're human artifacts, like hammers. Well, algorithms, like hammers, can be used to do bad things. They can be used as instruments of violence. I could whack you on the hand with a hammer.
But if I did that, we wouldn't think of this as some moral failing of the hammer, right? Like you would attribute that action directly to me, and that's basically how we regulate and write laws about violence induced by hammers, right? We say, if I whack you on the hand with a hammer, then I'm very likely going to have to go to jail, and I'll take that into account when I'm deciding whether I want to do that. But algorithms-- and when we say algorithms, we really mean models. The sort of trained models that at the output of machine learning pipeline are different.
They're different in a number of ways, but one that's salient for this discussion is that it's very difficult to predict the outcome in every situation of an algorithm that you've trained using the principles of machine learning. So many of you are aware of what the machine learning pipeline looks like, but let's just briefly recount it. You'll start with some data set. A data set might these days consist of records of millions of people. You might have hundreds of thousands of features for each person.
And in the best case-- if you're lucky, you're in the best case. You're not always in the best case. In the best case, you understand this data set as the data scientist developing an algorithm in the sense that maybe you know how the data was gathered. Maybe you know what all of the features represent, but it's hard to say that you really understand all of the information contained in such a massive object. Then you use this data set to formulate some usually narrow objective function, some proxy for classification error or maybe profit.
And you use some tool, something like stochastic gradient descent, to search over some enormous class of models to find the one that is best or very good at maximizing your narrow objective function. And then you get out some model, right? If you're training a deep neural network, this might consist of millions of parameters. And it's hard to say anything at all about this model, except that it's probably very good as measured according to the objective function you specified. And so the problem is when and if this model goes on to inflict some harm on some person or some group of people, it's typically not the case that this harm was the result of some mal intent of the software engineer or scientist who is sitting behind the scenes and building this algorithm, right?
If that was the case, the situation would be much simpler. Existing regulatory tools could be used to weed out bad actors. But the problem is that the harms that we see from algorithms are typically the unanticipated and unintended side effects of optimization over large classes of models of the very basic premise of machine learning. And so if we're going to prevent this bad behavior by learned algorithms, we need to figure out how to embed our social values, the actions that we want the algorithms not to exhibit into the design process itself.
OK, and that's hard, right? Because words like privacy, and fairness, and accountability, these are big and vague. They mean many things, but it's important to be precise about definitions when you say privacy or fairness, and in particular, when you say you want an algorithm to be private or fair. It's not enough to speak about these things as a philosopher might, for example. Because just at a very practical level, if you're going to embed these things as constraints into some optimization, you need to be mathematically precise.
It's also an enlightening exercise, even separately from the need to embed mathematical constraints when you're designing algorithms to think about what you really mean. What are different kinds of privacy? What are different kinds of fairness? And the very act of trying to be very precise about these things is illuminating and can reveal new trade offs that maybe weren't immediately evident. So we've written these words in decreasing degree of gray scale starting with privacy, ending with morality, and you know, you can't even see it.
But Michael assures me he wrote singularity in white at the bottom there. In proportion basically to how much progress we've made trying to understand these things at a sort of mathematically precise level, how much progress we've made in thinking about the consequences of embedding constraints representing these notions into algorithms. So it's not to say that we've solved privacy or that we have precise ways of thinking about all of the many different kinds of privacy. But as we'll talk about in a moment, we've made some progress.
但 Michael 向我保证,他在下面用白色字写了 singularity(奇点)。基本上,这个顺序对应于我们在从数学精确层面理解这些概念方面取得了多少进展,以及在思考把代表这些概念的约束嵌入算法之后会带来什么后果这方面,我们又取得了多少进展。所以这并不是说我们已经解决了隐私问题,或者说我们对各种各样不同类型的隐私都有了精确的思考方式。但正如我们稍后会谈到的,我们确实取得了一些进展。
便签笔记
7:18
Fairness isn't there yet, but it's along a good path. And for these other things, accountability, interpretability, and even more as you go further down the list-- and people are working on these things, and they're important. But we feel like we don't have the right definitions yet that are sort of a necessary prerequisite to making the kind of scientific progress that we talk about in the book. MICHAEL KEARNS: OK, thanks, Aaron. OK, so what we want to do with most of the remaining time is just go through two quick vignettes.
One on privacy and one on fairness, which as per Aaron's last slide, are there that we feel are, in relative terms, the most mature for the type of scientific research or algorithmic research that we're discussing. And as Aaron said, sometimes like the very exercise of having to think so precisely about the definitions of these social norms is itself greatly beneficial and might not only reveal trade offs that you weren't aware of, but like flaws in your intuitions about these ideas if you just talk about them at the level that, let's say, a moral philosopher might.
And so privacy is a good case study. We argue in the book that we feel like there's a definition of privacy for at least of the type of privacy that I'm going to talk about here is the right definition, which is differential privacy. But it's preceded by definitions that, I think, we and others feel like are fundamentally flawed. And unfortunately, these fundamentally flawed concepts are the ones almost exclusively in force in practice these days. So if you look at a end user license agreement or a privacy policy of a large company, they will normally refer to policies.
If they're precise at all, they'll talk about various forms of anonymization or removing PII, Personally Identifiable Information. And to give you a sense of why we think those definitions are fundamentally flawed, I have here a toy example in which there is two different databases from two different hospitals of medical records. And due to privacy concerns, there's been some anonymization done here, and anonymization largely consists of operations of redaction, like entirely removing certain columns from a database, or coarsening in which you sort of fuzz up the information.
And then the hope is that somehow when you're done with this, you have some sort of privacy guarantees. So in this top database, somebody has gone in and decided like, well, let's entirely redact a name. Rather than giving precise ages, let's group them into decades. So are you 10 to 20, 20 to 30, et cetera? Let's give some information about zip code but redact the last two digits. And let's keep some of the medical information, like whether you're a smoker or not-- we'll come back to smoking in a minute-- and what the particular diagnosis that you were given in your visit was.
And of course, in reality, you know, these databases would be much, much larger for a large hospital, like the University of Pennsylvania's. There might be tens of thousands of records, but the conceptual flaw can already be demonstrated in this toy example. Suppose you have some additional information aside from this database, like you have a neighbor named Rebecca, who you happen to know is female. And that she's 57 years old. And you know this because she's your neighbor and you're friends with her, OK?
So if with that side information you also managed to get hold of this allegedly anonymous database, then already in it there are exactly two records which match your knowledge about Rebecca. And they're the two highlighted in red. And notice that already from this side information you can infer that your neighbor either is HIV or has colitis, and she might reasonably already consider that to be a violation of her privacy alone. Now, again, in a real large database and in a real application of these methods, you might go for a criterion like what's called k-anonymity.
所以如果带着这些旁侧信息,你又设法拿到了这个所谓匿名的数据库,那么在里面恰好有两条记录与你对 Rebecca 的了解相匹配。就是标红的那两条。注意,仅凭这些旁侧信息,你就能推断出你的邻居要么是 HIV 感染者,要么患有结肠炎,而她完全有理由认为,光是这一点就已经侵犯了她的隐私。再说一次,在真实的大型数据库和这些方法的实际应用中,你可能会采用一个叫做 k-匿名(k-anonymity)的标准。
便签笔记
11:09
So what's k-anonymity? K-anonymity basically asks that you do enough of this coarsening and redaction so that any row in the allegedly anonymized database matches at least k other-- there at least k matches to that row, k identical records, OK? So then you wouldn't know-- rather than knowing this is like a two anonymous database. But in general, we might hope to get more privacy by asking for 100 anonymity rather than two anonymity. The real problem, of course, comes when you also know that your neighbor Rebecca happened to also have a visit to a second hospital whose database is at the bottom, and this hospital has also, in an effort to provide some kind of privacy, done some redaction.
那么什么是 k-匿名呢?k-匿名基本上要求你做足够多的粗化和涂抹处理,使得所谓已匿名化的数据库中的任何一行都至少能匹配到另外 k 条——也就是说至少有 k 条记录与该行匹配,k 条完全相同的记录,好吧?这样一来你就无法确定——而不是像这样,这只是一个 2-匿名的数据库。但总体而言,我们可以期望通过要求 100-匿名而不是 2-匿名来获得更多隐私保护。当然,真正的问题出现在你同时还知道,你的邻居 Rebecca 恰好也去过第二家医院,它的数据库在下面这里,而这家医院同样为了提供某种隐私保护,也做了一些涂抹处理。
便签笔记
11:53
The same kind of redaction and coarsening in their database, and now three records match Rebecca there. And of course, the real problem here is the join of these two databases, right? Which is sometimes called linkage analysis, or triangulation, or various other names. When I take the intersection of the top red records and the bottom red records, I uniquely now know that Rebecca is HIV. And you might try to wish these problems away with fancier definitions or by appealing to scale. But the real problem with these types of definitions is that they pretend that the data set in front of you is the only data that is ever going to exist now or forever in the world.
在他们的数据库里做了同样的涂抹和粗化,现在那边有三条记录与 Rebecca 匹配。当然,这里真正的问题在于这两个数据库的连接(join),对吧?这有时被称为链接分析(linkage analysis),或者三角定位,或者其他各种名称。当我取上面那些红色记录和下面那些红色记录的交集时,我就能唯一地确定 Rebecca 是 HIV 阳性。你可能会想用更花哨的定义或者诉诸规模来把这些问题搪塞过去。但这类定义真正的问题在于,它们假装摆在你面前的这个数据集是世界上现在或将来唯一会存在的数据。(承上)现在或永远。
便签笔记
12:33
And they don't anticipate attacks on privacy that come from triangulation of multiple databases, other information you might have about people, even publicly declared information that they weren't particularly trying to hide. Many of you might have seen this sort of mainstream news frenzy over articles that, I think, surprised probably very few people in this room. One was about a month ago, and it basically said, here are 18 apparently innocuous attributes that if I know them about you, they serve as a fingerprint for you among all US citizens.
So you know, I'm not sure what they were. But you can imagine if you tell me what kind of car you drive, you tell me your zip code, you tell me what color your eyes are, you tell me whether you have dogs or cats, each one of these things, of course, is like exponentially cutting away the remaining possibilities. And it doesn't take long to kind of have that sort of innocuous information, undo the privacy promises of these anonymity methods. OK, so these are bad privacy definitions as we discuss in the book.
What would be a good privacy definition? Well, let me start by proposing a definition, which has been, I think, proposed since at least the '70s, which if you could get it would be a nice definition. But we argue in the book that it's basically asking for too much in the sense that if you enforce this kind of privacy, we will never be able to do useful, interesting things with data, including things like medical research studies. OK, so what is the definition I have in mind? So imagine-- and you can make this mathematical, but I won't bother here.
Imagine we basically said the definition is that no harm should ever come to you of any kind as the result of a data analysis in which your data was included, OK? So let's think about that as a privacy definition for a second. So certainly, it's a strong privacy guarantee, right? I'm sort of allowing the notion of harm to be entirely general, and I'm basically saying if your data was used, no harm should come to you of that study. OK, so why is this asking for too much? So imagine that it's 1950, and you are a smoker, OK?
And if it's 1950, you are a smoker. Because in 1950, pretty much everybody smokes. There is no social or medical stigma associated with smoking. In fact, it's seen as a glamorous habit, and so you do it openly in public. Everybody that knows you knows that you're a smoker. Maybe even your health insurer knows that you're a smoker. Who cares? And suppose you're asked to contribute your medical record to the famous series of studies that were done in the 1950s in England that firmly established a correlation or connection between smoking and lung cancer.
So your data was included in this analysis. This analysis announced to the world that there is a connection between smoking and lung cancer. And now we can say real harm has come to you as a result of this study, right? Now everybody's posterior beliefs about the likelihood that you have cancer go up in light of this study, and your data was part of this study. And in particular, real harms might come to you of the financial variety. Your health insurer might decide to double your premiums, for example, OK?
Now the key observation-- so in particular, if we adopt this definition, this study would have been disallowed. This would have been a violation of the privacy of everybody whose data was included in this study. The key observation, though, here is that, of course, it's not the case that your particular medical record was the crucial piece of data that allowed the link between smoking and lung cancer to be established, right? Any sufficiently large collection of medical records would have been enough to establish this fact, because the fact that smoking and lung cancer are connected is not like a fact about you particular or your data.
It is what we might call a fact about the world that can be discovered provided we have enough data. So this brings us to what we claim as the right definition of privacy, which is differential privacy, which slightly refines the definition I give to sort of account for this fact that your data wasn't the crucial missing piece in this analysis. And this is a schematic, but in English, what does differential privacy ask? It basically asks you to consider two alternative worlds. One in which an analysis is done, and your data is included in that analysis.
And let's say that there are N medical records total in the analysis, and the other one is the same analysis is done but on N minus medical records, where the missing one is yours. So what we want is the harm that comes to you is basically identical in these two situations. So whatever your definition of harm is, whatever it is you're worried about, the chances that that harm comes to you in the case where your medical record is included compared to the one where it's only your medical record that's excluded is sort of controllably close, OK?
And as many people in this audience know, the definition of differential privacy involved-- it's a property of an algorithm, first of all, not about a data particular data set. An algorithm either is or is not differentially private. And differential privacy is generally achieved by adding noise to computations, so you move from deterministic to randomized algorithms. And you typically add noise in a way that kind of obscures the contribution of any individual piece of data in the analysis while preserving broad statistics.
So the first time-- Aaron's been working on differential privacy much longer than I have. And I remember the first time I saw the definition of it. I thought, well, that's a great definition, but I'm still worried that it's too strong, right? It's got many universal quantifiers in it. The algorithm has to provide differential privacy on absolutely any input database. The definition of harm can be anything you want it to be, and still the increase in harm as a result of including your data is controlled.
And so my first reaction was like, you know, maybe we still won't be able to do anything with this definition either. Luckily, that's turned out to be far from the truth. And in particular, pretty much any technique you know from statistics or modern machine learning has a variant. It is not differentially private in its original form. But it has a variant, which gives differential privacy. So for example, back propagation in neural networks or stochastic gradient descent have differentially private variance.
So differential privacy has kind of just in recent years started to make it out of the lab or maybe kind of more precisely off the whiteboard into practice. And the big moonshot for differential privacy is coming up next year when the US census has decided that every single report or statistic it results based on the raw underlying census data will be released under the constraint of differential privacy. And this is a huge engineering effort, and it'll be interesting to see how it turns out. And I'm going to turn it over to Aaron now to talk about fairness of it.
AARON ROTH: Yeah, so we're not there yet on fairness. So we sort of assert that if you think about differential privacy for a while, read chapter 1 in the book, that many of you will agree that, at least for a particular kind of privacy, statistical privacy and data sets, it's somehow the right definition. It's capturing what you want. There's nothing like that in the fairness literature yet. There's dozens of definitions of what we might mean by fairness, and for each one, I could tell you one reason why it's lacking.
It's not capturing everything you want. In fact, we even know the study of fairness is going to be more complicated than the study of privacy, because there are already known different reasonable definitions of fairness. That in isolation, you would nod your head and agree, yes, that's something I would like that are known to be incompatible with one another. Nevertheless-- so maybe you think about the study of fairness in machine learning as where the study of privacy was 15 years ago. Nevertheless, it's an extremely important problem.
Here on the slide are two headlines just from the last week, two applications that have attracted New York state regulatory scrutiny. One, a lending application, the Apple credit card that you might have heard about. There's a number of tweets from prominent people alleging that the algorithm that determines what your credit limit will be exhibits gender bias. The other article was about a widely deployed algorithm targeting health care interventions that seems to exhibit racial bias, so I don't want to talk too much about definitions of unfairness.
Because I don't think we've yet hit upon exactly the right ones, but I do want to give some idea for why machine learning might be unfair in the first place. Because I think a lot of people's first reaction is that, well, bias of the sort that we talk about when we talk about like racism or sexism, this is some human property. And we're removing it just by removing human beings from the decision making pipeline and using objective optimization procedures. And it's a little more complicated than that.
Here's a little cartoon to illustrate why. OK, so suppose that Michael and I volunteer to help out with Penn admissions. And we're going to design a machine learning algorithm to help admit students to Penn. OK, so maybe in this cartoon, we've got two observations about each applicant, their SAT score and their GPA. And there's some concrete thing we're trying to predict. OK, so maybe, for example, we're trying to predict whether students if admitted will graduate in at most five years with at least a 3.5 GPA.
Maybe we're trying to predict whether within 30 years of graduating, they'll donate at least $10 million. Whatever it is, some concrete thing such that we're trying to admit the people who we've labeled as plus, and we want to reject the people we've labeled as minus. And there's all sorts of problems you might imagine gathering this data. You might imagine that there's potentially the biases of past admissions officers embedded in this data, but let's wish that all away and imagine for this cartoon example that the data really is what it says it is.
Because I want to show you that things can be a little bit more complicated, even in the best case when you've got good data. So there's going to be two populations. You're looking at the green population now, and there's a couple of things I want you to notice about them. So first, slightly fewer than half of the green population is qualified for college, by which I mean, there's slightly more minus signs on this slide than there are plus signs. Second, there's a pretty good although not perfect decision rule.
There's a line I can draw through space. And by and large, although not exclusively, the positive points lie above the line, and the negative points lie below the line. OK, so that was the green population. Here's the orange population, and again, a couple of things I'd like you to notice about them. Maybe the first one you noticed is that the orange population is a minority, by which I mean, literally just that there are fewer orange points, OK? Like in this context, all it means to be a minority is that there's fewer of them.
The second thing you might notice is that the points seem to be drawn from a different distribution. In particular, they're shifted downwards on this plot. They seem to systematically have lower SAT scores. That could be for one of any number of reasons. For example, maybe the green points come from a wealthy population. They take SAT tutoring classes. They take the SAT three times and report only the highest score. The orange points take it once cold. That naturally results in a higher distribution on SAT scores for the green population, but it doesn't necessarily make them more qualified for college.
你可能注意到的第二点是,这些点似乎来自一个不同的分布。具体来说,它们在这张图上整体向下偏移。他们的 SAT 分数似乎系统性地偏低。这可能有很多种原因。比如,也许绿色的点来自富裕人群。他们上 SAT 辅导班。他们考三次 SAT,只报最高的那次分数。而橙色的点只裸考一次。这自然会让绿色群体的 SAT 分数分布更高,但这并不一定意味着他们更适合上大学。
便签笔记
24:28
In fact, when you look at the labels, when you look at the actual thing that we're trying to predict, it's the orange population that's better here. And the orange population is better in two ways. First, on average, they're more qualified for college, right? Half of them are positive examples here compared to fewer than half for the green population. And second, it's even easier to tell who is who. There's now a linear decision rule that I can implement that makes no mistakes at all. OK, we've got two populations.
And in this example, the minority population is the better one. When I say they're better, I mean they're more qualified on average, and it's easier to determine who are the qualified ones. And yet, here are the two populations together. And remember, we're only giving the algorithm SAT score and GPA. So you can see the colors of the points but the algorithm cannot. And suppose what we ask for is the standard objective in machine learning. We would like to find the model, in this case, the linear decision rule, that makes as few mistakes as possible.
在这个例子里,少数群体反而是更好的那个。我说他们更好,意思是他们平均而言更合格,而且更容易判断出谁是合格的那些人。然而,把两个群体放在一起就是这样。记住,我们只给算法提供 SAT 分数和 GPA。所以你能看到这些点的颜色,但算法看不到。假设我们提出的是机器学习中的标准目标。我们想找到一个模型——在这里就是线性决策规则——让错误尽可能少。
便签笔记
25:30
What could be more objective than that? Minimize the number of mistakes, and what you get is just the rule that best fits the green population. You can think about why that is, right? If I were to shift that decision boundary downwards, I would make fewer mistakes on the orange population, but I would make more mistakes on the green population. And that wouldn't be worth it from the point of view of minimizing overall error, because there are more green points. And so mistakes on the green population count more for overall error.
OK, so we have an example here, where the orange population was better than the green population, but drawn from a slightly different distribution. And when I asked to find the model that minimized overall error, it ended up rejecting every single member of the orange population despite the fact that they were more qualified and despite the fact that they actually had more signal in their features. Note, by the way, that were I allowed to use group membership color in this case in my model, for example, if I were allowed to build a decision tree that said, well, for green points, use the blue line.
For orange points, use the purple line. Then I could have improved things, and I could have improved things for everybody, right? I would have had a more accurate model. It wouldn't have changed the decisions for the green population, and all of a sudden, I'd be making the right decisions for the orange population. And so two things I want you to learn from this cartoon. The first is that if you just blindly optimize for error, that will tend to fit the majority population typically at the expense of the minority population.
Not for any kind of underlying-- not because there's any kind of underlying like racism baked into the objective function, but simply because larger populations contribute more to overall error. And second, although it's a knee jerk reaction to say, OK, like if I don't want like racial or gender bias in my algorithm, I shouldn't use those features. That's not always the case. This is an example where using those features can actually make things better. Not just for fairness, whatever that is-- we haven't defined it-- but for accuracy as well.
This is an example of something that intuitively seems unfair. We have this better population, and we've learned a model that nevertheless rejects all of them simply because there's fewer of them. If we want to design algorithms that correct this, we have to pick a definition. We have to specify what we mean by unfair. I don't want to dwell too much on definitions. But for example, in this application, you might decide that the people who are being harmed by the mistakes made by our algorithm are the qualified applicants, the positive examples, who are mistakenly rejected by our algorithm.
These are the people who-- like it's really too bad that our algorithm rejected them. They would have done well had they come to our college. And maybe the thing that you object to in this model is that the rate at which the algorithm is doing harm in these two populations, in this case, the rate of false rejection, the false negative rate, is drastically different between the two populations. It's 100% on the orange population. It's close to zero on the green population. And so you could imagine asking-- and this has become a popular thing to ask for-- we should find a model that comes close to equalizing these false rejection rates.
Maybe it exactly equalizes them. Or maybe it equalizes them up to 5%, or 10%, or 50%. So you've got some quantitative notion of unfairness that you can ask for. There's a knob that you can turn, trading off this notion of unfairness with other things you care about, like error, and what you find when you start designing algorithms that achieve these goals. And then you've got this knob that you can tune. And by the way, differential privacy also comes with such a knob, and so you can draw similar pictures when you're thinking about privacy.
What you find is that although there are inevitably trade offs that you have to grapple with, you can illuminate what those trade offs are. OK, so these are Pareto frontiers. These are on different data sets for a real machine learning task. The optimal rate of unfairness that you can achieve here measured by the difference between false negative rates between populations, that's what's plotted on the y-axis, with the optimal rate of error you can achieve, that's what's plotted on the x-axis. OK, so for a particular class of models, you can achieve an error unfairness trade off represented as any points on this Pareto frontier.
你会发现,虽然不可避免地要面对一些权衡取舍,但你可以把这些权衡清楚地揭示出来。好,这些是帕累托前沿。这些是在不同的数据集上、针对一个真实的机器学习任务得到的结果。这里能达到的最优不公平程度,用两个群体之间假阴性率的差值来衡量,这就是画在 y 轴上的量;而你能达到的最优误差率,就是画在 x 轴上的量。好,所以对于某一类特定的模型,你可以达到的误差与不公平之间的权衡,就是这条帕累托前沿上的任意一点。
便签笔记
30:08
And it is not possible to get a model that simultaneously improves on both of these metrics. And what you can see, if you're lucky, like in the plot on the left, you can sometimes get a dramatic decrease in this unfairness metric, in this case, the difference between false negative rates at the beginning, and only a very small cost to error. That's what happens when this curve looks very steep. Of course, these trade offs become more severe as you start asking for more and more stringent conditions.
And so as we describe in the book, the science can only take you so far. It can elucidate what these trade are, but it can't tell you where on this trade curve you want to live as a society and a particular application. And there's not going to be universal answers. We want to prioritize fairness for privacy more. In certain applications, we'll want to prioritize accuracy. Other things more in other applications, but you know, there's no avoiding that we have to make hard decisions. And what the science can do is it can help us make those decisions with our eyes open.
MICHAEL KEARNS: What we've described so far-- plus with the introduction gets us to about the halfway point of the book. And in midway through the book, we kind of take a wide left turn that we think is interesting and well motivated. And I just want to give you a teaser for what that wide left turn is. So in the different scenarios and applications we've talked about so far, it was fair to a first approximation to think about individual people, consumers, as the vehemence of algorithms. So you might be denied admission to a college you wanted to go to unfairly, or you might have your privacy leaked by a data set or a computation.
MICHAEL KEARNS:我们到目前为止讲的这些——再加上引言部分——差不多带我们走到了这本书的中间位置。而在书的中段,我们来了一个大转弯,我们觉得这个转弯很有意思,也很有理由。我只想先给你们透露一下这个大转弯是什么。在我们目前谈到的各种情境和应用中,粗略地说,把个体的人、消费者当作算法的承受者,是说得通的。所以你可能会被你想去的大学不公平地拒之门外,或者你的隐私可能因为某个数据集或某次计算而被泄露。
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And you might not even know it, right? And you might not also know that your data was being used to build these models that are being applied to decisions made about other people. There are other situations in which there is an algorithm or maybe more precisely an app. And there's a large base of users of that app, and it's not so easy to entirely blame the algorithm alone for the antisocial behavior that it exhibits. Because that antisocial behavior is sort of a function of the algorithm, but also of the incentives of the users who are using the app.
And this takes us into the realm of game theory. And so in particular, there are many, many apps these days that we can really think about as the word that's often used is personalization, but we might think about the game theory term as being computing your best response, right? So one concrete example is commuting using apps, like Waze and Google Maps. Where in response to real time traffic, mainly the activity of all the other drivers on the roads, there's this app that computes your best response.
It basically says this is the lowest latency or the shortest driving route for you to take from your point A to your point B. And you might think like, oh, well, what could be better than that? I've got this thing that uses real time traffic information right now and tells me which route to drive. But it is driving us all collectively towards a selfish equilibrium of some very, very large, complicated multiplayer game, like literally the Nash equilibrium of that game. And any of you that have had any basic game theory know that just because something is in equilibrium doesn't mean it's a good thing for you or necessarily for any of the players in that game.
它基本上是在说,这是你从 A 点出发所能选择的延迟最低、或者说最短的行车路线。B。你可能会想,哦,那还有什么能比这更好呢?我现在有这么个东西,它利用实时路况信息,告诉我该走哪条路线。但它正把我们所有人共同推向一个非常非常庞大、复杂的多人博弈的自私均衡,字面意义上就是那个博弈的纳什均衡。学过一点博弈论的人都知道,一件事处于均衡状态,并不意味着它对你有好处,也不一定对博弈中的任何参与者有好处。
便签笔记
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And so in particular, in the case of driving apps, there's well-known both toy examples and evidence that this happens in the real world, even though we're individually optimizing all the times with these apps. We might be collectively driving more, because we're in this competitive equilibrium. And in the book, we kind of take this semi-metaphor and apply it to areas that, I think, are less clearly mathematically formulatable as a game as commuting, including things like product recommendation on services like Amazon, or what you see in your Facebook news feed.
And talk about the tensions between individual optimization and self-interest versus the collective equilibrium that we're at, let's say, in the form of filter bubbles or vulnerability to fake news in the case of Facebook, things like that. And then the final chapter of the book before we get to the catch all chapter that discusses everything from sort of interpretability to every AI alarmists favorite dystopia, the Singularity. We talk about specifically sort of the competitive sport that machine learning has become.
And in particular, we talk about sort of game theoretic ways of thinking about that and the consequences that it has for things like the reproducibility crisis in the sciences. So in a very quick nutshell, I think many people in this room will be familiar with the fact that machine learning, in some sense, has become a competitive sport, where there are these benchmark data sets. There's selection bias in the reporting of results, because journals won't publish negative findings for the most part.
There's so many people in the field right now that we really have no idea how many experiments are actually being run, and how to correct for the complexity a number of those experiments to make sure that we're not going down the road that food science has already gone down, where some significant fraction of the published results are not reproducible under our kind of false discoveries. So that's a teaser for the second half of the book. And we wanted to invite Emily back up and chat with us. EMILY DENTON: So I really want to start with one of the major theses in your work is that the solutions to the ethical concerns that are arising from this prevalence of algorithmic decision making systems should themselves be in large part algorithmic.
And so I was wondering if you could talk a little bit about how you came to this perspective, if you're thinking on this matter as involved at all in the past few years. MICHAEL KEARNS: Yeah, I mean, I think we came to that perspective through our technical research work, right? So we were relatively early adopters of sort of the whole fate view of machine learning and algorithms, like many people in this room. And so we knew even while we were reading reports of our field, violating basic social norms, that we and others were thinking about, well, you could wait for better laws and regulations.
Or you could go fix that problem in the code this way, like right now. I definitely think our view has evolved and even the draft of the book evolved. We talked to many people outside of the computer science machine learning community who care about these issues, like regulators, like policymakers, like people who work in social agencies that see firsthand the damages caused by criminal sentencing models that have gender or racial bias in them, for example. And I think the main evolution it had, at least on the book, is to point out that we don't think that algorithms can solve every problem.
And that there's still a great deal of room and importance for laws, regulations, and more traditional solutions. And that, also, there are some problems that the really hard problems remain are kind of social. If it's the case that your police on the street are racially biased on who they decide to arrest or stop and frisk, that's going to kind of show up in the data. You may not know it, and the only solution for it is to make police less racist, right? And that's like not an algorithmic problem.
It's not even an easy regulatory or policy problem. AARON ROTH: The only other thing I would say is that-- so of course, like all of these problems are complicated. And their solutions probably can't be derived from just thinking about some very narrowly scoped algorithm without thinking about the sort of broader social and algorithmic ecosystem in which they live. But many of the issues that have come to light when thinking about, for example, algorithmic fairness, like trade offs between different reasonable notions of fairness.
Yeah, it's not that they're specific to algorithmic decision making. They've only come to light now. Because there's no avoiding, when you're using algorithms, making quantitative measurements, and specifying precisely what you want. But these issues are-- these trade, for example, are fundamental to any life decision making process. They apply also to human decision makers, and so I think many people think of like algorithm as a scary word. Of course, like as computer scientists and as folks at Google, we probably think of it as less scary.
其实并不是算法决策所特有的。它们只是到现在才被摆到台面上。因为当你使用算法时,你没法回避做定量测量,也没法回避精确地说明你到底想要什么。但这些问题——比如这些权衡——对任何决策过程来说都是根本性的。它们同样适用于人类决策者。所以我觉得很多人一听到“算法”这个词就害怕。当然,作为计算机科学家、作为 Google 的同行,我们大概觉得它没那么可怕。
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But it's not that just as simple tweaks to algorithms can't fix complicated problems. Saying, get rid of algorithms, like also isn't a workable solution. It doesn't fix anything. EMILY DENTON: Something else that you talk about in the book is how a lot of these outcomes are the results of professional scientists and engineers very carefully and rigorously applying principled machine learning methodology just to massive complex data sets. And so you do kind of get at this a little bit about the things that are missing in this standard sort of methodology, and so I'm really thinking that this points to how many different aspects of the kind of rigorous scientific practice that we would strive for actually fall outside the kind of standard machine learning sort of framing on educational training.
And so for example, one of the examples that you gave just now on the screen was this algorithmic health care system that was sort of reproducing racial biases in the health sector. And if I recall correctly, one of the problems with that system was this kind of equating of health care with health care costs. And so this is something that's been discussed a little bit in the algorithmic fairness community, this kind of failure to really precisely articulate and justify the kind of operationalization of abstract sort of social constructs into precise variables that are then predicted by the machine learning system.
And so I'm wondering if you could just talk a little bit about the sort of new machine learning education and practices that would kind of get at these things that fall slightly outside the kind of traditional machine learning thinking, but are still kind of in this algorithmic frame. MICHAEL KEARNS: Yeah, I mean, I guess in some ways, it's fair to characterize the fairness and privacy chapters of our book at least as kind of a tutorial on what you can do to make things better without leaving the field of machine learning and going and becoming a social worker, OK?
And by the way, in writing this book, we often would talk to people that would basically say to us like, well, if you really want to help, you should like quit your day job and go become a social worker. And I was like, OK, well, I'm not going to do that. But I mean, I think that maybe one of our points, especially to an audience like this, is that there are things that we can do that are just adjacent to what we're doing already. I mean, the hard part will be things like the Pareto curves that Aaron showed.
There will be hard trade offs between error and fairness or error and privacy. But it's not like a different kind of beast. I mean, if I had to phrase it very dryly, it's like the difference between solving the optimization problem that you're solving now to solving a constrained optimization problem, where your objective is the same. But now there is like fairness or privacy constraints. And so, I think, in many ways for the machine learning community, this is like low hanging fruit. It's low hanging fruit that will result in perhaps difficult decisions with leaders of your business units when you tell them like, oh, this will make our ad placement more fair.
But CTR prediction will be this much worse, which translates into this much less profit every year. But at least you sort of put the discussion on scientific grounds, and I think those parts are appropriate to put on scientific grounds. AARON ROTH: Yeah, I think there's two separate things here. So the discussion we had on this slide was in this idealized world, where the data was clean. It was correct. The labels were right, and even there, there's something to do to learn. But that's really the scenario in which you're talking about constrained optimization problems and having to deal with trade offs.
In the UnitedHealth case, the problem for those who aren't aware is this model was supposed to predict, given a patient with some collection of symptoms, health outcomes so that new interventions could be targeted. But they didn't have outcome data. Instead, they trained on health costs. How much did this patient cost the health care system down the line with the thought that patients who are sicker cost more? And it's thought the reason for the bias that the model exhibited that sort of two similarly sick patients, one of whom was Caucasian, one of whom was black.
The model would tend to suggest more health care intervention for the Caucasian patient. Well, the reason was because black patients who were similarly ill tended to cost less. Not because their health outcomes were better, but because they had less access to health care. So this is a case where you don't necessarily have to deal with a trade off in the sense that you trained your model on the wrong data. If you were able to go out and get the right data, then it might solve this sort of unfairness problem and simultaneously make your algorithm better at predicting the thing you really wanted it to predict.
But you know, again, I think this is something that's sort of made salient. Just because people are thinking about, in this case, fairness. But this is like a part of data science education that would have been important, even if we didn't care about fairness. In the sense that you could have made the model, even if you just cared about like overall accuracy. You could have made the model more accurate by training it on the correct data, and you know, it's only because someone wrote an article in science about the unfairness of the model that it was brought to light.
EMILY DENTON: Yeah, yeah, that's kind of what I'm getting at is that there are sort of really rigorous scientific practices in related fields for kind of turning these abstract constructs into measurable variables. And this kind of interdisciplinary kind of work, I think, is not really being adopted as much as it should be, and I think could really-- I don't necessarily view it as to entirely separate from the algorithm design. And I think that really should be integrated, and so yeah, I'm just glad to hear that you think it's also important.
OK, one more high level question. So you've detailed a lot of different sort of troubling practices prevalent within the machine learning community, and how these sorts of practices, like biases in reporting, kind of reliance on a small number of data sets, these types of things. These lead both to the reproducibility crisis, but also to a lot of really ethically questionable design and development of algorithms. And so I'm curious what your thoughts are on how the community as a whole can start to shift its practices, what types of new incentive structures you'd like to see in place.
Obviously, this is not a quick fix. This is a very long term thing, but I think a lot of us are members of this academic community. And so I'd love to hear your thoughts on how we as a group can kind of shift in a more socially, and beneficial, and ethically informed direction. AARON ROTH: Yeah, I mean, I guess my quick answer would be we do suggest some technical things in the book, and we talk about the pre-registration movement and things like that, which I think we view as too restrictive of a solution.
But you know, maybe to answer that question to make a broader social comment. I think it would be good for the field of machine learning to become less like a competitive sport, again, and this a relatively recent phenomenon. It's, I think, a byproduct of the tremendous empirical successes that areas like deep learning had and the need for these massive data sets and kind of concentrated focus by a large number of people undiminished in an intense period of time. And that's all been great. And I don't-- no knock whatsoever on the actual advances in those technologies, which are large, I think, in vision, speech, and NLP.
And I'll use my seniority here to point out that the field of machine learning, you know, it used to be that people were considering many, many different types of learning frameworks of different learning models. There wasn't this sort of uniformity of data sets to the extent that there is now. Or at least if there were, they were really kind of toy data sets that nobody considered like a serious benchmark for developing and deploying services. It's things like the UC Irvine data set, which you went to check your results on.
But it wasn't like, OK, on the UC Irvine data set, I've now developed this service that I'm now going to unleash on a billion users. And I think the field, I'm hoping, will organically balance itself back more to an earlier era, where there's not this single minded focus on sort of one framework for learning and a few data sets. And so maybe things like pre-registration or sort of smarter leader boards, which we do discuss in the book, maybe that's a part of the solution. But maybe part of it is just kind of a cyclical move back towards kind of a more diverse research landscape in the field.
EMILY DENTON: Cool. Do you have a question? AUDIENCE: Jack Dorsey from Twitter made the announcement that they're not going to do political ads at all. And machine learning algorithms are being used to target users with those ads. So algorithmic accountability and fairness is-- we get questionnaire. And you're chiming in with Aaron that there is some bit of-- not all algorithms are bad. We are trying to make them better. So a player leaving the field kind of creates this added pressure on the other players in the field to be really accurate about it.
EMILY DENTON:很好。你有问题吗?观众:Twitter 的 Jack Dorsey 宣布他们将完全不做政治广告。而机器学习算法正被用来向用户精准投放这些广告。所以算法问责和公平性——我们收到了不少这方面的提问。而你和 Aaron 都表示,并不是所有算法都是坏的。我们是在努力把它们变得更好。那么一个玩家退出这个领域,某种程度上会给场上其他玩家施加额外的压力,逼他们在这件事上做得更严谨。
便签笔记
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MICHAEL KEARNS: Briefly, I don't have deep thoughts on this particular issue. I think the policy to pull those ads entirely is better than having no policy whatsoever. On the other hand, I'm not sort of convinced that pulling things that are "designated" political ads eradicates kind of the penumbra of worries that people have around the politicization of social media. Like, I don't think it directly addresses things like fake news and the like. But I think it's better to have a clear policy than to have no policy at all.
MICHAEL KEARNS:简单说,我对这个具体问题没有太深入的思考。我认为完全撤下这些广告的政策,要好过完全没有任何政策。另一方面,我并不觉得,撤掉那些被“认定”为政治广告的内容,就能消除人们围绕社交媒体政治化所产生的那一整片模糊的担忧。比如说,我不认为这直接解决了假新闻之类的问题。但我认为,有一个明确的政策总比完全没有政策要好。
便签笔记
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And secondly, I do think it's good for the competitive landscape of the tech industry to have actors that take stands on issues and try to create internal pressure in the industry to sort of think harder about these issues and adopt them. To give an example, sort of, Apple has successfully-- you can debate how deserved it is. But Apple has carved out a reputation for greater concern about consumer privacy and was an early adopter of differential privacy. And I think that that does create kind of an environment where there is more internal pressure from the industry rather just then from regulators.
AUDIENCE: Thank you. AUDIENCE: I was wondering how much do you think that your book is sort of a snapshot of the current moment in time? So certainly it wouldn't have made sense to have this book published like 10 years ago. And how much do you think it is really something that's an enduring set of problems? And because of the list of problems, we understand less and less. It's really creating an outline and a framework that's going to have a significant impact over time. AARON ROTH: So as we say at the beginning of the book, like this is an emerging science.
And you might reasonably think that that means it's sort of too early to write such a book. But we think that it's sort of exactly the right time because it's when the ideas are developing that somehow the intellectual process of thinking about them is most exciting. So I certainly think that, especially as you go down that list-- maybe even already, you know, fairness, which was the second thing in the list-- that if you look at what the technical approaches are going to look like 15 years down the line, they might be quite different from what they look like today.
But I think that the basic premise of what needs to be done-- and that's been sort of successfully carried out from whiteboard, to product, to national scale deployments for privacy-- is enduring. Which is that what you need to do is you need to think very hard, in a rigorous, precise way, about what you mean when you say you want algorithms to be blah, where blah can represent any word you want, where a human being would just know what you meant if you told them you wanted accountability, fairness, transparency.
But that is not obvious to an algorithm. And then after you come up with a plausible definition-- and coming up with the definition is the hard part. But when you come up with a plausible definition, you have to think about how to-- you have to think about the scientific problem of how to design models satisfying that definition and think quantitatively about trade-offs because typically these things don't come for free. I think that general methodology is going to have to be enduring. And that even if the specifics of how people are thinking about these things 15 years down the line are going to be different, they will be thinking about these things.
EMILY DENTON: I'm going to throw in the story question really quickly. What skills are there, other than computer science, that are most needed for work on ethical algorithms? What advice do you have for successful interdisciplinary collaborations? MICHAEL KEARNS: Let's see. I mean, if by skill we mean sort of an academic or specific technical skill, I think it's more-- I think what I would advise most is sort of a willingness, an actual interest, in talking to people in adjacent fields that think about the same issues, but from a non-technical perspective.
So I think we've benefited greatly, for instance, in conversations we've had with people at the law school at Penn, who think hard about fairness and privacy, including in technological settings from a legal perspective, and just kind of understanding their views. And also, especially understanding the constraints that come from their world and in talking to regulators. It's quite revealing to talk to tech regulators and realize the handicaps that they face. These are smart people. But these are smart people, kind of with many, many shackles on what they can and can't do, that really kind of force them to lag in many ways the companies that they're regulating.
And so I think it's important to, in working in this area, even if it doesn't like, oh, you talk to some regulator. And then you got a research idea, that you then go work on, to just kind of understand that landscape more than any other particular field outside of CSI or machine learning. AUDIENCE: One thing that I've seemed to notice is that when people notice that, say, an algorithm is maybe not fair, then what algorithm designers and even society at large tend to do is to think of quick solutions on how to fix it, when the solution itself may not inherently be fair.
To take an example, for instance, the college selection slide that you showed, where you had two populations. And clearly, the initial solution of having of general cutoff was a problem. But like you just suggested, one thing that could have been done is consider the two populations separately, which seems like an OK thing to do. People might even agree with it. But then, when you look at the data, you do see that even the green population, there may be some data points which are positives. But they fall within the cutoff range of maybe population two.
And I do think that this happens a lot in real life too, that the easy solution is to maybe just say that one very easily observable variable, this population type. But maybe the actual hidden variable that you need to consider is maybe, like you mentioned, maybe the income. Maybe you couldn't test that three times, instead of one. So today, what I see is maybe people from the green population, perhaps as a result. If there is somebody who falls within cutoff, then they're completely screwed as well here.
So I'm wondering as one of the designers, what are the things that--
所以我想问,作为设计者之一,有哪些事情是——
便签笔记
55:44
how can this problem be solved? Because it seems like we are trying to optimize for maximum efficiency. You have the curve. But then as a result, there might be some fraction of people that always get left behind. Although overall, it might be the most optimal solution. AARON ROTH: Yeah. See, I think you've put your finger on one of the main weaknesses of these statistical notions of fairness. And we talked about this a little bit in the book. And it's actually one of the main focuses of our research.
And by the way, this is why we think of maybe the fairness in the machine learning field as an academic field as 15 years behind privacy. So the claim is not that any of the existing definitions are very good. So I think what you're putting your finger on is, when you look at these statistical notions of fairness that say things like, well, I'd like the false rejection rate to be similar between-- like orange people and green people, say. Well, you have to-- like the first step of even enunciating that, was you had to say, OK, well, there are these two groups I care about, orange people and green people.
And usually it's not so easy. And just because I guarantee some notion of statistical equality in aggregate over two large groups doesn't mean that the solution that we come up with is fair in various technical senses to you as an individual, or even to large groups of people that you think of yourself as a member of, if they weren't the exact groups that we specified upfront. So let me just, without saying too much about it-- this is an active area of research. There are things you can do. There are fairness notions that are somewhat more satisfying than these.
They don't require enunciating a small number of prespecified, coarsely defined groups upfront. There are ways to talk about fairness at an individual level. And maybe we can talk a little bit offline. But this is sort of the research frontier, like we don't understand that much about methods that guarantee protections of this sort and their implications. So it's a very good question. And I'd say, like there's people thinking about it. You should go off and think about it. It's not a settled science yet.