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第 55 期 · 核心追问 Ⅱ·07「语言还承载意义吗？」
Wittgenstein's Two Philosophies Explained: Anthony Quinton Interview (1977)
节目发布 2024-03-04章节 · 点击跳转视频
0:00
罗素与维特根斯坦：两种影响
2:15
生平：从工程师到逻辑学生
4:20
《逻辑哲学论》的中心问题
7:27
图像论：命题如何镜映世界
11:53
真、假与无意义的三分
15:11
不可说者与踢开的梯子
18:36
为何着迷：文体与人格
23:56
真值函项与逻辑重言式
27:17
维也纳学派与早期影响
29:26
中断十年与后期转向
32:39
意义即用法：语言游戏
35:45
哲学作为治疗：拆解私人对象
40:56
相对主义与人类学影响
43:02
Quinton 的评价与两期比较
本期小问 · 档案清单
35:45
语言塑造思想吗？
32:39
会说话，就等于理解吗？
40:56
真理是客观，还是共识？
7:27
语言还承载意义吗？
本期讲者
Bryan Magee英国哲学家、作家、BBC 广播人，曾任工党议员。主持 BBC 系列《Men of Ideas》（1978）与《The Great Philosophers》（1987），以向公众清晰讲解哲学著称。
安东尼·奎因顿英国哲学家（1925–2010），牛津新学院院士，后任三一学院院长、上议院终身贵族。著有《事物的本质》，属英国分析哲学传统。
01罗素与维特根斯坦：两种影响
0:00
[Music] I don't think anyone could quarrel with the assertion that in this Century the two most influential philosophers in the English speaking world have been Bertrand Russell and ludig wienstein Russell besides being a great philosopher was a tremendous public figure immersed in political and social Affairs nearly all his life he became exceedingly familiar to the general public as a broadcaster and journalist and social critic so people came to associate him quite rightly with certain General ideas and with a particular approach to social problems even if they didn't know much about his philosophy the best of which in any case was highly mathematical and Technical and therefore not really accessible to the non-specialist Vidgen Stein was quite different he was only a technical philosopher he took no no part in public activity shunned exposure even within his own profession published very little the result of this is that for a long time his influence though immense was confined to full-time students of
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philosophy only comparatively recently has this influence began to seep out into surrounding areas of thought and affect people in other fields of activity so the situation now is that a very large number of people have heard of vidin who don't really have any idea at all of what he did or why it's important in this program we're going to try and rectify that a bit and as far as it's possible in the short space of a single program to bring out clearly the main lines of viken Stein's thought and say something about what its influence has been outside as well as inside philosophy this not easy task is being taken on by Anthony Quinton fellow of new College Oxford where he's been teaching philosophy now for over 20 years Mr Quinton is currently also writing a history of philosophy in which vid will be treated at some considerable length but before I invite Anthony Quinton to start talking about vidin Stein's ideas I'd like myself if I may to say something about binstein the man he was born in Vienna in 1889 and died
02生平：从工程师到逻辑学生
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in Cambridge in 1951 having incidentally become a British subject in his middle age his father was the richest and most powerful steel magnet in Austria and as a young child wienstein developed a passionate interest in machine which was to set the pattern for his whole education his parents sent him to a school that specialized in mathematics and the physical sciences and he went on from there to become a student in mechanical engineering at the age of 19 he came to Britain as a research student in engineering at Manchester University and it was while he was there that he became fascinated by what were in fact philosophical questions about the foundations of the mathematics he was using he read Bertrand Russell's great book the principles of mathematics and this seems to have been a kind of Revelation to him he threw up engineering and went to Cambridge to study logic under Russell and within a very short time indeed he was producing original work of his own which many people have regarded from that day to
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this as work of Genius it resulted in the only it resulted in the only book of his to be published during his lifetime a book with the somewhat off-putting title tractatus logico philosophicus usually referred to by philosophers simply is the tractates it was published in Austria in 1929 and in England in 1920 it was published in Austria in 1921 and in England in 1922 it's very short but certainly one of the most influential works of philosophy to be published in this Century however while it was exerting this tremendous influence over subsequent years viken Stein himself was becoming more and more discontented with it in fact he came to the view that it was fundamentally mistaken and he he produced a whole new philosophy which repudiated his earlier one during his lifetime this second philosophy was disseminated only two and through his students at Cambridge but after his death the whole mass of writings came out which embodied it too the most important of these was a book called philosophical investigations which was
03《逻辑哲学论》的中心问题
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published in 1953 and which then proceeded to have as great an influence as the tractatus had had 30 years before this is a unique phenomenon in the whole history of philosophy a philosopher of Genius producing two different and incompatible philosophies Each of which decisively influenced a whole Generation Well now we must go back to the beginning and follow this story through in terms of the ideas involved first the tractatus then produced during the second decade of this Century Anthony Quinton it's a very short book it's less than 80 pages in The Standard Edition uh what would you say are the central problems that vidin Stein was trying to solve solving it I think the shortest way of stating the central problem of the book is as follows how is language possible people had assumed made all sorts of assumptions about meaning previously how people attached meaning to words binstein immensely generalized the question and said how in general is it possible for human beings by producing marks on paper or making
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noises to represent something that was utterly different in character from the marks and noises used to represent them I think many of the people watching this program might not see at once why that is a problem people are inclined to take language for granted why should the very existence of language present a philosophical problem well if one looks at the world in a more or less statistical way in a great deal of it things interact causally with each other rocks bang against rocks moons influence tides and so on but just here and there in the world is this extraordinary phenomenon of some ele elements in the world intelligently reproducing other elements of it in themselves agree I agree of course it's the the texture of our whole inner lives the use of language the understanding of language our communication with our fellow men of course principally they not exclusively takes place through it I think it's just one of those questions that seem so obvious that most people don't bother to
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ask it rather like Newton asking seriously why the planets didn't charge off in all directions why Stones dropped when released from the hand it's got the same naive pristine fundamental in other words we have this ability to think about and therefore handle in a sense things which are not present to us and this is made possible by language or least partly made possible by language and this raises two sets of questions what is the relationship of language to the world and what is the relationship of language to thought and I take you to degree that both of these questions are Central to what the tractors is trying to do yes people had asked questions about these things as it were in a peace meal way before the great fascination of the tractatus is there asked with the utmost conceivable generality and to both of the things you mentioned he has answers to give there's this apparently not very helpful answer in the first at first glance that language represents the World by depicting it propositions of
04图像论：命题如何镜映世界
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pictures he says of fact and equally propositions are expressions of thought they're the vehicles of thought they're what we think with now there's another site of this coin isn't there that he was also concerned with the very fact that he was concerned with the limits of what could be expressed in language and discovering what the limits were to what language could do meant that he was also concerned with what language can't do this was a very essential feature of the whole operation and perhaps in some ways one of of those that's had the largest possible influence his insistence that the limits of language were clearly statable and all this followed from his idea that language is essentially and I have to insist literally pictorial in character there's a well-known anecdote about blitstein hearing of the use of some models in a French Law Court I think it was to represent the State of Affairs in some Street accident and he had confronted with this the sort of experience that Archimedes cried urea
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about this is it I've got it he said that is the essence of language and this put very serious constraints on language that language had exactly to mirror states of Affairs in which objects were engaged and so this put limits to of a very marked kind on what could be said in his view in particular he thought that the relation of language to the world itself couldn't be meaningfully represented in language or or disgusted language let's I think we we we we've got a a pretty clear view now of what uh what the problems were that he was addressing himself to in this book we now have to start considering what the solutions were that he put forward uh what did he come around to saying the scope of language was and to saying the limits to its use were the fundamental thing I think here can be put in two points first of all that language has to fit the World very directly in that it has to be constituted a meaningful assertion a meaningful proposition has to be constituted of names that fit directly
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onto objects that are exactly correlated with the objects they're the names of and then a true proposition a genuine proposition will be an arrangement of names that mirrors the arrangement of the objects it treats of now this limits language in a sense to description of that which is outside language that's the uh limiting uh feature of that oh God I'm sorry I've foed it I've lost the second thing that's right no well you said there were uh you've mentioned you've mentioned what's often referred to as the picture theory of language I think it's very difficult for uh people to see in what sense a sentence can be a picture of a fact or a sentence can be a picture of any piece of reality can you explain that a bit better well I think his point is that the sentences of ordinary language don't look like pictures but his contention is if they are to have any meaning they must be capable of being analyzed or decomposed into a set of ultimate Elementary sentences which really are pictures which consist purely of names
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directly correlated with the objects that are being taught talked about and in which the arrangement of names mirrors the arrangement of of the objects let me recapitulate this to see if if we've got it absolutely clear between us the vien Stein thought that if you analyzed any utterance about the world you could analyze it down into words which were names of things and the relationship between the words in the sentence corresponded to the relationship between things in the real world and in this way the sentence was able to picture the world that's right and that was a purely argumentative assumption as it were he argued that from first principles he's he argued that it was necessitated by the requirement he laid down that every genuine proposition must have a definite sense and he thought no proposition could have a definite sense unless it was ultimately made up of these fundamental pictorial propositions well now sorry I he doesn't give any examples of these pictorial propositions other
05真、假与无意义的三分
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philosophers he influenced came forward with examples of them but he abstains altogether from giving the example he just says it can he thinks be proved that there must be propositions of this ultimate pictorial kind but now one immediate uh uh query that occurs to one is this a great many of the things that we say are false or untrue uh that means that I in those cases utter something to which there is nothing in the world that corresponds now how does he explain that well it kind emerges fairly simply from what's come out so far objects can be arranged in various different ways and the names we have for those objects it can also be arranged in various different ways a significant proposition assembles a set of names in one of the possible configurations that those names allow for and the possibilities of combination of the names is directly parallel to the possibility of the combinations of the objects so a meaningful proposition as such depicts a possible State of Affairs if the arrangement of the objects referred to
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by the proposition is identical with the arrangement of the names of the objects in the proposition then the proposition is true so the counters can be moved around as it were in various configurations most of these will represent simply possible states of Affairs when they're configured or arranged in the way the objects referred to are arranged then the proposition is true a lot of the things that we say in ordinary life uh and indeed in philosophy too aren't about states of Affairs at all we make uh moral judgments aesthetic evaluations and so on and so forth how are these explained by this theory of language well as far as um ethical and aesthetic judgments are concerned they're not in fact explained they're just said to be not part of language proper this is a very eccentric thing for anyone to say isn't it ethics is Transcendental ethics he maintains does not deal with fact and his he insists that the real function of language is the describing of fact truly if possible mean falsely if meaningful but that is
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what language fundamentally is in other words uh when I utter a sentence about the world I am arranging names together in a way which corresponds to a set a possible arrangement in the world if that Arrangement is actualized in the world then my statement is true if it's a possible statement of a a state of affairs in the world which is not actualized then my statement is false if the State of Affairs isn't possible in the world at all then my utterance is meaningless that's correct so we've got a three-fold analysis into true false and meaningless now this theory of language implies that the world must be of a certain kind that is to say that the world independently of us and of language must consist of ultimately simple objects which are related to each other in certain ways is that so that's precisely what what he says and that is what he asserts right at the beginning of the book in an unargued way he says the world consists of facts facts are arrangement of objects objects must be simple to take up the word you used and
06不可说者与踢开的梯子
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these come at one as one reads the book simply as dogmatic affirmations but they receive their support later on from the thesis that language has to have a a definite sense and it can have a definite sense only if it is of a certain structure and therefore the world must be of that structure in order to be capable of being represented in language now what about the unsayable we would talking earlier about viken Stein's concern with what can't be said as the other side of the same coin with his as his concern with what can be said what does the theory of language as we've now drawn it out have to say about what can't be said I suppose the central feature of the doctrine of what can't be said the one that's most philosophically important about it is that nothing can be said about the relation of language to the world this is the vital Paradox of the tractatus that right towards the end he says anyone who understands my propositions will recognize that they're senseless and then tries to mitigate the Paradox by
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saying You must conceive them as a ladder on which he's mounted to a level of understanding which he then kicks away uh he his thesis after all is that language and the world have to share a certain structure for it to be possible for language to represent the world and then says that this is not a fact about which discourse can um proceed it's something that shows itself in language but language can't be used to report and so philosophy as it were undermines itself in this mode of argument would it be true to say that that this is what he's is doing then that that uh for a sentence to mirror the world there's not only got to be a onetoone correlation between names in the sentence and objects in the world there's also got to be a structure internal to the sentence which relates the names in the sentence to each other in a way that corresponds to the way that objects in the world are related to each other and that this structure is exhibited by the proposition it's not something stated by it precis and
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therefore it's shown in the proposition but can't be expressed in language yes and in the light of that then he has to represent his own remarks in the tractatus as drawing our attention to what is open to view what is there shown if we only look the right way but that the propositions themselves are literally senseless but of course much else is to be is said to be nonsensical by him you mentioned a few moments ago judgments of value these he says are in the rather unhelpful word transcendental but it simply means they're not matters of describable fact and he gives no positive account in this book as to what they are then as an alternative and of course he's extremely hostile to past philosophy which purports to tell one all sorts of things about the world when what it is in fact doing is saying things in a hidden dialogue in a hidden dialect a code almost about the relation of language to the world which has to be shown and can't be described why did people think that this Doctrine was so marvelous I mean why why
07为何着迷：文体与人格
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did this philosophy have the enormous impact that it did because it does seem to me to be a very strange one and it does seem to me to leave an awful lot out uh for example uh I would have thought that the most expressive use of Lang uses of language that there are are those in creative art in poetry drama novels and so on both the most sophisticated uses of language and the profoundest and yet this theory of wienstein Simply all seems to allow no place for an explanation of these uses of language at all it seems very limited very partial would you accept that criticism of it yes um it is limited but I think if called upon to defend it he would perhaps say that all other uses of language in so far as they can be taken seriously and aren't some form of word play require the explanation of this fundamental descriptive employment World describing employment of language first of all but about why people thought it was important you mentioned as an argument against it being important that that it was strange but I thought part
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of the fascination just was that it was so strange it's not one might say a terribly modestly expressed book in the preface he says I am convinced that the final solution to all philosophical problems is contained here and of course quite compatibly with that he there and then gave up philosophy once for a considerable period 10 years or so once he completed the tractatus so it's strangeness is part of its appeal but it's not only that it's it's its literary quality is rather striking it's like a voice speaking out of a worldwind these short pregnant aphoristic sentences I'll give you a couple of examples the first one the world is everything that is the case it's one of those baffling announcements that one doesn't quite know what to make of the last one one whereof one cannot speak thereof one must remain silent um one first sight that looks like a trism and then one realizes it isn't quite a truism he says it's the essential message of the whole book is to draw the limits of what can intelligently
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intelligibly be said I suppose the first thing that strikes anyone about the book when they pick it up for the first time is the way it's written because it's written in not in continuous pros at all but in very brief paragraphs s numbered according to a very elaborate system of subdivisions and sub subdivisions and even subub subdivisions uh and some of these paragraphs are only one sentence long and as you've just indicated in what you said the connections between them aren't always very obvious nor is there meaning in itself very obvious either why did he write in this enigmatic uh almost hermetic way well he was an immensely fastidious man in all respects I presume but certainly there's evidence for any reader of what might call his intellectual fastidiousness he detested what I suppose I'll have to call Bourgeois academic philosophy the idea of philosophy is a trade a nto5 occupation which you do with a part of yourself and then you go off and lead the rest of your life in Independence of
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it he was a man of the utmost moral intensity of extreme passionate seriousness he took himself with very great seriousness he took his own work with very great seriousness when it wasn't going well he got into a desperate and agonized condition the result of this displays itself in his manner of WR is displayed in his manner of writing that um you feel that his whole idea of himself is behind everything that he says well this also means that he rather tends to disregard or to despise philosophy produced in a more easygoing relaxed businesslike vocational manner but he wishes to distance himself from that altogether and he doesn't want to make the thing too easy he doesn't want to express himself in a way that people can pick up uh by simply running their eyes over the pages it this is an instrument for changing the whole intellectual aspect of its readers lives and so the way to it is made difficult I think that could be a justification relative to his intentions of the his way of proceeding
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I must say the pros does seem to me to have extraordinary quality I find the sent is supercharged they have uh this haunting capacity to stay in the mind and one finds oneself quoting them very easily after one's read the book uh I would regard viken Stein as one of those few philosophers like Plato or schopenhauer or nich who are also great literary artists great writers uh would you agree with that I think he is he's certainly a very conscious artist he was a distinguished mind a cultivated man uh he didn't make a mess of it therefore there's nothing you couldn't say of his work that it was ever pretentious it pretends to great things it makes claims of itself but it seems to me the literary Garment of his thought is worthy of the seriousness with which he presented those thoughts I think we must go back a bit now to what some of the doctrines were we talked about this Central notion of language picturing the world and you explained how he distinguished between true utter utterances and false
08真值函项与逻辑重言式
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utterances does he provide us with any way of seeing if a statement pictures the world of seeing if our utterances are true or false what kind of analysis of the utterance will show us whether it's true or false there's absolutely no explanation as I said earlier of what the simple objects are and therefore there's no account given of so to speak how we come to be aware of the simple objects all he talks about is what the relation between the basic propos positions of discourse and the objects to which they relate must be what he does do is suggest various ways in which the sentences of ordinary discourse can be analyzed or decomposed into these ultimate basically pictorial sentences that his theory is that every genuine proposition that isn't itself one of these ultimate sentences and he doesn't give any examples of actual everyday propositions that are every such proposition must be decomposable into them and his thesis is to put it in a slightly technical way that every genuine proposition whatever is a truth
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function of Elementary propositions which in effect means that it's just an an abbreviate an abbreviated formula for a vast assemblage a conjunction of Elementary propositions and the negations thereof well I think before we move away from the tractatus and its doctrines which wienstein himself did because he came to think that they were unsatisfactory uh it would probably be helpful if you would summarize if you now could what the central doctrines of that book are well the central Doctrine I think is that language in its fundamentally distinctive use as a means for describing the world can work only by picturing the world how it pictures the world is through configuring names of objects names of simple objects into Arrangements that correspond where the proposition is true to an actual arrangement of objects which correspond where the proposition is false to a possible arrangement of objects uh from this of course it follows that the world is an array of some sort of simple objects exhibiting
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one of the possibilities of combination that are open to them connected with this is the view that although many genuine propositions we utter don't seem to be of this form they can be dismantled analyzed into propositions of this form there is one thing we haven't talked about which is of very great influence his view of log the nature of logic and Mathematics he insisted that this the propositions of logic and Mathematics don't describe the world they're so to speak a byproduct of the abbreviated nature of actual language what a logical truth does is State what should be evident namely that one proposition contains within itself another proposition that is some complex of pictures of the elementary pictures of the world contains in its content certain other some of them so in other words according to that theory all the truths of mathematics like all the truths of logic are Tories are Tories unpacking what is already there in the proposition yes that they give no information about the world itself
09维也纳学派与早期影响
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they're simply symbolic in character as it were they talk about the relation of symbolism and again he said that these propositions were senseless in that they had no factual content they didn't tell us anything about how things were when how things were was different from how they might have been they simply reflect the character of the language we use now what was the influence of this early philosophy of vikin it was in fact very great wasn't it very considerable but it was exercised through only a small part of the work he produced the greater part of the tractatus is concerned with this theory of propositions as pictures words as names the things propositions related to as configurations of simple objects or facts that's the great bulk of the book the first say 2third of it or something like that and in that form I think it's fair to say that nobody took it up a all people were baffled and astounded and puzzled by it but the group of philosophers who claimed to derive their main inspiration from
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binstein namely the positivists of the Vienna Circle although they accepted the view that there must be some basic propositions which relate as it were directly to the world there must be a point in language where direct contact with the world is made they gave a much more straightforward and easily intelligible account of this relation in essence it was that these Elementary propositions simply describe the S experiences of individual observers so they report immediate occurrences of experience feeling um perceptions uh by individual persons and then that everything else could be all the other beliefs we held could be analyzed out into propositions of this kind propositions about continuing material objects that exist unperceived propositions about minds other than our own propositions about social institutions that all of these could be analyzed in the end down to simple reports of um private experience now when wienstein began to become dissatisfied himself with this philosophy of his that he published in
10中断十年与后期转向
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the track us which way did his own dissatisfaction proceed I think perhaps I might say a little bit here about what vidin was doing in the interim you spoke earlier in general terms about his career the engineering at Manchester The Becoming interested in the nature of mathematics the studying of Russell the going to Cambridge to work with Russell and at this period he was an extremely isolated figure perhaps locked up mainly in his own thoughts talking to one or two people particularly Russell and the philosophy of the tractatus reflects that in a way by being an immensely individualistic philosophy there's no suggestion of uh language in a way being a communicative instrument it's an instrument for reporting to oneself to for describing there's no emphasis on it being a medium exchange as I said quite compatibly with the doctrines of the tractates he thought he' got all the answers and so at that point he gave up the subject and in the for a number of years in the 1920s he was an elementary school
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teacher then he worked as a monastery Gardener helped design a house for his sister and it wasn't until the end of the 1920s that he took the subject up again he got into conversations with various leading figures of what was to become the Vienna Circle and this interested him in philosophy again I mean one could reasonably suppose that philosophical thoughts were going through his mind in the interim but it clearly wasn't part of his plan of life to continue thinking about philosophy after the publication of the track datas then he was stimulated into thinking about philosophy again and of course the very different second philosophy of wienstein developed from that period onward now at first it seems that he was quite well disposed towards the particular interpretation that the Vienna Circle gave of his account of what the fundamental elements of language are namely um their view of them as reports of experience not just configuration at names of simple objects with no explanation of how those objects
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relate to our awareness uh but he moved away from that I think reasonably soon remember he returned to Cambridge in 1929 and stayed there in various capacities until getting involved in various sorts of war workor and in this period he produces a completely different philosophy which is no does not offer one clear definite abstract principles about the essential nature nature of language but approaches language as a natural human phenomenon something that we find going on around us very complicated overlapping array of human practices like one another in some ways different from one another in other ways and an essential feature of this lat later philosophy is that language is essentially a public or social phenomenon that it can only function if there are rules that are accepted by more than one person so that any one person 's use of the rules which guide him in speaking is open to correction and Improvement by another person's I think probably the the easiest way into the later philosophy of
11意义即用法：语言游戏
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wienstein and into seeing how it differs from the earlier philosophy is to start with the two different theories of meaning in the two different philosophies we talked earlier about how the uh the central theory of meaning in the early philosophy was that a proposition is a picture of the world a picture of reality this Central metaphor is changed in the later philosophy he no longer sees meaning as being a picture of the world at all or anything like that he sees the meaning of of an utterance as consisting in the use to which it can be put in other words he sees uh a sentence as not a picture but a tool and the meaning of this sentence is so to speak the sum total of its possible uses and this of course as you were just saying relates it to human activity and ultim indeed to different ways of life now this shift in what in in the view of what meaning is is absolutely fundamental to the whole philosophy and a whole mass of changes from the earlier philosophy then follow from that don't they can you can you so
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to speak take the story up from there yes what we've got here I think is in a way best expressed through the two metaphors that I think both cropped up in what you just said then first of all the reference constant reference from language to games which is Incorporated in a Crucial Technical term of the later philosophy the notion of a language game incidentally can I just interrupt to say I think that this metaphor has been extremely unfortunate because a lot of people have concluded from the fact that litchenstein is always talking about language games and the use of language as a game that he somehow regarded all utterance as frivolous and that confirms a lot of the prejudices that some people have about linguistic philosophy that they're just playing with words that was certainly not his intention it was just to draw uh not to two features of games the first one simply that they're rule governed practices and a lot follows from this in a way about how the rules of a game can change and uh the games
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can be resemble one another in all sorts of different ways that second Point leads on to the second feature about games which is that there's no common characteristic to all games games as he says are related to to one another by Family resemblance and that applied back to language means the various kinds of activity we perform with language asking questions cursing greeting praying to give some examples he enumerates these are all different things we do with language now the game analogy I agree might seem to carry with it the suggestion that therefore these things are just for fun or pastimes or what have you but the other analogy that you mentioned was the analogy of language to a system of a set of tools which are used with a purpose I mean there these two things about language it's a purposive undertaking and yet it's carried out with items which are governed by conventional and alterable rules well now uh this notion of language uh had a lot of influence outside philosophy didn't it um
12哲学作为治疗：拆解私人对象
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especially in anthropology and sociology can you say something about how they were affected by this new notion of meaning well I think one needs to proceed that by one remark about his view of later view of the nature of philosophy itself there is a great continuity between his earlier and later General view about philosophy namely that it's essentially an activity and not a theory to use the formula of the tractatus it's something that you have do philosophy it's not something you arrive at and can it's not a body of Doctrine body statable final body of Doctrine um he says that quite explicitly in the tractatus it Remains the case in the investigations he says one shouldn't put forward philosophical theories they simply augment confusion what one does as a philosopher is to assemble reminders about the way in which language is actually used in its various forms the various distinct but not utterly unrelated games language games in which it is employed one assembles reminders of these to prevent people from running away with
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misleading analogies the misleading analogy he had perhaps most prominently in mind was the tendency to think because we say I felt a pain or I have a pain a pain is some kind of definite identifiable inner object private to us which we notice within ourselves and report to other people and he a very great deal of the investigations is concerned to break the hold of that picture of how we talk about our own mental life the reporting of private experiences that picture is precisely uh the sort of picture that his earlier theory of language as put out in the tractatus would lead one to adopt do you think that there's any truth in the following that that when uh wienstein published the tractates he was as it were Bewitched by a single theory of language namely the the picture theory that he later came to realize that this was false and that being Bewitched by a misleading theory of language had resulted in a whole holy mistaken way of doing philosophy and therefore he came to uh think that before you could really
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do philosophy you had to carry out an investigation of the different ways in which language can mislead us so as not to be misled in our thinking about the world and that this itself became a way of doing philosophy in other words an invest a multiple investigation into the different ways in which false assumptions about language can mislead us in our thinking about the world do you think there's any truth in that well it's undoubtedly true that a great deal of the investigations takes the form of a criticism of his earlier Doctrine certainly the first quarter of it is largely directed towards attacking the notion that words are essentially names his view is that the use of names is one of these language games one element in language the teaching of names is a language game we have to understand a great deal of language he maintains in order to understand the activ the activities that someone's engaging in who's trying to tell us what the name of something is so he wants to argue there's no absolute
38:55
or fundamental priority to the notion of naming it's just one of the things that language does from that he goes on to attacking this idea that there are ultimately simple objects and ultimately simple propositions he insists that Simplicity is always relative to some particular investigation and so there's this enormous sense that has developed of language as a public available social reality not language as some kind of essence which you can work out in your head by pure reasoning in the later work one analogy that's been drawn a great deal is with psychoanalysis in the following sense that wienstein is saying that that we first of all become as it were knotted up in our view of some particular aspect of Reality by a false use of language and that the task of philosophy is to untie these knots and uh this so to speak therapeutic aspect of philosophical activity has often been said to be very like what Freud thought the psychoanalyst was doing in another direction do you think that uh a
39:55
similarity exists there yes I think there certainly is a similarity in that viken Stein's abstention from theory in his later philosophy is just like the Freudian analyst's abstention from saying what's wrong with you is your madly in love with your mother which doesn't produce any effect at all the procedure has to be much more Securus in that the person has to be brought by Recon reliving a whole lot of past experiences by being reminded of all sorts of thoughts and feelings he's had that his emotions have a certain peculiar structure so that something is eventually brought up out of the unconscious in vien Stein's case what is hidden isn't hidden in quite the same way what is what is has to be made evident to the philosophically confused or perplexed person is the way the rules of the language games that people actually use what has happened to him is he's on the basis of an analogy he's seen between the way words work in one game and the way they worked in worked in another he applies the rules of the
13相对主义与人类学影响
40:56
first game to the second one and gets into a fix thinks that because in a shop I say that's a bicycle that's a television set that's a so and so I'm doing something just analogous to that when I look Within Myself and say I have an acute pain in my left knee a pronounced desire for a cup of tea and I wish that it was Friday um he want say these are two utterly different operations that not just listing off things that one finds within oneself in self-description and the way to do this he maintains is to consider language in its natural setting to see all the circumstances in which people say things the behavior that characteristically accompanies their saying certain things can I now bring you back to the question of what the influence of this philosophy has been especially outside philosophy I fail to take up that question you're quite right the influence of it has been I suppose to encourage a certain kind of relativism because the abstention from Theory means and is connected with a recognition so to speak of the equal
41:59
rights of all language games provided that it passes the test of workability as a social instrument of communication then it constitutes what he calls a form of life and he doesn't think you can really understand some as it were unfamiliar language game without actually participating without playing it so to speak well now the you spoke of influence of this on anthropology and sociology all right a certain form of anthropology and soci ology who like looks at Social orders utterly different from those in which the student of the subject himself lives and he then proceeds to criticize what's going on there in the light of the accepted rules of his own society when the whole notion as it were of the Savage where people say well presumably Savage languages because their life is so technologically unadvanced their language is presumably going to be a few grunts whereas of course this is not true at all the languages of technically primitive people are of an enormous degree of complexity and then one sees I don't
14Quinton 的评价与两期比较
43:02
know rules of taboo or rules that we call taboo which is already a somewhat derogatory phrase because it suggests this is a rule which is based on false assumptions of what connects with what and he would say I think that just a misunderstanding bred by not actually being party to not fully being within the form of life in which these Tabo rules operate what speaking for yourself do you think is is wrong with this later philosophy unless of course you you buy it whole no I certainly don't buy it whole what I think is important about it I do think the philosophy of mind the account of our discourse about our own mental life and that of others has given very good reason for abandoning an assumption that was traditionally made that there was a kind of huge cleavage between our thought and discourse about the physical world and our thought and discourse about the mind it did bring to light that a great deal of what we have to say about our own and other people's mental lives is essentially tied to
44:07
behavior as it were being generous the test of whether a person is generous is what they give and when not whether they have generous impulses a person who claims to have endless generous impulses but actually always lets the plate pass by uh one supposes he's either being insincere or is at best deceiving himself well the generous impulses it were vien Stein's point is are neither here nor there it's just for a person to be generous is for them to act in a certain way in certain circumstances but and yet after all generosity is a character trait it's part an aspect of an individual's mind the mind isn't a hidden private thing altogether and that I think is important in the later work what I object to myself is the abstention from theory if you like that nothing ever seems to come to an end nothing ever gets settled the examples are heaped up and then as it were they're offered to you to take or to leave it seems to me an intellectually unsatisfactory practice the whole manner of exposition of the investigations is a
45:14
kind of cumulative and disorderly persuasion rather than definitely setting out something that is to be discussed and saying well in favor of it so and so is to be said against it so and so is to be said it's I don't say this is in any sense a mannerism on viken Stein's part it represents a commitment a belief on his part that this is the way the subject should be done I just don't believe it can be done like that or that um understanding of a lasting kind is achieved by this consciously inconclusive way of proceeding if one takes three PES back and looks at the two philosophies of litchenstein the earli and the later one uh there seem to me to be at least three ways in which they are viewed by other philosophers who are themselves very distinguished uh I suppose a large number of philosophers perhaps most regard both the early and the late philosophy as being works of Genius but some uh bertran Russell as an example regarded the first philosophy as being the product of Genius but the later philosophy as being trivial and
46:16
well really he kept saying he thought a worthless exercise there are other philosophers and Carl poer is one for example who doesn't think at all highly of either of them how do you evaluate them in their relation to each other well I'm perhaps docile enough to be quite convinced that vien Stein is a genius and that both stages of his work are works of Genius but as so often in philosophical works this isn't because everything is said in them is true the who who would deny after all that Plato is a genius yet who would believe Plato's view of the universe that what really exists is abstract Timeless entities and the world of things in space and time is a sort of shadowy appearance one can recognize the genius of a philosopher without in fact accepting very much of what he says the genius might consist as it one might say very evidently in the case of K in asking questions of a more fundamental and Powerful kind than people had asked before challenging assumptions that had gone hither to unchallenged and I think
47:21
in both parts of his work this is achieved thank you very much I think I must say that I think that you've succeeded in doing something that is very difficult to do and that is making two philosophies uh intelligible in a space that in this series we're normally devoting to one thank you very much Anthony Quinton
视频总结 · 一句话概括与核心要点
一句话概括
牛津哲学家安东尼·昆顿在1977年访谈中系统梳理了维特根斯坦前后两种互不相容却各自影响一代人的哲学：《逻辑哲学论》的"语言图像论"与《哲学研究》的"意义即用法/语言游戏"，并评价了二者的得失与对哲学之外领域的影响。
核心要点
- 维特根斯坦是哲学史上的独特现象：一位天才哲学家先后提出两种不相容的哲学，各自决定性地影响了一整代人。生于1889年维也纳，卒于1951年剑桥，中年入籍英国。父亲是奥地利最富有的钢铁巨头；他先学机械工程，在曼彻斯特做研究生时因读罗素《数学原理》而转投剑桥学逻辑。生前唯一出版的书是《逻辑哲学论》（奥地利1921年、英国1922年出版），不足80页；第二哲学生前仅通过剑桥学生传播，死后1953年出版《哲学研究》。
- 《逻辑哲学论》的核心问题是"语言如何可能"：昆顿将其类比为牛顿追问石头为何下落——世界大部分是因果互动（岩石碰撞、月球影响潮汐），却有一小部分元素能"智能地再现"其他元素。由此引出两组问题：语言与世界的关系、语言与思想的关系。
- 图像论的具体主张：有意义的命题必须能分析为"基本命题"，基本命题纯由与简单对象一一对应的名称构成，名称的排列方式镜像对象的排列方式。灵感来源是一则轶事——维特根斯坦听说法国法庭用模型重现交通事故现场，于是"阿基米德式"地宣称"这就是语言的本质"。值得注意的是，他从未给出任何基本命题或简单对象的实例，只是论证其必然存在（理由：每个真命题必须有确定意义）。
- 真/假/无意义的三分法：命题描绘一种"可能的事态"；若该排列在世界中实现则为真，可能但未实现则为假，根本不可能则无意义。由此推出形而上学结论：世界由事实构成，事实是简单对象的排列——书开头以独断方式断言，之后由语言理论倒推支持。
- "不可说"的悖论：语言与世界共享的结构只能在命题中"显示"而不能被"言说"，因此书末承认自己的命题是无意义的，须当作登高后踢开的梯子。伦理、美学判断被称为"超越的"，不属于语言本体；逻辑与数学命题都是重言式，不告知世界任何信息，仅反映符号体系的性质。
- 早期哲学的影响其实经过了改造：占全书三分之二的图像论本身几乎无人接受；维也纳学派逻辑实证主义者只吸收了"语言必须有直接接触世界的基本命题"这一点，并把基本命题解释为个人感觉经验的报告，再把物质对象、他人心灵、社会制度等一切信念还原为此类报告。
- 写作风格与人格的关联：全书为编号的格言式短段落，序言自称"包含了所有哲学问题的最终解决"，随即放弃哲学约十年（当小学教师、修道院园丁、为姐姐设计房子）。昆顿解释这种"隐晦"写法源于他对"朝九晚五式资产阶级学院哲学"的鄙视和极端道德严肃性——他要的是改变读者整个智识生活的工具，故意不让人轻易读懂。主持人将其与柏拉图、叔本华、尼采并列为文学艺术家式的哲学家。
- 后期哲学的根本转向是意义观的改变：从"命题是图像"变为"意义在于用法"——句子是工具而非图像。1929年重返剑桥后，他把语言视为自然的、公共的、社会性的人类实践，只有当规则被不止一人接受、可被他人纠正时语言才能运作。"语言游戏"的隐喻只强调两点：受规则支配、各游戏之间仅有"家族相似"而无共同本质（提问、诅咒、问候、祈祷都是不同的语言活动）——并非说言语是儿戏。
- 后期哲学的"治疗"性质及对早期的自我批判：《哲学研究》前四分之一主要攻击"词本质上是名称"的观点——命名只是众多语言游戏之一，"简单性"总是相对于特定研究而言。哲学不提出理论，只"汇集提醒"，防止人被误导性类比俘获；典型例子是把"我有痛感"误当成像在商店里说"那是自行车"一样对内在私人对象的报告。昆顿认可与弗洛伊德精神分析的类比：不直接下诊断，而是让人通过回溯语言实际使用的场景自己看清困惑所在。
- 对哲学之外的影响是某种相对主义：拒绝理论意味着承认所有语言游戏的"平等权利"——只要作为社会交流工具可运作，即构成一种"生活形式"，不参与其中就无法真正理解。这影响了人类学与社会学：反驳"技术原始的社会语言必然是几声咕哝"的偏见（实际上极为复杂），并把"禁忌"这类带贬义的标签视为未真正进入该生活形式而产生的误解。
结论与值得注意的细节
- 昆顿的个人评价：他自称"足够温顺"地承认两个阶段都是天才之作，但天才不等于正确——正如无人否认柏拉图是天才却少有人接受其理念论；天才体现在提出比前人更根本的问题、挑战从未被质疑的假设（他类比康德）。
- 他认可后期哲学最有价值的部分是心灵哲学：打破了物理世界话语与心灵话语之间的"巨大鸿沟"，说明关于心灵的大量话语本质上与行为相连——判断一个人慷慨看的是他何时给了什么，而非他自称有多少"慷慨的冲动"；心灵不是完全隐藏的私人之物。
- 他明确反对的是后期的"拒绝理论"：例子堆砌后任人取舍，"没有任何事情得到解决"，《哲学研究》的整体方式是"累积而无序的说服"，他不相信这种"有意识地不作结论"的方式能带来持久的理解——并强调这不是维特根斯坦的做作，而是其真诚的方法论信念。
- 同行评价的三种立场：多数哲学家认为前后期皆为天才之作；罗素认为前期是天才、后期琐碎无价值；波普尔对两者评价都不高。
- 一处有趣的现场细节：昆顿在阐述图像论"两点"时当场忘了第二点并道歉，主持人替他接续了"图像论"的话头。
- 主持人的两点批评：图像论似乎完全无法解释诗歌、戏剧、小说等最富表现力的语言用法（昆顿回应：维特根斯坦会说这些都以描述性用法为基础）；"语言游戏"这一隐喻很不幸，助长了"语言哲学只是玩弄词语"的偏见。
核心句型 · 9
1. I don't think anyone could quarrel with the assertion that …
“I don't think anyone could quarrel with the assertion that in this Century the two most influential philosophers … have been Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein”
以「没人会反对……」开场，把判断包装成共识，是英式演讲常用的稳妥开头。仿写：I don't think anyone could quarrel with the claim that …
2. The shortest way of stating X is as follows: …
“The shortest way of stating the central problem of the book is as follows how is language possible”
先预告「最简表述」再给出，能让复杂内容显得可控。适合口头讲解或写作中引出核心命题。
3. there's another side of this coin, isn't there, that …
“There's another site of this coin isn't there that he was also concerned with the limits of what could be expressed”
用「硬币另一面」引出问题的对立面，附加 isn't there 邀请对方认同，是访谈中推进话题的柔和方式。
4. Let me recapitulate this to see if we've got it absolutely clear …
“Let me recapitulate this to see if we've got it absolutely clear between us”
主持人用来复述确认理解，适合讨论、面试、课堂中总结对方观点后再追问。
5. in so far as … , … require …
“All other uses of language in so far as they can be taken seriously and aren't some form of word play require the explanation of this fundamental descriptive employment”
in so far as 表示「在……的范围内」，用于限定主张的适用条件，学术写作中常见。
6. it wasn't until … that …
“It wasn't until the end of the 1920s that he took the subject up again”
强调句式，突出时间转折点。仿写：It wasn't until she read the book that she understood.
7. one can recognize X without in fact accepting …
“One can recognize the genius of a philosopher without in fact accepting very much of what he says”
「承认 A 而不必接受 B」的让步结构，用于区分评价的不同层次，辩论中很实用。
8. do you think there's any truth in the following: that …
“Do you think that there's any truth in the following that when Wittgenstein published the tractatus he was as it were Bewitched by a single theory”
提出一个待验证的解释供对方评判，比直接断言更留余地，适合访谈或讨论中试探性提出观点。
9. X is neither here nor there
“The generous impulses it were Wittgenstein's point is are neither here nor there”
习语，意为「无关紧要」。用于把某因素排除在判断标准之外。
生词精讲 · 107 · 按出现顺序
quarrel with
phr.
0:00
对……提出异议、不同意（某说法）
immersed in
phr.
0:00
深深投入于、沉浸于
shunned
/ʃʌnd/
v.
0:00
刻意回避、避开（shun 的过去式）
seep out
phr. v.
1:12
（液体、影响）慢慢渗出、扩散
rectify
/ˈrektɪfaɪ/
v.
1:12
纠正、矫正
at some considerable length
phr.
1:12
以相当大的篇幅
magnate
/ˈmæɡneɪt/
n.
2:15
巨头、大亨（原文误拼为 magnet）
threw up
phr. v.
2:15
（英式）放弃、辞掉（工作、学业）
off-putting
/ˈɔːfˌpʊtɪŋ/
adj.
3:14
令人却步的、让人不想接近的
discontented
/ˌdɪskənˈtentɪd/
adj.
3:14
不满的
repudiated
/rɪˈpjuːdieɪtɪd/
v.
3:14
否定、与……断绝关系
disseminated
/dɪˈsemɪneɪtɪd/
v.
3:14
传播、散布（思想、信息）
embodied
/ɪmˈbɑːdid/
v.
3:14
体现、包含
incompatible
/ˌɪnkəmˈpætəbl/
adj.
4:20
互不相容的
decisively
/dɪˈsaɪsɪvli/
adv.
4:20
决定性地
take language for granted
phr.
5:24
把语言视为理所当然
causally
/ˈkɔːzəli/
adv.
5:24
因果地、以因果方式
texture
/ˈtekstʃər/
n.
5:24
质地；此处指（内心生活的）肌理、构成
pristine
/ˈprɪstiːn/
adj.
6:23
原初的、未经污染的
piecemeal
/ˈpiːsmiːl/
adj./adv.
6:23
零碎的、一点一点地（原文拼作 peace meal）
with the utmost conceivable generality
phr.
6:23
以可想象的最大普遍性
vehicles of thought
phr.
7:27
思想的载体
pictorial
/pɪkˈtɔːriəl/
adj.
7:27
图像的、图画式的
anecdote
/ˈænɪkdoʊt/
n.
7:27
轶事
constraints
/kənˈstreɪnts/
n.
8:30
限制、约束
mirror
/ˈmɪrər/
v.
8:30
镜映、如实反映
correlated with
phr.
8:30
与……相关联、一一对应
contention
/kənˈtenʃn/
n.
9:38
论点、主张
decomposed into
phr.
9:38
被分解为
recapitulate
/ˌriːkəˈpɪtʃuleɪt/
v.
10:52
扼要重述、概括
necessitated by
phr.
10:52
由……所必然要求
abstains
/əbˈsteɪnz/
v.
11:53
克制不做、回避（abstain from）
configurations
/kənˌfɪɡjəˈreɪʃnz/
n.
11:53
排列方式、构型
eccentric
/ɪkˈsentrɪk/
adj.
12:59
古怪的、离经叛道的
Transcendental
/ˌtrænsenˈdentl/
adj.
12:59
超越的、先验的（哲学术语）
actualized
/ˈæktʃuəlaɪzd/
v.
14:06
被实现、成为现实
three-fold
/ˈθriːfoʊld/
adj.
14:06
三重的、三分的
dogmatic affirmations
phr.
15:11
独断的断言
mitigate
/ˈmɪtɪɡeɪt/
v.
15:11
缓和、减轻
discourse
/ˈdɪskɔːrs/
n.
16:18
话语、论述
undermines itself
phr.
16:18
自我瓦解、自我拆台
purports to
/pərˈpɔːrts/
v.
17:30
声称、自称（常暗示实际并非如此）
dialect
/ˈdaɪəlekt/
n.
17:30
方言
profoundest
/prəˈfaʊndɪst/
adj.
18:36
最深刻的
if called upon to
phr.
18:36
如果被要求去……
pregnant
/ˈpreɡnənt/
adj.
19:43
（言辞）意味深长的、含义丰富的
aphoristic
/ˌæfəˈrɪstɪk/
adj.
19:43
格言式的、警句式的
baffling
/ˈbæflɪŋ/
adj.
19:43
令人困惑的
truism
/ˈtruːɪzəm/
n.
19:43
不言自明的道理、老生常谈（原文拼作 trism）
enigmatic
/ˌenɪɡˈmætɪk/
adj.
20:44
神秘费解的
hermetic
/hɜːrˈmetɪk/
adj.
20:44
晦涩难解的、密封式的
fastidious
/fæˈstɪdiəs/
adj.
20:44
极其讲究的、挑剔的
detested
/dɪˈtestɪd/
v.
20:44
憎恶
Bourgeois
/ˌbʊrˈʒwɑː/
adj.
20:44
资产阶级的、市侩的
agonized
/ˈæɡənaɪzd/
adj.
21:47
极度痛苦的
vocational
/voʊˈkeɪʃənl/
adj.
21:47
职业性的
supercharged
/ˈsuːpərtʃɑːrdʒd/
adj.
22:54
高能量的、充满张力的
haunting
/ˈhɔːntɪŋ/
adj.
22:54
萦绕心头的、难以忘怀的
pretentious
/prɪˈtenʃəs/
adj.
22:54
矫饰的、装腔作势的
Garment
/ˈɡɑːrmənt/
n.
22:54
衣裳；此处比喻思想的文体外衣
so to speak
phr.
23:56
可以说、姑且这么说
truth function
n. phr.
25:03
真值函项（逻辑学术语）
assemblage
/əˈsemblɪdʒ/
n.
25:03
集合、聚集体
conjunction
/kənˈdʒʌŋkʃn/
n.
25:03
合取（逻辑「与」）
dismantled
/dɪsˈmæntld/
v.
26:11
拆解
byproduct
/ˈbaɪprɑːdʌkt/
n.
26:11
副产品
tautologies
/tɔːˈtɑːlədʒiz/
n.
26:11
重言式、同义反复（原文拼作 Tories）
baffled
/ˈbæfld/
adj.
27:17
困惑不解的
positivists
/ˈpɑːzətɪvɪsts/
n.
28:23
实证主义者
intelligible
/ɪnˈtelɪdʒəbl/
adj.
28:23
可理解的
unperceived
/ˌʌnpərˈsiːvd/
adj.
28:23
未被感知的
in the interim
phr.
29:26
在此期间
medium of exchange
phr.
29:26
交流媒介
well disposed towards
phr.
30:31
对……态度友善、赞同
in various capacities
phr.
31:30
以各种身份
open to correction
phr.
31:30
可被纠正的
sum total
n. phr.
32:39
总和
cropped up
phr. v.
33:42
（意外地）出现、冒出来
frivolous
/ˈfrɪvələs/
adj.
33:42
轻浮的、无足轻重的
rule governed
adj. phr.
33:42
受规则支配的
Family resemblance
n. phr.
34:40
家族相似（维氏术语）
purposive
/ˈpɜːrpəsɪv/
adj.
34:40
有目的的
augment
/ɔːɡˈment/
v.
35:45
增加、加剧
running away with
phr. v.
35:45
被……冲昏头脑、不加审视地接受
break the hold of
phr.
36:51
打破……的控制、摆脱……的支配
Bewitched
/bɪˈwɪtʃt/
adj.
36:51
被蛊惑的、着魔的
knotted up
phr.
38:55
打结、纠缠不清
therapeutic
/ˌθerəˈpjuːtɪk/
adj.
38:55
治疗性的
abstention from
/əbˈstenʃn/
n.
39:55
对……的克制、弃绝
circuitous
/sərˈkjuːɪtəs/
adj.
39:55
迂回的、绕圈子的（原文拼作 Securus）
gets into a fix
phr.
40:56
陷入困境
relativism
/ˈrelətɪvɪzəm/
n.
40:56
相对主义
form of life
n. phr.
41:59
生活形式（维氏术语）
grunts
/ɡrʌnts/
n.
41:59
咕哝声、哼声
derogatory
/dɪˈrɑːɡətɔːri/
adj.
43:02
贬损的
bred by
phr.
43:02
由……滋生、引起
buy it whole
phr.
43:02
全盘接受
cleavage
/ˈkliːvɪdʒ/
n.
43:02
裂隙、分裂
lets the plate pass by
phr.
44:07
（教堂募捐盘传到面前）不掏钱；喻只说不做
neither here nor there
idiom
44:07
无关紧要
character trait
n. phr.
44:07
性格特征
heaped up
phr. v.
44:07
堆积起来
mannerism
/ˈmænərɪzəm/
n.
45:14
（刻意的）习性、做作风格
exposition
/ˌekspəˈzɪʃn/
n.
45:14
阐述、论述
inconclusive
/ˌɪnkənˈkluːsɪv/
adj.
45:14
无定论的
docile
/ˈdɑːsl/
adj.
46:16
温顺的、易受教的
hitherto
/ˌhɪðərˈtuː/
adv.
46:16
迄今为止（原文拼作 hither to）
理解自测 · 11 题 · 是真懂了，还是以为自己懂
1. 维特根斯坦进入哲学之前的教育与职业背景是什么？
他出身维也纳钢铁大王家庭，少年时痴迷机械，父母送他进专攻数学与物理科学的学校，之后学机械工程。19 岁到曼彻斯特大学做工程研究生，在研究中被数学基础的哲学问题吸引，读了罗素的《数学原理》，视之为「启示」，遂放弃工程赴剑桥师从罗素学逻辑。这一段在节目开头主持人的生平介绍部分（第 2–3 段）。
2. 《逻辑哲学论》出版时间和篇幅如何？它在维氏生前的地位是什么？
主持人更正后说明：德文版 1921 年在奥地利出版，英文版 1922 年在英国出版。全书不足 80 页，却是本世纪最有影响的哲学著作之一，也是维氏生前出版的唯一一本书。他后来越来越不满于此书，认为它根本错误，转而发展出第二种哲学，该哲学生前只通过剑桥学生传播，1953 年遗作《哲学研究》出版后才广为人知（第 3–4 段）。
3. 据 Quinton，《逻辑哲学论》的中心问题是什么？
「语言如何可能？」——人类如何靠纸上的记号或口中的声音，去表征与这些记号声音性质完全不同的事物。Quinton 认为此前人们只零散地问「词怎样有意义」，维氏把它普遍化到极致。主持人补充说这不像问题是因为人们把语言视为理所当然，Quinton 则用「世界大多是因果互动，唯独语言能在自身中再现世界」来说明其奇特性（第 4–6 段）。
4. 图像论如何解释假命题的可能性？
图像论主张有意义的命题由名称构成，名称排列镜映对象排列。关键在于：名称的可能组合方式与对象的可能组合方式平行。一个有意义的命题描绘的是一个「可能事态」；若对象实际按此排列，命题为真；若只是可能但未实现，则为假；若排列根本不可能，则命题无意义。于是意义在先、真假在后，假命题并非「对应于虚无」，而是对应于未实现的可能（第 11–13 段）。
5. 为什么说《逻辑哲学论》「自我消解」？梯子比喻的作用是什么？
书中主张语言与世界必须共享某种结构才能表征，但这一「关系」本身不是可描述的事实，只能在语言中「显示」，不能「言说」。于是全书讨论语言—世界关系的命题按其自身标准都无意义。维氏在结尾坦承这一点，并用「梯子」比喻缓解悖论：读者攀登后须把梯子踢开。Quinton 称之为该书的「关键悖论」，也是它对传统形而上学敌意的根源（第 14–16 段）。
6. 前后期哲学的意义理论分别是什么？这一转换带来了哪些连锁变化？
前期：命题是世界的图像，意义在于镜映事态。后期：意义在于用法，句子是工具而非图画。由此引出「语言游戏」概念——语言是受规则支配、彼此仅有家族相似的多种实践（提问、咒骂、问候、祈祷等）；语言本质上是公共的，个人用法可被他人纠正；不再有绝对的简单对象，简单性相对于具体探究；命名只是众多语言游戏之一而非语言基础。这些都在第 29–36 段展开。
7. Quinton 为什么说维也纳学派对《逻辑哲学论》的继承是「填补」而非「接受」？
《逻辑哲学论》占三分之二篇幅的图像论——命题作图像、词作名称、简单对象——Quinton 说「几乎无人接受」，人们只是困惑。维也纳学派保留了「语言中必须有直接接触世界的基本命题」这一形式，却给出更易懂的内容：基本命题就是个体观察者的感觉经验报告，一切关于外物、他心、社会制度的信念都可还原为此。维氏对此起初尚友善，但很快远离，因为这正是他后期要拆解的「私人报告」图画（第 25–28 段）。
8. 维氏后期哲学与精神分析的类比在哪里成立、哪里不成立？
成立之处：两者都不靠直接宣布理论来解决问题——分析师说「你爱上了母亲」无济于事，维氏也认为哲学理论只会增加混乱；都需要迂回地让当事人重新看到自身。不成立之处：弗洛伊德要从无意识中挖出真正隐藏的东西，而维氏要显现的东西并非隐藏，只是人把一种语言游戏的规则误用到另一种（如把「我有疼痛」当作商店里指认物品），方法是把语言放回自然情境观察伴随行为（第 36–38 段）。
9. Quinton 对后期哲学的肯定与批评各是什么？
肯定：后期心灵哲学有力地打破了「关于物理世界的话语」与「关于心灵的话语」之间的传统鸿沟，说明心理描述本质上与行为相连——慷慨的检验是给了什么，而非有无慷慨冲动。批评：拒绝理论导致「什么都没有了结」，例子堆积起来任人取舍，是「累积而无序的说服」，而不是可以正反讨论的明确主张。他认为这不是文风癖好而是维氏的信念，但他不相信持久的理解能以刻意不下结论的方式获得（第 40–42 段）。
10. 若有人反驳「语言游戏一律平等」会导致无法批评任何文化实践，Quinton 或维氏会如何回应？
视频给出的线索是：后期哲学确实「鼓励某种相对主义」，只要一种语言游戏通过「作为社会交流工具可用」的检验，就构成一种生活形式，且不参与其中就无法真正理解。维氏会说，把「禁忌」视为基于错误因果假设，本身就是不在该生活形式之内导致的误解。但 Quinton 自己明确说「不全盘接受」，他的批评正在于这种拒绝理论使「什么都无法定论」——可推断他会承认相对主义倾向是这套哲学的真实代价，而非误读（第 38–42 段）。
11. 把「意义即用法」的观点迁移到今天的大语言模型上，会引出什么问题？视频的框架能提供什么？
若意义在于使用而非内在图像，那么一个能在各种语言游戏中恰当接话的系统似乎已「掌握意义」。但视频强调的另一半是：语言游戏嵌入「生活形式」，规则由多人共享并可被相互纠正，理解需要「参与」而非旁观。由此可问：模型是否真正参与了某种生活形式，还是只在统计上模拟了语言游戏的表层？Quinton 对「不参与就无法理解」的转述（第 39 段）与主持人对「工具」隐喻的强调（第 30 段），恰好给出了正反两面的思考起点。
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