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第 51 期 · 核心追问 Ⅰ·04「数学是发现，还是发明？」
Frege, Russell, & Modern Logic - A. J. Ayer & Bryan Magee (1987)
节目发布 2023-08-26章节 · 点击跳转视频
0:00
两位奠基者：弗雷格与罗素
3:12
弗雷格的目标：让数学严格化
5:27
逻辑主义与反心理主义
7:50
涵义与指称的区分
11:32
达米特的评价与艾耶尔的保留
13:37
罗素悖论击垮弗雷格
15:50
皮亚诺、《数学原理》与逻辑爆发
19:05
摹状词理论与转向一般哲学
22:32
辩护的追求与立场的反复
27:08
科学、形而上学与归纳难题
29:30
罗素的影响：摩尔、怀特海到艾耶尔
35:57
战后沉浮与弗雷格复兴
40:30
结语：什么是值得做的哲学
本期小问 · 档案清单
——
数学是发现，还是发明？
——
因果关系存在吗？
——
知识从哪里来？
——
语言还承载意义吗？
本期讲者
A.J.艾耶尔英国哲学家（1910–1989），逻辑实证主义在英语世界的代表，1936年《语言、真理与逻辑》成名，曾任牛津威克姆逻辑讲座教授，著有罗素研究专著。
布莱恩·麦基英国作家、播音员、前工党议员（1930–2019），主持BBC《思想家》《伟大的哲学家》等哲学访谈系列，以向大众清晰呈现哲学著称。
01两位奠基者：弗雷格与罗素
0:00
a great deal of the philosophy that's going on today in the English-speaking World in fact probably most of it can be traced back through intermediate developments to the work of two men got lob Fraga and Burton Russell working for the most part independently of each other they laid the foundations of modern logic but more than that although the work on which they began concerned chiefly the principles of mathematics and the relationship between mathematics and logic its implications went so wide that in the course of time it came to have a profound influence on philosophy in general exactly the same happened with the philosopher who most obviously and directly followed on from them named Wittgenstein Wittgenstein started by developing Russells and fraga's work in mathematical logic but he ended up acquiring an influence at large on 20th century philosophy which is second to nobody's in this program without going into any of the technicalities of mathematics or logic I want to give some indication of
当今英语世界正在进行的哲学，其中很大一部分——事实上可能是绝大部分——都可以通过一些中间环节追溯到两个人的著作：戈特洛布·弗雷格和伯特兰·罗素。他们在很大程度上彼此独立地工作，奠定了现代逻辑的基础。不仅如此，尽管他们最初着手研究的工作主要关注数学的原理，以及数学与逻辑之间的关系，但其影响所及如此广泛，以至于随着时间的推移，它对整个哲学产生了深远的影响。同样的情况也发生在最明显、最直接地承接他们工作的那位哲学家身上，他就是维特根斯坦。维特根斯坦一开始是在发展罗素和弗雷格在数理逻辑方面的工作，但他最终对20世纪哲学产生的整体影响，不亚于任何人。在这期节目中，我不打算涉及任何数学或逻辑上的技术细节，我想大致说明弗雷格和罗素是如何对20世纪思想产生
0:58
how Freda and Russell came to have this enormous influence on 20th century thought and to say a little about some of the more recent individuals and groups who've come under that influence first a word about the individuals themselves Freda a German was born in 1848 and spent his entire working life in comparative obscurity in the mathematics Department of the University of yena not until after his death did his name become known at all widely even among philosophers his first major work published in 1879 was called the griefshrift and I'm afraid even the English translation keeps the German title because there's no satisfactory English for it it means something like the putting of Concepts into notation and we'll begin to see later what that's about his next major work published in 1884 is called in English the foundations of arithmetic he went on producing important and original work most notably in 1893 and 1903 two volumes of the projected larger work called in English the basic laws of arithmetic
这种巨大影响的，并且谈一谈近来受到这种影响的一些个人和学派首先说说这两个人本身。弗雷格是德国人，生于1848年，他的整个职业生涯都是在耶拿大学数学系相对默默无闻地度过的。直到他去世之后，他的名字才广为人知，甚至在哲学家当中也是如此。他的第一部重要著作出版于1879年，名为《概念文字》，恐怕连英译本都保留了这个德文标题，因为英语里没有令人满意的对应词。它的意思大致是“把概念写成符号记法”，我们稍后会开始明白这是怎么回事。他的下一部重要著作出版于1884年，英文书名是《算术算术方面的工作，他继续做出了重要而原创的研究，最著名的是1893年和1903年出版的两卷，属于他计划中的一部更大著作的一部分，英文名叫做《算术的基本法则》。但这部作品实在太深奥、太艰涩，以至于他的研究总体上一直鲜为人知，直到
2:06
but it was all of such depth and difficulty that his work in general remained very largely unknown until Bertrand rustled her attention to it in 1903. Russell was a totally different sort of person grandson of a British prime minister from whom he was later by his elder brother to inherit an eldom he was always prominent on the political and social scene as well as in philosophy in fact a famous public figure all his life he did a tremendous amount of popular writing and journalism and broadcasting which influenced social attitudes among successive generations of British people I think this is obscured for many the fact that the true foundations of his Fame as a philosopher lie in contributions to mathematical logic of a highly professional and Technical character he was born in 1872 and lived till 1970 and was politically active almost to the end though the great bulk of his philosophical work was done by the 1920s here to discuss the work of these two men and some of its influences down to
1903年伯特兰·罗素让人们注意到它。罗素则是完全不同类型的人物，他是一位英国首相的孙子，后来又从他的兄长那里继承了伯爵爵位。他在政治和社会舞台上一直很活跃，在哲学界也是如此，事实上他一生都是知名的公众人物。他写了大量通俗读物，做了大量新闻写作和广播节目，这些影响了一代又一代英国人的社会观念。我想这对很多人来说反而掩盖了一个事实：他作为哲学家的声誉，其真正基础在于他对数理逻辑的贡献，那是极为专业和技术性的内容。他生于1872年，一直活到1970年，几乎到生命的最后都还在政治上活跃，尽管他绝大部分哲学工作在20世纪20年代之前就已完成。今天来和我们讨论这两个人的工作，以及它一直影响到
02弗雷格的目标：让数学严格化
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our own day is one of the most famous philosophers of our time AJ air who has written a great deal about Russell including the best short introductory book on Russell's work Professor let's start with freygar as being the earlier figure when he began what was it he was trying to do well he was trying to um make up what he thought well the deficiencies in arithmetic he thought that mathematical statements as they were expressing his day were not sufficiently precise and the mathematical proofs were not sufficiently rigorous and so he began by trying to develop a notation the progressive to referred to in which you become in which this would be remedied annotations to show exactly what mathematical statement stated and exactly what their proofs consisted in it was supposed to make it obvious how one step in a proof succeeded another and this was it was a deficiency in mathematics in his time applying even to Euclid where there were assumptions not made explicit which are required for the proofs to be valid wasn't one of the
我们今天的一些余绪的，是我们这个时代最著名的哲学家之一，A.J.艾耶尔。他写过大量关于罗素的著作，其中包括介绍罗素思想的最佳简明入门书。教授，我们先从弗雷格谈起吧，因为他是较早的那位。当他起步时，他想做的是什么呢？嗯，他是想弥补他所认为的算术中的缺陷。他认为当时数学命题的表述方式不够精确，数学证明也不够严格。所以他一开始就试图发展出一套记号系统，也就是刚才提到的《概念文字》，在其中他……一种能弥补这一缺陷的记法，用来精确地表明数学命题究竟陈述了什么、它们的证明究竟由什么构成它应当让人一眼就看清，证明中的一步是怎样承接上一步的，而这在当时的数学中正是一个缺陷他那个时代的数学，甚至连欧几里得也不例外，其中有些假设并没有被明确说出来，而这些假设正是证明得以成立所必需的。这里是不是也涉及一点：任何论证，包括数学证明，都必须有前提，而这些前提究竟是什么
4:18
points involved that every argument including a mathematical proof has to have premises and what those premises are often creates problems and he tried to show that all mathematics was ultimately derived from Pure principles of logic exactly both he and Russell did this and this involved two Enterprises first of all defining mathematical Concepts in pure logical one and secondly showing that mathematics were arithmetic anyhow not all mathematics but arithmetic were deducible from probably The Logical premises and this has achieved the first part was achieved fairly simply I think fairly simple illustration will show how it was done if you take let's say any couple let's take um Tom and Jerry then you could Define them as a couple by saying that they are both members of the set and anything which is a member of is identical with one or other of them they will Define the number two as a set of of such sets a set of couples and you do this for all numbers there are certain complications about Infinity but in this way you can
常常会造成问题。他试图表明，全部数学最终都是从纯粹的逻辑原则中推导出来的正是如此，他和罗素都做了这件事。这包含两项工作：首先是用纯逻辑的语汇来定义数学概念其次是表明数学——无论如何是算术——不是全部数学，而是算术——是可以从纯粹的逻辑前提推导出来的。我想第一部分实现得相当简单一个相当简单的例子就能说明它是怎么做到的。比方说随便取一对，就拿汤姆和杰瑞来说，你可以把他们定义成一对：说他们两个都是某个集合的成员，而凡是这个集合的成员，都等同于他们两人中的某一个。这样就可以把数字二定义为所有这类集合构成的集合，也就是一切“对”的集合；对所有的数都可以这么做。关于无穷会有一些复杂之处，但用这种方式你就能纯粹用逻辑的
03逻辑主义与反心理主义
5:27
define a cardinal number in purely logical terms is what he did and then also so by generalizing logic which hadn't been done are still in logic which had prevailed from ancient times until 19th century was not holy General he was able to State premises from which most terrific it was deducible it was shown later by somebody by another logician Augustine girdle that in fact this couldn't be completely done the derivative day couldn't be completed but that in so far as it could be completed freyr shared a method of doing it wouldn't it also be true to say that before Fraga the laws of logic had been regarded as laws of thought that's to say has something to do with human mental processes but Fraga realized that that this couldn't be so that the validity of a proof couldn't depend on our psychology oh yes this was very important this is one of one of the most important things that Fraga did and he began by one of his early work was an attack on a book of honorific German philosopher called whose cell in which
词汇来定义基数，这正是他所做的。此外，他还推广了逻辑——这在他之前没人做过——从古代一直沿用到十九世纪的那套逻辑并不够普遍。他因此得以陈述出一些前提，绝大部分数学都可以从中推出不过后来另一位逻辑学家哥德尔证明，这件事其实无法完全做到，那种推导是不可能彻底完成的，但是就它能够被完成的范围而言，弗雷格提供了一套办法。是不是也可以这么说：在弗雷格之前，逻辑规律一直被看作思维的规律，也就是说与人的心理过程有关，但弗雷格意识到事情不可能是这样，一个证明的有效性不可能取决于我们的心理。对，这一点非常重要，这是弗雷格所做的最重要的事情之一。他一开始，他早期的一项工作就是抨击一位颇有名望的德国哲学家胡塞尔的一本书，在那本书里逻辑被表现为一种判断理论，而当时的思想界是由
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logic was represented as a theory of judgment and this was it was ruled by the German idealists and fragrant insisted he was entirely objective and nothing to do with with psychological processes but the the sets in which you reduce numbers were entirely objective things and that logic was quite independent of uh wasn't about psychology at all these were objective truths which of course the mind is capable of gospeling they didn't depend upon features of thinking so the search then becomes in a mathematical proof for what it is that the proof conveys from step to step that's right that impersonally validates the conclusion regardless of how we think and this in a way accounts for Fraga having a philosophical interests Beyond this probably mathematical work because he also developed a theory of of meaning of meaning which would show how mathematics could be objectively valid and he talked of of the he tied up the meaning of mathematical statements but this could be extended to statements in
德国唯心论者主导的。弗雷格坚持认为逻辑完全是客观的，与心理过程毫无关系；而用来还原数的那些集合也完全是客观的东西，逻辑是完全独立的，呃，它根本不是关于心理学的，这些都是客观的真理，当然心灵有能力把握它们，但它们并不依赖于思维的特征。于是问题就变成在一个数学证明中，究竟是什么东西从一步传递到下一步——对，是那种不依赖于任何个人、客观地证成结论的东西而与我们怎么想无关。这在某种意义上也解释了弗雷格为什么会有超出纯数学工作之外的哲学兴趣，因为他还发展出一套意义理论，用来说明数学何以能够客观有效。他谈到……他把数学命题的意义——这也可以推广到一般的陈述——同真值条件联系起来，同陈述中那些
04涵义与指称的区分
7:50
general with truth Traditions with with the features in them that made them candidates for truth or falsehood I suppose the most uh historically influential distinction that he introduced was the distinction between sense and reference which has to do with his theory of meaning and one still hears people constantly referring to this can you explain it yes it's it's fairly it's fairly complicated the tool German expressions are Zin which are generally translated since and bedok which is translated well it is in fact the German word for meaning but by philosophers usually translated as I have a reference or denotation and the denotation of a name is the object to which it uh which it names I mean the irritation of brown McGee is is you the actual person whereas the sense of of the name is the contribution that it makes to the meaning and say if if I uh just say Tom you have to say to me who's Tom and then I say well Tom his son says brother and or the person who invented such and such or all the first person
使它们能够成为真或假的候选者的特征联系起来。我想他提出的、在历史上最有影响的一个区分就是涵义与指称的区分，这与他的意义理论有关，而且人们至今还不断地提到它。你能解释一下吗？可以，这相当……相当复杂。那两个德文词是 Sinn，一般译作“涵义”（sense），还有 Bedeutung，它其实就是德文里表示“意义”的那个词，但哲学家通常把它译作“指称”（reference）或“指谓”（denotation）。一个名称的指谓，就是它所命名的那个对象。我是说，“布莱恩·麦基”这个名字的指谓就是你这个活生生的人，而这个名字的涵义则是它对意义所作的那份贡献。比如说，如果我只说一句“汤姆”，你就得问我：汤姆是谁？于是我说，汤姆是某某人的儿子、是某某人的兄弟，或者是发明了某某东西的人，或者是第一个登上某座山的人——用这种
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that kind of the mountain and in this way I give you a sense and in this way I enable you to identify him now this distinction becomes important in certain contexts generally what you care about in the case of a name is what the name stands for and but there are certain cases where it's important to make a distinction between uh sense and denotation and one good example would be statements of identity the phrase favorite example was that of the evening star and The Morning Star both of which as you know uh uh Venus and but if someone says the evening Stars I don't this is where the Morning Star a man takes the reference of these two expressions to be in the denotation then he's simply saying Venus is Venus which is the tautology and of no interest whereas in fact the morning star in the evening star is a mathematical Discovery and therefore in this usage well the Expressions referred to is not 30 notation not the object not their senses so in other words he he analyzed meaning into two different components that's
方式我给了你一个涵义，也就使你能够辨认出他。这个区分在某些语境中会变得重要。一般来说，对一个名称你关心的是它代表什么，但确实有某些场合必须区分涵义和指谓，一个很好的例子就是同一性陈述。他最爱举的例子就是“昏星”和“晨星”，你知道，这两个都是金星。但如果有人说“昏星就是晨星”，假如一个人把这两个表达式所指的东西理解成它们的指谓，那他不过是在说“金星就是金星”，这是同语反复，毫无意思；可事实上“晨星就是昏星”却是一项数学上的发现。所以在这种用法里，这些表达式所指的并不是指谓、不是那个对象，而是它们的涵义。那么换句话说，他把意义分析成了两个不同的成分——对，涵义和指称。是的。而一个
10:19
right sense and reference yes and a statement may have a sense but not have a reference well this happens in two ways and uh uh there could be names or or nominal expressions like uh president King of France for example which has a sense but no reference because nobody corresponds to it and also there is the complicated case of Expressions which have a function in in a sentence as contributing to its making it capable of being true or false um but don't you know anything like periodicus is is is good is bad is the answer which themselves are what he called incomplete Expressions namely don't themselves have a reference but contribute to giving the sentence a sense and through its sense of reference and these distinctions that he introduced and his theory of meaning had in fact had a very widespread influence in philosophy haven't they they've become very fashionable in recent years that's and and there's been a a change in the anyhow in England and perhaps to go to well in the United States to some
陈述可能有涵义却没有指称。这有两种情形。一种是可能有些名称或名词性表达式，比如“当今法国国王”，它有涵义却没有指称，因为没有任何人与之对应。另外还有一种比较复杂的情形：有些表达式在句子中起作用，使句子能够为真或为假，但它们本身并不指称什么东西，比如“……是好的”“……是坏的”这类谓词它们就是他所说的“不完整的表达式”，也就是说它们本身没有指称，但对句子获得涵义、并通过涵义获得指称有所贡献。他所引入的这些区分，以及他的意义理论实际上在哲学中产生了非常广泛的影响，是吧？近些年它们变得非常流行是的，而且发生了一种变化——至少在英国是这样，也许在美国某种程度上
05达米特的评价与艾耶尔的保留
11:32
extent and uh a change in sort of main concern of philosophy for a very long time the theory of knowledge was dominant ever since stick out in in these in 2017 Century the main concern has been the theory of knowledge uh what we what we can know and how we can know it and how we are justified in hurting the beliefs we do and in recent years this has given way to what's sometimes called the philosophy of logic which is mainly concerned with questions about meaning and here fragrance coming to get prominence and for instance my successor as Professor logic Oxford and Michael damit has voted nearly I mean certainly two large books uh two fragrance worked and is concerned with exploring the implications of fragrance distinctions for a theory of meaning well Michael dummett who I suppose is must be called the leading living commentator on frago makes enormously large claims for him doesn't he he says that he's introduced a whole new era in philosophy that he has de-psychologized philosophy that in the
也是如此。哲学的主要关切发生了转变：很长一段时间里知识论一直居于主导地位，自笛卡尔以来从十七世纪起，主要的关切就是知识论——我们能知道什么、我们如何能知道以及我们凭什么有理由持有我们所持的信念。而近些年来，这已经让位于有时被称作“逻辑哲学”的东西，它主要关心的是意义问题，而弗雷格正是在这里凸显出来的举例来说，我在牛津逻辑讲座教授职位上的继任者迈克尔·达米特，就写了差不多——我是说确实写了两大部头的书来讨论弗雷格的工作，并且致力于探讨弗雷格所作的那些区分对意义理论的意涵。迈克尔·达米特，我想他应该算是当今在世的弗雷格研究第一权威他对弗雷格提出了极高的评价，是吧？他说弗雷格开创了哲学的一个全新时代，说他把哲学去心理学化了，说正如你刚才所解释的，他把知识论从哲学的中心
12:36
way you just explained he dethroned the theory of Knowledge from the center of philosophy and replaced it with logic and this has changed 300 years of philosophical development well I think there has been a different emphasis but I think that Michael exaggerates in two ways first of all philosopher's always been concerned with meaning ever since Socrates went about saying what is knowledge what is what is goodness and so on which is a way of asking what what the what the Greek equivalence of these terms meant so there's always an interest in in meaning in in philosophy and secondly I don't seek interest in the theory of knowledge has totally disappeared I think I think that that there are still people who are connected with with concerned with this and insofar as even in metal damage own work uh the theory of meaning is very much uh bound up with uh questions about truth and falsehood this also doesn't entirely take us away from the idea of knowledge because after all of that I'm always
赶了下去，代之以逻辑，而这改变了三百年来的哲学发展。嗯，我认为重点确实有所转移，不过我觉得迈克尔在两个方面夸大了。首先，哲学家一直都关心意义，自从苏格拉底到处追问“什么是知识”“什么是善”等等以来就是如此，而那正是在问这些词的希腊文对应词究竟是什么意思。所以哲学中对意义的兴趣一直都在其次，我也不认为对知识论的兴趣已经完全消失了。我认为现在仍然有人关心这个问题；而且就连在达米特自己的著作里意义理论也和真假问题紧紧地捆在一起，这同样并没有完全把我们带离知识这一观念，因为说到底，我们总是关心我们有什么理由
06罗素悖论击垮弗雷格
13:37
concerned with what reason we have to suppose that certain statements propositions are true or false so I think that that there has been a shift of emphasis but not the the great break the damage insists on before we continue with the more recent applications of fraga's work I want to turn to Russell for a moment when I introduced this discussion I emphasized the fact that Fraga worked in isolation throughout almost the whole of his life and this becomes very important when one starts to consider Russell because poor Russell spent the first several years of his life reinvent work that fragr had already done without realizing that he'd done it didn't he uh cat so that should make it rather easy for you to explain to us something about the importance of Russell's very early work quite know how to say poor Russell because it is quite true that Russell did a lot of work that Fraga had done before him but Russell also exposed a fatal deficiency in fraga's system he showed that fraga's system of logic actually contained a
去认为某些陈述、某些命题是真的或假的。所以我认为确实有重点上的转移，但并不是达米特所坚持的那种重大断裂。在继续谈弗雷格工作的晚近应用之前，我想先转到罗素谈一会儿。我在开场介绍时强调了一个事实：弗雷格几乎一生都在与世隔绝中工作，而这一点在我们开始谈罗素时就变得非常重要，因为可怜的罗素，他早年有好几年都在重新做弗雷格已经做过的工作，自己却不知道，是吧？所以这应该能让你比较容易地向我们说明罗素早期工作的重要性。我不太确定该不该说“可怜的罗素”，因为确实，罗素做了很多弗雷格在他之前就做过的工作，但罗素也揭示了弗雷格体系中一个致命的缺陷。他表明弗雷格的逻辑体系实际上包含一个悖论，就像那个著名的古老
14:41
paradox it's like the famous old contradiction of epimenity as the Christian who said that all creations were Lars it follows and it it it comes into the category of self-defeating propositions and also although on the surface it seems to be trivial it's not trivial because it shows that the underlying argumentation has something wrong with it it does it shows that one of one of uh flag is essential assumptions led to contradiction and when and Russell in 19 I think it was in 1903 uh conveyed this in a letter to Fraga and fraga's first reaction was not oh I'm wrong you've seen the Arrogant to reply the whole of mathematics has been shown to be worthless then he thought this is going too far and he then managed to put together some sort of answer to Russell's objection but then it was shown only after faker's death in fact by a polished Edition that fraga's answer also was untenable it led the foundation and Frank himself never recalled from this player after he received after the publication of the
的埃庇米尼得斯悖论——那个克里特人说所有克里特人都是骗子。由此可见，它属于自我否定命题这一类。而且，虽然表面上看它似乎无关紧要，其实并非无关紧要，因为它表明底下的整套论证出了毛病。确实如此，它表明弗雷格的一条根本假设导致了矛盾。罗素在——我想是一九零三年——写信把这件事告诉了弗雷格。弗雷格的第一反应并不是“哦，我错了”，你看过那封回信，他说：整个数学都被证明是毫无价值的了。后来他觉得这话说得太过头，于是设法拼凑出某种回应来答复罗素的反驳，但是后来——其实是在弗雷格去世之后——由一位波兰学者证明，弗雷格的这个回答同样站不住脚，它使整个基础都垮了。弗雷格本人从这一打击中再也没有恢复过来，自从他收到那封信、自从那部大著作出版以后
07皮亚诺、《数学原理》与逻辑爆发
15:50
great shift you see of the bishop the yes um you yourself said earlier he never wrote the third volume and he simply came up from 1903 to 1925 his death he never did anything and this was the result he thought his life's work has been abolished yes so that in fact um it's a very sad story yes and and a tragic story and Russell then went on to meet this Paradox in his own way some complicated thing called the theory of types it remains true I had ought to press this point that an enormous amount of the of the work that Russell had done and spent years over Fraga had already done and Russell didn't know yes that is true but it's also true that although Fraga did it first and some experts today think that Fraga did most of it better it was through Russell that the ideas actually became famous in philosophy and influential in philosophy that is true I don't know why it was that frago's work was so uh neglected and partly because the third reason that um interest in the new developments of logic was very much an English thing
是的。你自己刚才也说过，他从没写第三卷，从一九零三年一直到一九二五年去世他几乎什么都没做，原因就在这里，他觉得自己毕生的工作被摧毁了。是的，所以说实际上这是个非常令人难过的故事。是的，也是个悲剧性的故事。罗素后来则用他自己的方式去应对这个悖论，就是那个复杂的东西，叫做类型论。不过我还是要强调这一点：罗素花了多年功夫做出来的大量工作弗雷格早就已经做过了，而罗素并不知道。是的，这是事实。但同样是事实的是，虽然弗雷格做在前面，而且今天有些专家认为其中大部分弗雷格做得更好，可正是通过罗素，这些思想才真正在哲学中出了名、产生了影响这是真的。我不知道为什么弗雷格的工作会这么被忽视，部分原因是对逻辑新发展的兴趣在很大程度上是英国的事情，因此弗雷格的工作在德国
16:59
because therefore frago's work wasn't taken up in Germany uh because in Germany the psychological mistaken psychological view of logic still prevailed yeah and wasn't taken I'm in England simply because of English instrumentality and and in incompetence in foreign languages and it was left but Russell who had been brought up by German governesses and German nurses but even Russell only got indirect clear what happened was the Russell and his collaborator Whitehead went to a congress in Paris in 1903 I met an Italian logician called piano and it was through piano whose work enormously impressed them and was working in the same direction with a less efficient system and fragrance that they got to hear a Fraga and then Russell redfagger had once realized how how important that it was and the result of all this was that the science of logic which had remained virtually static for over 2 000 years since Aristotle suddenly exploded a whole new and enormously through Russ mainly through Russell and Whitehead's
没有被接受，因为在德国那种关于逻辑的、错误的心理主义看法仍然占上风；在英国也没有被接受只是因为英国人的岛国心态，以及在外语上的无能。于是这件事就留给了罗素——他是由德国家庭女教师和德国保姆带大的。但即使是罗素，也只是间接地才知道事情是这样的：罗素和他的合作者怀特海一九零三年去巴黎参加一次大会，在那里遇到一位意大利逻辑学家皮亚诺，正是通过皮亚诺——皮亚诺的工作给他们留下了极深的印象，方向和弗雷格相同，只是系统不如弗雷格的高效——他们才听说了弗雷格；随后罗素去读弗雷格，一读就意识到那有多么重要。而这一切的结果就是：自亚里士多德以来两千多年几乎停滞不前的逻辑科学，突然爆发出全新的局面而且规模极大，主要是通过罗素和怀特海的《数学原理》，那部书他们两人合作写了大约十年
18:02
principle of Mathematica which took them together about ten oh ten years well Russell wrote the principles of mathematics in 1903 where he does recognize with the freak I think in the previous and in the opinion he does yes and then then he went on with his with his tutor uh Trinity Cambridge Whitehead to write a three volume worked called principal Mathematica in which he actually tried to do the work of deducing mathematics from logic and it's full of formulas and and it is it is a stupendous work although as you rightly said it doesn't uh quite achieve the standards of logical rigor that freyja achieved before it but this was the one that really uh popularized the subject we had all sorts of people took it up but it man it took from there on it has preceded by Leaps and Bounds and it's now so to speak a major field of intellectual Endeavor throughout the Western World in every University but it's interesting I think also should be mentioned that one of the effects has been not so much to subdue mathematics
罗素在一九零三年写了《数学的原理》，我想他在序言里确实承认了弗雷格。是的，他确实承认了然后他又和他在剑桥三一学院的老师怀特海一起，写了一部三卷本的著作，叫做《数学原理》，在书中他真正尝试去完成从逻辑推导出数学的工作，书里满是公式，那确实是一部了不起的著作，尽管正如你说得对，它在逻辑严格性上并没有完全达到弗雷格此前所达到的标准。但正是这部书真正让这门学科流行开来，各种各样的人都开始研究它从那以后它就突飞猛进，如今可以说已经成为整个西方世界每一所大学里的一个重要智识领域。不过我觉得也应该提一句，它带来的效果之一并不像弗雷格和罗素所希望的那样把数学归并到逻辑之下，反倒是把逻辑归并到了数学之下；近些年来
08摹状词理论与转向一般哲学
19:05
to logic which is what Fraga and Russell wanted but to subdue logic to mathematics and that the the in recent years mathematical logic has become more and more mathematical yes and less and has had less and less to do with philosophy in general and even a disciple Fraga like Michael damit is more interested in the semantic side of it the theory of meaning that he has his friend himself to be in the purely mathematical side well unlike Fraga Russell actually made the explicit step after he'd done all this work to General philosophy really not until he was 40 years old but then he did and he started producing General works of philosophy can you give us some indication of of of what position well it's very hard how little the two were connected they um the one place where I suppose they are connected is something that Russell called the theory of uh descriptions there was a puzzle about the meaning of of statements like the president King of France which didn't denote anything what did you say the president King of France
数理逻辑变得越来越数学化。是的，而且与一般哲学的关系越来越少就连像迈克尔·达米特这样的弗雷格信徒，也更关心其中语义的一面，也就是意义理论，而不是纯数学的那一面。跟弗雷格不同，罗素在做完这一切工作之后，确实明确地迈向了一般哲学——其实要到他四十岁以后才开始，但他确实开始写作一般哲学的著作了。你能给我们讲讲他持什么样的立场吗？嗯这很难说，这两者之间的联系其实很少。我想唯一相连的地方，是罗素所说的摹状词理论。有一个难题：像“当今法国国王”这样的表达并不指称任何东西，那这类陈述的意义是什么你说的是——“当今法国国王是秃头”。正是。根本就没有法国国王
20:12
is bald exactly there is no king of France therefore I didn't know anything and therefore there was a question how it could be meaningful and there had been philosophers a notable example is a German called Minong who then thought that that these things not everybody called subsistent entities and Russell thoughts was rubbish and he he shared a way of translating out such Expressions by saying that they in fact contained covert existence claims okay was translated into there is one thing that now rules over France and whatever it is France is born roughly and this got rid of of the of the apparent Paradox and so in that way his logical work had a result of implication but in the main he simply went off from another attack his first purely philosophical book came out in 1912 it's called the problems of philosophy it's a home University library books and in my view still all the best introduction to philosophers there is because Russell says a marvelous writer although it's a little bit old-fashioned and there he
因此这句话没有指称任何东西，于是就产生了它怎么可能有意义的问题。曾经有些哲学家，一个著名的例子是德国人迈农，他就认为这些东西是……他称之为“潜存的实体”。罗素认为这是胡说，于是他提出了一种把这类表达式翻译掉的办法说它们实际上包含着隐蔽的存在性断言。好的，这句话被翻译成：现在有一个东西统治着法国，而不管它是什么，法国都大致是天生如此。这样就消除了那个表面上的悖论。所以从这个角度说，他的逻辑工作确实产生了影响。但总的来说，他后来转向了另一个方向。他第一本纯粹的哲学著作出版于1912年，叫《哲学问题》，是家庭大学丛书里的一本。在我看来，它至今仍是最好的哲学入门书，因为罗素是个了不起的作家，虽然这本书有点老派。而在书里，他其实完全没有涉及逻辑方面的工作，他只是延续了英国经验主义传统。这是一本
21:21
really takes no account with logical work at all he simply continues the British imperative tradition this is a book that follows straight on from and it starts off with the theory of our perception it's very like Barclay there it says that what we perceive are not tables and chairs and things but what Berkeley what luck called Simple ideas what uh Russell following his friend were called sense data and then deals with the old traditional philosophical question how on the basis of being presented with these sense impressions we arrive at physical objects and then he deals with a set of traditional philosophical problems in in that sort of way and he more or less gave up logic after uh Mathematica he himself said that um this wore him out um he collaborated in the book on the book with Whitehead but Whitehead was teaching mathematics at Cambridge and mainly occupied with that Russell at that time was living independently had a lecture ship but came into 1915 but in the first decade of the century he was
直接承接前人的书，开篇讲的是我们的知觉理论，那部分非常像贝克莱。书里说，我们所感知到的并不是桌子、椅子这些东西，而是贝克莱——洛克所说的简单观念，也就是罗素追随他朋友的说法称之为“感觉材料”的东西。然后他处理了那个古老的传统哲学问题：我们如何在被给予这些感官印象的基础上达到物理对象。接着他就以那样的方式处理了一系列传统哲学问题。而在《数学原理》之后，他多多少少放弃了逻辑。他自己说这项工作把他掏空了。他和怀特海合作写这本书，但怀特海当时在剑桥教数学，主要精力都在教学上。罗素那时靠自己的收入独立生活，虽然有个讲师职位，但那是1915年才有的。而在本世纪头十年，他是靠自己的独立收入生活的，所以
09辩护的追求与立场的反复
22:32
living on his independent income and so he had that the actual work of writing out all his proofs and he said that this really um incapacitated him but ever doing any detailed work in future and this is some extent true all his network is full of brilliant ideas they never he never fully works out it's a certain point he gets born he says oh yes it goes on like this he just bought through to dot the eyes and and cross the t's and this is true of what it's there to work I think that I see one very important continuing concern in the later work I'd be interested to know if you agree with this or not you've just said I'm sure rightly that that Russell was a a radical empiricist in a direct tradition of Lark and human uh it seems to me that Russell was always concerned to validate the Natural Sciences in terms of sense data that he always wanted to show that the whole Corpus of our scientific knowledge could be derived from and was derived from nothing but observations and our Reflections on our observations
写出全部证明的实际工作落在他身上。他说这件事真的让他此后再也没有能力做任何细致的工作了。这在某种程度上是真的——他后期的著作满是精彩的想法，但他从来没有把它们充分展开。到了某个点他就厌倦了，说“对，就是这么下去”，他就是懒得去把每个细节一一敲定。这一点在他那里的工作中确实如此。我认为我看到了一个非常重要的、贯穿始终的关切，我很想知道你是否同意。你刚才说——我相信说得很对——罗素是洛克和休谟这一直接传统中的激进经验主义者。在我看来，罗素始终关心的是用感觉材料来为自然科学作辩护，他一直想表明，我们全部科学知识的整体都可以从观察、以及我们对观察的反思中推导出来，而且事实上就是从中推导出来的，别无其他。
23:32
not always uh I think you make one very important important Point here and one in fact that I overlooked when I was uh to ask you a few moments ago and that is that from the very beginning Russell's approaches philosophy was an interest in justification there's a quite an amusing story that uh when he was about 12 his elder brother who said to school Russell was taught at home the elder brother Frank was said to school taught Russell geometry and Russell refused to accept the axioms he wanted to have them proved and his brother said that they couldn't get on unless they give us accepted the accidents they agreed to provisionally but he always wanted just to have everything Justified and this was common both in his approach to logical mathematics and his approach to other branches of knowledge and as you say also in his opposed to science he wanted to have a basis for our belief in science and but here his views varied in the um uh mentioned the problems of philosophy it's quite true that he wanted to start
不总是这样。不过我觉得你在这里提出了一个非常重要的点，而且这一点其实是我刚才回答你时忽略掉的，那就是：罗素从一开始对哲学的进路就是出于对“辩护”的兴趣。有个相当有趣的故事：他大概十二岁时，他上过学的哥哥——罗素是在家里受的教育——那个哥哥弗兰克，上过学，教罗素几何。罗素拒绝接受那些公理，他要求把它们证明出来。他哥哥说，除非他接受这些公理，否则他们没法继续下去。他们就暂且这么约定了。但他始终想让一切都得到辩护。这一点既体现在他对逻辑和数学的进路上，也体现在他对其他知识分支的进路上。而且正如你所说，也体现在他对科学的态度上——他想为我们对科学的信念找到一个基础。不过在这一点上他的看法有过变化。刚才提到的《哲学问题》……确实，他想从感觉材料出发，但他并不认为所有科学陈述、甚至所有常识
24:38
with sense data but he didn't think that all scientific or even all common sense statements statements like out of the table can be could be reduced to sensory statements he adopted a causal theory that you could um assume the existence of the physical world as the best explanation for our sensory experiences then he changed his View and in the next important book he published on the theory of knowledge which was a knowledge of the external World which came out in 1914 he did take the view you just you just referred to namely he thought you could actually reduce every not only every Common Sense statement but every scientific statement two statements about our actual and possible hypothetical sense experiences and this this put this view which is technically known as phenomenalism and was the view of of uh Barclay if you rob Barkley of God and also the viewer of John Stuart Mill who was incidentally Russell's Godfather lay Godfather because because they Godfather um this phenomenalistic view was
陈述——比如关于桌子的陈述——都能被还原为感觉陈述。他采纳了一种因果理论，即你可以假定物理世界的存在，把它当作对我们感觉经验的最佳解释。后来他改变了看法。在他出版的下一部关于知识论的重要著作《我们对外部世界的知识》中——该书1914年问世——他确实持有你刚才提到的那种观点，也就是说，他认为你其实可以把不仅是每一个常识陈述、而且是每一个科学陈述，都还原为关于我们实际的和可能的、假设性的感觉经验的陈述。这种观点在专业上被称为现象主义，它也是贝克莱的观点——如果你把上帝从贝克莱那里拿掉的话——同时还是约翰·斯图亚特·密尔的观点，而密尔恰好是罗素的教父，世俗意义上的教父，因为他们……教父嘛。这种现象主义的观点在《我们对外部世界的知识》中得到了阐发，
25:53
developed in Arnold's external world and also in some important essays that Russell wrote in a book called mysticism and logic which he produced during the first world war an essay called something like sense later and physics is the most important one and he continued this um in another important book called The analysis of mind which came out I think in 1921 and he adopted a theory which had been Advanced before him by the pragmatist William James Henry James's um elder brother in which both mind and matter were composed of what James called neutral stuff and which were where in fact since data and images and and they differed only in being different Arrangements this fundamental data but then Russell gave this up and in 1925 we'll identifies the Curious book that is the matter where he well the traces of this view still remaining but he mainly went back to the causal theory that that he'd held in 1912 and when he revived his interest in philosophy in the 1940s and any news final or his next last philosophical
也体现在罗素写的一些重要论文里，收在一本叫《神秘主义与逻辑》的书中，那是他在第一次世界大战期间写的，其中一篇题目大概是《感觉材料与物理学》，是最重要的一篇。他又在另一部重要著作《心的分析》中延续了这一思路，那本书我想是1921年出版的。他采纳了一种理论，这理论在他之前由实用主义者威廉·詹姆斯——亨利·詹姆斯的哥哥——提出过，按照这种理论，心与物都由詹姆斯所说的中性材料构成，而这些中性材料实际上就是感觉材料和意象，它们之间的区别只在于是这些基本材料的不同排列组合。但后来罗素放弃了这一点，在1925年——我们说的是那本奇特的书《物的分析》——在那本书里，这种观点的痕迹仍有残留，但他主要还是回到了他1912年所持的因果理论。等到1940年代他重新燃起对哲学的兴趣，在他最后一部、或者说下一部也是倒数第一部哲学
10科学、形而上学与归纳难题
27:08
book uh human knowledge and scope and limits he goes back to a causal theory he always he always thought that the basis of our knowledge uh was laying in in in science experience but he varied uh in uh in the next step I mean he it was only during one period of his work that he thought that the whole thing could be uh reduced to sensory terms uh more often and certainly in the LA at the end of his life irreverently he he adhered to the causal Theory which put the physical world beyond all the veil observation one thing that is constant with Russell um is the attempt to bring a wholly new rigor to bear in philosophy not only of a logical kind but one's tempted to say the scientific kind he was always very concerned for example that our beliefs should relate to the evidence for them this is something he reiterated over and over again isn't it and it's something which if taken seriously sweeps aside a great deal of traditional philosophizing and traditional thinking oh yes that I think is true and I think that this you
著作《人类的知识：其范围与限度》中，他又回到了因果理论。他始终认为，我们知识的基础在于感觉经验，但在下一步该怎么走的问题上，他的看法有过变化。我是说，只有在他工作的某一个时期，他才认为整个事情都可以还原为感觉的用语。更多时候，尤其是在他生命的晚期，说来有点不敬——他坚持的是因果理论，那种理论把物理世界置于观察的帷幕之外。罗素身上有一点是始终不变的，那就是他试图把一种全新的严格性引入哲学，不仅是逻辑意义上的严格，甚至可以说是科学意义上的严格。比如说，他一直非常关心我们的信念应当与支持它们的证据相符，这一点他反复强调，一再重申，是不是？而这一点如果被认真对待的话，就会扫除大量传统的哲学思辨和传统的思维方式。哦，是的，我认为确实如此。我想，你已经提到过罗素和
28:18
already mentioned that uh Russell and inflambikistan indeed wickenstein was Russell's uh and uh as you know wittenstein and also that group of philosophers in Vienna called the Vienna Circle condemned what they call metaphysics and metaphysics in their view was existed at least partly in any attempt to describe the world in non-scientific terms they thought that this was the only World there is and that science was a matter of forming theories about it which were verified by observation and any assumption that was Superior world a world inhabited by gods or anything of that thought was nonsensical and Russell certainly all the time held this there and was always concerned to just write sounds and was always worried by the fact he thought the justification for science was extremely problematic yeah I mean and it remained problematic to the end to the end I mean and in the interesting in in the last book that he wrote a human knowledge the one I referred to he then sets out what he thinks uh the set of
维特根斯坦，维特根斯坦确实是罗素的……而且你也知道，维特根斯坦还有维也纳那批哲学家，也就是所谓的维也纳学派，谴责他们所说的形而上学。在他们看来，形而上学至少部分地就在于任何用非科学的语汇去描述世界的企图。他们认为，这个世界就是唯一存在的世界，而科学就是对它形成种种理论、再由观察加以验证的事情，任何假设只要是至高的世界——一个由诸神居住的世界，诸如此类的想法都是无稽之谈，罗素当然自始至终都是这么看的，而且他一直念念不忘要为科学提供辩护，同时也一直为此忧心——他认为为科学辩护这件事极其成问题。是啊，我是说，它直到最后都还是个难题——直到最后。我是说，有意思的是，在他写的最后一本书里，《人类的知识》《人类的知识》，就是我提到的那本，他在里面列出了他认为必须做出的那一整套假定，如果
11罗素的影响：摩尔、怀特海到艾耶尔
29:30
assumptions that required to be made if belief in scientific theories is to be justified and makes it quite clear do you think this is these assumptions must as well be taken on faith yes and he tried to work out what we call a theory of induction but was never entirely satisfied with it and and more or less said well I remember what he said he said that we really can't be sure that science is true but it has a greater chance of being true than anything else that could be surrounded its rival yes that he still couldn't validate it in the way he couldn't validate in the way he would like to like to have done that's just talk now in an orderly way about the influence of Russell because he and Wittgenstein I suppose must be the two most influential philosophers in the 20th century at least in the English-speaking world now I suppose Russell's first great influence was on his immediate contemporaries and indeed older uh contemporaries like Whitehead and MOA in the in the Cambridge of his young day
对科学理论的信念要能得到辩护的话；而且他讲得很清楚——你觉得呢——这些假定说到底也只能凭信念去接受。是的。他也试图构建我们所说的归纳理论，但从来没有完全满意过。他多多少少是说——我记得他的原话大意是，我们其实没法确定科学是真的，但它为真的机会比任何与它竞争的其他东西都要大。是的但他还是没能把它论证清楚，没能按他本来希望做到的那种方式去论证那我们现在就有条理地谈谈罗素的影响吧，因为他和维特根斯坦我想应该算是二十世纪最有影响的两位哲学家，至少在英语世界是这样。我想罗素最初的重大影响是在他那些同辈人身上，甚至包括年长一些的同辈，比如怀特海和摩尔，在他年轻时的剑桥……嗯，这么说吧，在罗素和怀特海合作的那些纯逻辑工作里，我想是罗素
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um let us put it this way in in the purely logical work in which Russell Almighty had collaborated it was I think Russell who had the monitoring ideas I mean I think the theory of types they have descriptions uh came from Russell but when it came to trying to apply that sort of technique to philosophy which is what saint Russell did in knowledge of the external world for example in trying to reduce abstract Concepts like concepts of points and instance to observational terms then it Whitehead who took the lead and Russell got his ideas of Whitehead and did they quarreled over this because Russell didn't pay Whitehead sufficient acknowledgment you'll find that they are developed in two books of writing that came out after the war the principles of natural knowledge and the concept of Nature and Russell at one time was influenced by McTaggart who was the disciple of Hegel and got Russell to be both Russell Moore to begin to be idealists and more first of all rebelled against this the interests of Common
提出了那些主导性的想法——我是说，类型论、摹状词理论我认为都出自罗素；但一旦要把那套技巧应用到哲学上，也就是罗素在《我们关于外部世界的知识》里所做的事比如说，试图把点和瞬间这类抽象概念还原为观察性的词项，那时候就是怀特海领头了，罗素的想法是从怀特海那里得来的。他们是不是为这个吵过架，因为罗素没有给怀特海足够的致谢？你会发现这些思想在怀特海战后出版的两本书里得到了发展《自然知识原理》和《自然的概念》。罗素一度受麦克塔加特的影响，后者是黑格尔的信徒，他使罗素——使罗素和摩尔一开始都成了唯心论者，而摩尔最先起来反叛反对这一点，站在常识的立场上。摩尔是常识的伟大捍卫者，他对罗素的影响大到
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Sense more was great defender of Common Sense and the influence Russell to the extent that he that he cured Russell very belief in idealism so the infant the influence went that way also it with respect to ethics which was never greatly interested he accepted like all Bloom's prayer he accepted Morris principal ethical he believed that good was a non-natural indefinable uh concept but then Russell had a very big influence on the later for my generation of philosophers in as much as he convinced us that since science was Sovereign in the description of the world or philosophy could do was he elucidated analyze and so Russell can be regarded I think as the father of analysis but here he differs profoundly from Wittgenstein I don't want to go to too deeply to wickenstein but well I'd rather you didn't because we're going to devote the whole of the next program to be but one thing it will come out in our next program it's the biggest I thought that philosophy was largely a matter of people being getting into a model and
把罗素对唯心论的信仰给治好了。所以影响也是往那个方向走的。而在伦理学方面——他对伦理学从来没有太大兴趣——他跟整个布卢姆斯伯里圈子一样，接受了摩尔《伦理学原理》的观点，他相信善是一个非自然的、不可定义的概念。不过罗素对后来的、对我这一代哲学家有非常大的影响，就在于他让我们相信：既然在描述世界这件事上科学是至高无上的，那么哲学所能做的就是澄清和分析。所以我想罗素可以被看作分析哲学之父。但在这一点上他和维特根斯坦有极深的分歧……我不想太深入地谈维特根斯坦。嗯，我倒宁愿你先别谈，因为我们打算把下一整期节目都用来讲他。不过有一点会在下一期里讲到，那就是他认为哲学在很大程度上就是人们把自己困进某种模式里，而像他这样的人要做的事——用他自己那句名言说——
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The Business of people like because I must do as in his own famous phrase show the fly the way out of the fly bottle to kill people of these models well Russell always thought that philosophical problems had a solution and that was why he was so very hostile to the purely linguistic philosophy a little bit of Oxford after the war under the leadership of of Austin because the mere explanation of language for its own sake the the the exploration of the implications of English usage was trivial and Russell really thought there were questions about justification of our beliefs that um it was this is a philosophy to answer and these questions were answerable he thought that the answers could be discovered if you worked at it hard enough otherwise you didn't think philosophy was worth doing I'm not here I agree with it yes I was going to say I want to put a personal question to you because you own your life you have acknowledged that you yourself have been enormously influenced so we wrestled and
就是给苍蝇指出飞出捕蝇瓶的路，把人们从这些模式里解救出来。而罗素始终认为哲学问题是有解的，这也正是为什么他对纯粹的语言哲学那么反感就是战后牛津在奥斯汀带领下的那一套；因为在他看来，为语言本身而研究语言、探究英语用法的种种蕴含，是琐碎的。罗素真心认为关于我们信念之辩护的那些问题，才是哲学该回答的，而且这些问题是可以回答的他认为只要下足够的功夫，答案是能被发现的；否则他就不觉得哲学值得去做了。这一点我也同意。是的，我正想说——我想问你一个私人问题，因为你一生都承认自己深受罗素影响，这一点你说得很清楚，而且一向如此
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you make that very clear and always have so you you can tell us what it's like from the inside as it were to have been influenced by Russell what has its influence been on you on me uh it's been first of all that unlike most of my contemporaries I still think one should start with what Russell called sends data what I now political since qualia that is a technical difference whether you begin with the particulars or or or something more General um but for our present purposes it comes to the same thing so that on the whole I I share his um uh certainly the starting point of views on perception I share them I also agree with the importance the Primacy he attaches to the theory of knowledge I M until I've always been a thorough going empiricist I agree with the view that Russell derived from Hume there's no necessity of The Logical necessity and so that there's not such thing as causal tests they cause it was just a matter about whom originally said it was namely constant conjunction and something
所以你可以从内部、从亲身的角度告诉我们，受罗素影响是什么样的。他对你的影响究竟是什么？对我吗？首先是，和我大多数同辈不同，我仍然认为人应该从罗素所说的感觉材料出发——我现在管它叫感受质（qualia），这是个技术性的区别，即你是从殊相出发，还是从更一般的东西出发；不过就我们眼下的话题而言，两者是一回事。所以总的来说，我认同他的——至少在知觉问题上的出发点，我是认同的。我也同意他赋予知识论的重要性他给知识论的那种首要地位。我一向是个彻头彻尾的经验论者。我同意罗素从休谟那里继承来的看法：除了逻辑必然性没有别的必然性，因而也就不存在所谓的因果必然性——因果关系不过就是休谟最早说的那个东西，也就是恒常联结，是某种
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purely contingent I agree with Russell in rejecting any form of theology or anyhow Transcendent Theology and injecting metaphysics and I also most importantly agree with Russell the philosophy wouldn't be worth doing unless it posed questions to which we could find the answers perhaps not he perhaps not I but cleverer persons than I will eventually find them and all these are examples not just of your agreeing with him but of him having influence oh yes are they all of them quite directly yes quite directly quite directly and I think you've even been influenced by him in the way you write haven't you that appears what I do regard him as a master of English prayers and I think I'm not in the same class as but I do think that I do write English reasonably well and I do think and again partly under his influence yes I think there is affiliation there both the ideas and of style from Hume through Mill to Russell and coming down the stage to me yeah now the the philosophers that we're discussing here Fraga and Russell
纯粹偶然的东西。我同意罗素拒斥任何形式的神学，至少是超验的神学，也拒斥形而上学。而且我还最重要地同意罗素：哲学如果不提出我们能找到答案的问题，就不值得做——也许不是他也许也不是我，但比我聪明的人最终会找到答案。所有这些例子都不只是你同意他，而是他确实影响了你。哦，是的。全都是很直接的影响吗？是的，很直接很直接。我想连你写作的方式都受了他的影响，是不是？这倒是真的，我确实把他看作英文散文的大师。我想我够不上他那个水平，但我确实觉得自己英文写得还算不错，而且我确实认为这部分也是受了他的影响。是的，我想这里有一条传承的脉络，思想上和文风上都有从休谟经密尔到罗素，再一路下来到我。是啊。那么我们这里讨论的这几位哲学家，弗雷格和罗素
12战后沉浮与弗雷格复兴
35:57
have enormous effect on the living yourself included now I now want to talk about the Revival of interest in Fraga after the second world war so that the interest in Fraga and the interest in Russell for the first time proceeds side by side into the age that we now live in it's very difficult to account for historical events particularly in such short perspective and the I think the in the there certainly was in immediately after the war a decline in Russell's influence in here in England and this is I think not due to a Revival of interest in Fraga but to uh an increased importance attached to the work of Wittgenstein and Moore in most cases that I enormously liked and respect him as a man I think philosophically it was excessive and I think this was to be responsible for this but partly not so much Ryle who respected Russell but mainly Austin who uh was the linguistic philosopher and narrowest possible sense and had a great respect for more as as someone who attached great importance to ordering
对在世的哲学家——包括你自己——都有巨大的影响。现在我想谈谈二战之后对弗雷格重新兴起的兴趣……这样一来，对弗雷格的兴趣和对罗素的兴趣第一次并肩走进了我们如今身处的这个时代。要解释历史事件是很难的，尤其是在这么近的距离上看。我想，战后紧接着的那段时间，在英国这里，罗素的影响确实是下降了，而我认为这不是因为弗雷格重新受到重视，而是因为人们越来越看重维特根斯坦和摩尔的工作——摩尔这个人我个人极为喜欢也很尊敬，但我认为在哲学上对他的推崇过头了。我觉得要为这件事负责的，与其说是赖尔——赖尔是尊敬罗素的——不如说主要是奥斯汀呃，是最狭义上的语言哲学家，而且他非常尊重摩尔，把他看作一个极为重视让自己的用词回归常识等等的人。罗素说过，常识
37:05
his users into common sense and so on Common Sense was said by Russell is that it'll be the metaphysics of savages and I think it was the upgrading of more that was responsible for at that time for the downgrading of Russell and this is a train that's now been reversed I'm glad to say I I think you go a bit too far in saying Russell was downgraded because if one thinks back to those post-war years and thinks about who were the major philosophers in the English-speaking world the shortest of shortlists would have to include apart from Russell himself vittgenstein Karl Popper Quine Gilbert rail yourself and all of you were massively influenced by Russell yes Perhaps Perhaps I'm I uh I mean yes so you would know better than I because you after our upper talks in in in the 50s when I had already departed um uh for for London but my certainly the impression reaching Us in London was that wrestlers began that means you're taking an oxford-based View and I think that's what's mistaken about the view right I think there were other
不过是野蛮人的形而上学。我认为，正是当时对摩尔的抬高，导致了对罗素的贬低，而我很高兴地说，这个趋势现在已经被扭转了。我觉得你说罗素被贬低这个说法有点过头了，因为如果回想那些战后的年头，想想在英语世界里谁是主要的哲学家，最短的名单里也一定得包括——除了罗素本人之外——维特根斯坦、卡尔·波普尔、蒯因、吉尔伯特·赖尔，还有你自己，而你们所有人都深受罗素影响。是的，也许吧，也许我呃，我是说，是的，所以你会比我更清楚，因为在五十年代我们那些牛津的讨论之后，你还在，而我那时已经离开去了伦敦。但我们在伦敦所得到的印象，肯定是罗素开始……那就是说你是从牛津的角度来看的，而我认为这种看法的问题正在于此。对，我认为还有别的
38:06
people around then who disparaged Russell it's perfectly true yes but their work and their influences I'm very glad he had to hear this yeah and I certainly Russell has has recovered he himself yeah the fact that he himself thought this yeah because I was seeing great idea we believe him at the time I I organized the group in LA in London that he attended and he was certainly uh miffed his perhaps too mild but he thought that that he that he wasn't getting his due and all floss is a slightly vein and and he this certainly caused him pain but we agree in any case that that he's come back he's come back yes now um the Revival of freyja is something that I really I think I'm can't explain I don't even know exactly how it happened probably it started in America uh with the development of our school of logicians led by a man called Alonso Church who insisted on very great rigor in logical mathematics and found it in Fraga and didn't find it in in Russell and Whitehead of course they did find it
当时周围有些人贬低罗素，这完全是真的，是的，但他们的工作和影响力——我很高兴他得听听这个，是啊，而且我当然罗素已经恢复了名声，他本人，是的，他自己当时是那么想的，是的，因为我当时看到很棒的想法，我们当时相信他，我在洛杉矶、在伦敦组织了他参加的那个小组，他确实有点恼火，说'恼火'也许太轻了，但他觉得他没有得到应有的认可，而且所有哲学家都有点虚荣，他这确实让他很痛苦，但无论如何我们都同意，他已经回来了，他回来了，是的，那么现在，弗雷格的复兴，这是我真的觉得我无法解释的事，我甚至不确切知道它是怎么发生的，可能是从美国开始的，随着我们逻辑学派的发展，领头的是一个叫阿隆佐·丘奇（Alonzo Church）的人，他坚持在逻辑数学中要有极高的严格性，他在弗雷格那里找到了这一点，而在罗素和怀特海那里没有找到，当然他们在别处也找到了，比如他们在
39:15
elsewhere they found it for example in Hilbert they disagree with Hilbert for other reasons and in England it seems to have been the first evidence I can find of it is in a book published or fairly late about 1960 I think by William and Martha Neal which is a very uh impressive history of logic in which which very great importance is given to Freda he's put on a level with Aristotle these are two great names suddenly remind me there was a translation in the early 50s 1950 itself 950 itself made by Austin of fraga's grundlagen and then there was also a translation made two or three years later by uh Max black an Englishman living working in America and by Peter geech of two of fragras very obscure but important semantic essays one of them called sense and reference and the other called functional concept and so there was in the early 50s this sudden interest in Prego but I'm not quite certain what led to it or indeed what conference is it had well a lot of very bright younger people took it up didn't
希尔伯特那里找到了，他们出于其他原因不同意希尔伯特，而在英国，我能找到的最早证据似乎是在一本大约1960年出版的书里，我想是威廉和玛莎·尼尔写的，那是一部非常令人印象深刻的逻辑史在那本书里，弗雷格被赋予了极高的重要性，他被放到了和亚里士多德同一个层次上，这是两个伟大的名字这突然让我想起，50年代初，就是1950年，奥斯汀翻译了弗雷格的《算术基础》，然后两三年后还有一个译本，是由住在美国工作的英国人马克斯·布莱克和彼得·吉奇翻译的翻译的是弗雷格两篇非常晦涩但很重要的语义学论文，一篇叫《论涵义与指称》，另一篇叫《函数与概念》，所以在50年代初，人们突然对弗雷格产生了兴趣，但我不太确定是什么导致的，或者说这到底有什么意义——嗯，很多非常聪明的年轻人接受了他的思想，不是吗，并且受到了影响，至于
13结语：什么是值得做的哲学
40:30
they and were influenced by it whether that'll last a lot I don't know but it certainly seems to me to have been going on recently I find very little influence of fragrant current philosophical work apart from the work of damit if you if you look at the example I think now perhaps some of the most interesting work being done has been done in America and if we look at the work of people like Quine and and Putnam and and Thomas Nagel and uh and Donald Davidson in particular you don't find so strong influence of Fraga except perhaps in Davidson's case indirectly through the work of the Polish tradition Dusky on Truth which says links up with vegan as much as frega linked himself linked meaning and Truth are you confident that the influence of Russell will last uh yes do i why why so because I think because that because that is who I take a philosophy I think that that the questions he asked are the important philosophical questions and I think that his answers to them whether uh right or wrong will always need to be taken into
这种影响能持续多久我不知道，但在我看来最近确实一直是这样——我发现在当前的哲学工作中，弗雷格的影响很小除了达米特的工作之外。如果你看看例子，我想现在也许一些最有意思的工作是在美国做出来的，如果我们看看那些人的工作比如奎因、普特南、托马斯·内格尔，尤其是唐纳德·戴维森，你并不会发现弗雷格有很强的影响，也许除了戴维森那里是间接的——通过波兰传统中塔尔斯基关于真理的工作，这确实和弗雷格有联系，就像弗雷格自己把意义和真理联系起来那样。你有信心罗素的影响会持续下去吗？——是的，我有——为什么呢？因为我认为，因为那就是我所理解的哲学，我认为他提出的那些问题就是重要的哲学问题，而且我认为他对这些问题的回答，无论对错，都将永远需要被纳入考量。如果我对你的理解没错的话
41:37
consideration and if I'm right about you too you also think that he's approached his conception of what philosophy is is the right conception yes that it consists of clarification therefore analysis and justification therefore argument of our important beliefs written in straightforward English prose oh well obviously English was written in in straightforward prayer and straightforward prayers yes thank you very much professor
你也认为他的进路、他对哲学是什么的构想是正确的构想——是的，哲学就在于澄清（因而是分析）以及为我们的重要信念作辩护（因而是论证），并且要用平实的英文散文写出来哦，显然，英文是用平实的散文写的，平实的散文，是的，非常感谢您，教授
视频总结 · 一句话概括与核心要点
一句话概括
A. J. Ayer 与 Bryan Magee 梳理了弗雷格与罗素如何独立奠定现代逻辑、试图把算术还原为逻辑、引入意义理论（含义/指称、摹状词理论），以及两人截然不同的命运与对 20 世纪英语哲学的深远影响。
核心要点
- 弗雷格的初衷是修补数学的不严格：他认为当时的数学陈述不够精确、证明不够严谨（连欧几里得都有未明示的前提），于是在 1879 年《概念文字》中创造了一套记号法，让证明中每一步如何推出下一步一目了然。
- "逻辑主义"分两步走：先用纯逻辑术语定义数学概念（如"2"被定义为所有"双元集"的集合），再从逻辑前提推出算术。前者较易完成；后者后来被哥德尔证明不可能彻底完成，但在可行范围内弗雷格已给出方法。
- 逻辑被彻底"去心理学化"：此前逻辑被视为"思维规律"，弗雷格批判胡塞尔式的心理主义，坚持逻辑真理与数、集合都是客观的，证明的有效性不依赖于人的心理过程。
- 含义（Sinn）与指称（Bedeutung）的区分：名称的指称是它所命名的对象，含义是它对句子意义的贡献。"晨星是昏星"若只看指称就成了"金星是金星"的同义反复，但它实际是天文学发现——因此这类同一陈述关涉的是含义而非指称。"当今法国国王"则是有含义而无指称的表达。
- 罗素既重复了弗雷格的工作，又击垮了他的体系：1903 年罗素致信弗雷格指出其系统含有悖论（类似"说谎者悖论"的自我挫败结构）。弗雷格先是回复"整个数学被证明毫无价值"，后勉强补救，但这一补救在他死后又被一位波兰逻辑学家证明站不住脚。弗雷格从 1903 年到 1925 年去世再无重要成果，第三卷终未写成。
- 弗雷格长期无名的原因：德国仍盛行心理主义逻辑观，英国人则不通外语；罗素本人也是 1903 年在巴黎会议上经意大利逻辑学家皮亚诺间接才知道弗雷格。此后罗素与怀特海耗时约十年写成《数学原理》，让沉寂两千多年（自亚里士多德以来）的逻辑学突然爆发，尽管其严格程度不及弗雷格。
- 一个反讽的后果：两人本想让数学从属于逻辑，结果却是逻辑日益数学化，与一般哲学渐行渐远；连弗雷格的信徒达米特也更关心语义/意义理论那一面。
- 罗素的摹状词理论是逻辑与哲学的连接点："当今法国国王是秃子"被翻译为"存在唯一一个统治法国的东西且他是秃子"，暴露出隐含的存在断言，从而无需像迈农那样假设"潜存实体"。
- 罗素的认识论立场反复摆动：1912 年《哲学问题》持因果理论（物理世界是感觉经验的最佳解释）；1914 年《我们关于外部世界的知识》转向现象主义（一切科学陈述可还原为实际与可能的感觉经验）；1921 年《心的分析》采纳威廉·詹姆斯的"中性一元论"；1925 年后及 1940 年代《人类的知识》又回到因果理论。他始终认为科学的辩护是个难题，最后承认归纳所需的假设只能"凭信念接受"。
- Ayer 承认自己直接受罗素影响：从感觉材料（他现称"感受质"）出发的知觉理论、认识论优先、彻底经验主义、休谟式否认因果必然性、拒斥神学与形而上学、相信哲学问题有可解答案，甚至散文风格——他认为自己处在休谟—密尔—罗素这一谱系的下游。
结论与值得注意的细节
- Ayer 认为达米特把弗雷格说成"开启哲学新纪元、用逻辑取代认识论中心地位"是夸大：哲学从苏格拉底起就关心意义，认识论也并未消失；只是重心有所转移，而非断裂。
- 战后英国罗素影响一度下降，Ayer 归因于牛津语言哲学（奥斯汀）对摩尔"常识"的抬高——罗素曾讥讽常识是"野蛮人的形而上学"。Magee 反驳说这只是牛津视角，维特根斯坦、波普尔、蒯因、赖尔、Ayer 本人都深受罗素影响；两人一致认为罗素已经"回归"，而罗素本人生前确曾为未获应有认可而耿耿于怀。
- 弗雷格的复兴大致始于 1950 年代：奥斯汀 1950 年翻译《算术基础》，Black 与 Geach 译出《论含义与指称》等论文，美国以 Alonzo Church 为首的逻辑学派推崇其严格性，Kneale 夫妇约 1960 年的逻辑史将他与亚里士多德并列。但 Ayer 认为除达米特外，当代（蒯因、普特南、内格尔、戴维森）受弗雷格的直接影响其实很少。
- 罗素自称《数学原理》的繁重工作耗尽了他，此后其著作"充满绝妙想法但从不完整展开"。有趣细节：罗素 12 岁学几何时拒绝接受公理，坚持要证明——这种"凡事都要辩护"的态度贯穿其一生。
- 两人都认同罗素的哲学观：哲学是对重要信念的澄清（分析）与辩护（论证），并且应以平实的英语散文写成；罗素之所以敌视纯语言哲学，正是因为他相信哲学问题是可以真正解决的。
核心句型 · 8
1. A can be traced back through … to …
“A great deal of the philosophy … can be traced back through intermediate developments to the work of two men”
追溯渊源的句式。through 引出中间环节，to 引出源头，适合写思想史、技术演变。仿写：Modern AI can be traced back through decades of neural-net research to McCulloch and Pitts.
2. not until … did …
“Not until after his death did his name become known at all widely”
否定词前置引发倒装，强调时间之晚。仿写：Not until the 1950s did Frege's work reach English readers.
3. It was through X that Y
“It was through Russell that the ideas actually became famous in philosophy”
强调句突出「渠道/媒介」。适合说明某事经由谁或什么才实现。仿写：It was through Peano that Russell first heard of Frege.
4. insofar as / in so far as …
“In so far as it could be completed freyr shared a method of doing it”
「就……范围而言」，用于限定断言的适用范围，学术写作高频。仿写：Insofar as the data are reliable, the conclusion holds.
5. X exaggerates in two ways: first of all …, and secondly …
“I think that Michael exaggerates in two ways first of all philosopher's always been concerned with meaning … and secondly …”
礼貌反驳的标准结构：先承认部分（there has been a different emphasis），再分点指出夸大之处。适合评审、辩论。
6. it remains true that … / it is also true that …
“It remains true I had ought to press this point that an enormous amount of the work … Fraga had already done”
在承认对方后重申自己要点，用于「让步—坚持」的推进。仿写：It remains true that the method, however elegant, has never been tested at scale.
7. the attempt to bring a wholly new rigor to bear in …
“The attempt to bring a wholly new rigor to bear in philosophy”
bring X to bear (on/in) 表示「把某种力量、方法施加于」。仿写：She brought her statistical training to bear on the problem.
8. X wouldn't be worth doing unless …
“Philosophy wouldn't be worth doing unless it posed questions to which we could find the answers”
用 unless 给出「值得做」的必要条件，语气坚定。适合表达工作准则。仿写：Research wouldn't be worth doing unless its results could in principle be checked.
生词精讲 · 113 · 按出现顺序
intermediate
/ˌɪntərˈmiːdiət/
adj.
0:00
中间的、居间的（此处指思想传承中的中间环节）
laid the foundations
phr.
0:00
奠定基础
implications
/ˌɪmplɪˈkeɪʃənz/
n.
0:00
含义、影响、推论
second to nobody's
phr.
0:00
不亚于任何人的（second to none 的变体）
comparative obscurity
phr.
0:58
相对默默无闻的状态
notation
/noʊˈteɪʃən/
n.
0:58
记号系统、符号体系
prominent
/ˈprɑːmɪnənt/
adj.
2:06
显要的、突出的
obscured
/əbˈskjʊrd/
v.
2:06
遮蔽、掩盖（obscure 的过去分词）
the great bulk of
phr.
2:06
绝大部分
deficiencies
/dɪˈfɪʃənsiz/
n.
3:12
缺陷、不足
rigorous
/ˈrɪɡərəs/
adj.
3:12
严格的、严密的
remedied
/ˈremədid/
v.
3:12
补救、纠正
made explicit
phr.
3:12
被明确表述出来
premises
/ˈpremɪsɪz/
n.
4:18
（逻辑）前提
deducible
/dɪˈduːsəbəl/
adj.
4:18
可推导出的
identical with
phr.
4:18
与…同一、等同于
cardinal number
n.
5:27
基数（表示数量的数）
prevailed
/prɪˈveɪld/
v.
5:27
盛行、占上风
validity
/vəˈlɪdəti/
n.
5:27
（论证的）有效性
idealists
/aɪˈdiːəlɪsts/
n.
6:39
唯心论者、观念论者
impersonally
/ɪmˈpɜːrsənəli/
adv.
6:39
不带个人因素地、客观地
validates
/ˈvælɪdeɪts/
v.
6:39
证成、使有效
sense and reference
n.
7:50
涵义与指称（弗雷格术语 Sinn/Bedeutung）
denotation
/ˌdiːnoʊˈteɪʃən/
n.
7:50
指谓、外延所指
stands for
phr.
9:07
代表、指代
statements of identity
n.
9:07
同一性陈述（如 a = b）
tautology
/tɔːˈtɑːlədʒi/
n.
9:07
同语反复、恒真式
nominal expressions
n.
10:19
名词性表达式
incomplete Expressions
n.
10:19
不完整表达式（弗雷格指谓词/函数词）
dominant
/ˈdɑːmɪnənt/
adj.
11:32
占主导地位的
given way to
phr.
11:32
让位于、被…取代
prominence
/ˈprɑːmɪnəns/
n.
11:32
显要地位、突出
successor
/səkˈsesər/
n.
11:32
继任者
dethroned
/dɪˈθroʊnd/
v.
12:36
废黜、赶下王座（比喻使失去中心地位）
exaggerates
/ɪɡˈzædʒəreɪts/
v.
12:36
夸大
bound up with
phr.
12:36
与…紧密相关
shift of emphasis
phr.
13:37
重点的转移
in isolation
phr.
13:37
孤立地、与世隔绝地
fatal deficiency
phr.
13:37
致命缺陷
paradox
/ˈpærədɑːks/
n.
14:41
悖论
self-defeating
/ˌselfdɪˈfiːtɪŋ/
adj.
14:41
自我挫败的、自相矛盾的
trivial
/ˈtrɪviəl/
adj.
14:41
琐碎的、无关紧要的
untenable
/ʌnˈtenəbəl/
adj.
14:41
站不住脚的
abolished
/əˈbɑːlɪʃt/
v.
15:50
废除、摧毁
theory of types
n.
15:50
类型论（罗素解决悖论的分层方案）
neglected
/nɪˈɡlektɪd/
adj.
15:50
被忽视的
insularity
/ˌɪnsəˈlærəti/
n.
16:59
岛国心态、狭隘（原文误拼为 instrumentality）
governesses
/ˈɡʌvərnəsɪz/
n.
16:59
家庭女教师
virtually static
phr.
16:59
几乎停滞不前
stupendous
/stuːˈpendəs/
adj.
18:02
惊人的、了不起的
logical rigor
n.
18:02
逻辑严格性
by Leaps and Bounds
phr.
18:02
突飞猛进地
intellectual Endeavor
n.
18:02
智识事业
subdue
/səbˈduː/
v.
19:05
征服、使隶属
disciple
/dɪˈsaɪpəl/
n.
19:05
信徒、追随者
elucidate
/ɪˈluːsɪdeɪt/
v.
19:05
阐明、澄清
theory of descriptions
n.
19:05
摹状词理论
subsistent entities
n.
20:12
潜存的实体（迈农术语）
covert
/ˈkoʊvərt/
adj.
20:12
隐蔽的、暗含的
existence claims
n.
20:12
存在性断言
perception
/pərˈsepʃən/
n.
21:21
知觉
sense data
n.
21:21
感觉材料
wore him out
phr.
21:21
把他累垮、耗尽（wear out）
incapacitated
/ˌɪnkəˈpæsɪteɪtɪd/
v.
22:32
使丧失能力
dot the eyes and and cross the t's
phr.
22:32
（应为 dot the i's and cross the t's）把细节一一敲定
empiricist
/ɪmˈpɪrɪsɪst/
n.
22:32
经验论者
Corpus
/ˈkɔːrpəs/
n.
22:32
全集、整体
justification
/ˌdʒʌstɪfɪˈkeɪʃən/
n.
23:32
辩护、证成
axioms
/ˈæksiəmz/
n.
23:32
公理
provisionally
/prəˈvɪʒənəli/
adv.
23:32
暂时地、暂且
reduced to
phr.
24:38
被还原为
causal theory
n.
24:38
因果理论（知觉/知识的因果说）
hypothetical
/ˌhaɪpəˈθetɪkəl/
adj.
24:38
假设性的
phenomenalism
/fɪˈnɑːmɪnəlɪzəm/
n.
24:38
现象主义
pragmatist
/ˈpræɡmətɪst/
n.
25:53
实用主义者
neutral stuff
n.
25:53
中性材料（中性一元论术语）
scope and limits
phr.
27:08
范围与限度
adhered to
phr.
27:08
坚持、信奉
bring … to bear
phr.
27:08
施加、运用（某种力量/方法）于
reiterated
/riˈɪtəreɪtɪd/
v.
27:08
反复重申
sweeps aside
phr.
27:08
一扫而空、扫除
condemned
/kənˈdemd/
v.
28:18
谴责
metaphysics
/ˌmetəˈfɪzɪks/
n.
28:18
形而上学
nonsensical
/nɑːnˈsensɪkəl/
adj.
28:18
无意义的、荒谬的
problematic
/ˌprɑːbləˈmætɪk/
adj.
28:18
成问题的、有疑难的
taken on faith
phr.
29:30
凭信念接受（不加证明）
theory of induction
n.
29:30
归纳理论
collaborated
/kəˈlæbəreɪtɪd/
v.
30:32
合作
acknowledgment
/əkˈnɑːlɪdʒmənt/
n.
30:32
致谢、承认
non-natural
/ˌnɑːnˈnætʃərəl/
adj.
31:39
非自然的（摩尔论「善」的属性）
indefinable
/ˌɪndɪˈfaɪnəbəl/
adj.
31:39
不可定义的
Sovereign
/ˈsɑːvrən/
adj.
31:39
至高无上的、拥有最高权威的
hostile to
phr.
32:44
对…怀有敌意
for its own sake
phr.
32:44
为其本身之故
qualia
/ˈkwɑːliə/
n.
33:42
感受质（经验的质性特征）
particulars
/pərˈtɪkjələrz/
n.
33:42
殊相、个别事物
Primacy
/ˈpraɪməsi/
n.
33:42
首要地位
constant conjunction
n.
33:42
恒常联结（休谟因果观核心概念）
contingent
/kənˈtɪndʒənt/
adj.
34:55
偶然的、非必然的
Transcendent
/trænˈsendənt/
adj.
34:55
超验的、超越的
affiliation
/əˌfɪliˈeɪʃən/
n.
34:55
渊源、隶属关系
account for
phr.
35:57
解释、说明原因
excessive
/ɪkˈsesɪv/
adj.
35:57
过度的
savages
/ˈsævɪdʒɪz/
n.
37:05
野蛮人
downgrading
/ˈdaʊnɡreɪdɪŋ/
n.
37:05
贬低、降级
disparaged
/dɪˈspærɪdʒd/
v.
38:06
贬低、轻视
miffed
/mɪft/
adj.
38:06
恼火的、不快的（口语）
getting his due
phr.
38:06
得到应有的认可
obscure
/əbˈskjʊr/
adj.
39:15
晦涩难懂的
took it up
phr.
39:15
接受、开始研究
taken into consideration
phr.
40:30
被纳入考量
clarification
/ˌklærɪfɪˈkeɪʃən/
n.
41:37
澄清
straightforward
/ˌstreɪtˈfɔːrwərd/
adj.
41:37
平实的、直截了当的
理解自测 · 11 题 · 是真懂了，还是以为自己懂
1. 弗雷格最初想解决的是什么问题？他采用了什么手段？
他想弥补当时算术中的缺陷：数学命题表述不够精确，证明不够严格，连欧几里得的证明也依赖未明说的假设。为此他发明了一套记号系统，即1879年的《概念文字》，用来精确显示命题陈述了什么、证明由哪些步骤构成，使每一步如何承接上一步一目了然。这些内容出现在访谈开头「弗雷格的目标」一节，艾耶尔并指出这一工作随后扩展为「逻辑主义」纲领——用逻辑定义数学概念，再从逻辑前提推出算术。
2. 艾耶尔用「汤姆和杰瑞」的例子说明了什么？
他在说明如何用纯逻辑语汇定义数：把汤姆和杰瑞定义为「一对」，即两人都是某集合的成员，且该集合任何成员都等同于其中一人；然后把数字「二」定义为所有这类集合构成的集合。对每个数都可如此处理（无穷情形较复杂）。这是逻辑主义第一步「定义数学概念」的实例，艾耶尔认为这一步完成得相当顺利，困难在第二步——从逻辑前提推导算术，而哥德尔后来证明这无法彻底完成。
3. 「晨星就是昏星」为什么能说明涵义与指称的区分？
晨星和昏星都指金星，即指称相同。如果名称的意义只在于指称，那么「昏星=晨星」就等于「金星=金星」，是空洞的同语反复。但这句话事实上是一项（天文学）发现，有真实信息量。弗雷格由此推论：名称除了指称还有「涵义」，即呈现对象的方式；两个表达式涵义不同，所以同一性陈述有认知价值。这是访谈中「涵义与指称」一节的核心例子，艾耶尔把它称为弗雷格在历史上最有影响的区分。
4. 罗素悖论对弗雷格造成了什么后果？
罗素1903年写信指出弗雷格逻辑体系的一条根本假设导致矛盾（类似说谎者悖论）。弗雷格先是回复「整个数学已被证明毫无价值」，随后拼凑出一个补救方案，但该方案在他死后被一位波兰学者证明同样站不住脚。弗雷格从此再未恢复，《算术的基本法则》第三卷从未写出，1903年到1925年去世之间几乎无所作为，认为毕生工作已被摧毁。艾耶尔和麦基都称之为「令人难过而且悲剧性的故事」。罗素则以类型论应对该悖论。
5. 艾耶尔为什么不同意达米特「弗雷格把知识论赶下哲学中心」的说法？
艾耶尔承认重点确实转移了——从笛卡尔以来的知识论转向关注意义的「逻辑哲学」——但认为达米特在两方面夸大。第一，哲学一直关心意义：苏格拉底追问「什么是知识、什么是善」本身就是在问词的意义，所以这不是新时代的开启。第二，知识论并未消失，仍有人在研究；而且连达米特自己的意义理论也与真假问题捆绑，而真假归根结底涉及「我们有什么理由认为某命题为真」，这仍是知识论的关切。结论是「重点转移」而非「重大断裂」。
6. 为什么弗雷格做在前面、做得更好，出名的却是罗素？艾耶尔给出了哪些原因？
艾耶尔列出三方面原因。一是德国仍盛行心理主义的逻辑观，弗雷格的反心理主义在本国无人接受；二是英国人有岛国心态且外语能力差，读不了德文原著；三是对新逻辑的兴趣当时基本是英国的事，而罗素正好由德国保姆带大、懂德文，又经皮亚诺（1900年巴黎大会）间接得知弗雷格。此外罗素本人是知名公众人物、文笔出众，《数学原理》「让这门学科流行开来」。所以传播渠道与个人声望，而非原创性，决定了谁被记住。
7. 从摹状词理论看，罗素如何处理「当今法国国王是秃头」这类句子？其哲学动机是什么？
这类句子的主语不指称任何东西，问题是它如何还能有意义。迈农的方案是承认「潜存实体」，罗素斥之为胡说，转而把句子翻译成隐含存在断言的形式：「存在唯一一个现在统治法国的东西，且它是秃头」。这样句子不再需要一个不存在的对象来指称，表面悖论消除，句子只是为假而非无意义。动机与经验主义一致：不为语言的语法表象增添可疑的本体，用逻辑分析揭示句子的真实结构。艾耶尔说这是罗素逻辑工作与其哲学之间少数直接相连的地方。
8. 罗素在「感觉材料如何通向物理世界」上的立场经历了怎样的变化？为何艾耶尔仍称其为「贯穿一生」的关切？
1912年《哲学问题》持因果理论：假定物理世界存在，作为对感觉经验的最佳解释；1914年《我们对外部世界的知识》转向现象主义，认为一切常识与科学陈述可还原为实际与可能的感觉陈述；1921年《心的分析》采纳詹姆斯的中性一元论；1927年后逐渐回到因果理论，1948年《人类的知识》最终定为因果论。虽然「下一步怎么走」不断变化，但底层不变：知识的基础在感觉经验，科学必须相对于证据得到辩护。艾耶尔追溯到罗素十二岁拒绝接受几何公理的轶事，说明「要求辩护」是其一生的气质。
9. 艾耶尔说逻辑主义的实际效果「与初衷相反」，这是什么意思？
弗雷格和罗素的目标是让数学隶属于逻辑——证明数学只是逻辑的延伸。但历史结果是逻辑被数学吞并：数理逻辑越来越数学化，成为数学的一个分支，在每所大学都是重要领域，却与一般哲学关系越来越少。就连弗雷格的信徒达米特也更关心弗雷格的语义学（意义理论）而非纯数学部分。这一点反直觉之处在于：一项为哲学目的发起的事业，最终在技术上繁荣、在哲学上离场，而它留给哲学的反倒是原本的「副产品」——意义理论。
10. 若有人反驳「哲学问题本就无解，只是语言纠缠」，艾耶尔会如何回应？
艾耶尔会站在罗素一边反驳。他明确说自己「最重要地」同意罗素：哲学如果不提出能找到答案的问题就不值得做。答案也许他和罗素都找不到，但更聪明的人终会找到。他认为这正是罗素敌视战后牛津奥斯汀式语言哲学的原因——为语言本身探究英语用法是「琐碎的」；而「我们的信念有什么辩护」是实质性问题。他也不接受维特根斯坦「哲学是把苍蝇放出捕蝇瓶」的治疗观。所以他会说：语言分析是澄清的手段，不是终点；哲学的任务还包括对重要信念的论证与辩护。
11. 把弗雷格「逻辑不依赖心理」的立场放到今天的AI语境：一个语言模型能推理，是否意味着推理规律取决于它的「心理」？
按弗雷格的立场，答案是否定的，而且这一情境反而强化他的观点。弗雷格反对把逻辑规律看作「思维的规律」，因为证明的有效性不能取决于谁在想、怎么想；一个证明「不依赖任何个人、客观地证成结论」。若模型与人以完全不同的机制得出同一有效推论，恰说明有效性独立于任何具体认知过程——无论是神经元还是参数。反过来，如果模型出错，弗雷格会说那是它未能把握客观真理，而非逻辑规律本身有多种版本。视频中艾耶尔强调，正是这一去心理化立场促使弗雷格发展客观的意义理论，以说明数学何以客观有效。
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